Why the bias against materialism?

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The discussion centers on the tension between materialism and idealism, emphasizing that materialistic views are often dismissed despite their empirical support. Participants argue that while science is a valuable tool for understanding the physical universe, it has limitations and cannot fully explain consciousness or the meaning of life. There is a critique of anti-materialist sentiments, likening them to historical resistance against scientific progress, and highlighting the psychological need for beliefs beyond materialism. The conversation also touches on the role of community in belief systems and the subjective nature of human experience. Ultimately, the debate reflects a struggle to reconcile scientific understanding with deeper existential questions.
  • #801
I guess what Whitehead means is that if thinking were fully determined by nature, thinking about nature would be self-limited, because the mental instance could only experience being fully determined. In other words, being determined (in this case by nature) excludes being 'above' that thing, i.e. non-determined. What do you mean, Zero, by "wishful thinking" in this respect?

I guess there can only be much misunderstanding in these questions as long as the will (required for the act of thinking to be reasonable) as a subjectively necessary element is mixed up (con-fused) with the contents of thinking, which have to relate to each other in an objective way. The brain is an inevitably necessary condition too, but this does not mean that it is 100.00% causal -- unless one remains in the mentioned conceptual mixup, as is widely the case in the current mainstream of philosophy of mind too (which can't account for the will, it simply disregards it). So that's precisely where the interpretations of empirical facts are clashing, also in this debate.

For whoever believes the will is irrelevant: try empirically to think clearly about something without directing your will so the result will be reasonable.

What Whitehead says, on the other hand, accounts for the self-limitedness of many positions in the current debate, who can't see their own 'blind spot', precisely because they let themselves be determined by aspects of what they would like to talk about.
 
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  • #802
Here we go with the blah blah blah about 'will' not being accounted for. Again, the entire point of the arguments agaist reality is hoping for a special exemption for people.
 
  • #803
Be a Material Conservative. You can't take it with you, and most don't have it to begin with.
 
  • #804
I'll say again; 'will' is like 'propulsion'...we don't claim that a rocket's movement is apart from the workings of the rocket, so why do we treat the actions of the brain as apart from the brain itself?
 
  • #805
Originally posted by Fliption
I do not understand why you keep bringing up this homunculun problem. I am trying to accommodate your materialistic assumptions by claiming that the mind, consciousness etc is nothing special and is nothing more than physical processes. These physical processes are no different then the physical process of an automobile working. The process of an automobile working is of course dependent on the less complex processes involving fuel consumption, lubrication, frictionless revolution and shock absorbtion of wheels, etc etc. What is wrong with this comparison? Why does this homunculun problem only a problem when I'm talking about the brain and no other physical process? It seems you are the one glorifying consciousness.

Oh boy. Forgive me if I get a little impatient, it's been a long day...somebody actually misused the Exercise in "nothing" semantics - that's never happened before - and then somebody else reiterated the same misunderstanding of another topic on at least three different threads...anyway, I'll try to remain good-spirited in my response :smile:.

Alright, you can't see why I keep bringing up the homunculun problem. Here's why: every time you mention a process that occurs in the brain, as a result of the processing functions of the brain, and call it (this new process, which is an effect of the brain's electrochemical processes) "consciousness", you introduce the idea of a "mind's eye". It's inevitable, because what good would it do me to have an inner display of "qualia" of there was no viewer on the inside to "see" them? And if there is such a viewer (no matter what form he takes) then you have infinite regress.

Perhaps this is getting close to a response of what I've written above but I don't understand exactly what you mean.

I mean that I still like my definitions of Materialism and Idealism, since either of them could fall into the dualistic problem (which the problem that your definition focuses on) but only one can fall into the non-physical/physical problem.

So you're saying that everything in the universe is just one big process and cannot be reductively separated? This just doesn't make sense to me.

I wasn't making a statement about everything in the Universe, just the things in the brain.

You said this...


Then you said this...


Tell me why these don't contradict one another. I'm not trying to be difficult, I really just don't understand your point. These 2 quotes seem like contradictions so I cannot grasp what your trying to say.

Alright, I see what the problem is, and apologize. No, they are not contradictory, but I may have slightly mis-stated the second one. You see, a particular thought or a particular "picture in the mind" (or anything of this nature, which I refer to as phenomenological events, hypnagogue prefers the term "qualia", it doesn't really matter, as long as you understand what I'm saying) does not exist, either physically or non-physically; there's just no such thing. Now, consciousness itself (being aware and self-conscious, and all that) is a physical process of the brain, but when one refers to an individual thought they fall into logical error, which means that we should eliminate the idea of an individual thought and replace it with Dennett's model (or another that does the same job better, I suppose).

Thus, what I'm saying is that phenomenological events don't exist. In fact, when I refer to "phenomenological events" I'm using words to describe...absolutely nothing - except, of course, a misconception that is commonly engrained in the human mind, of the actual processes of the mind.

Here I don't think you've understood what I'm saying. I'm not claiming the existence of any effects and trying to called them physical. It seems you think I am because you're asking me "why don't they take up space?". I'm just restating what you've told me. I'm saying let's assume consciousness is nothing but a physical process. Do you not agree with this?

Oh. I agree that we should just assume that consciousness is nothing but a physical process, but I don't think that we have quite the same vision. In my (currently Materialistic) concept, there are no thoughts at all, merely the question/answer "game" of the different neurons and sets thereof in the brain.

So, basically, my concept of "consciousness as nothing but a physical process" is: Look at the brain, see the neurons and synapses, there is nothing else.

To claim there is nothing else but what is in my mind is making statements about reality, Mentat.

Yes, statements about reality, but reality would only be that which went on in your mind, and thus every statement about reality (to the Solipsist) is merely (only, and nothing but) a statement about their own mind (since nothing else exists).

But I'm not using that terminology anymore. I've moved from that terminology several posts ago. My position isn't changing but I'me having to jump through semantic hoops to get you to see that you're definition doesn't work. So I'm not using things like "inside the mind" anymore.

It doesn't matter if you've changed the terminology in these particular posts. The matter still stands that your definitions from before require a distinction between that which occurs "inside the mind" and that which occurs outside the mind, which is the wrong distinction (a logically non-existent one). My definitions, OTOH, have been rooted in the distinction between belief in only the physical or something else. The only reason we are still discussing philosophies of the mind, instead of tackling the big picture (the whole paradigms of Materialism and Idealism) is because of your definitions (and all those like it which come from a (IMO) misconception about the issue at hand).

I just do not understand this point. It seems like a semantic nightmare.

In many senses, it is. However, I can attempt to simplify it for you: Materialist belief on philosophies of the mind = there are electrochemical activities involving synapses and neurons, and, in order for this to become conscious it also requires...nothing. It doesn't require anything, because those synaptic activities are consciousness.

You tell me Mentat. You're the one that initially brought it up. Why would you do that if it communicates nothing?

To illustrate the confusion that is brought up from assuming that there is such a thing as a phenomenological event.

Ahh but see you reversed it. This definition is not what you said an idealist believes. Of course, if a person believes they are the only mind to exists then you could conclude that they also believe there is nothing physical.But the definition is flipped in that example.

You said that an idealists believes there is nothing physical. So you have to begin with this belief!

What?? I never said an Idealist believe there is nothing physical. I said a Solipsist believes there is nothing physical. An Idealist believes that there is something non-physical (the amount of things that are non-physical is greater than or equal to 1).

Not the belief that "I am the only mind". If you start with that belief then you're using my definition of ldealism.

I'm trying to get you to make the connection from the belief that nothing is physical(first!) to one that says "I am the only mind". You'll notice that if you reverse your statement above, it is no longer true. It would read

"Because, if there are no physical realities then only some singular mind exists. This is not necessarily true.

Actually, it is. If there are no physical realities, and yet I'm still conscious of something, then my mind must exist, while nothing else does.
 
  • #806
Heres more...

http://magazines.enews.com/easterbrook.mhtml?pid=717

90% OF THE UNIVERSE ISN'T REALLY MISSING, JUST MISPLACED: Today is the first day of a University of Chicago conference at which cosmologists are mapping out plans to attempt to locate "dark matter" and "dark energy." I don't wish to alarm you, but at least 90 percent of the universe is missing. Astronomers hope to find it.

When cosmologists measure the gravitational attraction on heavenly bodies, at least two-thirds of the matter in the cosmos appears to be missing; that is, stars move as if acted upon by much more gravity than can be accounted for by observed amounts of normal matter. For years this has led to speculation that there is "dark matter" or "missing mass" throughout the firmament--perhaps as strange forms of subatomic particles not present in this solar system, perhaps as huge numbers of black holes, perhaps as huge numbers of almost-stars hard to see because they don't shine. There are other theories. Searching for the missing mass has for several decades been an obsession of astrophysics.

Then, a few years ago, astronomers made the unexpected discovery that not only are the galaxies rushing away from each other, they are speeding up. It had been assumed that the Big Bang provided the impetus for the movement of the galaxies, and across the eons, momentum from the Big Bang would wear off, causing the galaxies to slow down. Instead they're speeding up: the evidence looks solid. Cosmic acceleration cannot be happening unless something is pushing on the galaxies, that is, adding energy to them. Hence, dark energy.

The new betting line among scientists is that the luminous, observable forms of energy in the universe--shining stars, natural radio waves and X-rays and so on--actually constitutes only a small share of total energy. Something much more potent, dark energy, carries most of the power in creation; dark energy has so much power that it's speeding up unfathomable numbers of galaxies across unfathomable distances. The existence of dark energy would answer the riddle of why gravity does not cause everything in creation to crush together: Dark energy is repelling the components of the universe at the same time that gravity attracts them. And it's looking like dark energy is stronger than gravity--stronger, perhaps, by orders of magnitude.

Here's the rub. While there are theories about what dark matter might be, no one has the slightest clue what dark energy is. No instrument can detect it. No one knows where it comes from or how it works. Dark energy appears strong enough to push the entire universe, and yet science can't locate it.

Bear this in mind when you're tempted to think Homo sapiens already understands the physical world, or even has the slightest idea what's going on. Combining missing dark matter and missing dark energy, science can't so much as locate 90 percent of the universe! Bear this in mind, as well, when you're tempted to think we "know" there is no nonmaterial world. An energy strong enough to push the entire universe is pulsing through your body right now; you can't feel it, and science has no idea how it works or where it originates. How many other nonmaterial forces might there be?

As for the University of Chicago conference, you won't want to miss the session: "APEX-SZ, a Millimeter-wavelength galaxy cluster survey using the Sunyaev-Zel'dovich Effect."
 
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  • #807
Originally posted by Mentat
Here's why: every time you mention a process that occurs in the brain, as a result of the processing functions of the brain, and call it (this new process, which is an effect of the brain's electrochemical processes) "consciousness", you introduce the idea of a "mind's eye".


OK, I think I see the problem we're having. The problem we seem to be having is with the phrase "processes of the brain". You define them as all being on the same level and I do not. The processes that you are referring to are the processes dealing with neurons etc etc. I'm claiming that the processes of neurons are themselves made up of less complex physical processes. So if I agree that consciousness is exactly the same thing as the process of neurons working in the brain, then I can claim that consciousness is caused by those simpler processes. Perhaps you wouldn't even call these simpler processes "processes of the brain" but it would be a small matter to clear up if you don't.

Going back to the automobile analogy, you claim that an "automobile" is not the result of the "process of the engine on wheels". It "IS" the "process of the engine on wheels". I am not claiming that the "process of the engine on wheels" produces this non-physical thing called the automobile. I am agreeing that they are one and the same thing. But I then am going further to say that the "process of the engine on wheels" or the "automobile" is the result of less complex physical processes (fuel consumption, shock absorption etc.)

Do you follow this? I'm going in a different direction from you. I'm not projecting anything new as a result of processes. I am simpler stepping back in the heiarchy of processes and assigning labels. This is all so semantic it's almost funny.


Oh. I agree that we should just assume that consciousness is nothing but a physical process, but I don't think that we have quite the same vision. In my (currently Materialistic) concept, there are no thoughts at all, merely the question/answer "game" of the different neurons and sets thereof in the brain.
OK and I'm agreeing with this and now asking the question "Isn't the process of thought, the question/answer game, made up of even simpler physical processes? I realize this is dependent on how you define process but, again, this is merely semantics and surely we can overcome that.
So, basically, my concept of "consciousness as nothing but a physical process" is: Look at the brain, see the neurons and synapses, there is nothing else.
I ask again for emphasis, what is the science behind the workings of neurons and synapses? There should be some more fundamental process within this process.

In many senses, it is. However, I can attempt to simplify it for you: Materialist belief on philosophies of the mind = there are electrochemical activities involving synapses and neurons, and, in order for this to become conscious it also requires...nothing. It doesn't require anything, because those synaptic activities are consciousness.
It requires nothing but the processes that make up the synaptic process.


What?? I never said an Idealist believe there is nothing physical. I said a Solipsist believes there is nothing physical. An Idealist believes that there is something non-physical (the amount of things that are non-physical is greater than or equal to 1).

How is this distinction relevant? The point I'm trying to make is that the choices for an idealists are not just 1) the physical and non-physical exist together or 2)I am the only mind.

Actually, it is. If there are no physical realities, and yet I'm still conscious of something, then my mind must exist, while nothing else does.

So you're saying that if nothing physical exists, then 2 or more non-physical minds cannot exists? Please connect the dots for me.
 
  • #808
Originally posted by Fliption
OK, I think I see the problem we're having. The problem we seem to be having is with the phrase "processes of the brain". You define them as all being on the same level and I do not. The processes that you are referring to are the processes dealing with neurons etc etc. I'm claiming that the processes of neurons are themselves made up of less complex physical processes. So if I agree that consciousness is exactly the same thing as the process of neurons working in the brain, then I can claim that consciousness is caused by those simpler processes. Perhaps you wouldn't even call these simpler processes "processes of the brain" but it would be a small matter to clear up if you don't.

Whoah, whoah, wait a minute. What simpler processes? You mean the typical cell division, or the currents of electricity in the axons, or the releasing of chemicals across the synaptic space? What exactly are you talking about?

Going back to the automobile analogy, you claim that an "automobile" is not the result of the "process of the engine on wheels". It "IS" the "process of the engine on wheels". I am not claiming that the "process of the engine on wheels" produces this non-physical thing called the automobile. I am agreeing that they are one and the same thing. But I then am going further to say that the "process of the engine on wheels" or the "automobile" is the result of less complex physical processes (fuel consumption, shock absorption etc.)

Do you follow this? I'm going in a different direction from you. I'm not projecting anything new as a result of processes. I am simpler stepping back in the heiarchy of processes and assigning labels. This is all so semantic it's almost funny.

What about it though? You can use reductionism on a car if you want, that has no bearing whatsoever on brain functions. The functions of the brain are those of any other cell, except that which occurs in the axons and dendrits or across the synaptic space. How are the "simpler processes" relevant at all?

OK and I'm agreeing with this and now asking the question "Isn't the process of thought, the question/answer game, made up of even simpler physical processes? I realize this is dependent on how you define process but, again, this is merely semantics and surely we can overcome that.

I ask again for emphasis, what is the science behind the workings of neurons and synapses? There should be some more fundamental process within this process.

I've already listed the "more fundamental" processes, but they are not, on their own, even brain functions, since brain functions require all of them to work together (electricity has to be conducted along axons, which have to stimulate packets of sodium ions to travel across the small synaptic space...these processes on their own are irrelevant, but the sum product is a very adaptable being).

It requires nothing but the processes that make up the synaptic process.

What processes?!?

I re-iterate that which you must already know, but have stored somewhere in the far reaches of your memory (no offense), an atom is the simplest form of matter which still retains the properties of the element. Therefore, if you try to get any simpler than the sodium ions propogated across the synaptic space, you have left the realm of philosophies of the mind.

How is this distinction relevant? The point I'm trying to make is that the choices for an idealists are not just 1) the physical and non-physical exist together or 2)I am the only mind.

Their only choices are 1) the physical and the non-physical exist together; or 2) there is only the non-physical.

So you're saying that if nothing physical exists, then 2 or more non-physical minds cannot exists? Please connect the dots for me.

Spacetime is physical, Fliption. If I am a Solipsist, then I believe that there is nothing physical, and that includes space...which means, of course, that there can be no "other people" since those would be separated from me by space. And you can't get around that by saying that "they could be separated by 'something else'" or some other such rebuttal, since Relativity dictates that there is really no such thing as "space or time" independent of reference points; thus, if there are two beings, there are two reference points, and there is thus space.
 
  • #809
Originally posted by Mentat
Whoah, whoah, wait a minute. What simpler processes? You mean the typical cell division, or the currents of electricity in the axons, or the releasing of chemicals across the synaptic space? What exactly are you talking about?


I'm saying that the brain is no different from an automobile in that the process that you call consciousness is made up of less complex processes. It is not so relevant to my point exactly what these processes are, only that they exists. Those that you mentioned may qualify.

If I can get you to agree to this very simple idea then I will explain why it is relevant. I don't want to do that now because I feel I need to move slowly due to the amount of resistance I'm getting on every single step.

Their only choices are 1) the physical and the non-physical exist together; or 2) there is only the non-physical.
Agreed. But neither of these necessarily mean solipsism.


Spacetime is physical, Fliption. If I am a Solipsist, then I believe that there is nothing physical, and that includes space...which means, of course, that there can be no "other people" since those would be separated from me by space. And you can't get around that by saying that "they could be separated by 'something else'" or some other such rebuttal, since Relativity dictates that there is really no such thing as "space or time" independent of reference points; thus, if there are two beings, there are two reference points, and there is thus space.

I can't believe you're claiming that an idealist can't believe in the existence of 2 non-physical minds in a non-physical world. The 2 minds don't need to be separated by space to be separate minds. Space is meaningless to immaterial entities. They just need to have 2 different senses of being. We're not talking about "people", as you put it, with bodies and heads. We're talking about "minds" as an idealist might define it.
 
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  • #810
Originally posted by Fliption
I'm saying that the brain is no different from an automobile in that the process that you call consciousness is made up of less complex processes. It is not so relevant to my point exactly what these processes are, only that they exists. Those that you mentioned may qualify.

Yes, of course. The process of consciousness is a process that involves many different parts of the brain, each of which is composed of neurons and synapses.

If I can get you to agree to this very simple idea then I will explain why it is relevant. I don't want to do that now because I feel I need to move slowly due to the amount of resistance I'm getting on every single step.

Sorry ...this seems to be deeply ingrained in me.

Agreed. But neither of these necessarily mean solipsism.

Correct.

I can't believe you're claiming that an idealist can't believe in the existence of 2 non-physical minds in a non-physical world. The 2 minds don't need to be separated by space to be separate minds. Space is meaningless to immaterial entities. They just need to have 2 different senses of being. We're not talking about "people", as you put it, with bodies and heads. We're talking about "minds" as an idealist might define it.

Alright, let me clarify: The statement "All things exist in my mind" (the statement that the Solipsist makes) requires the statement "All things are non-physical", however the inverse is not true.
 
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