I'm going to skip some of your questions as, although I believe I can answer them, I suspect there will be more questions following my answers. Then more questions, then more answers. And so on. If you really want to know, you should go to the source, and that source is the work of Gell-Mann, Griffiths, Hartle and Omnes.
I will not even pretend that I understand what you are saying here. Coarse-grained? Fine-grained?
That's the decoherent histories of Gell-Mann and Hartle which is closely related to the consistent histories of Griffiths and Omnes. As detailed a description as possible (a "fine-grained" description) in quantum mechanics doesn't usually allow for the assignment of probabilities but if we ignore the details, times, etc. that are irrelevant (a "coarse-grained" description), quantum mechanics can give the usual probabilities.
Gell-Mann gives a nice little introduction to the idea in his popular science book,
The Quark and the Jaguar. Coarse-graining is just an explanation of what we do to extract useful probabilities from the fundamental physics.
Then what's the problem? If the whole purpose of this is to "pacify" and make QM palatable for human consumption, then this is more appropriate to be in the Philosophy section. Physics has no such demands.
The problem here is that with the EPR paradox, people are thinking the argument is over locality -- when it's actually about realism -- and this makes them think quantum mechanics and special relativity are arguing with each other and that we have faster-than-light effects when we don't.
It's important that people know there is nothing "wrong" with special relativity and there's nothing "wrong" about quantum mechanics, there's just some concepts in quantum mechanics that are not classical and are difficult and abstract to the human mind. It's either this or let people believe in physical effects and theoretical problems which don't exist.
What "incompatible descriptions"? You just said that QM isn't wrong. In physics, if I have incompatible descriptions of anything, that theory is suspect. Wave and particle descriptions are incompatible descrptions in classical mechanics of the same entity. That's why classical mechanics is suspect when we get into a scale where an entity can exhibit such properties. QM, instead, has NO such distinction, and has only ONE description of BOTH classical wave and particle behavior.
Again, even after reading your "A" and "B" scenario, where are these "incompatible descriptions"?
This central idea of "incompatible frameworks" is very difficult and even specialists in interpretation often misunderstand it. Both Gell-Mann and Griffiths have lamented this. Gell-Mann has even accused them of deliberate misunderstanding. I myself even know one person who is convinced Gell-Mann doesn't understand EPR and is talking nonsense.
It's strange, then, that when Gell-Mann and Hartle described their work at a lecture at Caltech, Richard Feynman stood up and said he "agreed with every word" they said. Then again, that's perhaps no surprise as the decoherent histories approach I'm referring to has some of its basis in on-off discussions over decades between Feynman and Gell-Mann. But I guess this person I know who says it's all nonsense must be far smarter than Feynman, Gell-Mann and Hartle, eh?
I certainly hope you are more open-minded than he was, and not for my sake either.
It's conceptually tough. If it was easy then it wouldn't have taken so long to sort out quantum mechanics and need the insight of people like Gell-Mann and Feynman to do it.
Anyhow, on the issue of incompatibility, Griffiths has a paper called "Choice of Consistent Family, and Quantum Incompatibility" that may help:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9708028
Of course, if you are not interested then fair enough. I'm not keen to continue this discussion as I'm not gaining anything from it, I just thought people might be interested.
