Questioning the cosmological principle

[Chalnoth]

That's only indirect. If you want to prove the existence of a particle you must detect the particle. I am sorry, but that's my opinion.

There's no such thing as direct evidence by the most strict definition. All that we do have are models and experiments/observations that either confirm or falsify those models. When a specific model holds up under a variety of conditions, and alternative models do not, we gain confidence that the model is accurate. The model for dark matter has held up. Other models have not. By the standard, tested practices of science, this is sufficient to consider a WIMP to be highly likely to explain these observations.

I am asking b/c the LHC is expected to say something about SUSY and therefore perhaps about string theory. If SUSY is not found at the LHC this is no problem for string theory as SUSY at a higher energy scale would be OK as well. Regarding the MSSM the LHC should find something, otherwise the simplest MSSM is ruled out.
My question is about DM, so we should check the allowed parameter space for the lightest SUSY particle to be required by CDM.

Well, again, you're probably not going to see it at the LHC no matter the mass.

 

[tom.stoer]

Does the distribution of the hypothetical dark matter violate the homogeneity principle? Is it found wherever baryonic matter is found?

DM will form lumps as well, but probably smoother than ordinary matter. So galaxies would swim in a halo of DM which is much larger than the visbily galaxy. That means that with DM you can come closer to homogeneity, but certainly not exactly.

 

[tom.stoer]

Looking at the discussion at http://cosmocoffee.info/viewtopic.php?p=4737 my conclusion is that the affair regarding large voids and a possible violation of the cosmological principle is by no means resolved.

 

[Chalnoth]

Looking at the discussion at http://cosmocoffee.info/viewtopic.php?p=4737 my conclusion is that the affair regarding large voids and a possible violation of the cosmological principle is by no means resolved.

The existence of some larger-than-expected voids is perhaps somewhat reasonable, and should be examined further. However, having us at the center of a large void being the explanation for the accelerated expansion is highly unreasonable and should be considered massively unlikely.

 

[tom.stoer]

The existence of some larger-than-expected voids is perhaps somewhat reasonable, and should be examined further. However, having us at the center of a large void being the explanation for the accelerated expansion is highly unreasonable and should be considered massively unlikely.

I agree that according to the standard model this seems to be unreasonable. But I want to entertain the idea that introducing unobservable quantities may be as unreasonable as the violation of the cosmological principle as long as it is not a proven fact.

So we should stop to insist in claiming something to be "(un)reasonable", "(un)physical", "(un)natural" etc. Currently there is neither a way to proof the standard model nor to rule it out. In addition there is no consensus that the ideas of large voids have been ruled out. So my conclusion is that we have competing ideas which must undergo a detailed examination. The conclusion is not that we have only one model subject to minor corrections.

 

[Chalnoth]

I agree that according to the standard model this seems to be unreasonable.

Even if you assume that such voids are likely, it's a completely unreasonable model, because it requires we be situated pretty much exactly at the center of one such void, and that the void be almost perfectly spherical.

But I want to entertain the idea that introducing unobservable quantities may be as unreasonable as the violation of the cosmological principle as long as it is not a proven fact.

There are no unobservable quantities in the standard model of cosmology. Every single one of them has an effect on observations.

 

[tom.stoer]

There are no unobservable quantities in the standard model of cosmology. Every single one of them has an effect on observations.

You should accept that up to now both dark matter and dark energy are known only phenomenologically as physical effects and that they haven't been detected experimentally as physical entities. You can't claim to have proven the existence of DM as long as no single DM particle has been detected. You can't claim to have proven the existence of DE - and you will never be! You have hints based on cosmic acceleration - but you will never be able to proof its existence in the same way as you have e.g. detected the neutrino as as you may hopefully be able to detect the Higgs and perhaps SUSY particles. You are not able to say what the DE really is. Comsomological constant, effect of f(R) or ScVeTe theories, quantum gravity relict, scaling limit for one parameter in asymptotic safety, ...

Both DE and DM are unvisible as physical entities, they are only observable as phenomena - but these phenomena do not allow us to deduce what they really are; alternative candidates are known, but the currebtly available facts do not allow us to rule out all alternatives.

Nevertheless: I think we should stop exchanging arguments as we are spinning in a circle. We are neither able to prove nor to refute our positions and should therefore be patient and wait for future experiments to shed more light on these affairs.

 

[Chalnoth]

You should accept that up to now both dark matter and dark energy are known only phenomenologically as physical effects and that they haven't been detected experimentally as physical entities.

Look, it is completely and utterly unreasonable to make arbitrary statements about what sorts of evidence you need before believing a model is at least approximately accurate. This is the exact same tactic that many creationists use, for instance, by claiming they won't believe in evolution until they see every single step of every transition between species. This attitude is fundamentally anti-science.

When approaching a scientific model, the only reasonable thing to do is to approach the model on its own grounds, and test it on those grounds. We have no expectation whatsoever that reality should bend to our whims, and so we should be flexible about what sorts of evidence we accept. The evidence in favor of dark matter is, today, so varied and robust that it really cannot be denied. The evidence in favor of dark energy is substantially less, but by basic inductive logic, the most reasonable explanation is the one that requires the fewest new parameters. Since the cosmological constant fully explains all observations with just one parameter, it is, by far, the most likely explanation.

You have hints based on cosmic acceleration - but you will never be able to proof its existence

This is the problem of induction and applies to all science. Your distinctions between this and neutrino physics are arbitrary and irrelevant.

 

[Chronos]

Interesting question. The fractal explanation is not well supported. Irregulaties in the CMB are inconsistent with a fractal distribution on scales less than the size of the observable universe. This may or may not be significant. They appear more gaussian, but, not decidedly so. It is a puzzle. I think part of the problem is WMAP has unresolved bias errors. The next generation of IR space probes should help.

 

[Calimero]

The existence of some larger-than-expected voids is perhaps somewhat reasonable, and should be examined further. However, having us at the center of a large void being the explanation for the accelerated expansion is highly unreasonable and should be considered massively unlikely.

I agree that large inhomogeneities are probably poor attempt to explain acceleration, but if you want to be completely scientific you can't exclude it easily. Your argument that it is highly unlikely to have us at center of such void does not hold if, somehow (don't ask me why), that is the most favorable place for life to emerge.

 

[tom.stoer]

@Chalnoth: the comparison with creationism is nonsense!

Physics works such that we are constructing theoretical frameworks able to explain observable phenomena. As these theoretical frameworks introduce "physical entities" testing (verifying / falsifying) such a framework requires to detect these physical entities. According to the mainstream DM hypotheses the DM consists of SUSY particles, so you have to detect the WIMPs; the existence of the neutrino has been proven by detecting the neutrino, not by postulating it. The above mentioned DM hypethosesis will be proven as soon as the SUSY particles have been detected, not one day earlier (this has nothing to do with the fact that the model seems to be approximately accurate; it is, but that's not sufficient)

Your idea to believe in the existence of DM consisting of SUSY particles w/o the requirement detecting these SUSY particles is belief, not science. It becomes science by working on verification or falsification, not by believing in existence and calling it "evidence".

 

[Chalnoth]

I agree that large inhomogeneities are probably poor attempt to explain acceleration, but if you want to be completely scientific you can't exclude it easily. Your argument that it is highly unlikely to have us at center of such void does not hold if, somehow (don't ask me why), that is the most favorable place for life to emerge.

While true, the statement that the center of a void is the most favorable place for life to emerge is manifestly unlikely. After all, the distances between galaxies are great, so there is unlikely to be much of an effect of the overall density on the behavior of galaxies, and the centers of voids will have fewer galaxies and thus fewer chances for life to appear.

 

[Chalnoth]

Physics works such that we are constructing theoretical frameworks able to explain observable phenomena. As these theoretical frameworks introduce "physical entities" testing (verifying / falsifying) such a framework requires to detect these physical entities.

Why? This requirement is arbitrary and nonsensical.

 

[tom.stoer]

I agree that large inhomogeneities are probably poor attempt to explain acceleration, but if you want to be completely scientific you can't exclude it easily. Your argument that it is highly unlikely to have us at center of such void does not hold if, somehow (don't ask me why), that is the most favorable place for life to emerge.

Think about the following: two research groups provide two different models, one using some sort of DE, one using large voids to explain accelerated expansion. Both models fit all available data comparably well.

Question: do you think that one model is "more likely", "more reasonable", "simpler" in the sense of Ockhams razor than the other? How do you calculate and compare the probability of a cosmological constant having a certain value with the probability of sitting near the center of a huge void?

I am afraid that answering this question is beyond science as long as the data do not rule out one model.

 

[tom.stoer]

Why? This requirement is arbitrary and nonsensical.

Congratulations! You are questioning what most research programs did over the last few hundred years.

I am referring to theories like Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism using electromagnetic waves to explain certain phenoma (which have been detected experimentally); I am referring to the standard model of elementary particles introducing the idea of particles living in representations of certain symmetry groups (the success of the SM was not to postulate the existence of these particles but to detect them :-)

 

[Chalnoth]

Question: do you think that one model is "more likely", "more reasonable", "simpler" in the sense of Ockhams razor than the other? How do you calculate and compare the probability of a cosmological constant having a certain value with the probability of sitting near the center of a huge void?

It's not really that difficult. First, you compare the free parameters in the theory used to explain the acceleration.

The cosmological constant has one free parameter.

The void model has three free parameters (our position in three spatial dimensions).

Things aren't looking so good for the void model already.

To do this in more detail, it makes sense to compare the fraction of parameter space that is consistent with the model to the entire parameter space. With the void model, this requires some estimate of the frequency of such nearly-spherical large voids, but we can easily provide an extremely pessimistic estimate by taking the maximum value of this frequency that is still consistent with the void model explaining acceleration. We then compare the number of galaxies that lie close enough to the center of such a void to explain the observed acceleration to the total number of galaxies. This gives a rough estimate of how likely the model is.

To contrast this, we can compare the current error bars on the cosmological constant to the available parameter space for the cosmological constant that is consistent with an old universe that forms galaxies.

Now, I haven't done the numbers here, but I'd be willing to bet that the void model will end up with a much, much lower likelihood than the cosmological constant.

Bear in mind that the numerator of this fraction that makes up the likelihood depends upon experimental precision, so we can't take the likelihood itself as being physical, just a means of comparing between different models.

Using this sort of analysis, it is not at all difficult to compare models even when the experimental support for two competing models is identical. The result may, in some cases, be ambiguous, but it's still possible to do the comparison, and certainly not outside of the realm of science.

 

[Chalnoth]

Congratulations! You are questioning what most research programs did over the last few hundred years.

Er, no. I'm not saying it wouldn't be nice to directly detect the dark matter particle, for instance. Rather I'm saying that what we test in science isn't things. We test theories. And there is no a priori reason to select one specific sort of data as being the only kind that is acceptable to accept a theory. Instead, we use well-tested epistemological tools to determine whether or not a theory is likely to be at least approximately true.

The tool of interest where dark matter is concerned is this: we know that we make mistakes. We expect it. So a good test of any theory is an independent test. We have different scientists examine the same data in order to reduce the possibility of individual errors impacting the results. We have different groups of scientists collect the same class of data using different instrumentation in order to make sure there is not some problem with the instruments. We have different groups of scientists collect entirely different sorts of data to test the same model predictions, or very different model predictions.

The first couple of types of error-checking are just verifications that we didn't make any dumb mistakes. These sorts of mistakes are pretty frequent when a scientific field is new, but tend to become less and less common as a field matures and scientists learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. But it is the last type of error checking that really gets into the meat of the issue and checks whether or not a particular theory is likely to describe reality, at least at an approximate level.

And with dark matter, today we have such a diverse and varied body of evidence that it is highly, highly unlikely that what we interpret as dark matter is not a WIMP of some sort or other.

I am referring to theories like Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism using electromagnetic waves to explain certain phenoma (which have been detected experimentally); I am referring to the standard model of elementary particles introducing the idea of particles living in representations of certain symmetry groups (the success of the SM was not to postulate the existence of these particles but to detect them :-)

And guess what? Almost none of those particles have been directly detected, in the sense of having a more-or-less direct measurement of their charge and mass. Your objections seem to me to be identical to, in the particle physics sense, not accepting the existence of a particle unless you can see its tracks in a bubble chamber (or equivalent detector that independently measures charge and mass).

 

[tom.stoer]

Yes, I am coming from the particle physics community and therefore my statement is rather simple:

Any claim that a certain class of elementary particles (WIMPs, SUSY, ...) exists and is responsible for a certain class of phenomena must be tested according to principles valid in the domain of elementary particle physics. B/c people working in elementary particle physics do not claim to have proven SUSY to exist, any claim tat SUSY is realized in nature is lacking experimental support (even if it's highly "reasonable" or "evident" looking at results from cosmology).

I think this is a fair and reasonable statement.

 

[tom.stoer]

It's not really that difficult. ...

It is not difficult, it's impossible.

You would have to define the probability of having the cc in a certain interval on the real axis. But there is no well-defined probability measure on "theory spaces" and there is no probability measure on the real numbers. I am sorry for that, but mathematically it's impossible to do what you have in mind.

What I am saying is that "likely", "reasonable", "evidence" etc. cannot be defined rigorously.

The main problem is that physics today is partially confronted with the the situation that certain physical theories may bot be verifiable or falsifiable (especially in cosmology this is very likely). My conclusion is that it's better to admit that according to scientific principles the decision is not yet possible instead of weakening scientific principles in order to come to a decision.

 

[Chalnoth]

Yes, I am coming from the particle physics community and therefore my statement is rather simple:

Any claim that a certain class of elementary particles (WIMPs, SUSY, ...) exists and is responsible for a certain class of phenomena must be tested according to principles valid in the domain of elementary particle physics. B/c people working in elementary particle physics do not claim to have proven SUSY to exist, any claim tat SUSY is realized in nature is lacking experimental support (even if it's highly "reasonable" or "evident" looking at results from cosmology).

I think this is a fair and reasonable statement.

Given the current status of the evidence, any claim that the dark matter evidence supports any particular particle physics theory is ridiculous. However, the evidence that there is some kind of WIMP not in the standard model is quite strong.

 

[Chalnoth]

You would have to define the probability of having the cc in a certain interval on the real axis. But there is no well-defined probability measure on "theory spaces" and there is no probability measure on the real numbers. I am sorry for that, but mathematically it's impossible to do what you have in mind.

No, not at all. A first step would be to merely assume a constant probability density within the allowable region. If somebody wants to propose a particular physical model for the cosmological constant, then we can take things one step further and ask about what the probability density is within the allowable region for that particular model. But absent a physical model, a constant probability density is reasonable.

There's no real reason to worry about theory spaces when simple model comparisons are good enough.

The main problem is that physics today is partially confronted with the the situation that certain physical theories may bot be verifiable or falsifiable (especially in cosmology this is very likely). My conclusion is that it's better to admit that according to scientific principles the decision is not yet possible instead of weakening scientific principles in order to come to a decision.

1) There is no reason whatsoever to avoid investigations regarding whether a particular model is more or less likely than another given current evidence.
2) The situation for dark energy may well fall in the position of "not enough to make a decision", but dark matter long ago passed that point.

 

[tom.stoer]

I will stop responding; thanks for the discussion, but further progress seems to be impossible.

 

[Calimero]

While true, the statement that the center of a void is the most favorable place for life to emerge is manifestly unlikely. After all, the distances between galaxies are great, so there is unlikely to be much of an effect of the overall density on the behavior of galaxies, and the centers of voids will have fewer galaxies and thus fewer chances for life to appear.

We have no clue what are conditions that are necessary for life to emerge, beside obvious ones (energy, water, etc). I for sure, can't think of any reason why one part of universe will be more fertile for life than the other, providing same local conditions, and taking the premise of homogeneity seriously. But if you abandon large scale homogeneity, then it is quite possible that life will favour some parts more then others.

Remember that there is the fact that we are "sitting" on the special place on a(t) curve, which may be coincidence, or may be necessity for which we have no obvious explanation.

Point is - we should exercise caution, and remain open.