Should we be worried about an H5N1 pandemic?

[hammertime]

The second of two controversial H5N1 studies was released today. My question is this: if H5N1 were to become easily transmissible between humans, how bad would it be? Are there any potential vaccines available (I heard the swine flu vaccine helps)? How hard would it be to develop and mass-produce a vaccine before the pandemic gets out of hand?

Or is the talk of a pandemic just hype?

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Threat of pandemic is always something we should be concerned about. With globalisation, urbanisation and increasing human activities in all ecosystems (increasing the risk of zoonosis) we should always be investing in better epidemic defences.

If H5N1 became easily transmissible we would be in trouble, whilst there do exist vaccines (which many countries are stockpiling) the efficacy is limited due to to mutability of H5N1. If a pandemic strain were to evolve there is no real guarantee that current vaccines would be applicable. As far as developing and mass-producing a new vaccine usually this takes years and years but in an epidemic there's enough international funding and collaboration to shrink this time but IIRC it would still take the best part of a year to manufacture enough vaccine.

As an aside when you are referencing a study you really should link to it and if you're calling it controversial you should explain why (just so you know the controversy surrounds releasing information regarding an airborne version of the virus that was evolved in the lab for study). Both papers are available free in the http://www.sciencemag.org/site/special/h5n1/index.xhtml. The special introduction by the editor-in-chief is very interesting:

Introduction to Special Issue
Introduction

H5N1

Bruce Alberts, Editor-in-Chief of Science

The publication in this issue of the research paper airborne transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets, plus its newer companion The Potential for Respiratory Droplet–Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus to Evolve in a Mammalian Host, marks the end of more than 8 months of widely reported controversy over whether some of the data now freely accessible should be withheld in the public interest (see http://scim.ag/H5N1_Flu for a compilation of News and Commentary recently published in Science). As a result, people worldwide are now much more aware of the potential threat that this virus, commonly known as “bird flu,” poses to humanity. And the open publication of new data concerning the potential of H5N1 to convert directly to a form that can be transferred through the air between ferrets will motivate many more policy-makers and scientists to work to reduce the likelihood that this virus will evolve to cause a pandemic. Breakthroughs in science often occur when a scientist with a unique perspective combines prior knowledge in novel ways to create new knowledge, and the publication of the two research Reports in this issue will hopefully help to stimulate the innovation needed, perhaps from unsuspected sources, to make the world safer.

As described in News and Commentary pieces in this special section, the prolonged controversy has also provided a “stress test” of the systems that had been established to enable the biological sciences to deal with “dual-use research of concern” (DURC): biological research with legitimate scientific purposes that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security. One centerpiece of this system is the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). Science strongly supports the NSABB mechanism, which clearly needs to be supplemented and further strengthened to deal with the inevitable future cases of publication of dual-use research, both before and after their submission to journals. Still missing is a comprehensive international system for assessing and handling DURC—one that provides access, for those with a need to know, to any information deemed not to be freely publishable.

If fields subject to DURC are to attract the outstanding young scientists required to address problems such as those posed by H5N1, the appropriate experts may need to define in advance the most promising research strategies and, acting in concert with security experts, agree on responsible ways to address them. It is our hope that the thoughtful Commentaries, News, and research Reports in this special issue will help to jump-start intensive efforts along these lines.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Flicking through this special edition further it seems like this review could answer a lot of your questions:

Influenza: Options to Improve Pandemic Preparation
Rino Rappuoli, Philip R. Dormitzer
Science and society have been struggling to find a way to protect humankind from recurring epidemics and pandemics of influenza. Here, we review the options available in the short term and also briefly address the solutions that research may make available in the long term.
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6088/1531.full

 

[hammertime]

What I'm wondering is this: if H5N1 does become easily transmissible among humans, what kind of death toll are we looking at? Millions? Tens of millions? Hundreds of millions? Billions?

By the way, didn't some researchers find that the swine flu vaccine also helps protect against H5N1?

 

[mazinse]

What I'm wondering is this: if H5N1 does become easily transmissible among humans, what kind of death toll are we looking at? Millions? Tens of millions? Hundreds of millions? Billions?

By the way, didn't some researchers find that the swine flu vaccine also helps protect against H5N1?

we are in 2012 now, I think your estimation is way too inflated

 

[Evo]

What I'm wondering is this: if H5N1 does become easily transmissible among humans, what kind of death toll are we looking at? Millions? Tens of millions? Hundreds of millions? Billions?

There is no way for anyone to know. Contracting the flu does not equal death.