Originally posted by Fliption
I do not understand why you keep bringing up this homunculun problem. I am trying to accommodate your materialistic assumptions by claiming that the mind, consciousness etc is nothing special and is nothing more than physical processes. These physical processes are no different then the physical process of an automobile working. The process of an automobile working is of course dependent on the less complex processes involving fuel consumption, lubrication, frictionless revolution and shock absorbtion of wheels, etc etc. What is wrong with this comparison? Why does this homunculun problem only a problem when I'm talking about the brain and no other physical process? It seems you are the one glorifying consciousness.
Oh boy. Forgive me if I get a little impatient, it's been a long day...somebody actually misused the Exercise in "nothing" semantics - that's never happened before - and then somebody else reiterated the same misunderstanding of another topic on at least three different threads...anyway, I'll try to remain good-spirited in my response

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Alright, you can't see why I keep bringing up the homunculun problem. Here's why: every time you mention a process that occurs in the brain, as a result of the processing functions of the brain, and call it (this new process, which is an effect of the brain's electrochemical processes) "consciousness", you introduce the idea of a "mind's eye". It's inevitable, because what good would it do me to have an inner display of "qualia" of there was no viewer on the inside to "see" them? And if there is such a viewer (no matter what form he takes) then you have infinite regress.
Perhaps this is getting close to a response of what I've written above but I don't understand exactly what you mean.
I mean that I still like my definitions of Materialism and Idealism, since either of them could fall into the dualistic problem (which the problem that your definition focuses on) but only one can fall into the non-physical/physical problem.
So you're saying that everything in the universe is just one big process and cannot be reductively separated? This just doesn't make sense to me.
I wasn't making a statement about everything in the Universe, just the things in the brain.
You said this...
Then you said this...
Tell me why these don't contradict one another. I'm not trying to be difficult, I really just don't understand your point. These 2 quotes seem like contradictions so I cannot grasp what your trying to say.
Alright, I see what the problem is, and apologize. No, they are not contradictory, but I may have slightly mis-stated the second one. You see, a particular
thought or a particular "picture in the mind" (or anything of this nature, which I refer to as phenomenological events, hypnagogue prefers the term "qualia", it doesn't really matter, as long as you understand what I'm saying) does not exist, either physically or non-physically; there's just no such thing. Now, consciousness itself (being aware and self-conscious, and all that) is a physical process of the brain, but when one refers to an individual thought they fall into logical error, which means that we should eliminate the idea of an individual thought and replace it with Dennett's model (or another that does the same job better, I suppose).
Thus, what I'm saying is that phenomenological events don't exist. In fact, when I refer to "phenomenological events" I'm using words to describe...absolutely nothing - except, of course, a misconception that is commonly engrained in the human mind, of the actual processes of the mind.
Here I don't think you've understood what I'm saying. I'm not claiming the existence of any effects and trying to called them physical. It seems you think I am because you're asking me "why don't they take up space?". I'm just restating what you've told me. I'm saying let's assume consciousness is nothing but a physical process. Do you not agree with this?
Oh. I agree that we should just assume that consciousness is nothing but a physical process, but I don't think that we have quite the same vision. In my (currently Materialistic) concept, there are no thoughts at all, merely the question/answer "game" of the different neurons and sets thereof in the brain.
So, basically, my concept of "consciousness as nothing but a physical process" is: Look at the brain, see the neurons and synapses,
there is nothing else.
To claim there is nothing else but what is in my mind is making statements about reality, Mentat.
Yes, statements about reality, but reality would only be that which went on in your mind, and thus every statement about reality (to the Solipsist) is merely (only, and nothing but) a statement about their own mind (since nothing else exists).
But I'm not using that terminology anymore. I've moved from that terminology several posts ago. My position isn't changing but I'me having to jump through semantic hoops to get you to see that you're definition doesn't work. So I'm not using things like "inside the mind" anymore.
It doesn't matter if you've changed the terminology in these particular posts. The matter still stands that your definitions from before require a distinction between that which occurs "inside the mind" and that which occurs outside the mind, which is the wrong distinction (a logically non-existent one). My definitions, OTOH, have been rooted in the distinction between belief in only the physical or something else. The only reason we are still discussing philosophies of the mind, instead of tackling the big picture (the whole paradigms of Materialism and Idealism) is because of your definitions (and all those like it which come from a (IMO) misconception about the issue at hand).
I just do not understand this point. It seems like a semantic nightmare.
In many senses, it is. However, I can attempt to simplify it for you: Materialist belief on philosophies of the mind = there are electrochemical activities involving synapses and neurons, and, in order for this to become conscious it also requires...nothing. It doesn't require anything, because those synaptic activities
are consciousness.
You tell me Mentat. You're the one that initially brought it up. Why would you do that if it communicates nothing?
To illustrate the confusion that is brought up from assuming that there is such a thing as a phenomenological event.
Ahh but see you reversed it. This definition is not what you said an idealist believes. Of course, if a person believes they are the only mind to exists then you could conclude that they also believe there is nothing physical.But the definition is flipped in that example.
You said that an idealists believes there is nothing physical. So you have to begin with this belief!
What?? I never said an Idealist believe there is nothing physical. I said a
Solipsist believes there is nothing physical. An Idealist believes that there is something non-physical (the amount of things that are non-physical is greater than or equal to 1).
Not the belief that "I am the only mind". If you start with that belief then you're using my definition of ldealism.
I'm trying to get you to make the connection from the belief that nothing is physical(first!) to one that says "I am the only mind". You'll notice that if you reverse your statement above, it is no longer true. It would read
"Because, if there are no physical realities then only some singular mind exists. This is not necessarily true.
Actually, it is. If there are no physical realities, and yet I'm still conscious of something, then my mind must exist, while nothing else does.