Vitalist nonsense versus Science.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?

Precisely by explaining the properties of macroscopic physics in terms of the properties of microscopic physics. For instance, the macroscopic liquidity of a liquid can be explained in terms of the chemical bonding structure of the atoms/molecules which compose the liquid.

The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.

But we have a clear conceptual picture of how the small scale physics accounts for the large scale physics. We do not have a clear conceptual picture of how physics at any scale can account for consciousness, and there are strong reasons to believe that we never will unless we accept that our fundamental ontology (those things which are taken to exist axiomatically, without further explanation: spacetime and matter/energy) is somehow altered or expanded to take the existence of consciousness into account.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.

Ok. Let's just say that none of these theories have gained any degree of acceptance.

Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer,

Precisely what philosophers argue, in reverse. Take your pick.

and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.

Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.

Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.

What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming consensus.

Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter? [/B]

It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.

Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.

No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.

The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.

What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming consensus.

Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.

It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.

If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;


Then one will have explained conscious experience. All one has to do is by-pass the philosophical question of "what makes this physical process 'produce' this outcome" and look at it scientifically (see my thread on Faulty Expectations of a Theory of Consciousness.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.

I agree that this is exactly what he does. The question is whether this approach might lead to an explanation or whether it just begs the question. I'd say the latter.

The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.

Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding. Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.

Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.

Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.

Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.

Ok, but you've got some healthy opposition.

If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;

I would say that, more simply put, Chalmer's position is that we need to expain the existence of 'what it is like to be'. As this is not a meaningful scientific description or definition he argues that science needs to consider redefing itself in order to include consciousness, and thus have a chance of explaining it. In a sense the 'hard problem' is finding a scientific definition for consciousness, for only if we can find one can we say that it is a scientific entity. Calling it physical is a sort of bulldozer of a strategy, and is completely ad hoc and counterintuitive. Many people, me incuded, cannot make sense of this hypothesis.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding.

Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occurring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?

Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.

Of course this is true, but what makes you think they haven't already defined it as thoroughly as they've defined everything else?

Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.

You are certainly not, and perhaps this is indicative that there is something really wrong with his theory...but then, nobody seemed to want to agree with Copernicus or Galileo or Darwin. Dennett could be wrong, or everyone else could be wrong...again.

 

[confutatis]

Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occurring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?

That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.

Here's my criteria for accepting an explanation of "consciousness" as meaningful and possibly true:

- 'X' is a computer that can communicate with humans in English
- X is programmed to never lie, but because of that it often fails to answer a question
- X knows the meaning of some 50,000 words, including the word "consciousness"
- when asked "X, are you conscious?", X gives an answer

A truly meaningful explanation of consciousness must allow us to understand how it's possible to buid a machine that knows how to answer the question "are you conscious" without lying (nevermind what the answer is, it's beside the point). Dennett's theory spectacularly fails that. And so do all theories.

Chalmers is right, but for the wrong reasons.

 

[TENYEARS]

Mentat, long time no talk kid. Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.

Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.

But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, long time no talk kid.

How've you been?

Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.

Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.

If you're right, I'm sure it will make for an interesting new paradigm of discovery.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Mentat
But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?

Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?

What needs to be clearly delineated is where "consciousness" differs from "ability to think". To a good extent my computer is perfectly capable of thinking, but I suspect you don't believe my computer is capable of thinking in a conscious manner. Can you explain why?

 

[TENYEARS]

Confused us, why did you choose such a name, probably for the same reason you ask such questions. He was not enlightened. These are good questions, but you must answer them. If you have not, have you asked them yet? To think of them on your own means there is is a smell in the air, so follow your nose.

Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?

Keep the ball rolling, you never know what you may stumble into.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?

Consciousness is a collection of thought.

You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?

This is an interesting statement, TENYEARS. What's the difference?

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Mentat
Consciousness is a collection of thought.

You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.

I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?

If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?

Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?

If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?

Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?

You want my opinion? What would constitute evidence of consciousness, for me, would be if the computers processing routines were working in a Selectionist manner, producing Multiple Drafts of each sub-experience by interaction between the discreet processing units.

But that's just because I like Dennett's approach.

Aside from this, if the computer could think (and there's no reason, IMO, to say it couldn't), then it would conscious. It might not be sentient, or even have a particularly high level of consciousness, but it would be conscious to some degree.

 

[TENYEARS]

There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truly assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.

What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.

Then again, maybe I just lie.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truly assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.

What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.

Then again, maybe I just lie.

It is not a lie if you believe it, TENYEARS.

 

[TENYEARS]

Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by confutatis
What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"?

If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.

Do you really believe what you just said?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)

Define "unconscious thought".

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Define "unconscious thought".

Some neural activity that plays a similar functional role to what we think of as conscious thought, but which nonetheless occurs unconsciously.

For instance, there have been scientists/mathemeticians/thinkers who have unsuccessfully tried to solve difficult problems in their waking lives, only to have the solution spontaneously present itself to their conscious awareness in a dream. This suggests that their brains were processing information relevant to the problems while they slept (and perhaps subconsciously while they were awake), unbeknowst to them. Hence, they were having at least some 'unconscious thoughts'-- those thoughts that led to the solution.

This is one of the more striking examples of unconscious thought, although in reality we probably have such unconscious thoughts (judgments, reactions, deductions) all the time. There is much that goes on in the brain that does not reveal itself to consciousness, even when it comes to the higher cognitive functions.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

For once I completely disgree with you. You have arbitrarily redefnined 'thoughts' to suit your argument. I think just about Just about everyone would normally say that a thought that one is not having is not a thought.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think the usual notion of 'thought' can embody two roles: the experiential role (how it feels) and the functional role (what it does). The same can be said for other 'higher' cognitive functions, such as memory. Thus there is a sense in which we can talk about thought and memory without referring to our conscious experiences of them at all. Obviously we do not take everything into account if we refer to conscious thought and conscious memory without referring to their experiential components; but it appears that we can still take into account their functional roles in the brain without explicitly referring to their experiential contents. That is to say, although it is obviously nonsensical to speak of the occurrence of an experience in the absence of subjective experience of it, it is not necessarily nonsensical to speak of the occurrence of a physical brain function in the absence of subjective experience of it, even if that physical function is sometimes subjectively experienced.

From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways). However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways). However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.

If one 'search' of a problem is done while conscious and the other problem 'search' is done while unconscious—do you think the two possibilites for that 'search' would alter in opinions? This, of course is a purely subjective opinion.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

Two objections. First I stand by my point about the definition of a 'thought'. It is perfectly possible to redefine the meaning to include hypothetical unconscious processes, but this contradicts everyday usage.

Secondly I still think that you're making assumptions. The fact that solutions to problems sometimes appear out of the blue does not even prove that we have an unconscious mind. After all if these processes are hidden from consciousness then it may be that they are entirely physical, deterministic mechanical brain functions, and it doesn't seem proper to call these thoughts or assume an unconscious mind that has them.

Neither does the fact that solutions to problems sometimes seem to appear spontaneously prove that we were processing the variables when we weren't looking. That's what we assume, but theoretically the solution could have appeared simply because we hadn't been thinking about the problem for a while and so came back to it with a new mind-set and fresh perspective, able to see instantly what we couldn't before. It's difficult to prove that anything at all was happening prior to our awareness of having the solution. (Not sure about that point but it seems correct).

I would say that 'unconscious thoughts' is an oxymoron. Even if it isn't it seems a rather empty phrase, since no such thing has ever been proved to exist, or ever will be.

 

[TENYEARS]

Mentat, No.

hypnagogue/Canute, you are out of your minds, don't go to far, you may not come back.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think we'll just have to disagree on this one.

Originally posted by Canute
Two objections. First I stand by my point about the definition of a 'thought'. It is perfectly possible to redefine the meaning to include hypothetical unconscious processes, but this contradicts everyday usage.

I don't think it's redefining terms. If what I am proposing as 'unconscious thought' really does serve the same general functional role in the brain as 'conscious thought,' then the only major difference between the two is whether or not they are represented in conscious experience. Hence if you define thought as a process of which we are aware, I don't see the contradiction in naming a similar process of which we are not aware, so long as I always refer to it as unconscious thought. In doing so I have not redefined 'thought,' I merely have defined a new phenomenon which is similar in the relevant ways to 'thought' as you define it except for the experiential aspect; but, I have made it explicit that it does not include this experiential aspect.

Secondly I still think that you're making assumptions. The fact that solutions to problems sometimes appear out of the blue does not even prove that we have an unconscious mind. After all if these processes are hidden from consciousness then it may be that they are entirely physical, deterministic mechanical brain functions, and it doesn't seem proper to call these thoughts or assume an unconscious mind that has them.

That's exactly what I think an 'unconscious thought' is: just a physical information processing mechanism in the brain. I do not think subjective experience can be coherently identified as literally 'being' a purely physical neural mechanism, for all the familiar reasons regarding the incommensurability between the ontologies of two. However, the philosophical problems of such an identity do not apply for cognitive processes that are not associated with subjective experience, because in this case there is nothing for the physical processes to be incommensurable with. The functional role of thought, devoid of the experiential aspect, can be seen as a physical, algorithmic process without any inherent contradictions. (This is why eg the notion of a 'zombie' is not logically incoherent.)

Neither does the fact that solutions to problems sometimes seem to appear spontaneously prove that we were processing the variables when we weren't looking. That's what we assume, but theoretically the solution could have appeared simply because we hadn't been thinking about the problem for a while and so came back to it with a new mind-set and fresh perspective, able to see instantly what we couldn't before. It's difficult to prove that anything at all was happening prior to our awareness of having the solution. (Not sure about that point but it seems correct).

Difficult to prove, yes, but there are good reasons for believing it nonetheless. The alternative is to suppose that the solution spontaneously occurs ex nihilo, and to me that is not a satisfying proposition. It is readily demonstrable that conscious thought involves the utilization of certain general but differentiated neural mechanisms, so I do not think it's a stretch to posit such mechanisms performing their functions as usual even though they happen in this instance to not be a content of consciousness.

Numerous scientific studies involving phenomena such as unconscious priming, in addition to common sense concerns such as 'why do thoughts appear to bubble up randomly from nowhere?' all point to the general conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible or incoherent, to account for the performace of consciousness without taking into account brain activities which themselves are not all privilege to conscious access.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Jeebus
If one 'search' of a problem is done while conscious and the other problem 'search' is done while unconscious—do you think the two possibilites for that 'search' would alter in opinions? This, of course is a purely subjective opinion.

I don't see why that wouldn't be possible. In fact such a phenomena may account for eg the situation where a person struggles to accept a certain idea even though he cannot pinpoint exactly why.

In cases of brain lesioned patients it's not uncommon to see internal conflicts like this occurring. For instance, I recall reading about a patient who had some kind of dissociation of conscious control of one of his hands. This led to the very strange occasion where he was buttoning up his shirt with his consciously controlled hand only to have it unbuttoned by the hand he could not control!