vanhees71 said:
Of course, a probability distribution doesn't select which outcome you'll get when performing the random experiment. It just tells you the probability for that outcome.
And we can explore what this probability distribution is telling us about nature. Is it telling us:
1) There is, in truth, only one possible outcome but we calculate a probability due to a lack of information.
2) In truth, every position with a non-zero probability, has a genuine possibility of being measured.
#1 tells us precisely why we only ever measure the system in a single, well-defined position. #2 doesn't tell us this.
If the answer is 2), then we can explore how it is a genuine possibility that any position could be measured but ultimately we only ever measure the system in a single, well-defined position. What random process is at play here?
vanhees71 said:
QT can be considered complete if you accept that Nature behaves objectively random as described by it. If you don't accept this, you consider QT as incomplete.
We can accept that Nature behaves objectively random but still request an explanation of the random process.
We start by preparing the system in a lab and then we randomly detect it on a screen in another lab, but what happens in between?
vanhees71 said:
Of course, you can neither prove that QT is complete nor that it is incomplete. One can only say that with the hitherto observed facts there is no need for an alternative theory, because QT describes all the observed facts very well.
Again, I think it's important to come back to the title of the EPR paper, 'Can quantum-mechanical
description of physical reality be considered complete?' (emphasis mine). They set out their general criterion for completeness, that 'every element of physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory'.
They then set out an argument which aimed to demonstrate that there are facts about the system which are unobserved (and possible unobservable). Bell tests demonstrate that their assumptions [about physical reality] cannot account for the observations of experiments. EPR, however, state that their approach is just one possible way of identifying 'elements of reality' and that it does not exhaust all the possible ways of identifying 'elements of reality'.
EPR opens us to the possibility that there are unobserved/unobservable facts about the system but that those facts do not necessarily take single, pre-defined values. That doesn't mean, however, that there are no unobserv-ed (-able) facts about the system.
EPR Completeness & Observables
But, even if we talk strictly about the observable facts of the system, and we classify these observable facts as 'elements of reality' - the alternative is to deny them as 'elements of reality' - these individual elements of reality do not correspond to anything in the mathematical formalism. The reason being, the individual detection events i.e. the elements of reality occur with certainty, so they cannot correspond to the probability distribution. So, in this sense the statistical interpretation fails the general EPR criterion for completeness.
Where the probability distribution does correspond to something is the pattern of detection events of an ensemble of 'elements of reality'. Is this pattern an 'element of reality'? Does the probability distribution correspond exactly to the pattern? Even if we answer yes to both these questions, the fact remains that the individual 'elements of reality' i.e. detection events do not correspond to anything in the mathematical formalism.
Again, it comes back to what Ballentine said.