Is Language Useless in Philosophical Discussions?

[selfAdjoint]

Here is a http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/10/05/out_of_the_matrix?mode=PF of the philosopher Donald Davidson which suggests that we should forget about Descartes and the notion of inner impressions versus the outside world.

 

[hypnagogue]

I can't say I agree with everything in this article.

One way to sum up this anti-Cartesian line of thought is to say that words acquire their meanings by being used in roughly similar ways by most speakers, not by being paired off with particular experiences or objects. (If men and women consistently use "blue" in the same way on the same occasions, they automatically mean the same thing by "blue.")

I agree that words acquire their meanings in this way. All the same, however, once words are acquired in this way they do go on to be paired off with particular experiences or objects.

For instance, if men and women consistently use "blue" in the same way on the same occasions, then they mean the same objective thing by blue (in this case, they have agreed to call light of so-and-so wavelength "blue"). But this is just a behavioristic account of language. Once the word "blue" has been acquired, it is indeed 'paired off' with the individual's conscious perception of blueness.

But one individual's conscious perception of blueness can (in principle) differ from another's. So although objectively/behavioristically two such speakers would 'automatically mean the same thing by "blue",' in actuality they would be associating the word with different internal conscious perceptions. If one could perceive directly what the other experienced as 'blueness,' he would certainly not say that this other person meant the same thing by "blue." (He would say, for example, "that's not blue, that's green!")

I realize that this is exactly what this Davidson fellow argued against, and that this article can't really capture his philosophy in any depth. But the above points seem so obvious as to be incontestable. This theory of language looks to me suspiciously like a simple behavioristic account that denies the existence or importance of conscious states.

In a famous article of 1974 titled "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Davidson explained why we did not have to worry about another familiar science-fiction suggestion: that an advanced civilization, flourishing in a faraway galaxy, might wield concepts that are forever beyond our grasp, concepts entirely incommensurable with our own. The reason is that every language, even the most advanced, has to get its start as a set of behavioral responses to stimuli, responses that can be correlated with our own responses. So there is no such thing as an unlearnable language.

Once again, I have to say 'hogwash!' Same behavioristic symptoms as above. It's easier to recognize the flaw by inverting the situation. Imagine that we meet another intelligent form of life, and assume that this life form has absolutely no emotional analog of 'shame.' They can certainly learn much of our language, and even learn the behavioristic indicators of human shame, but this race can never really grasp what it feels like for a human to be in shame. This is precisely because they do not have the proper internal emotion to 'pair off' with the word 'shame,' once they have acquired a rough understanding of it in the objective/behavioristic sense.

 

[zk4586]

Well, I just happened to stumble upon this thread while doing a search, and I have to argue a point here:

But one individual's conscious perception of blueness can (in principle) differ from another's. So although objectively/behavioristically two such speakers would 'automatically mean the same thing by "blue",' in actuality they would be associating the word with different internal conscious perceptions. If one could perceive directly what the other experienced as 'blueness,' he would certainly not say that this other person meant the same thing by "blue." (He would say, for example, "that's not blue, that's green!")

Such differences in "internal conscious perceptions", whatever they may be, hardly seem important to me. As long as colors can be agreed upon, thus allowing people to create understanding between themselves while operating in the world, I don't think we have to worry about whether two people are experiencing different internal perceptions when they refer to various colors. For example, if one person asks another person to hand him a blue crayon, all that matters is that both agree on which one is the blue crayon. It seems insignificant whether or not both people's internal perceptions are the same.

 

[RageSk8]

I agree with zk4586 point that as long as one knows how to use the word "blue", one has the concept of "blue". But, I must say that this argument, as true as it is, will not persuade hypnagogue. To hypnagogue and others like him – those Dennett calls “the new mysterians” – we holists will always be ignoring the defining aspect of consciousness: phenomenological data. Hypnagogue seems to admit that we holists have a handle of on the behavioral and objective aspects of meaning but not on the “true conception” of meaning, the ineffable core of human experience that breaths life into terms. I don’t know how to debate this point, namely, because I have no idea what use phenomenological data is to meaning. The only way we can ever know if someone has the concept of a word is if they know how to use that word. All of this talk about “what it is really like” seems like quixotic foolishness to me.

Hypnagogue said:

I realize that this is exactly what this Davidson fellow argued against, and that this article can't really capture his philosophy in any depth. But the above points seem so obvious as to be incontestable. This theory of language looks to me suspiciously like a simple behavioristic account that denies the existence or importance of conscious states.

And he is mostly right. Rorty’s article can’t capture Davidson’s (or Wittgenstein’s thought) and either can a few forum posts. However, his is only partially right to say that we deny the importance of conscious states. We do not deny we have mental states - we just think of mental states in vastly different terms. Hypnagogue thinks that we miss “what it is like” for an individual to see the color blue. What exactly is seeing this color blue? Who is this personage watching the Cartesian theatre? In our opinion once we have mapped out all of the causal relations of a mental state we have mapped out the mental state. We’re done. What else could be done? How could a mental state be defined more than this? Even hypnagogue would have to admit that we could never describe “what it is like” to see the color blue. He believes that seeing blue is intrinsic and ineffable. This is why we holists view hypnagogue and those who side with him as mystics tilting at windmills.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
Such differences in "internal conscious perceptions", whatever they may be, hardly seem important to me. As long as colors can be agreed upon, thus allowing people to create understanding between themselves while operating in the world, I don't think we have to worry about whether two people are experiencing different internal perceptions when they refer to various colors. For example, if one person asks another person to hand him a blue crayon, all that matters is that both agree on which one is the blue crayon. It seems insignificant whether or not both people's internal perceptions are the same.

When you say "internal conscious perceptions hardly seem important to me," it seems you are saying this in relation to the importance of language. I believe what hypnagogue is talking about however is the nature of consciousness. I don't think he would disagree with you that for practical purposes, at the moment of asking for a crayon the issue of how conscious experience works makes much difference to getting the crayon one asks for. At the same time, the fact that we get the expected crayon doesn't tell us all that went on in consciousness which allowed such an action to take place.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by RageSk8 I agree with zk4586 point that as long as one knows how to use the word "blue", one has the concept of "blue". But, I must say that this argument, as true as it is, will not persuade hypnagogue. To hypnagogue and others like him – those Dennett calls “the new mysterians” – we holists will always be ignoring the defining aspect of consciousness: phenomenological data. Hypnagogue seems to admit that we holists have a handle of on the behavioral and objective aspects of meaning but not on the “true conception” of meaning, the ineffable core of human experience that breaths life into terms. I don’t know how to debate this point, namely, because I have no idea what use phenomenological data is to meaning. The only way we can ever know if someone has the concept of a word is if they know how to use that word.

Calling your view of consciousness “holist” is about as apt as a skeleton claiming to define humanness. I say that because you seem so obsessed with structure and "parts" that you don’t see, or feel, the integrating aspects that fills the gaps between parts.

So, you “have no idea what use phenomenological data is to meaning”? Your tone indicates you interpret that to mean we who disagree with your dis-integrated approach are deluded. But it could be that the new mysterians are mystifying to you the same way an ape is mystified by why he can’t pick up water with a fork.

Originally posted by RageSk8 What exactly is seeing this color blue? Who is this personage watching the Cartesian theatre?

Exactly! That is the question you and Mr. Dennett are trying to get around. You don’t have a way to answer “who is this personage” and so you have decided to create a model that denies the nature of experience. In other words, since your model cannot explain all that is present in consciousness, you simply deny that the aspects exist at all!

Originally posted by RageSk8 In our opinion once we have mapped out all of the causal relations of a mental state we have mapped out the mental state. We’re done. What else could be done? How could a mental state be defined more than this?

The map of California is not California. And then, California is not merely my journey from one point on the map to another point on the map. The map isn’t even close, and can never come close, to describing the “whole” of California.

Originally posted by RageSk8 Even hypnagogue would have to admit that we could never describe “what it is like” to see the color blue. He believes that seeing blue is intrinsic and ineffable.

What difference does it make whether or not he can describe what blue is like? If I needed you to understand me or know what I know before I could properly exist, then you might have a point. But I am perfectly able to live relying on my own certainty. Description only means something when we are communicating, it has nothing to do with the existence of an object or quality.

Originally posted by RageSk8 All of this talk about “what it is really like” seems like quixotic foolishness to me. . . . This is why we holists view hypnagogue and those who side with him as mystics tilting at windmills.

I see your hiatus hasn’t brought you much humility.

 

[zk4586]

I don't intend to speak for RageSk8, he's perfectly capable of answering LW Sleeth's criticisms on his own, but for my part I must respond to the following:

When you say "internal conscious perceptions hardly seem important to me," it seems you are saying this in relation to the importance of language. I believe what hypnagogue is talking about however is the nature of consciousness. I don't think he would disagree with you that for practical purposes, at the moment of asking for a crayon the issue of how conscious experience works makes much difference to getting the crayon one asks for. At the same time, the fact that we get the expected crayon doesn't tell us all that went on in consciousness which allowed such an action to take place.

I don't deny that such conscious states exist (nothing in my first response would suggest that), I simply think that the most important - and yes, the most practical - questions about consciousness address relations between individuals. In my view, one need not concern oneself with the nature of consciousness, merely the outward manifestations of consciousness (particularly language). So to ask a question regarding internal conscious perceptions is to ask the wrong kind of question and to ignore the only interesting (and informative) aspects of consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
I don't intend to speak for RageSk8, he's perfectly capable of answering LW Sleeth's criticisms on his own, but for my part I must respond to the following:

I don't deny that such conscious states exist (nothing in my first response would suggest that), I simply think that the most important - and yes, the most practical - questions about consciousness address relations between individuals. In my view, one need not concern oneself with the nature of consciousness, merely the outward manifestations of consciousness (particularly language). So to ask a question regarding internal conscious perceptions is to ask the wrong kind of question and to ignore the only interesting (and informative) aspects of consciousness.

First let me say that my criticism of RageSk8 was not intended to be associated with you. If it seems hard, it is because of what I see as his arrogant attitude, one which I have witnessed plenty of times in the past. A slight problem here at PF (IMO) is teenagers (or close to it) who, hiding behind the shelter of their computers and IP's, behave like know-it-alls or, it seems, vent their frustrations with parents and adults on the people here. I am pretty sure you and I disagree, but I don't see that as a problem, but rather as an opportunity to trade ideas.

I know your view is that "one need not concern oneself with the nature of consciousness, merely the outward manifestations of consciousness." I say, if you want to run your consciousness that way, fine. The problem is, you are agreeing in essence with Rorty's point that we define consciousness, for humans in general, as that which is MOST intended for language and human interaction. I see that as arrogance.

I say that because I personally do not want to make the priority for my conscious development interacting with others (and consequently language). You can do that if you want, Rorty can do that if he wants, RageSk8 can do that if he wants . . . but I decline the opportunity. There are plenty of others who agree with me too.

This attempt to define consciousness as language and human interaction is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to model a human as a machine. It is the latest functionalist/behaviorist strategy to convince us poor ignert humans there is no inner being. The truth is, those so determined to do that only know they haven't figured out how to be aware of innerness; they do not know anything about, nor do they investigate properly, those who have achived something inwardly.

Personally, I prefer to make the first and foremost priority for my conscious development learning how to be content and happy within myself, and how not to be dependent on others (or anything else) for that. My second priority might be human interaction; I do consider it important . . . just not first. So that's why I say to attempt to define what the priority of consciousness should be for all of us arrogates others' right to decide for themselves how they should and will develop it.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by RageSk8
Even hypnagogue would have to admit that we could never describe “what it is like” to see the color blue. He believes that seeing blue is intrinsic and ineffable. This is why we holists view hypnagogue and those who side with him as mystics tilting at windmills.

Sometimes I have the feeling that people who deny the ineffable aspect of experience are not really conscious, they just behave as if they were.

A blind man knows quite a lot about the color blue. Does that mean you have to be a mystic tilting at windmills to believe that vision tells you something you can't possibly learn with language?

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by confutatis
Sometimes I have the feeling that people who deny the ineffable aspect of experience are not really conscious, they just behave as if they were.

A blind man knows quite a lot about the color blue. Does that mean you have to be a mystic tilting at windmills to believe that vision tells you something you can't possibly learn with language?

What exactly does a blind man know about the color blue?

 

[RageSk8]

My arrogant tone? There is obviously arrogance on both sides. There always will be in debate as people naturally believe they are right and the other is wrong. My description of those on your side as “quixotic” is completely accurate from the perspective of those on my side. Just as you thinking of my views as ‘misled arrogance’ is the expected and natural response. If you look at my post I take care to explain the divergence between the two conceptions of consciousness. I am all for the presentation of each conception and, in fact, encourage it (as shown here where I present your side's argument against Turing to promote intellectual diversity). Come on, you can’t honestly believe that “a slight problem here at PF (IMO) is teenagers (or close to it) who, hiding behind the shelter of their computers and IP's, behave like know-it-alls or, it seems, vent their frustrations with parents and adults on the people here.” I have no problem with honest debate, but I do have a problem with toning down debate so people don’t feel threatened or looked down upon. That’s BS. It doesn’t happen in actual academic debates and shouldn’t happen here. Anyways, back to the discussion…

Exactly! That is the question you and Mr. Dennett are trying to get around. You don’t have a way to answer “who is this personage” and so you have decided to create a model that denies the nature of experience. In other words, since your model cannot explain all that is present in consciousness, you simply deny that the aspects exist at all!

This is pretty close but misses and important aspect of our argument. What Dennett has done is present a new set of metaphors to talk about consciousness (a better set of metaphors in Dennett’s and my opinion). This is called philosophical therapy – the ‘cleaning up’ of old, outdated, messy metaphors and the pseudo-problems they create. Are you denying that your view of consciousness has a historical heritage with roots in Descartes? Descartes created a new vocabulary for describing the mind. There is no doubt that this vocabulary has gone through changes since first conceptualized, but those who agree with Dennett, Rorty, and Davidson see the basic model as fundamentally flawed. So, yes, we do attack the very questions that lie at the core of what is traditionally thought of as consciousness, but we also redescribe consciousness, conceptually recreate it in a different more useful form.

The map of California is not California. And then, California is not merely my journey from one point on the map to another point on the map. The map isn’t even close, and can never come close, to describing the “whole” of California.

This is equivocation. A “map” of California is not equivalent to a map of causal relationships. To put it in a different way, I think it is good enough to explain why it appears as if there is phenomenological data. You don’t.

Calling your view of consciousness “holist” is about as apt as a skeleton claiming to define humanness. I say that because you seem so obsessed with structure and "parts" that you don’t see, or feel, the integrating aspects that fills the gaps between parts.

So, you “have no idea what use phenomenological data is to meaning”? Your tone indicates you interpret that to mean we who disagree with your dis-integrated approach are deluded. But it could be that the new mysterians are mystifying to you the same way an ape is mystified by why he can’t pick up water with a fork.

Well, no. To quote Rorty: “ostensive definition requires a lot of stage-setting in the language, and that ostention without stage-setting (as when one says ‘forget about how it might be described; just concentrate on the feel of it – on what it is like’) does not pick out an entity.” This is what I mean by “holist.”

 

[RageSk8]

Originally posted by confutatis
Sometimes I have the feeling that people who deny the ineffable aspect of experience are not really conscious, they just behave as if they were.

A blind man knows quite a lot about the color blue. Does that mean you have to be a mystic tilting at windmills to believe that vision tells you something you can't possibly learn with language?

You have a strange view of language. Langauge is intimately tied with other interactions with world. Anyways, zk4586 said it best, "What exactly does a blind man know about the color blue?" My brother is red/green color blind. He sees our Christmas tree every year as "brown." In this case, he does not know the concept of green (at least in this instance) because he cannot play a language game where one identifies a Christmas tree as green. I fail to see how this challenges our position at all.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by RageSk8My arrogant tone? There is obviously arrogance on both sides.

Agreed.

Originally posted by RageSk8 Come on, you can’t honestly believe that “a slight problem here at PF (IMO) is teenagers (or close to it) who, hiding behind the shelter of their computers and IP's, behave like know-it-alls or, it seems, vent their frustrations with parents and adults on the people here.” I have no problem with honest debate, but I do have a problem with toning down debate so people don’t feel threatened or looked down upon. That’s BS.

I do believe it because I’ve wasted hours and hours of my time trying to reason with kids who lack enough life experience to know if their theories actually work, but who nonetheless advocate them here with the zealousness of someone who knows. Maybe “toning down” might stand for speaking with some degree of acknowledgment that one just might not know everything there is to know about a subject.

Originally posted by RageSk8
My description of those on your side as “quixotic” is completely accurate from the perspective of those on my side.

Your description might be expected, but I don’t think you are correct when you say it is accurate, no matter which “side” from which it derives. Aren’t we doing epistemology? In such a case, one cannot claim the validity of a general (wholesale) statement based on incomplete retail data.

Originally posted by RageSk8 What Dennett has done is present a new set of metaphors to talk about consciousness (a better set of metaphors in Dennett’s and my opinion). This is called philosophical therapy – the ‘cleaning up’ of old, outdated, messy metaphors and the pseudo-problems they create.

If antiquity does not make ideas true, then neither does fashionability. I say Dennett’s ideas are not better metaphors, but spin that attempts to establish a philosophical foundation for his variety of physicalism.

Originally posted by RageSk8 Are you denying that your view of consciousness has a historical heritage with roots in Descartes?

I deny it absolutely. My view of consciousness stems from the time I have taken to directly experience it. How is one going to understand one’s consciousness by contemplating it theoretically? If to know the reality of things outside us we must “observe,” must we not also experience the nature of consciousness to know anything about it?

Originally posted by RageSk8 So, yes, we do attack the very questions that lie at the core of what is traditionally thought of as consciousness, but we also redescribe consciousness, conceptually recreate it in a different more useful form.

Very funny. What exactly is “more useful”? Useful to what or whom? If I were a politician, I would define “useful” as that which gets me votes. Useful to Dennett and yourself seems to be what supports your theory of consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by RageSk8
You have a strange view of language. language is intimately tied with other interactions with world. Anyways, zk4586 said it best, "What exactly does a blind man know about the color blue?" My brother is red/green color blind. He sees our Christmas tree every year as "brown." In this case, he does not know the concept of green (at least in this instance) because he cannot play a language game where one identifies a Christmas tree as green. I fail to see how this challenges our position at all.

I suspect what Confutatis meant was that a blind man can have a zillion concepts about the color blue, and talk about it, without having the slightest bit of experiential knowledge about it. language might be tied to our interactions with the world, but that doesn't mean conscious experience must be tied to interactions with the world. The challenge to your position is found in the fact that you can't demonstrate conscious experience must necessarily be linked to what one thinks or says.

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I suspect what Confutatis meant was that a blind man can have a zillion concepts about the color blue, and talk about it, without having the slightest bit of experiential knowledge about it. language might be tied to our interactions with the world, but that doesn't mean conscious experience must be tied to interactions with the world. The challenge to your position is found in the fact that you can't demonstrate conscious experience must necessarily be linked to what one thinks or says.

I still don't see how this is in any way true. What concepts can a blind man have about the color blue without experiencing it (through the senses)? How can he talk about the color blue?

And let us all just keep in mind that we're debating a question with very little, if any, real importance. There's no reason for hostility from anyone.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
I still don't see how this is in any way true. What concepts can a blind man have about the color blue without experiencing it (through the senses)? How can he talk about the color blue?

And let us all just keep in mind that we're debating a question with very little, if any, real importance. There's no reason for hostility on either side of the issue.

I've listened to a number of songs Stevie Wonder wrote where he created verses based on visual information, including color. I used to wonder myself what sort of mental images he'd imagined for those verses. I can only guess obviously, but possibly he questioned others about color, and possibly he took clues from his other senses, such feeling the heat of the sun and then associating it with his concept of color. However blind persons do it, they are able to develop color concepts without experience.

I agree about the hostility. However, I disagree that the question of consciousness is of little importance. Many of us recognize it as the place where physicalistic theory breaks down. Dennett and others are trying to make the case that the brain can be the cause of consciousness. My opinion is that the only way he can do that is to first deny the existence of those aspects of consciousness he can't explain with physicalist theory.

My objection to Rorty's point in this thread is the assumption that the primary functions of consciousness are language and thinking. A computer can talk and think but doesn't know it does. Self-knowing that can evolve understanding, wisdom, joy, love etc. as it learns is what the computer lacks, and it is also what the brain model of consciousness lacks. This evolved self knowledge doesn't need to speak or think, it just knows the way one just knows how to ride a bike once it's learned. I speak with understanding, but the understanding itself is not a thought and it is not language. It is a sort of conscious singularity (like love or joy) that is already in place. Those of us who believe in and want to develop this inner ability to know are who Dennett wants to label the new mysterions. I want to label him the new computer wanna-be.

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I've listened to a number of songs Stevie Wonder wrote where he created verses based on visual information, including color. I used to wonder myself what sort of mental images he'd imagined for those verses. I can only guess obviously, but possibly he questioned others about color, and possibly he took clues from his other senses, such feeling the heat of the sun and then associating it with his concept of color. However blind persons do it, they are able to develop color concepts without experience.

I agree that that probably is how Stevie Wonder worked visual information, including color, into his songs. Knowing that color plays an important part in people's lives, he asked friends what they associated with certain colors and emotions and so forth. But that doesn't mean that Stevie Wonder understands the concept of a particular color. Because he's blind, he can't tell you the color of something unless he's been told by someone else what the color is. He can sing, "The woman in red, The woman in red, Like fine wine she's going straight to my head," but that doesn't mean that he understands the concept of the color red, merely that he's been told that attractive women can often be found wearing a red dress (and no doubt has had "experience" with this fact). But he has no way of generalizing (on his own) his experience of color so that he can apply it to new things. He can't take part in a language game which uses color (and certain other things dependent on the sense of vision).

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I agree about the hostility. However, I disagree that the question of consciousness is of little importance. Many of us recognize it as the place where physicalistic theory breaks down. Dennett and others are trying to make the case that the brain can be the cause of consciousness. My opinion is that the only way he can do that is to first deny the existence of those aspects of consciousness he can't explain with physicalist theory.

I say that the question of consciousness is of little importance for two reasons: 1) Even when simply confining oneself to the realm of philosophy, there seems to me far more important questions to ask (e.g. How should one live? What constitutes a just society? And so forth). 2) I doubt we'll ever come to any kind of consensus about the nature of consciousness and even if we did, I don't think it would really change the way we live our lives.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
My objection to Rorty's point in this thread is the assumption that the primary functions of consciousness are language and thinking. A computer can talk and think but doesn't know it does. Self-knowing that can evolve understanding, wisdom, joy, love etc. as it learns is what the computer lacks, and it is also what the brain model of consciousness lacks. This evolved self knowledge doesn't need to speak or think, it just knows the way one just knows how to ride a bike once it's learned. I speak with understanding, but the understanding itself is not a thought and it is not language. It is a sort of conscious singularity (like love or joy) that is already in place. Those of us who believe in and want to develop this inner ability to know are who Dennett wants to label the new mysterions. I want to label him the new computer wanna-be.

I've already said that I believe the primary functions of consciousness are language and thinking. I don't need to go over that again. But I must object to the idea that a computer will never be able to attain certain features of human consciousness (such as emotion or self-awareness). There is definitely a difference of complexity at work here, but I can't make sense of the notion that this difference is necessarily absolute.
--------------
"Turing shows that if a computer can add, subtract, multiply, and divide, and if it can tell the difference between zero and one, it can do anything. You can take that set of mindless abilities and build them up into structures of indefinite discriminative power, indefinite discerning power, indefinite reflective power. You can make a whole mind ... you can get ideas to think for themselves."
--Daniel Dennett, in an interview with Harvey Blume.
http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/digicult/dc981209.htm

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
I agree that that probably is how Stevie Wonder worked visual information, including color, into his songs. Knowing that color plays an important part in people's lives, he asked friends what they associated with certain colors and emotions and so forth. But that doesn't mean that Stevie Wonder understands the concept of a particular color. Because he's blind, he can't tell you the color of something unless he's been told by someone else what the color is. He can sing, "The woman in red, The woman in red, Like fine wine she's going straight to my head," but that doesn't mean that he understands the concept of the color red, merely that he's been told that attractive women can often be found wearing a red dress (and no doubt has had "experience" with this fact). But he has no way of generalizing (on his own) his experience of color so that he can apply it to new things. He can't take part in a language game which uses color (and certain other things dependent on the sense of vision).

I think you are making Confutatis' point for him. My interpretation of what he was trying to say is that one cannot have real knowledge of color without the experience of color. That is what is wrong with a model of consciousness as mere thinking and language. You can think and talk all day about the color blue, you might even manage to formulate the perfect blue concept, but you will still not know the color blue. That's because the impression of blue in consciousness does not get there via a concept, it gets there through experience.

Jumping ahead to your belief below about computers achieving consciousness, if a human can't know the color blue through thinking and language, how is a computer going to think its way to knowledge of the color blue?

Originally posted by zk4586
I say that the question of consciousness is of little importance for two reasons: 1) Even when simply confining oneself to the realm of philosophy, there seems to me far more important questions to ask (e.g. How should one live? What constitutes a just society? And so forth). 2) I doubt we'll ever come to any kind of consensus about the nature of consciousness and even if we did, I don't think it would really change the way we live our lives.

Those philosophical questions you cite as more important all involve humanity. To understand what is best for humanity we need to understand what humanity is at the core. This is the real reason for the debate about consciousness -- it is a struggle to decide everything from how we educate our children to what sorts of social design best fit human nature.

Originally posted by zk4586
I've already said that I believe the primary functions of consciousness are language and thinking. I don't need to go over that again.

We'll have to disagree about the primary function of consciousness. I think I can prove you are wrong, and I will attempt to do so in new thread. I'll be interested in your opinion.

Originally posted by zk4586
But I must object to the idea that a computer will never be able to attain certain features of human consciousness (such as emotion or self-awareness). There is definitely a difference of complexity at work here, but I can't make sense of the notion that this difference is necessarily absolute. . . . "Turing shows that if a computer can add, subtract, multiply, and divide, and if it can tell the difference between zero and one, it can do anything. You can take that set of mindless abilities and build them up into structures of indefinite discriminative power, indefinite discerning power, indefinite reflective power. You can make a whole mind ... you can get ideas to think for themselves."
--Daniel Dennett, in an interview with Harvey Blume.
http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/digicult/dc981209.htm

Just like those who claim we've all but proven life comes about through abiogenesis, so far all we get from Dennett et al. is exaggerated claims. To them I say, do it! Until they do, it is all speculation and they should stop pretending they have figured out what consciousness is.

Also, Turing did not show a computer "can do anything," he showed a computer should be capable of any sort of computing the human mind can do. I personally do not believe consciousness is built up from the complexity of computing operations. I think it comes about through the generalization of experience.

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I think you are making Confutatis' point for him. My interpretation of what he was trying to say is that one cannot have real knowledge of color without the experience of color. That is what is wrong with a model of consciousness as mere thinking and language. You can think and talk all day about the color blue, you might even manage to formulate the perfect blue concept, but you will still not know the color blue. That's because the impression of blue in consciousness does not get there via a concept, it gets there through experience.

After re-reading Confutatis' post, I don't think I missed what he was trying to say.

Originally posted by Confutatis
Sometimes I have the feeling that people who deny the ineffable aspect of experience are not really conscious, they just behave as if they were.

A blind man knows quite a lot about the color blue. Does that mean you have to be a mystic tilting at windmills to believe that vision tells you something you can't possibly learn with language?

It seems to me that Confutatis is saying there are certain intrinsic properties in consciousness directly related to the concepts that we acquire through experience. But I think he's making an unfortunate distinction between what we experience and how we describe what we experience.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Jumping ahead to your belief below about computers achieving consciousness, if a human can't know the color blue through thinking and language, how is a computer going to think its way to knowledge of the color blue?

A computer depends on imputs provided by a user. These inputs are interpreted by interplay between the hardware and the software. To me, this seems akin to sensory experience being interpreted by interplay between innate concepts and social constructs.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Those philosophical questions you cite as more important all involve humanity. To understand what is best for humanity we need to understand what humanity is at the core. This is the real reason for the debate about consciousness -- it is a struggle to decide everything from how we educate our children to what sorts of social design best fit human nature.

We have produced a number of very good ideas (supported by well-reasoned arguments) about what is best for humanity, none of which require us to get clear on the nature of consciousness.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
We'll have to disagree about the primary function of consciousness. I think I can prove you are wrong, and I will attempt to do so in new thread. I'll be interested in your opinion.

Agreed.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Just like those who claim we've all but proven life comes about through abiogenesis, so far all we get from Dennett et al. is exaggerated claims. To them I say, do it! Until they do, it is all speculation and they should stop pretending they have figured out what consciousness is.

Also, Turing did not show a computer "can do anything," he showed a computer should be capable of any sort of computing the human mind can do. I personally do not believe consciousness is built up from the complexity of computing operations. I think it comes about through the generalization of experience.

There just seems to me no reason to rule out the possibility that computers may one day acquire emotions and become self-aware. Though, as you say, this goes back to ones particular conception of what constitutes consciousness and of how consciousness arises.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by zk4586
It seems to me that Confutatis is saying there are certain intrinsic properties in consciousness directly related to the concepts that we acquire through experience.

What I'm saying is that knowledge is not evidence of consciousness. The fact that a blind man knows a lot about 'blue' without ever seeing it proves my point. What a blind man does not know about the colour blue cannot be communicated, and that must necessarily mean conscious experience is ineffable.

But I think he's making an unfortunate distinction between what we experience and how we describe what we experience

Why 'unfortunate'? You mean there's no distinction, or the distinction should be ignored?

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by confutatis
What I'm saying is that knowledge is not evidence of consciousness. The fact that a blind man knows a lot about 'blue' without ever seeing it proves my point. What a blind man does not know about the colour blue cannot be communicated, and that must necessarily mean conscious experience is ineffable.

That conclusion only follows if you accept that a blind man knows something about the color blue. I don't think that he does, and I've argued as much in this thread.

Originally posted by confutatis
Why 'unfortunate'? You mean there's no distinction, or the distinction should be ignored?

I don't think the distinction exists.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by zk4586
That conclusion only follows if you accept that a blind man knows something about the color blue. I don't think that he does, and I've argued as much in this thread.

This only supports the point you are trying to refute, though. If a blind man can know nothing of the color blue, then clearly the concept of blueness must include more than a linguistic account of blueness. Otherwise, the blind man would be able to know blueness just as well as you and I.

I don't think the distinction [between what we experience and how we describe what we experience] exists.

So if I read a description of a tree in a novel, this is the literally the same thing that happens when I look at a tree?

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by zk4586
That conclusion only follows if you accept that a blind man knows something about the color blue. I don't think that he does, and I've argued as much in this thread.

If you argue that a man knows nothing about what he doesn't see, where does that lead us? Do you know anything about quarks, black holes, American history, algebra? Do you know your age, your last name, how many days there are in a week, what year the Beatles broke up? If you don't call those things knowledge, what do you call it then?

I don't think the distinction exists.

Well, if you maintain that knowledge only comes from experience, then you must necessarily accept that language and abstract thought have nothing to do with consciousness. Which is my argument!

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This only supports the point you are trying to refute, though. If a blind man can know nothing of the color blue, then clearly the concept of blueness must include more than a linguistic account of blueness. Otherwise, the blind man would be able to know blueness just as well as you and I.

The reason I say that a blind man can't have knowledge of the color blue is because knowing what blue is depends on being able to use blue in a variable linguistic manner. That is to say, being able to recognize the color blue and then being able to apply that information to achieve some end. Go back to the example I used in my first post in this thread.

Originally posted by hypnagogue
So if I read a description of a tree in a novel, this is the literally the same thing that happens when I look at a tree?

All I'm saying is that there is no qualitative difference between what we experience and how we would describe (either to ourselves or to someone else) what we experience. language has come to dominate the way we experience and interact with the world. Now, is reading about a tree and seeing a tree the same thing? No, I'm not going that far. But if you were to describe the tree, it would probably be in roughly the same terms as the author. So language, as I see it, places limits on how we experience the world.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by zk4586
The reason I say that a blind man can't have knowledge of the color blue is because knowing what blue is depends on being able to use blue in a variable linguistic manner. That is to say, being able to recognize the color blue and then being able to apply that information to achieve some end.

Being able to recognize color and then apply that information to achieve some end does not necessitate linguistic representations. Or does every animal that can discriminate and act on the basis of light wavelength information have some sort of linguistic representation of it?

All I'm saying is that there is no qualitative difference between what we experience and how we would describe (either to ourselves or to someone else) what we experience.

What does it mean exactly for there to be no qualitative difference between the two? I think it is obvious that there are rather considerable qualitative differences. If I hear someone utter the word 'blue,' it is qualitatively nothing like what I experience when I look at a cloudless afternoon sky. I can visually experience blueness without being aware of the linguistic token 'blue,' and likewise I can think of the concept of blueness in linguistic terms without visually experiencing it.

The only way the distinction vanishes is if we look at things from a purely objective view, without allowing a subjective, 1st person view. But why should we so artificially limit ourselves? Just because the 1st person view seems incommensurate with our established understanding of the 3rd person view thus far? I see no compelling reason to disallow subjective experience from our account of the world, other than in the interest of maintaining a certain worldview. But theory should not contradict observation.

Now, is reading about a tree and seeing a tree the same thing? No, I'm not going that far. But if you were to describe the tree, it would probably be in roughly the same terms as the author. So language, as I see it, places limits on how we experience the world.

language places limits (rather tautologically) on how we describe our experience of the world. But description of a phenomenon is not the same thing as the phenomenon itself. If some mad scientist added a new kind of photoreceptor in my retina and then altered my visual cortex such that I then saw a totally novel kind of color, what would happen? Would I say 'hmm, there is some unknown color in my field of vision' before I actually visually experienced the color? Or would I visually experience this new color first, and then try to create a linguistic account of it?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
The reason I say that a blind man can't have knowledge of the color blue is because knowing what blue is depends on being able to use blue in a variable linguistic manner. That is to say, being able to recognize the color blue and then being able to apply that information to achieve some end.

I have to say that this concept completely escapes me. Now, if it weren't for this thread, I'd not tell you what I am about to, which is . . .

I live in a very beautiful place, 60 miles north of San Francisco a few miles inland from the Pacific in the middle of a vineyard. A great pleasure of my life is experiencing the misty presence of the ocean on the land. The land is primarily very steep hills, covered with various evergreen trees and other vineyards. In the morning and evening the moist air can be seen lingering in valleys and around vegetation, and when the sun filters through it -- whew! -- for some reason it really gets to me.

However, my point is that I spend a lot of time alone, and I seldom say anything to anyone about this place other than it is beautiful. But do you think because I don't talk or think about it I don't know it? Or, do you think the simple "application" as you put it, of me enjoying it isn't enough to make the experience useful?

Originally posted by zk4586
All I'm saying is that there is no qualitative difference between what we experience and how we would describe (either to ourselves or to someone else) what we experience. language has come to dominate the way we experience and interact with the world. Now, is reading about a tree and seeing a tree the same thing? No, I'm not going that far. But if you were to describe the tree, it would probably be in roughly the same terms as the author. So language, as I see it, places limits on how we experience the world.

Again, maybe it dominates for you, but that isn't necessarily so for everyone. When I experience the morning mist here, I am not talking to myself or trying to find words for it. My experience is to join in the moment, be present, feel it . . . I don't need or want my mentality to be involved at all, to tell you truth. There are times when I want to use my intellect or when I appreciate language, and there are times when I don't. It's hard for me to understand someone wanting to live in his mind all the time.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Being able to recognize color and then apply that information to achieve some end does not necessitate linguistic representations. Or does every animal that can discriminate and act on the basis of light wavelength information have some sort of linguistic representation of it?

This may sound like I'm jumping to the other side, but if animals are not conscious (in a self-aware sense) doesn't that mean they experience nothing at all?

I can visually experience blueness without being aware of the linguistic token 'blue,' and likewise I can think of the concept of blueness in linguistic terms without visually experiencing it.

I'm not sure we can experience blueness before we have an awareness of the linguistic token 'blue'. Isn't it interesting that we have no recollection at all of our early childhood? Also, isn't it interesting that when you look around you, you can't find a single image which you can't describe? Don't those two facts sound a bit suspicious?

I don't think our perception of the world arised the way we usually think it does. I don't think a newborn baby sees the world the way an adult does, and learns language by matching words to objects. More likely it is an iterative process, whereby the child divides his/her perceptions into categories. Langauge starts as just another set of perceptions, but eventually it comes to dominate the whole process.

I have no way to know, but my guess is that a languageless being does not experience "blueness", "colour", "tree", or even "the world". The perceptions of such a being probably amount to a senseless mess which is constantly changing in completely unpredictable ways. If that is true, then parents not only teach children to speak, they actually teach them to perceive the world in a particular way. A way that is the product of thousands of years of evolution.

This is getting interesting...

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by confutatis
This may sound like I'm jumping to the other side, but if animals are not conscious (in a self-aware sense) doesn't that mean they experience nothing at all?

Well, we can't be sure of animal consciousness one way or the other, but recognition and action themselves do not seem to require consciousness in order to work. Both recognition and action can be dissociated from each other via brain lesions such that one can do one but not the other (although I am not aware of any cases where both do not work and the subject is still conscious).

I'm not sure we can experience blueness before we have an awareness of the linguistic token 'blue'. Isn't it interesting that we have no recollection at all of our early childhood? Also, isn't it interesting that when you look around you, you can't find a single image which you can't describe? Don't those two facts sound a bit suspicious?

It could simply be that the brain needs to develop before it can create long term memories.

I don't think our perception of the world arised the way we usually think it does. I don't think a newborn baby sees the world the way an adult does, and learns language by matching words to objects. More likely it is an iterative process, whereby the child divides his/her perceptions into categories. language starts as just another set of perceptions, but eventually it comes to dominate the whole process.

I don't doubt that language serves an integral part in our categorization of perceptual experience. But categorizing perceptual experience is not the same as having perceptual experience. Certain brain lesions can interfere with recognition/categorization and still leave visual experience intact.

 

[zk4586]

I feel that I might have dug myself into a hole here, but I'll try to work my way out of it tomorrow by responding to everyone's criticisms. And to think, I just wanted to make one post about the unimportant distinction between internal conscious perception and linguistic description. My head hurts.

Oh, and btw, I fully admit that I didn't understand Confutatis' argument until just a few minutes ago when I read over some of the posts again. My fault entirely, I apologize. Once again, I'll try to sort through all the arguments tomorrow. That will be one long post. I need sleep.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
It could simply be that the brain needs to develop before it can create long term memories.

I see no difference. What we call memory is just consciousness extended through time - you can only remember what you once were conscious of. To say we had no capability to make memories is equivalent to saying we were not conscious.

Besides, I believe it's a misconception to think it is even possible to have memories of early childhood. This has nothing to do with the brain, it's a matter of logic. The world as we experience is an elaborate interpretation of raw sensory data; it doesn't make sense to think people can be born with the ability to interpret what they have never seen before. Unless you believe in reincarnation, that is.

I don't doubt that language serves an integral part in our categorization of perceptual experience. But categorizing perceptual experience is not the same as having perceptual experience.

I think you are right and wrong. This sounds related to the point zk4568 was trying to make, and he may be right after all. But it is a difficult idea to explain, so let me try an analogy.

I don't speak Russian. Whenever I hear someone talk in Russian, I don't experience Russian words, I only experience a meaningless jumble of sounds. Even though I sense the sounds vary in pitch and timbre, I can't categorize particular sounds - it's all the same seemingly random mess to me.

Now if I keep listening, something starts happening. I may, for instance, take notice of the word "nyet". I will become curious as to why a seemingly ordered pattern of sounds appears from time to time amid the random mess. When that happens, I'm on my way to learning my first Russian word. But more importantly, I'm no longer experiencing Russian the same way - it's not just a meaningless jumble of sounds, at least some of it exhibits order and predictability.

Don't you think experience works the same way? That is, when we are born we're inundated with meaningless raw sensory data which makes no sense at all and can't even be 'categorized', for it's all the same mess. So we couldn't experience blue before we had a concept of color, and we couldn't experience color before having a concept of image, and we couldn't experience images before having a concept of vision, and we couldn't experience vision before having a concept of ... well, I don't know where the thing starts.