Chris Fuchs said:
It may come as no surprise that philosophers of physics generally hate the point of view. It wasn't in their coursework when they were first discussing philosophy and it impinges on philosophies that aren't part of the standard curriculum of philosophy of physics. And to my ear, their main complaint is: "Wah, wah, wah, you don't believe wave functions are real, they're clearly real, so we're not going to pay attention to QBism".
The (representative) philosophers of physics on the slide, from left to right are: Wayne C. Myrvold, David Z. Albert, David Wallace, Ruth E. Kastner, Harvey R. Brown, and Tim Maudlin.
Chris Fuchs claims that just because he doesn't believe wave functions are real, philosophers won't listen to him. However, the problem for the philosophers is probably rather that he doesn't even seem to care what is real, independent of whether it is the wave function, particles, or measurement results.
If he would just deny that the wavefunction is real, he certainly wouldn't be alone. But what can it even mean that the wavefuntion is not real?
My guess that is that you can try to ask the same question in the context of non-deterministic computation to better understand this:
gentzen said:
Both non-deterministic computation and quantum computation give rise to a
compact closed category. But how can you interpret a compact closed category? For non-deterministic computation, it is basically a collection of equations, local ones, or rather locally verifiable ones, where “local” can take on many meanings, depending on context. Obviously, such equations don’t have a preferred time-direction, and also no preferred “causality direction”.
Take two simple examples, namely non-deterministic finite automata, and non-deterministic push-down automata. An analog question for the finite automata would be whether the set of states reachable for a given initial segment of an input string is real. You can answer yes, if you want. However, then you should also try to ask the same question for the push-down automata. Now you are not just talking about a set of finite states of the automata, but about set of pairs of finite automata state and a state of the stack. You can still declare that this set is real, but other interpretations can become more attractive now, where that set it is not real.