Set of representable real numbers

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the nature of the set of representable real numbers within the framework of set theory, particularly under the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms. Participants explore whether this set is countable and if it qualifies as a set or a class, delving into logical formulations and definitions.

Discussion Character

  • Technical explanation
  • Debate/contested
  • Mathematical reasoning

Main Points Raised

  • One participant suggests that the class of all representable real numbers is countable but questions if it constitutes a set under ZF axioms.
  • Another participant argues that every subclass of a set is a set according to the axiom of separation, but raises the issue of whether the set of definable real numbers can be defined by a formula of set theory.
  • A different participant attempts to construct a proof that the definable reals form a set, proposing a function that maps formulas to subsets of real numbers.
  • One participant challenges the assumption that definable numbers form a class, referencing a lack of a first-order logic statement for definable reals.
  • Another participant elaborates on the construction of the function and acknowledges difficulties with quantifiers, suggesting that first-order logic can be integrated into set theory.
  • One participant notes a potential difference in the understanding of the term "class" in the context of the discussion.
  • A later reply discusses a specific condition for membership in the set of definable reals, suggesting that it may be possible to arithmetize the language to align with ZFC formulas.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express differing views on the classification of the set of representable real numbers, with no consensus reached on whether it is a set or a class. The discussion remains unresolved regarding the implications of definability and the nature of the formulas involved.

Contextual Notes

Participants highlight limitations in definitions and the need for precise formulations, particularly concerning the use of first-order logic and the axioms of set theory. There are unresolved issues related to the construction of functions and the interpretation of classes.

Office_Shredder
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From what I understand, the class of all real numbers that we can represent as a sentence in logic is countable. But I'm not sure if it's a set under the standard ZF axioms... it seems intuitive that it should be, since the axioms are really designed to prevent problems involving sets that are too large, and countable sets are fairly innocent, but was wondering if anyone knew one way or the other.
 
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Well, every subclass of a set is a set, according to the axiom of separation, but the question is whether the set of definable/representable real numbers is a class, i.e. can be defined by a formula of set theory.

Here's my attempt at a proof: the class of all formulas of set theory is clearly a set (it can easily be defined inductively). Now if there is a class function f: formula phi -> the subset of R defined by phi, then (because the image of a set is a set) the class of all definable subsets of R is a set. Being a singleton set is a definable condition, so we take the intersection of this class and the class of singletons. We take the union of this set to get the set of definable real numbers. So we need to construct the function f, but this can be done inductively (unless I'm mistaken). Therefore, the definable reals form a set.
 
Well, every subclass of a set is a set, according to the axiom of separation

Only if they can be described as satisfying a first order logic statement right? According to wikipedia, no such statement exists for the definable reals.
 
Yes, which is what I said and then went on to attempt a proof without using the presupposition that the definable numbers form a class.

ETA: every class is definable by a first-order formula of set theory, so your "only if they can be described as satisfying a first order logic statement" is merely a restatement of the assumption that it's a class.

ETA 2: to try to make the construction of f explicit: [itex]f(x \in a) = a, f(\neg\varphi)=\neg f(\varphi),f(\varphi \wedge \psi) = f(\varphi) \cap f(\psi), f(\exists y \varphi(x,y))=\cup_{y \in V} f(\varphi(x,y))[/itex]

The quantifier step doesn't work as it is, I can't figure out how to fix it right now, but intuitively speaking it should be possible, as first-order logic can be immersed into set theory.
 
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I think the problem is we're defining class differently. I think I see what you're saying there
 
You're looking at:

{x in R : there exists phi s.t. "phi is a formula" and "there exists unique y in R s.t. V models phi[y]" and "V models phi[x]"}

The condition for x to be in this set doesn't look like a formula of ZFC, but you can probably arithmetize the language such that it becomes equivalent to a formula of ZFC, e.g. (there exists phi s.t. "phi is a formula") is equivalent to (there exists n s.t. n is in the set of Godel numbers of ZFC formulas) where the set of Godel numbers of ZFC formulas is somehow definable.
 

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