I Quantum mechanics is not weird, unless presented as such

[A. Neumaier]

don't know if QM is weird or not, but the believe it is, made me much of my push to study it as an amateur

This is probably the reason why the physics community has little interest to change the state of affairs: it makes excellent advertisement for the subject.

I started this thread (and contributed to some related ones) for those who want to get a better understanding, not for those who are content with the current practice of talking about quantum mechanics.

The weirdness is not in quantum mechanics itself (the math and its relation to the applications, which works very smoothly) but only in the way it is translated into ordinary language. So the latter must be changed if things shall improve. My gradual discovery was that it can be changed to a considerable extent, with remarkable consequences.

 

[A. Neumaier]

Or do you think that there's something wrong with the interpretation of these experiments?

Yes. I need to study one in detail to see precisely what goes wrong. But it is most likely the meaning attached to the word ''photon'' that allows these seemingly absurd conclusions.

 

[fresh_42]

I started this thread for those who want to get a better understanding, not for those who are content with the current practice of talking about quantum mechanics.

... which made me thankful for the book you published and linked to.

 

[A. Neumaier]

even though I don't agree with him that they have been fully addressed (by him, or by anyone).

Did you read all my evidence? It is not only what I actually wrote down here. A much more detailed case is made in Chapter 10 of my book and in my Thermal interpretation FAQ.

In QM, there seems to be a fundamental distinction between observations and the underlying equations of physics, which means that the former is not completely explained by the latter.

This is due to a weird notion of ''observable''. The true observables are only the macroscopic ones, given by statistical mechanics. That one only measures macroscopic stuff (pointer readings, pixels on a screen, numbers stored on an electronic memory device, electric currents, and the like) is obvious once one asks the question. Concluding that everything about the microscopic world are inferences - whose translation into ordinary language is faulty - reconciles everything.

Is the wave function a description of the state of the world, or is it a description of our knowledge about the world? Or somehow both? Neither alternative really fits all the facts comfortably.

The wave function is completely meaningless; it is not even well-defined since its phase is undetermined. The object with a physical meaning is the density matrix. It describes the objective state of the world and/or any well-defined part of it, Our knowledge about the world is only an approximation to this state, and therefore given by a different density matrix (different for each subject or object having knowledge). The extend of the difference is a measure of the quality of this knowledge. This perfectly fits all facts.

 

[stevendaryl]

The wave function is completely meaningless; it is not even well-defined since a phase is undetermined. The object with a physical meaning is the density matrix. it describes the objective state of the world, Our knowledge about the world is only an appoximation to it. This perfectly fits all facts.

Well, the distinction between the wave function and the density matrix is not important for what I'm about to say.

In an EPR-type experiment with spin-1/2 particles, let's suppose that Alice and Bob agree ahead of time to each measure their respective particle's spin along some agreed-upon axis, \vec{A}. Suppose that in Alice's rest frame, she measures her particle a few seconds before Bob measures his.

• So, before Alice's measurement, she doesn't know whether Bob will measure spin-up or spin-down.
• Then she measures her particle to have spin-up.
• Immediately afterward, she knows that Bob will measure spin-down.

So, it seems to me that after Alice observes her result, she would describe Bob's particle to be in a definite spin-down state. I don't care whether she describes it using density matrices or wave functions. So the question is: Was it in a definite spin-down state BEFORE Alice performed her measurement? Neither an answer of "yes" nor "no" makes any sense to me.

Answering "yes" would seem to me to be in line with the interpretation of states as reflecting knowledge; Alice's measurement simply reveals the value of a variable that already had a definite value. That seems along the lines of a "hidden variables" assumption, which is inconsistent with Bell's theorem.

Answering "no" would seem to me to be implying that Alice's measurement had an effect on the state of Bob's particle. It was in an uncertain state of spin beforehand, and it was in a definite state of spin afterward. It's not an FTL signal, because Alice can't communicate anything using this change, but it seems nonlocal to me.

 

[A. Neumaier]

it seems to me that after Alice measures her result, she would describe Bob's particle to be in a definite spin-down state.

The change in knowledge and the associated model of the situation is an anthropomorphic step introduced into the objective description. It is precisely this anthropomorphism - absent in classical mechanics (which makes classical mechanics rational) but omnipresent in the discussion of quantum foundations - that causes the problems. Cutting out the anthropomorphic part restores rationality to the quantum foundations.

The rational way to describe a change of knowledge is by going over to conditional expectations. If you know nothing about a situation, you assume a probability model Pr(x) for arbitrary random variables x. If you get to know the value of some random variable y you change your model to a conditional probability model Pr'(x)=Pr(x|y). This takes care of all facts and the change in knowledge. It is not difficult to see that applied to quantum mechanical models, this change of probability model is exactly equivalent to collapse.

Thus the collapse is a necessary element of a rational description of anthropomorphic knowledge (but also of animate machine knowledge) in the quantum domain. Whereas it is absent in an objective description of Nature, which has no notion of knowledge.

Lo and behold - through a more careful choice of language we have reconciled the basic conflict in the quantum foundations by cleanly separating the objective and the subjective.

 

[stevendaryl]

The change in knowledge and the associated model of the situation is an anthropomorphic step introduced into the objective description. It is precisely this anthropomorphism - absent in classical mechanics (which makes classical mechanics rational) but omnipresent in the discussion of quantum foundations - that causes the problems. Cutting out the anthropomorphic part restores rationality to the quantum foundations.

The rational way to describe a change of knowledge is by going over to conditional expectations. If you know nothing about a situation, you assume a probability model Pr(x) for arbitrary random variables x. If you get to know the value of some random variable y you change your model to a conditional probability model Pr'(x)=Pr(x|y). This takes care of all facts and the change in knowledge. It is not difficult to see that applied to quantum mechanical models, this change of probability model is exactly equivalent to collapse.

Thus the collapse is a necessary element of a rational description of anthropomorphic knowledge (but also of animate machine knowledge) in the quantum domain. Whereas it is absent in an objective description of Nature, which has no notion of knowledge.

Lo and behold - through a more careful choice of language we have reconciled the basic conflict in the quantum foundations by cleanly separating the objective and the subjective.

I don't see that clean separation, at all. It seems to me that if there were such a clean separation, then my questions would have clear answers:

1. After Alice measures spin-up, is it true (an objective fact about the world) that Bob's particle is in a spin-down state?
2. If so, was it in that state before Alice performed her measurement?

 

[A. Neumaier]

if there were such a clean separation, then my questions would have clear answers

Indeed, your questions have a clear answer:

• After Alice measures spin-up, is it true (an objective fact about the world) that Bob's particle is in a spin-down state?

• If so, was it in that state before Alice performed her measurement?

It is true in her subjective approximation $\rho'_A$ of the objective state $\rho$. And it wasn't subjectively in that state before since before she performed the measurement, her subjective approximation was $\rho_A$, from which $\rho'_A$ was derived by collapse = conditional expectation.

Symmetrically, Bob has a subjective approximation $\rho_B$ of the objective state $\rho$ that changes into $\rho'_B$ when the knowledge of Bob is updated.

Neither of these changes has any effect on the objective state $\rho$. The latter changes in accordance with the dynamics of the universe, of which it is a projection to a tiny 2-photon subspace. The dynamics of the universe also contains a description of the activities of Alice and Bob, and all details of the measuring equipment, while $\rho$ only contains a description of the cumulative effect on the 2-photon system.

This incompleteness in the 2-photon description is responsible for the perceived randomness in the whole setting - not very different from the randomness introduced in a deterministic chaotic system once some of its variables are discarded. The reduced quantum mechanical only takes into account (an idealized version of) the preparation, and this part accounts for the perfect correlations among the otherwise random results.

 

[Mentz114]

I don't see that clean separation, at all. It seems to me that if there were such a clean separation, then my questions would have clear answers:

1. After Alice measures spin-up, is it true (an objective fact about the world) that Bob's particle is in a spin-down state?
2. If so, was it in that state before Alice performed her measurement?

These questions refer to classical concepts like individual particle, position, time ordering and maybe others. I find that if I abandon those I get a picture of a system whose internal 'state' is unknowable between the initial state and final state. The system must end in a state that does not violate conservation laws. Whatever is required will happen - and those events or processes do not have classical analogues. The extended field relaxes into the final state and that's it.

Applying billiard ball dynamics naturally causes confusion and misunderstanding. A statement like 'a photon is created at (t,x) then moves to (t',x')' is devoid of meaning. How would one ever determine this ? We cannot 'see' it in the classical sense.

All I did to remove all the mysteries was to forget the classical notion of 'before' and 'after'. If the final state is deferred until (classically) every possible measurement order has been tested, there is no quantum mystery, only the (classical) perception that information has come from the (classical) future.

To misquote Prof Neumaier

"You see particles and quantum mystery, I see fields and quantum beauty'.

 

[zonde]

The change in knowledge and the associated model of the situation is an anthropomorphic step introduced into the objective description. It is precisely this anthropomorphism - absent in classical mechanics (which makes classical mechanics rational) but omnipresent in the discussion of quantum foundations - that causes the problems. Cutting out the anthropomorphic part restores rationality to the quantum foundations.

The change of knowledge is only analysis of physical fact that detector clicked. So what do you propose to cut out as anthropomorphic part?
- the idea that "detector clicked is a physical fact"
- any analysis of physical fact that detector clicked

 

[martinbn]

Well, the distinction between the wave function and the density matrix is not important for what I'm about to say.

In an EPR-type experiment with spin-1/2 particles, let's suppose that Alice and Bob agree ahead of time to each measure their respective particle's spin along some agreed-upon axis, \vec{A}. Suppose that in Alice's rest frame, she measures her particle a few seconds before Bob measures his.

• So, before Alice's measurement, she doesn't know whether Bob will measure spin-up or spin-down.
• Then she measures her particle to have spin-up.
• Immediately afterward, she knows that Bob will measure spin-down.

So, it seems to me that after Alice observes her result, she would describe Bob's particle to be in a definite spin-down state. I don't care whether she describes it using density matrices or wave functions. So the question is: Was it in a definite spin-down state BEFORE Alice performed her measurement? Neither an answer of "yes" nor "no" makes any sense to me.

Answering "yes" would seem to me to be in line with the interpretation of states as reflecting knowledge; Alice's measurement simply reveals the value of a variable that already had a definite value. That seems along the lines of a "hidden variables" assumption, which is inconsistent with Bell's theorem.

Answering "no" would seem to me to be implying that Alice's measurement had an effect on the state of Bob's particle. It was in an uncertain state of spin beforehand, and it was in a definite state of spin afterward. It's not an FTL signal, because Alice can't communicate anything using this change, but it seems nonlocal to me.

Isn't this just a problem with the language? The two events are spacelike seperated, but you say that Alice measures before Bob, which is meaningless. I know you said in a certain reference frame, but the notion before is meaningless for spacelike separeated events. If you acknoledge that how do you get a problem with the second answer?

 

[lightarrow]

THis is probably the reason why the physics community has little interest to change the state of affairs: it makes excellent advertisement for the subject.

I started this thread (and contributed to some related ones) for those who want to get a better understanding, not for those who are content with the current practice of talking about quantum mechanics.

The weirdness is not in quantum mechanics itself (the math and its relation to the applications, which works very smoothly) but only in the way it is translated into ordinary language. So the latter must be changed if things shall improve. My gradual discovery was that it can be changed to a considerable extent, with remarkable consequences.

Yes, Alfred, I had get it, I only wanted to express my opinion on motivation to the study.
Thanks for your answer.

--
lightarrow

 

[A. Neumaier]

So what do you propose to cut out as anthropomorphic part?

Any talk about knowledge. Knowledge requires a subject, hence turns the problem into something subject-dependent = subjective.

Let us modify the setting a little. A machine makes the decisions and records the responses in the experiment while Alice sleeps. Next morning Alice wakes up and reads the records of all decisions and responses. At this moment her knowledge changes and the states of all the photons collapse, long after they stopped to exist. It is obvious that in this setting the states only refer to Alice's knowledge not to any underlying physical reality. Here approximation $\rho_A$ to the true physical state $\rho$ improves as she draws the consequences of having obtained new information.

This explains the acausality of collapse. One has the same acausality classically under similar circumstances when rolling classical dice. Knowledge = subjective beliefs based on prior information are well-known not to respect causality. This also resolves the problem when

there are experiments which claim to show entanglement between photons which haven't coexisted.

Note that in all these experiments nothing nonlocal happens - something happens in Alice's memory (or interpretation of her memory) only. But this memory is localized in her brain.

 

[A. Neumaier]

Yes, Alfred

Who is Alfred?

 

[A. Neumaier]

what's weird about QM is never addressed in advanced work. It almost never comes into play

Why do you write ''almost''? It never comes into play since it is not objective.

 

[A. Neumaier]

To me, the idea of single quantum object spanning the universe is a bit weird no matter how you slice it.

The universe as a whole is a single quantum object, no matter how you slice it.

It is obvious that talking about the values of some observables of this quantum object as if they depend on the knowledge of tiny parts of it is misguided and therefore prone to all sorts of paradoxes. Weird in, weird out.

 

[martinbn]

The universe as a whole is a single quantum object, no matter how you slice it.

And what do you call the universe as a whole?

 

[A. Neumaier]

what do you call the universe as a whole?

The smallest thermally, mechanically, and chemically isolated physical system that contains the Earth.

There is just one of these, and it is the only system that deserves this name.

 

[Andrew Wright]

The weirdness is not in quantum mechanics itself (the math and its relation to the applications, which works very smoothly) but only in the way it is translated into ordinary language. So the latter must be changed if things shall improve. My gradual discovery was that it can be changed to a considerable extent, with remarkable consequences.

The terminology for discussing quantum mechanics is certainly weird for onlookers. In re-translating quantum mechanics into ordinary language, is there a danger of creating even more weirdness?

 

[martinbn]

The smallest thermally, mechanically, and chemically isolated physical system that contains the Earth.

There just one of these, and it is the only system that deserves this name.

My question was about something else. If you have no preferred time coordinate it makes no sense to talk about the universe. It is a frame depended consept.

 

[A. Neumaier]

In re-translating quantum mechanics into ordinary language, is there a danger of creating even more weirdness?

Like in every translation, one has to choose the best substitute in the language translated to. if it is done well, the content of the original comes through fairly faithfully. if it is done poorly, it comes through in a weird, distorted way.

The fact that the math in quantum mechanics and nonrelativistic quantum field theory is completely unproblematic but the traditional translation into ordinary language is weird shows that the current translations are very poor. The quality of retranslation depends on the care with which the correspondences are made. If it is done well, the amount of weirdnes drops drastically. But if done poorly, it may well end up even more weird.

 

[ddd123]

The smallest thermally, mechanically, and chemically isolated physical system that contains the Earth.

There just one of these, and it is the only system that deserves this name.

Are you assuming its existence?

 

[A. Neumaier]

If you have no preferred time coordinate it makes no sense to talk about the universe. It is a frame depended concept.

No. In flat spacetime (which suffices for the present discussion as nonrelativistic quantum field theory and QED presuppose that), the objective universe is described by 4-dimensional Galilei or Minkowski space and the fields in it. Choosing a frame only reveals the subjective view of the universe a particular observer gets.

The situation is analogous in curved spacetime. Here the objective universe is described by a curved 4-dimensional manifold, and the fields in it. The observer-dependent subjective views at any given time are given by a Cauchy surface and the approximations of the fields that reflect the observer's knowledge or assumptions. (Because of the unresolved issues in quantum gravity it does not make sense to discuss this question assuming quantized geometry - at least not in this part of the forum.)

 

[A. Neumaier]

Are you assuming its existence?

Of course, otherwise we wouldn't be able to have this discussion.

 

[ddd123]

Of course, otherwise we wouldn't be able to have this discussion.

I mean, that of an isolated system. If the universe is infinite, it's never isolated.

 

[stevendaryl]

Isn't this just a problem with the language? The two events are spacelike seperated, but you say that Alice measures before Bob, which is meaningless. I know you said in a certain reference frame, but the notion before is meaningless for spacelike separeated events. If you acknoledge that how do you get a problem with the second answer?

Well, it's interesting if it turns out the interpretation of QM necessarily involves an interpretation of SR, so QM is inherently relativistic. I think that's just a complication that doesn't actually change anything, though. Whether or not there is a meaningful notion of "before" and "after" for spacelike separated events, we can certainly make sense in SR of a spacelike slice of spacetime. I'll have to think about it.

But in any case, to address the claim that QM is not weird by bringing up ways that things are even more complicated to reason about isn't really an argument in favor of non-weirdness. At best, it is a plausibility argument that there might be a way to sort things out.

 

[stevendaryl]

Why do you write ''almost''? It never comes into play since it is not objective.

Well, there have been lots of experiments testing the weirdness, such as tests of Bell's inequality, delayed-choice, etc. So "never" is too strong. But those experiments are sort of peripheral, and outside of the main stream of physics.

 

[stevendaryl]

My question was about something else. If you have no preferred time coordinate it makes no sense to talk about the universe. It is a frame depended consept.

I would say that that claim is slightly circular. The issue is about nonlocality in QM. If there is nonlocality, then that implies that our ideas of SR are either wrong, or that we don't completely understand it. So you can't really use SR as an argument against nonlocality.

 

[A. Neumaier]

If the universe is infinite, it's never isolated.

Isolated just means that nothing flows into or out of the system. Thus a universe without boundary satisfying the usual conservation laws is completely isolated. Something can flow further away but not leave it.

 

[stevendaryl]

Isn't this just a problem with the language? The two events are spacelike seperated, but you say that Alice measures before Bob, which is meaningless. I know you said in a certain reference frame, but the notion before is meaningless for spacelike separeated events. If you acknoledge that how do you get a problem with the second answer?

Another thought about your points. In nonrelativistic physics, the way that we talk about dynamics is:

• Specify the state of the system at time t_0
• Use the evolution equations to evolve the state to a future time t_1

In relativistic physics, what I thought was that the only change is to generalize this in the following way:

• Specify the state of the system along a spacelike hypersurface.
• Use the evolution equations to evolve the state to a future spacelike hypersurface.

So instead of the issue of "what's true at time t", you have the analogous issue of "what's true along such-and-such spacelike hypersurface".

Now, the way that calculations for relativistic QFT are done, the state almost never comes into play. It's there in the background, since the fields of QFT are operators on Fock space. But usually, there is no other state used in calculations other than the vacuum.

 

[A. Neumaier]

the only change is to generalize this in the following way:

• Specify the state of the system along a spacelike hypersurface.
• Use the evolution equations to evolve the state to a future spacelike hypersurface.

There are problems with this, as in the relativistic scenario an observer can prepare only a localized part of the state. This part is then evolved into the common causal future of this localized part. This implies an additional loss of information compared to the nonrelativistic situation. Thus relativistic analyses of few particle experiments are difficult.

the way that calculations for relativistic QFT are done, the state almost never comes into play. It's there in the background, since the fields of QFT are operators on Fock space. But usually, there is no other state used in calculations other than the vacuum.

This is far from true. Even when things are expressed in terms of multiparticle vacuum expectation values, these can always be reinterpreted as matrix elements of few-particle states. Indeed, this is their operational interpretation.

In QFT scattering calculations one needs the (asymptotic) states.

When one has to do dynamical calculations one needs time-dependent states explicitly, and uses them in a Kadanoff-Baym approximation.

The book by Mandel and Wolf on quantum optics is full of computations with non-vacuum states. But most of the time they are not states of fixed photon number but coherent states or squeezed states. (Already preparing states with fixed photon number is an experimental challenge, though it can be done to a reasonable accuracy.)

 

[stevendaryl]

The book by Mandel and Wolf on quantum optics is full of computations with concrete states - but most of the time they are not states of fixed photon number but coherent states or squeezed states. (Already preparing states with fixed photon number is an experimental challenge, though it can be done to a rasonable accuracy.)

Okay, this points out the limitations of my education. When I studied QFT, I only learned to use it for scattering problems where the only states involved were states in the far past and far future. States at intermediate times didn't come into play.

 

[A. Neumaier]

States at intermediate times

See, e.g., J. Berges, Introduction to Nonequilibrium Quantum Field Theory, AIP Conf. Proc. 739 (2004), 3--62.
(preprint version: hep-ph/0409233)

 

[stevendaryl]

Okay, this points out the limitations of my education. When I studied QFT, I only learned to use it for scattering problems where the only states involved were states in the far past and far future. States at intermediate times didn't come into play.

The interesting thing about the two limits t \rightarrow -\infty and t \rightarrow +\infty is that it neatly avoids the issue of "what's the state of a distant particle right NOW". The first limit (far past) is in everybody's far past, and the second limit (far future) is in everybody's far future, so relativity of simultaneity doesn't matter.

 

[A. Neumaier]

it neatly avoids the issue of "what's the state of a distant particle right NOW".

It also precludes any discussion of states at any fixed time, and hence of entanglement experiments.

At finite times - i.e., times where interactions are appreciable so that cluster decomposition (independent bound states at large spatial separation), which is at the heart of the scattering approach, is no longer applicable -, the relativistic particle picture breaks down completely and one needs a field approach, typically in a hydrodynamic or kinetic approximation. These approximations have an interpretation as quantum fluids, with the associated classical intuition but nonclassical interactions featuring quantum corrections. The liquid drop model in nuclear physics (which predicts that iron, Z=26, has the most tightly bound nucleus, which sort of explains the iron core of the Earth) was the earliest approximation of this kind. It is already meaningful for nuclei containing very few protons and neutrons. This indicates again that, in the microscopic domain, the field picture is a better informal picture than the particle picture.

 

[zonde]

Any talk about knowledge. Knowledge requires a subject, hence turns the problem into something subject-dependent = subjective.

Let us modify the setting a little. A machine makes the decisions and records the responses in the experiment while Alice sleeps. Next morning Alice wakes up and reads the records of all decisions and responses. At this moment her knowledge changes and the states of all the photons collapse, long after they stopped to exist. It is obvious that in this setting the states only refer to Alice's knowledge not to any underlying physical reality. Here approximation $\rho_A$ to the true physical state $\rho$ improves as she draws the consequences of having obtained new information.

Do you understand that we can't cut out "any talk about knowledge" as that's a bit too much, right? You have to be more specific. But in particular context I suppose I can guess what you mean by that.
Ok suppose we can cut out the talk about knowledge of Alice or Bob about remote states. But we can't cut out any talk about detection records, do you agree?

 

[A. Neumaier]

Do you understand that we can't cut out "any talk about knowledge" as that's a bit too much

No, it is not too much, but precisely what is needed to make quantum mechanics objective. My whole book on quantum mechanics is quite close to applications but mentions knowledge only in two contexts:

• in a section on modeling, which is done by a human,
• in two sections on information theory, where I criticize basing the foundations of physics on a notion of knowledge.

The only kind of knowledge Nature knows about (and hence may be mirrored in a theory and its discussion) is the one directly encoded into the equations and the initial conditions. Any other talk of knowledge is anthropomorphic and leads to problems.

 

[A. Neumaier]

At finite times, the relativistic particle picture breaks down completely

This holds already classically. See the discussion in https://www.physicsforums.com/posts/5183296/

 

[A. Neumaier]

But we can't cut out any talk about detection records, do you agree?

Detection records define the results of experiments, and are indeed needed to interpret how Nature responded to the experimental setting.

 

[zonde]

No, it is not too much, but precisely what is needed to make quantum mechanics objective.

Objective is property of knowledge. There is not much sense of "objective" that is independent from knowledge.

 

[martinbn]

@A. Neumaier : Now I am even more confused. It seems that by the universe you mean the space-time!

@stevendaryl : I didn't mean to say your example was not good for showing weirdness, I am just worried if there might be something that isn't there just because of the phrasing. I don't think the intial valiu problem is relevant here, because the events are still in such causal relationship, that we cannot talk in an invariant way about which is first and which is second. This may be just me not being able to see the forest because of the trees.

 

[zonde]

Detection records define the results of experiments, and are indeed needed to interpret how Nature responded to the experimental setting.

I think this can be used as common basis to reach some agreement. I would agree that collapse is not really needed if it does not follow from detection records.
So would you agree that collapse is needed if it follows from detection records without involving subjective knowledge of Alice and Bob? (I am not proposing to start discussion on the subject here.)

 

[A. Neumaier]

Objective is a property of knowledge.

No. objective is what is the case in Nature.
Knowledge depends on who has the knowledge, making it subjective. It is precisely as objective as it agrees with the true state of Nature.

Even in science, what counts as knowledge changes in the course of new research, otherwise our scientific knowledge couldn't grow with time. This shows that is is to some extent subjective.

Since we do not know the true state of Nature we replace in our Gedankenexperiments and our analyses of real experiments Nature by a (drastically simplified) quantum mechanical model of it. Then for the purposes of the Gedankenexperiment or analysis, objective is what is the case in the quantum mechanical model - not what the (Gedanken)people involved in the experiment know about it.

 

[A. Neumaier]

It seems that by the universe you mean the space-time!

The space-time including all the quantum fields in it, and the Heisenberg state that defines the QFT expectations. (Or, actually, the reality that is described by this, but in a scientific discussion, this is indistinguishable from it since talking about items in the universe we have to address them by their physical identity.)

 

[A. Neumaier]

I think this can be used as common basis to reach some agreement.

OK, so start form here. As to your other question, I don't invest time in counterfactual reasoning.

 

[zonde]

No. objective is what is the case in Nature.
Knowledge depends on who has the knowledge, making it subjective. It is precisely as objective as it agrees with the true state of Nature.

Even in science, what counts as knowledge changes in the course of new research, otherwise our scientific knowledge couldn't grow with time. This shows that is is to some extent subjective.

Since we do not know the true state of Nature we replace in our Gedankenexperiments and our analyses of real experiments Nature by a (drastically simplified) quantum mechanical model of it. Then for the purposes of the Gedankenexperiment or analysis, objective is what is the case in the quantum mechanical model - not what the (Gedanken)people involved in the experiment know about it.

I agree with all this except some semantics related things. But I don't want to continue this semantics discussion if it seems that I can't make the point.

OK, so start form here. As to your other question, I don't invest time in counterfactual reasoning.

You don't do that at the level of detection records. But you use counterfactual statements at statistics level. When you spell out quantum mechanics prediction you are making counterfactual statement.

 

[zonde]

OK, so start form here. As to your other question, I don't invest time in counterfactual reasoning.

I suppose that it should be possible to formulate minimal interpretation without collapse (if we refuse to go into any details about detection events and how we get statistics) but then we have to stay agnostic about locality or non-locality as there would be no real connection to individual spacetime events.

 

[A. Neumaier]

When you spell out quantum mechanics prediction you are making counterfactual statement.

Don't talk about 'you' when you mean yourself; it sounded like you addressed me. But when I spell out quantum mechanics prediction I don't make counterfactual statements.

It is easy to avoid any subjunctive form (and hence any counterfactual statements) in the discussion. You can make case distinctions if you need.

it should be possible to formulate minimal interpretation

I am not interested in discussing subjunctive statements. Do it, or don't claim it!

 

[A. Neumaier]

to stay agnostic about locality or non-locality

If one has to stay agnostic about (non)locality in the absence of invoking subjective knowledge, it is proof of my earlier assertion that nonlocality is a purely subjective feature of the interpretation, without any objective content.

 

[zonde]

Don't talk about 'you' when you mean yourself; it sounded like you addressed me. But when I spell out quantum mechanics prediction I don't make counterfactual statements.

It is easy to avoid any subjunctive form (and hence any counterfactual statements) in the discussion. You can make case distinctions if you need.

I think I was a bit sloppy.
If you make two mutually exclusive predictions and then test one of them the other one becomes counterfactual statement.