Is Language Useless in Philosophical Discussions?

[Canute]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
This an area of thought that is quite undecided. I am someone who can't agree with your overall statement.

What I could agree with is there is a whole class of things which are defined in terms of their relation to other things. That class gives us relative understanding, and in that class is included many things which are important to us, such as rational thought and language.

However, to say "there's no starting point" is only to say that you either haven't found one, can't imagine one, or see no need for one in order to understand the nature of reality. Personally, I cannot figure out how the relative aspects of existence ultimately make sense unless there is a starting point.

Actually, I think the two sides of the debate in this thread really boils down to the relativists and the "foundationalists." Dennett claims his model of consciousness gets around the problem of infinite regress that always plagues any relativist position attempting to circumvent an absolute principle (of course, the irony is that in the process any relativist position must eventually become the absolute!). The much simpler solution is to accept there is an absolute foundation at the base of all existence.

Great post. This is where the link is between epistemology and ontology. A priori the 'absolute' in ontological terms (what lies outside of Plato's cave) cannot be a relative phenomenon and cannot have a scientific existence (so we are chained to our benches). This seems to be generally accepted by philosphers.

But in an epistemological sense the 'absolute' is the starting point for discrimination (categorisation, defining, conceiving etc). This starting point, if all knowledge derives from experience, can only be an 'absolute' experience.

Hence in Advaita, Taoism etc. epistemology and ontology are the same thing in the end. All IMHO of course, but we seem to agree on this.

 

[Canute]

"By the way, 'confutatis' is meant to tell an important fact about me: I'm nuts about a particular kind of music."

Ok I'll have a stab. You like Bach and especially the 48 P's and F's. On the mechanics of playing the piano Rubenstein (I think) said - it's not the notes that are difficult to play, it's the silences between them.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
This an area of thought that is quite undecided. I am someone who can't agree with your overall statement.

That is only because you don't understand what I said. It's not easy to explain this, but it's quite clear once you understand it.

to say "there's no starting point" is only to say that you either haven't found one, can't imagine one, or see no need for one in order to understand the nature of reality.

It's neither. The issue is that knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist.

Personally, I cannot figure out how the relative aspects of existence ultimately make sense unless there is a starting point.

Well, there was a time people could not understand why the world was not falling if it had no foundation. That left them confused, because they couldn't possibly imagine a foundation, other than an infinite chain of turtles. It was only when astronomy revealed that the world can't possibly fall, because there's nothing for it to fall into, that people understood how their intuition betrayed them.

Knowledge is no different. It has no foundation, no starting point, because such a foundation can't possibly exist. There's nothing outside what you know that can convince you that what you know to be true is actually false. (and notice that you can only be proven wrong on something because you accept that something else is true; there's no way to prove that everything you know to be true is false - some of it perhaps, but not everything)

The much simpler solution is to accept there is an absolute foundation at the base of all existence.

The "absolute foundation at the base of all existence" can't possibly exist. If it did, then it would need a foundation for itself. Turtles all the way...

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Canute
Ok I'll have a stab. You like Bach and especially the 48 P's and F's.

That too.

On the mechanics of playing the piano Rubenstein (I think) said - it's not the notes that are difficult to play, it's the silences between them.

Great quote. As for my experience, I found that playing what's written in the score is trivial, so trivial even a computer can do it. The real challenge is to play what is not written - that takes genius.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by confutatis
Great quote. As for my experience, I found that playing what's written in the score is trivial, so trivial even a computer can do it. The real challenge is to play what is not written - that takes genius.

This is somewhat of a tangent, but computer programs have been written to play musical scores taking things such as natural biological timing fluctuations and such into account, and the result is judged by experimentally blind human judges to sound decidedly emotive and 'human.' There's more to it than just the biological timing fluctuations but that's what I can remember off the top of my head.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Canute
This raises one of the main points of misunderstanding. Many people treat 'consciousness' (experience) as synonymous with 'mind' (computation/thinking). This happens all the time in the literature. I sometimes wonder if we're all conscious in the same way given the arguments on this point. Perhaps one has to live in country with some space to expand into, some sense of nature and natural complexity, and star-lit nights to walk into appreciate the difference, as you suggested.

I am convinced we are not all conscious in the same way. Your comment about notes and the "silences" between notes is exactly the difference I see between the two main ways people are conscious. In this world, of course one needs to pay attention to thinking ("notes") as well as what might lie hidden in the silence. One extreme gives the computer mind, the other extreme leaves behind the spaced out mind. My goal is to develop both the ability to be silent inside, and develop my ability to reason.


I wanted to add that I've been working on a thread for the last few days to examine this contrast in types of consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
That is only because you don't understand what I said. It's not easy to explain this, but it's quite clear once you understand it. . . . The issue is that knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist.

Just saying so doesn't make it so. I'll assume your next sentences are your arguments, so let's see if you have justified your statement "knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist."

Originally posted by confutatis There's nothing outside what you know that can convince you that what you know to be true is actually false. (and notice that you can only be proven wrong on something because you accept that something else is true; there's no way to prove that everything you know to be true is false - some of it perhaps, but not everything)

I understand there are things which are better (or even only) understood by studying their relationships to other things. There is no argument about that. But you are describing the workings of what you believe from within the context of what you believe. It is not a proof to say there is nothing but relativeness because relative things always work in a relative way.

Originally posted by confutatis . . . there was a time people could not understand why the world was not falling if it had no foundation. That left them confused, because they couldn't possibly imagine a foundation, other than an infinite chain of turtles. . . .Knowledge is no different. It has no foundation, no starting point, because . . . the "absolute foundation at the base of all existence" can't possibly exist. If it did, then it would need a foundation for itself. Turtles all the way...

When you say there is no starting point, and then talk about "Turtles all the way," actually you are describing exactly what must happen if things are only relative. Nothing you say solves the problem of endless regress.

An absolute foundation, on the other hand, is the most basic principle/cause/existence possible. It needs nothing to hold it up, it is the basis of everything. If such a "ground state" exists, all beginings and regress start and end there respectively.


So, you have not yet made your case that all is relative because "knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist." Instead you've given reason to suspect all is not relative.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I understand there are things which are better (or even only) understood by studying their relationships to other things.

No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things. That's what "understanding" means. You can't understand a thing if it relates to nothing else. That's why nobody understands "reality", "consciousness", "space", "time", "beauty", and so many other mysteries.

But once again you are describing the workings of what you believe from within the context of what you believe.

I'm describing things as I see them.

It is not a proof to say there is nothing but relativeness because relative things always work in a relative way.

What do you mean by proof? Philosophy is thousands of years old and, if you exclude mathematicians, no one was ever able to come with a philosophical proof of anything. You know why? Because language is to philosophers what wood is to a carpenter. Just like a carpenter's imagination must be restrained by the limitations of wood, a philosopher can only do what his language allows him to do. And "proof" is definitely not allowed.

When you say there is no starting point, and then talk about "Turtles all the way," actually you are describing exactly what must happen if things are only relative.

Nope.

Nothing you say solves the problem of endless regress.

Think of a dictionary. Anything you can possibly talk about is described there. How does the dictionary define words if not by describing one word in terms of others? Are you saying that can't be done? Nonsense!

Now does a dictionary really describe anything? Of course not. A dictionary only describes a language. But you are mistaken if you think any description of anything is fundamentally different from a dictionary. It isn't. It's exactly the same thing. All these posts, all those philosophy books, they are mere attempts at definitions of the way we talk. Watch it closely and you will see.

An absolute foundation, on the other hand, is the most basic principle/cause/existence possible.

Right there! You just described "an absolute foundation" in terms of something else! Your absolute foundation is anything but absolute!

It needs nothing to hold it up, it is the basis of everything. If such a "ground state" exists, all beginings and regress start and end there respectively.

So that's the (relative) definition of your absolute foundation? Thanks for making my point for me

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things.

Are you going to be another one of those here who argues one's case by restating over and over again what one believes?

Originally posted by confutatis
I'm describing things as I see them.

Hmmmm, looks like it . . .

Originally posted by confutatis
That's what "understanding" means. You can't understand a thing if it relates to nothing else. That's why nobody understands "reality", "consciousness", "space", "time", "beauty", and so many other mysteries.

. . . .and again.

Originally posted by confutatis
What do you mean by proof? Philosophy is thousands of years old and, if you exclude mathematicians, no one was ever able to come with a philosophical proof of anything. You know why? Because language is to philosophers what wood is to a carpenter. Just like a carpenter's imagination must be restrained by the limitations of wood, a philosopher can only do what his language allows him to do. And "proof" is definitely not allowed.

Relax, I didn't mean a formal proof, I meant with evidence and reason to build a case that so thoroughly accounts for how reality works I must, if I am being reasonable, accede to your model. So far all you are doing is repeating what you believe, you are not addressing the exceptions and counterpoints I bring up other than to say "No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things," as you are about to do again . . .

Originally posted by confutatis Think of a dictionary. Anything you can possibly talk about is described there. How does the dictionary define words if not by describing one word in terms of others?

[zz)]

Originally posted by confutatis Are you saying that can't be done? Nonsense!

The classic strawman . . . I have never once said any of the things are arguing against.

Originally posted by confutatis Now does a dictionary really describe anything? Of course not. A dictionary only describes a language. But you are mistaken if you think any description of anything is fundamentally different from a dictionary. It isn't. It's exactly the same thing. All these posts, all those philosophy books, they are mere attempts at definitions of the way we talk. Watch it closely and you will see.

Who's arguing? You are doing exactly what I said you were doing in my last post.

You are also doing what your above argument was supposed to refute about what I said, which was, ". . . you are describing the workings of what you believe from within the context of what you believe. It is not a proof [substitute: sound argument] to say there is nothing but relativeness because relative things always work in a relative way."

Originally posted by confutatis
Right there! You just described "an absolute foundation" in terms of something else! Your absolute foundation is anything but absolute! . . . So that's the (relative) definition of your absolute foundation? Thanks for making my point for me

We are using language to represent what we are talking about. Langauge and thought are exactly what you represent them to be: tools for communicating about what is relative. I have NEVER disputed that. If they are as such, and if there is something absolute, then tools which only operate in relative terms can never adequately express this absolute.

All that is understood by half-way informed philosophers when it comes this area of metaphysics. So being sarcastic about that rather elementary point doesn't tell us anything.

As an "experientialist" the only thing I consider a "proof" is that which has been experienced somewhere, at sometime, by someone (excluding tautalogies and such, of course). I have been telling you that your model of consciousness doesn't account for experiences I have had, and I believe others have had. I freely admit language cannot express that experience, but guess what, language can never be equivalent to any experience other than the experience of participating in language.

If you are hungry, will your hunger get satisfied by talking about eating, or do you need to experience eating? Obviously the language "food" is not the experience food. Period. You know that, I know that.

If that is the case, then the experience of the absolute (if possible) would also not be the language of the absolute. We know if it exits we can't get at it through the language of philosophy. What we are trying to do therefore is infer from the way reality "works" if an absolute is a logical hypothesis, or maybe even a necessary hypothesis.

That is why when you argue for the absoluteness of relativity , I bring up logical problems I have with it, such as infinite regress. Your answer is to come back and tell me about all the relative stuff in the universe, which I already know and don't dispute. It seems more appropriate to first address people's counterarguments so that your answers reflect you have taken into account the points that have been made.

 

[hypnagogue]

LW, how exactly are you using the term 'experience'? From what I gather you have been using it primarily to mean conscious, subjective experience, but you've also used it a couple of times (or so it seems) to refer to objective actions/activities. For instance, you say the way to satisfy hunger is to experience eating. But if I were to have the conscious experience of eating induced in me by a mad scientist, I imagine it would not have a completely overriding effect on my hunger, which is ultimately satisfied by the ingestion of sugars and such by my objective body. (If you have ever been hooked up to one of those nutrtition transport systems in a hospital-- whatever they're called-- you'll find that you don't get terribly hungry despite not eating for long periods.)

 

[Les Sleeth]

LW, how exactly are you using the term 'experience'? From what I gather you have been using it primarily to mean conscious, subjective experience, but you've also used it a couple of times (or so it seems) to refer to objective actions/activities. For instance, you say the way to satisfy hunger is to experience eating. But if I were to have the conscious experience of eating induced in me by a mad scientist, I imagine it would not have a completely overriding effect on my hunger, which is ultimately satisfied by the ingestion of sugars and such by my objective body. (If you have ever been hooked up to one of those nutrtition transport systems in a hospital-- whatever they're called-- you'll find that you don't get terribly hungry despite not eating for long periods.)

I have been using the term "experience" to refer to that aspect of consciousness that is aware of what it senses. I use the word "senses" in the broadest possible way so that it includes the physical senses, intuition, or any other way we detect information. In other words, we sense/feel and we know we sense/feel; both aspects together is what I consider experience.

The hunger analogy probably wasn't the best, but it is one I like because we all know what it is like to be hungry. My point was that there is a big difference between thinking or talking about eating, and actually eating. For the general meaning of experience I do not distinguish between information that comes from the outside, or that which comes from within. So it wouldn't matter to the basic nature of experience if the information I become aware of is regarding my objective actions/activities. And if you were to have the conscious experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, that would be the experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, and not the experience of eating. You might not be able to properly interpret the situation until you were starving to death, but that doesn't change the nature of experience, which is really my overall point. Experience is one thing, thinking and language are another.

 

[Canute]

No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things. That's what "understanding" means. You can't understand a thing if it relates to nothing else. That's why nobody understands "reality", "consciousness", "space", "time", "beauty", and so many other mysteries. SNIP

What do you mean by proof? Philosophy is thousands of years old and, if you exclude mathematicians, no one was ever able to come with a philosophical proof of anything. You know why? Because language is to philosophers what wood is to a carpenter. Just like a carpenter's imagination must be restrained by the limitations of wood, a philosopher can only do what his language allows him to do. And "proof" is definitely not allowed.

All this seems pretty much true, but only in a way.

You are right that science and 'analytical' philososophy is restricted to the study of relative phenomena, and that neither is capable of absolute proofs. However experience is not reasoning. Reasoning has limits (Plato's cave again) but experience transcends those limits. We know this from mathematics among other things.

Experience must preceed perceptual or conceptual knowledge. Therefore experience (or not all experience) is not this kind of knowledge. This is why direct knowledge (apperception) can, in theory at least, bring certain knowledge but reasoning, as you say, cannot.

You can't say that nobody understands ultimate reality and so on, because there are many people who claim they do. They may be wrong but you'd have to show this.

Think of a dictionary. Anything you can possibly talk about is described there. How does the dictionary define words if not by describing one word in terms of others? Are you saying that can't be done? Nonsense!

Words in dictionaries are relative phenomena as you say. However dictionaries exist so clearly not all the words in a dictionary are relative, otherwise they could not exist. There is at least one undefined term in every dictionary and in every mathematical theory and in any 'theory of everything'.

The universe consists entirely of relative phenomona. There is therefore soemthing that is not relative that underlies these phenomena, and on which all these relative phenomena are epiphenomenal. This must be something absolute.

Now does a dictionary really describe anything? Of course not. A dictionary only describes a language. But you are mistaken if you think any description of anything is fundamentally different from a dictionary. It isn't. It's exactly the same thing. All these posts, all those philosophy books, they are mere attempts at definitions of the way we talk. Watch it closely and you will see.

Half right again I'd say. Sleeth was not talking about 'describing'. He was talking about experiencing. Experiencing, at the limit, does not require words, categories, conceptions, perceptions, sensory data, or relative phenomena of any kind. For the reasons you give this must be the case since realtive phenomena cannot exist unless something that is not relative underlies them.

Right there! You just described "an absolute foundation" in terms of something else! Your absolute foundation is anything but absolute!

It is not possible to describe something that is absolute except in relative terms. This is why in non-dual cosmologies it is asserted that nothing true can be said about the absolute. To describe it is to 'relativise' it. Hence it is not correct to say that the absolute exists or not-exists, they are incorrect terms. However luckily to have an experience it is not necessary to describe it so absolute knowledge is theoretically possible.

It is the experience that Sleeth is talking about, and the words are necessary. "The Tao must be talked" in Chuang Tsu's words. However the experience is not the words.

BTW this is worth reading in this context
from ( http://www.dieoff.org/page126.htm)

Your point about philosophy is a good one. Analytical philosophy hasn't made any progress in two thousand years. The reason is that this tradition of philosophy does not acknowledge the limits to reasoning, even though we know what they are. Martin Heidegger is brilliant on this issue. Here's an extract from 'What is Metaphysics', his inaugural lecture at U of Frieberg. The whole text is worth reading. The guy is my all time hero-genius.


"Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means beings as beings. From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. This confusion, to be sure, must be considered an event and not a mere mistake. It cannot by any means be charged to a mere negligence of thought or a carelessness of expression. Owing to this persistent confusion, the claim that metaphysics poses the question of Being lands us in utter error."

 

[zk4586]

...if I were to have the conscious experience of eating induced in me by a mad scientist, I imagine it would not have a completely overriding effect on my hunger, which is ultimately satisfied by the ingestion of sugars and such by my objective body.

Geez, you have a real hypothetical-scenario-involving-a-mad-scientist fetish, don't you?

 

[hypnagogue]

Geez, you have a real hypothetical-scenario-involving-a-mad-scientist fetish, don't you?

No more than you have a fetish for language. I just think the mad scientist thing is a useful device to demonstrate a realistically plausible scenario where experience is shown to be dissociated from the objective referrents to which it usually is taken to refer. This is an important distinction to make.

 

[hypnagogue]

And if you were to have the conscious experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, that would be the experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, and not the experience of eating. You might not be able to properly interpret the situation until you were starving to death, but that doesn't change the nature of experience, which is really my overall point.

I agree with your second statement here, which is why I think you shouldn't make the distinction that you make in the first. From the 1st person perspective, for at least some nonnegligible duration of time, the experience of eating is identical whether it arises from actually eating, or from being fooled into thinking that you are eating by proper stimulation of your brain. The upshot of this is that there is no direct tie from subjective experience to objective referrents. Your distinction between the two arises from a 3rd person perspective, but is not apparent from the 1st person. So, in fact, I would say that it is more proper to say that experientially the two are identical. If we do not say this then we introduce an objective term into our notion of experience and so we are no longer referring exclusively to subjective experience, or 'awareness of sensation' as you put it.

This is a side-issue to your main point, but I think it is important to talk about it so we remain as precise as possible on what we mean by 'experience.'

Experience is one thing, thinking and language are another.

Absolutely agree.

 

[confutatis]

All this seems pretty much true, but only in a way.

Yes, but in a very interesting way.

Reasoning has limits (Plato's cave again) but experience transcends those limits. We know this from mathematics among other things.

It works both ways. Reason can transcend experience, experience can transcend reasoning, and the interplay between the two is what allows us to acquire knowledge. As a result of that, the way you reason shapes the way you experience, and vice-versa. Then, talking about "reason" is equivalent to talking about "experience". They are two sides of the same coin.

You can't say that nobody understands ultimate reality and so on, because there are many people who claim they do. They may be wrong but you'd have to show this.

I mean "understand" in a rational way, in the sense of being able to describe it to others.

Sleeth was not talking about 'describing'. He was talking about experiencing.

To talk about experience is to describe experience. You can't talk about anything without describing that thing.

Experiencing, at the limit, does not require words, categories, conceptions, perceptions, sensory data, or relative phenomena of any kind.

Sure, but that kind of experience can't be understood or talked about, except in extremely elusive terms.

It is not possible to describe something that is absolute except in relative terms. This is why in non-dual cosmologies it is asserted that nothing true can be said about the absolute.

Why is it that you can't see that the statement "nothing true can be said about the absolute" is nonsense? For one thing, it can't possibly be true as it is a statement about the absolute.

To describe it is to 'relativise' it. Hence it is not correct to say that the absolute exists or not-exists, they are incorrect terms.

Exactly! We can't think of reality as being a "thing", and we can't think of consciousness as being a "process". Thinking about things that way lead to all sorts of nonsense.

Analytical philosophy hasn't made any progress in two thousand years.

Actually they did, they achieved quite a progress, only not in the area where they expected it. The greatest contribution of philosophy to mankind is an elaborate vocabulary. This discussion about 'consciousness' would not be possible if philosophers had not invented the concept. The mistake is to think that any philosophical discussion about 'consciousness' consists of anything other than an attempt to define what the word 'consciousness' means. That's what I think some people don't get, but it's not their fault, it's not easy to see through the deceptive aspects of language.

That applies to all my posts, by the way. I'm not trying to prove or demonstrate anything about consciousness, philosophy is not capable of that. All I'm saying is that the concept 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness', except perhaps in a tautological way.

 

[Canute]

It works both ways. Reason can transcend experience, experience can transcend reasoning, and the interplay between the two is what allows us to acquire knowledge. As a result of that, the way you reason shapes the way you experience, and vice-versa. Then, talking about "reason" is equivalent to talking about "experience". They are two sides of the same coin.

This is not the case. Try reading Russell or Popper for instance.

I mean "understand" in a rational way, in the sense of being able to describe it to others.

Understanding has got nothing to with describing to others. Experiences are indescribable in principle. In philophy this is known as 'incommensurability.

To talk about experience is to describe experience. You can't talk about anything without describing that thing.

Ok

Sure, but that kind of experience can't be understood or talked about, except in extremely elusive terms.

No kind of experience can be talked about except in 'elusive terms'.

Why is it that you can't see that the statement "nothing true can be said about the absolute" is nonsense? For one thing, it can't possibly be true as it is a statement about the absolute.

That isn't quite right. The statement is saying that 'the absolute' (let's say 'essence or 'ultimate reality') has no attributes. Therefore any statement like 'it exists' is untrue, but not entirely untrue.

Depending on how much philosophy you know you may find this a strange claim. However it can be shown logically.

Exactly! We can't think of reality as being a "thing", and we can't think of consciousness as being a "process". Thinking about things that way lead to all sorts of nonsense.

Hmm. Don't know what you mean there.

Actually they did, they achieved quite a progress, only not in the area where they expected it. The greatest contribution of philosophy to mankind is an elaborate vocabulary. This discussion about 'consciousness' would not be possible if philosophers had not invented the concept. The mistake is to think that any philosophical discussion about 'consciousness' consists of anything other than an attempt to define what the word 'consciousness' means. That's what I think some people don't get, but it's not their fault, it's not easy to see through the deceptive aspects of language.

Sorry, I didn't mean to suggest that philosophy was a waste of time. I meant that the questions which were unanswerable to Plato are still unanswerable today. That is why one philosopher (can't remember but could check) remarked that Western philosophy 'consists of a series of footnotes to Plato'. In this context it's intersting that you cite 'an elaborate vocabulary' as a success.

That applies to all my posts, by the way. I'm not trying to prove or demonstrate anything about consciousness, philosophy is not capable of that. All I'm saying is that the concept 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness', except perhaps in a tautological way.

The only agreed defintion of consciousness is 'what it is like'. Whether that invokes the concept of consciousness depends on whether you think the words are the thing, or the thing is something that the words point at.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It works both ways. Reason can transcend experience, experience can transcend reasoning, and the interplay between the two is what allows us to acquire knowledge. As a result of that, the way you reason shapes the way you experience, and vice-versa. Then, talking about "reason" is equivalent to talking about "experience". They are two sides of the same coin.

Sometimes it seems like you believe arbitrariness is a compelling line of reasoning. Why don't you feel the need to justify statements you offer that are in dispute among us? Just saying things are true without logical and/or evidential support gives me no way to either accept your point, or understand how you came to your conclusion.

For example, you say "the interplay between the two [reason and experience] is what allows us to acquire knowledge." If that is so, then how do you explain rats that can learn how to negotiate a maze or feed themselves from a mechanical feeding device? Did they require reason to know, or was experience enough to give them knowledge?

When you debate, mostly what I see you do is state your point of view; you don't adequately respond to others' legitimate counterpoints, and you don't seem particularly bothered by exceptions to your statements. Are you trading ideas with an openness to learn, or are you lecturing?

That applies to all my posts, by the way. I'm not trying to prove or demonstrate anything about consciousness, philosophy is not capable of that. All I'm saying is that the concept 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness', except perhaps in a tautological way.

First you say you aren't trying to prove anything about consciousness, and then you say " 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness'." You might not have noticed but you are participating in a discussion about the nature of consciousness. Some of us disagreed with a basic assumption of Rorty (and Dennett) that language and thought are the defining aspects of consciousness. We are not talking about "defining" consciousness as a dictionary would! But in any case, I'd love to see how you get rid of experience in your definition. Are you going to show us that, are or you going to just keep making arbitrary statements.

Exactly! We can't think of reality as being a "thing", and we can't think of consciousness as being a "process". Thinking about things that way lead to all sorts of nonsense. . . .

. . . The mistake is to think that any philosophical discussion about 'consciousness' consists of anything other than an attempt to define what the word 'consciousness' means. That's what I think some people don't get, but it's not their fault, it's not easy to see through the deceptive aspects of language.

I say, you are the one who doesn't get it. You don't even know what discusssion you are in. Here's how I see what you are saying in relation to what the rest of us are talking about.

I say the word "green" represents a certain wavelength of light. You say, green is only a word. I say, I know green is a word, but what does that have to do with whether or not there is a certain EM wavelength? You say, even EM and wavelengths are just words. I say, yes but so what, who said they weren't words? Well, you say, even a word is just a word. I say, the discussion is not about words, we are trying to talk about what a certain words represent in objective reality. You say, there is nothing but words, and, and all else is nonesense! Okay, I say, if that is so, then make your case. You say, I just state the obvious facts, it's up to you to figure out what I'm talking about, although its not your fault you don't understand me 'cause what I'm talking about is over most people's heads.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I agree with your second statement here, which is why I think you shouldn't make the distinction that you make in the first. From the 1st person perspective, for at least some nonnegligible duration of time, the experience of eating is identical whether it arises from actually eating, or from being fooled into thinking that you are eating by proper stimulation of your brain. The upshot of this is that there is no direct tie from subjective experience to objective referrents. Your distinction between the two arises from a 3rd person perspective, but is not apparent from the 1st person. So, in fact, I would say that it is more proper to say that experientially the two are identical. If we do not say this then we introduce an objective term into our notion of experience and so we are no longer referring exclusively to subjective experience, or 'awareness of sensation' as you put it.

This is a side-issue to your main point, but I think it is important to talk about it so we remain as precise as possible on what we mean by 'experience.'

Yep, you caught me there. As I generalized about experience, I knew something was inaccurate about lumping internal and external experience together. Let me see if I can say it better.

That experience which comes from within my consciousness has only me as its source. If there is anything truly unique about consciousness, then I don't see how anything "outer" can indentically simulate an experience of that uniqueness. But that which comes from without is usually information reaching me from my senses and brain. There's no reason I can think of that outer information, registering mostly as vibratory analogs of physical events in my consciousness, couldn't (in theory) be simulated perfectly. So I agree, with the right tools a mad scientist could give me the "experience" of eating. However, I do not think he could give me an experience of the most basic nature of consciousness since (I believe) that can only come from within consciousness itself.

 

[confutatis]

I meant that the questions which were unanswerable to Plato are still unanswerable today.

We don't have more answers than Plato, but we do have a lot more questions. That was my point. Philosophy gives us something to talk about. Without philosophy we could not have cocktail parties. Or this forum, for that matter.

The only agreed defintion of consciousness is 'what it is like'. Whether that invokes the concept of consciousness depends on whether you think the words are the thing, or the thing is something that the words point at.

That can't possibly be an agreed definition of consciousness because I don't agree with it :)

I was actually wondering about that this morning. According to that line of thinking, there must be something that "it is like" to be a woman which only women know, right? After all, you have to be a woman to know what it is like to be a woman. Even though I kind of grasp the idea behind the argument, I think putting things that way is silly. The idea may be valid, but the expression of it is pure nonsense. Let's see if I can explain it.

What is a woman? A woman is certainly not defined by "what it feels like to be a woman"; if things were that way no one could know that something as "being a woman" existed, for no one can know what a person feels inside. So a woman must be defined in a different way. Let's say we define a woman by her appearance. So as far as everyone is concerned, if it looks like a woman then it is a woman. That sounds like a more sensible definition. But what about the "what it feels..." stuff? Can someone have the appearance of a woman and "feel like" a man? And here's where the nonsense becomes clear, at least for me.

If "looking like a woman" and "feeling like a woman" are exactly the same thing, then no one who "looks like a woman" could possibly "feel like" anything except a woman. Any difference between "how it looks like" and "how it feels like" would be simply a matter of perspective, different language to describe the same phenomenon. But people are saying this is wrong, there is a difference, so let's examine it.

Someone named 'JS' claims to "feel like" a woman. Even though JS looks like a man, behaves exactly as a man, is sexually attracted to women, and exhibits any known characteristic of a man, JS insists the "feeling inside" is that of a woman. What do we make of JS? We are tempted to call him a fool, right? But the problem is, how can we be sure that JS doesn't really feel like a woman? After all, only JS knows about his/her subjective feelings, so we have to give JS the benefit of the doubt, right? Wrong! Just as we don't know "what it feels like to be JS", likewise JS doesn't know "what it feels like to be a woman". His claim is bogus, he's a man, period.

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

 

[Fliption]

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

It appears to me that you are trapped in a box and can't get out. You're turning everything into a semantic game. Who cares what it feels like to be a "woman"? That's just an arbitrary distinction with a word assigned to it. It doesn't have anything to do with consciousness. Consciousness is "what it's like to be". Not be "something", necessarily. Just "to be".

 

[confutatis]

It appears to me that you are trapped in a box and can't get out. You're turning everything into a semantic game.

My goodness, that's the point! We are all trapped in a box called "the subjective world" and everything anyone says IS a semantic game. The only alternative to communication is reading people's minds. I cannot do that.

Consciousness is "what it's like to be". Not be "something", necessarily. Just "to be".

So, are you?

 

[Canute]

We don't have more answers than Plato, but we do have a lot more questions. That was my point. Philosophy gives us something to talk about. Without philosophy we could not have cocktail parties. Or this forum, for that matter.

Very true. However think we should take this as a sign that our phiolosophising has gone wrong somewhere.

That can't possibly be an agreed definition of consciousness because I don't agree with it :)

No you're right. Not everyone agrees. However this is the common definition within consciousness studies, after a well known papar by Thomas Nagel which asked what it would be like to be a bat. It isn't a scientific definition of course, but it's the only one on which there is any concensus.

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

No offense (really) these are difficult issues. However this is nonsense. If we do not feel anything we are not conscious. How you can say that subjective experience has nothing to do with consciousness defeats me completely. There is no answer to it.

Also every shred of evidence suggests that what it is like to be a woman is unlike what it is like to be a man, thank goodness. Imagine feeling like you can't park.

 

[hypnagogue]

I was actually wondering about that this morning. According to that line of thinking, there must be something that "it is like" to be a woman which only women know, right? After all, you have to be a woman to know what it is like to be a woman.

'What it is like to be' refers to one's direct subjective experience. It does not follow from this that any linguistic dividing line we can come up with entails a totally unique and unknowable set of subjective experiences. For instance, the totality of what it is like to be me is certainly distinct from the totality of what it is like to be you. However, this does not imply that there is no overlap. If we were to look upon the same sunset from the same vantage point, our subjective experiences would still not be identical, but to a large extent they would contain the same phenomenological content-- assuming that your 'red' is the same as my 'red,' and so on.

There is certainly something it is like to be a normally functioning human woman, but it is a further, non-trivial question whether or not it is possible in principle for a man to have a good grasp of this 'what it is like-ness.' The question to ask is, to what extent do the typical subjective experiences of a man overlap with that of a woman? Although differences undoubtedly exist, there is also undoubtedly a great deal of overlap. For a man to have no comprehension of what it is like to be a woman, there would have to be some sort of subjective experience that woman encounter for which a man has no adequate analog in his own repertoire of subjective experience. This may or may not be the case, but we certainly can't assume as you have that it must be the case.

For instance, a man does not undergo menstruation, but a typical man probably experiences cramps at some point in his life, and probably experiences some form of mood swing as well. While still not identical in every detail to the woman's experience, the man can probably imagine a reasonable facsimile of a menstruating woman's experience by way of comparison to his own past experiences. (This claim would be bolstered considerably if the typical woman claims that subjective feeling of menstrual cramps is not qualitatively different in a fundamental way from the feeling of 'normal' cramps, and so on.) Contrast this with a blind man, who will never even be able to construct a reasonable facsimile of what it is like to experience visual consciousness, since he has no adequate experiential analogs through which to attain an understanding.

Can someone have the appearance of a woman and "feel like" a man? And here's where the nonsense becomes clear, at least for me.

We can guess at the answer using a linguistic interchange between men and women on their subjective experiences, but we cannot be sure. So in some respect it may be a nonsensical question to ask, but the nonsense belongs to the way the question has been framed, not to the underlying concept of 'what it is like.'

If "looking like a woman" and "feeling like a woman" are exactly the same thing, then no one who "looks like a woman" could possibly "feel like" anything except a woman.

I honestly don't know what justification you have for tying together appearances and subjective experience in this way. You'd be better served to talk about neurobiology. If there were some neural correlates of consciousness that were scientifically shown to correspond to 'feeling like a woman,' and if your JS character was then shown to possesses these neural correlates, then we would have a high degree of confidence that his claim is justified.

Of course, the problem here is that 'feeling like a woman,' if there truly is such a thing, would probably be exceedingly subtle, vague, and complex. It is not nearly so easy to pick out such a thing as it is to pick out, say, visually 'feeling' redness.

His claim is bogus, he's a man, period.

There seems to be some confusion here. JS is obviously a man, since manhood is defined physiologically. That does not preclude him from feeling like a woman, just like an adult is not precluded from the possibility of feeling like a child under the proper circumstances.

The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

Subjective experience has everything to do with it. You are speaking of a mechanism by which one concludes that other people possesses the same type of subjective experiences that one encounters directly. One does not need this process to know one's own subjective experience-- obviously not, since the only way one can observe the appearance and behavior of others in the first place is through the medium of their own subjective experience.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

I am becoming infatuated with your vision for humanity. Music without feeling, relationships without feeling, life without feeling . . . very efficient. I just hope that what creates everything from dull pianists to mass murderers isn't the lack of feeling.

 

[confutatis]

I am becoming infatuated with your vision for humanity. Music without feeling, relationships without feeling, life without feeling . . . very efficient. I just hope that what creates everything from dull pianists to mass murderers isn't the lack of feeling.

My piano playing is rather dull, and I killed four people yesterday. Are you happy to hear that?

Now if you'd excuse me, I have to think about a reply to hypnagogue's thoughtful post.

 

[confutatis]

For a man to have no comprehension of what it is like to be a woman, there would have to be some sort of subjective experience that woman encounter for which a man has no adequate analog in his own repertoire of subjective experience. This may or may not be the case, but we certainly can't assume as you have that it must be the case.

That is way beside my point. All I said was that we can assume for sure that if there is something about yourself which you think only you have, then you have no word for it. As a consequence, everything you talk about, absolutely everything, must consist of concepts that are shared. Applied to my example, all that is possible for women to talk about themselves are those things that are common to all people who are defined as women.

You seem to be getting the wrong impression that language controls what you are. I never said that. All I said was that language controls what you think you are. You must agree with me that there's far more to you than what you think you are.

For instance, a man does not undergo menstruation, but a typical man probably experiences cramps at some point in his life, and probably experiences some form of mood swing as well. While still not identical in every detail to the woman's experience, the man can probably imagine a reasonable facsimile of a menstruating woman's experience by way of comparison to his own past experiences.

Men have noses and women also have noses. Whatever it is that men share with women, I can assure you it is not part of what makes women "women", if you think of "women" as oppose to "men".

Contrast this with a blind man, who will never even be able to construct a reasonable facsimile of what it is like to experience visual consciousness, since he has no adequate experiential analogs through which to attain an understanding.

Listen to yourself! Are you able to construct a reasonable facsimile of what it is like to experience visual consciousness? Are you saying a blind man cannot know he is blind? It seems so, as one needs to understand what vision is before one knows one doesn't have it.

I honestly don't know what justification you have for tying together appearances and subjective experience in this way.

I'm not "tying together appearances and subjective experience". Read my post. I said "subjective experience has nothing to do with it".

You'd be better served to talk about neurobiology. If there were some neural correlates of consciousness that were scientifically shown to correspond to 'feeling like a woman,' and if your JS character was then shown to possesses these neural correlates, then we would have a high degree of confidence that his claim is justified.

If I could get you to understand the point I'm trying to make, you would see that this idea of "neural correlates" those materialists love to talk about is nonsense. But we have to save that discussion for a later time.

There seems to be some confusion here. JS is obviously a man, since manhood is defined physiologically. That does not preclude him from feeling like a woman

No, it does not. That's not what I said. What I said is that if JS does feel like a woman, he has absolutely no way to know it.

just like an adult is not precluded from the possibility of feeling like a child under the proper circumstances.

That's not a correct analogy. Adults know how it feels to be a child. It's perfectly correct for an adult to say "I'm feeling like a child today". I certainly feel like a child when I'm completely free of worries and just enjoying myself. But the reverse is not true; no child can claim to feel like an adult because a child doesn't know how an adult feels. As a child I often felt adult-like feelings, but I never thought of them as "adult-like feelings" until I grew up and learned what an "adult-like feeling" is.

Do you understand what I'm trying to say?

Subjective experience has everything to do with it. You are speaking of a mechanism by which one concludes that other people possesses the same type of subjective experiences that one encounters directly. One does not need this process to know one's own subjective experience

That's not what I said. What I said is that you need this "process" in order to describe you own subjective experience in linguistic terms, to others and even to yourself.

For instane, I have never felt "enlightened". Maybe I did a few moments in my life, I have recollections of experiences which I could not understand at the time they happened. So those experiences happened, I'm not questioning that. But I don't think I can call those experiences "enlightenment", because I don't know what "enlightenment" means.

Now you tell me: how do I know if I ever experienced "enlightenment"? Is it enough for me to look at people who did? Certainly not, as according to them you can't tell the difference from the outside. Is it enough for me to listen to people explaining what "enlightenment" is? Again not, for they all tell me that "enlightenment" can't be explained. Now that leads me to conclude, from my perspective, that "enlightenment" can't be experienced, and that people who claim to have experienced it don't know what they are talking about.

Please don't get me wrong about that. The fact that you don't know what you are talking about doesn't diminish it. I certainly feel profound love for many things, but I don't know what "love" is. I know what loving behaviour is, but "love" completely eludes me. When I use the word "love", it's always in a poetical way. I'm quite OK with the fact that I don't know what "love" is, for the thing I feel when I use the word is far more important, far more meaningful than any word can possibly convey.

 

[Fliption]

Please don't get me wrong about that. The fact that you don't know what you are talking about doesn't diminish it. I certainly feel profound love for many things, but I don't know what "love" is. I know what loving behaviour is, but "love" completely eludes me. When I use the word "love", it's always in a poetical way. I'm quite OK with the fact that I don't know what "love" is, for the thing I feel when I use the word is far more important, far more meaningful than any word can possibly convey.

Confutatis, not only do I understand what you're saying here, I can agree with it too. But what you're describing is no different than the situation with color that everyone here has already acknowledged. None of us know whether our experience of "blueness" is really the same. But you have to be careful when you make statements like "You have no idea what blue is." As you did with enlightenment. You can experience anything. You just can't know whether what you're experiencing would be considered the same thing by another. This doesn't mean that the subjective experience cannot exists.

And while I understand your point in the last post, it is not at all what was being said earlier. Earlier, the view was that experience cannot exists without some conceptual understanding. This is what I've disagreed with from the start. I'm still not sure how to relate this latest view with those "the physical world is just a blur until you learn some words" posts.

 

[zk4586]

The real issue that divides us is this: Is subjective experience important?

Some of us say yes, some of us say no.

We should just agree to disagree.

 

[Fliption]

The real issue that divides us is this: Is subjective experience important?

Some of us say yes, some of us say no.

We should just agree to disagree.

Important for what?

 

[zk4586]

Important for what?

I give up.

 

[Fliption]

I give up.

Generally when you say something is unimportant, you are referring to something as it relates to something else or to some goal/objective. For example, if you need an automobile to get you from point A to point B, then it isn't important what color the automobile is. You are claiming subjective experience isn't important. It isn't important for what? I don't understand the context of this statement.

 

[zk4586]

Generally when you say something is unimportant, you are referring to something as it relates to something else or to some goal/objective. For example, if you need an automobile to get you from point A to point B, then it isn't important what color the automobile is.

Try telling that to my girlfriend.

You are claiming subjective experience isn't important. It isn't important for what? I don't understand the context of this statement.

Essentially, unimportant when it comes to understanding (or constructing a theory of) consciousness. Isn't that what we've been arguing about for seven pages worth of posts now?

 

[confutatis]

Confutatis, not only do I understand what you're saying here, I can agree with it too. But what you're describing is no different than the situation with color that everyone here has already acknowledged. None of us know whether our experience of "blueness" is really the same. But you have to be careful when you make statements like "You have no idea what blue is."

But I made no such statement. Of course a lot of people have a pretty good idea what blue is. I'm fully aware of why I'm not being understood, but I don't know how to explain it. I'll try once more.

Imagine a word, any word. Let's choose 'cat'. So there is the word 'cat', which is made of the letters 'c', 'a', 't', and there is something which the word is supposed to invoke in your mind when it's being used. Now how do you call that something which the word 'cat' invokes in your mind when you read or hear it? I bet you call it... 'cat'!

Now leave aside the fact that you know there's a difference between 'cat' and 'cat', and think of how nonsensical it seems to say that 'cat' and 'cat' are not the same thing. It is nonsense, but you have to understand why I'm saying it's nonsense. The fact of the matter is that human beings have an awesome ability: we have the ability to understand nonsense. And that is nothing short of a miracle.

People who claim computers will one day be conscious don't understand that fact; they don't understand that it's impossible to build a machine that makes sense of nonsense, a machine that doesn't do what it would be logical for it to do.

You can experience anything. You just can't know whether what you're experiencing would be considered the same thing by another.

Exactly. But if you don't know if your experience would be considered the same thing by another, then you don't know what you're experiencing. No man is an island, knowledge does not belong to an individual alone but to the whole human race. Knowledge can be shared, subjective experience cannot.

From that perspective, it's clear to me you can't know if you ever experienced blue if you don't know what the word 'blue' means. But what does 'blue' really mean? What if what I see as 'blue' is what the rest of the world sees as 'yellow'? Clearly I have no way to know if I ever experienced 'blue', yet that fact doesn't prevent me from talking about 'blue'. And that means whatever it is that I mean when I talk about 'blue', it can't possibly be my subjective experience of it.

At this point I know why you still don't understand the argument, so let me introduce you another question: do you think I'm conscious? I hope you do. Why is that? Is it because you think I know, for instance, what the subjective experience of 'blue' is? I clearly don't, I just stated that. The reason you think I'm conscious is far more trivial: I talk as if I'm conscious. So your subjective knowledge of my subjective consciousness is all based on my ability to talk in a particular way. From your perspective, whether I have subjective experiences or not is completely beside the point, so long as I act as if I do.

This doesn't mean that the subjective experience cannot exist.

I hope I was able to show that whether subjective experience exists or not is completely irrelevant to understand consciousness. That's what I'm trying to say.

And while I understand your point in the last post, it is not at all what was being said earlier. Earlier, the view was that experience cannot exists without some conceptual understanding. This is what I've disagreed with from the start. I'm still not sure how to relate this latest view with those "the physical world is just a blur until you learn some words" posts.

I'm talking nonsense, which is a good sign I'm conscious. Since you're conscious too, you can make sense of the nonsense. All you have to do is try, but don't try too hard if it's not worth it.

 

[Fliption]

Try telling that to my girlfriend.

Ok, give me her number and I'll give it a try.

Essentially, unimportant when it comes to understanding (or constructing a theory of) consciousness. Isn't that what we've been arguing about for seven pages worth of posts now?

Sorry I made you restate it. I just want to be clear. What you're saying clearly depends on how you define consciousness. If you define it the way it is defined in philosophical discussions, then obviously what you're saying isn't true.