Why the bias against materialism?

[Fliption]

Mentat this whole discussion has been one big evolving semantic mess.

I'm going to try to stop the cycle of non-productive circular argument and start from the beginning. I have in no way suggested a biased definition. Firstly, I claimed that the difference between the 2 views was that an idealists believes that "things of the mind" have a primary existence and therefore cause the things outside the mind to exists. And a materialist claims that the things outside the mind are primary and causes the thinks inside the mind to exists. You then said that this asssumed a non-physical thing called "the mind" so I wasn't allowed to go in this direction. Now it seems you are no longer denying the existence of a mind. You're just saying that it is physical and not non-physical. Great! Considering this new information I don't understand why my original distinction cannot work. Since the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is not dependent on whether the mind is physical or not.

Here is where I get my info:

You are missing the point, and I think it's caused by the fact that (somehow) you have taken my defintions to mean that the difference between Materialism and Idealism is that one believes in the mind and one does not. The difference is that one believes in a non-physical mind and the other does not.

This last sentence implies that there is such a thing as a physical mind. The reason that I have interpreted your belief as being that one view believes in mind and the other does not is because you have been disallowing the use of the word "mind" by claiming it must be referring to a non-physical thing. For example...

2) Your definition (again, IMO) is biased, because it makes reference to supposed non-physical things under the assumption that "they'll understand what I mean", even though, as far as the Materialistic paradigm is concerned you have not referred to anything, but have simply used words in your definition for the mistaken purpose of expressing a concept when in fact no concept was expressed or made reference to.

The concept you are referring to that I used is "mind". So you can see how I am even more confused as to why my definition is not the better one.

The problem with your definition is that it does not provide the same distinction to everyone. I have tried to illustrate and show this and you seemingly agreed with me. I haven't seen any good reason that refuted anything I said. I've seen basic dictionaries make similar attempts as you but then they go on to say things like 'this doesn't mean that materialistic don't believe in "love" because they do'. So they're full of contradictions.

Originally posted by Mentat
The debate on Materialism and Idealism is obviously not resolved, but there are two logical errors with an Idealistic approach (unless that Idealistic approach is Solipsistic in nature, in which case you are not really discussing anything with "me" anyway ) to consciousness, and I have pointed them out, and no one has been able to get by them yet. [/B]

This is a pet peeve of mine. When people continually keep referring to their argument totally ignoring the counter arguments to it. LifeGazer used to do this. I have explained to you at least 3 times and Hynagogue in another thread explained the same thing to you once. Your first logical error is not an error with Idealism. It is a problem with dualism. It is as much a problem for a materialist as an idealist.

The second logical problem makes no sense. I cannot agree with it or refute it if I don't know what it means. I suspect I am not the only one.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, I am not astonished that you believe I am dead wrong, and that you don't see the acts of thinking occurring in logic, but only that which is thought about. Yet I have some nice quotations from Tom, which show who is dead wrong here, by being deeply one-eyed:

"Logic is the study of the prescriptive laws of reasoning"

Do you realize that following a prescriptive law is possible only if one thought -- i.e. the thought of the required law -- applies this law to what it must control, i.e. to another thought?

The required law is not a thought, it is thought about but it itself is not a thought. A law is a pattern of behavior that has been observed to hold true. Thus, we think about laws, but we are not applying the thought to new circumstances, we are applying the law itself and (of course) resultant thoughts thereof.

And another of Tom's tidbits:

"Deductive validity is no safeguard against false conclusions. In fact, ... the truth of the statements in an argument cannot be determined by logic, and so logicians typically restrict their attention to analysis of validity."

What does this have to do with thoughts checking on thoughts? What Tom was saying was that Deductive validity is only that which can be attained by proposing two propositions and then seeing which logically follows - and that this is in no way a determined "truth", merely a valid deduction.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Mentat this whole discussion has been one big evolving semantic mess.

I'm going to try to stop the cycle of non-productive circular argument and start from the beginning. I have in no way suggested a biased definition. Firstly, I claimed that the difference between the 2 views was that an idealists believes that "things of the mind" have a primary existence and therefore cause the things outside the mind to exists. And a materialist claims that the things outside the mind are primary and causes the thinks inside the mind to exists. You then said that this asssumed a non-physical thing called "the mind" so I wasn't allowed to go in this direction. Now it seems you are no longer denying the existence of a mind. You're just saying that it is physical and not non-physical. Great! Considering this new information I don't understand why my original distinction cannot work. Since the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is not dependent on whether the mind is physical or not.

Ok, let me break it down for you again...I said your definition was biased, not because it implies a mind, but because it implies a non-physical mind. The very fact that it refers to things that exist within the mind, as though these also existed in the Materialistic paradigm, jumps the gun of neutral defining before debating.

Anyway, I was trying to clarify before: I do not/have not deny(ied) the existence of the mind. All I'm saying is that a Materialist is incapable of believing in a non-physical mind.

btw, the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is entirely dependent on whether the mind is physical or not, since, if the mind is physical then everything (or, rather, everything that pertains to philosophies of the mind (thoughts, consciousness, etc)) is physical, and there is thus no such thing as the primary/secondary distinction at all. However, if the mind is not physical (as the Idealist philosopher of the mind believes) then - and only then - the distinction of primary and secondary existence is a factor.

This last sentence implies that there is such a thing as a physical mind. The reason that I have interpreted your belief as being that one view believes in mind and the other does not is because you have been disallowing the use of the word "mind" by claiming it must be referring to a non-physical thing.


The concept you are referring to that I used is "mind". So you can see how I am even more confused as to why my definition is not the better one.

I was not referring to the word "mind", but to the phrase "things that exist only inside the mind" or "...only inside consciousness". These are non-sequitors in the Materialist paradigm, and thus make any definition that uses them biased.

Remember, if I ever refer to "mind" derogatorily, it's because it was used in a context that implies a non-physical nature.

The problem with your definition is that it does not provide the same distinction to everyone. I have tried to illustrate and show this and you seemingly agreed with me. I haven't seen any good reason that refuted anything I said. I've seen basic dictionaries make similar attempts as you but then they go on to say things like 'this doesn't mean that materialistic don't believe in "love" because they do'. So they're full of contradictions.

But a Materialist does believe in "love". They just don't believe that the word refers to something non-physical. They believe that the word "love" only refers to a particular rush of hormones, or (alternately, since there are different kinds of love) an innate tendency toward taking care of another being (called "imprinting" in Biology).

This is a pet peeve of mine. When people continually keep referring to their argument totally ignoring the counter arguments to it. LifeGazer used to do this. I have explained to you at least 3 times and Hynagogue in another thread explained the same thing to you once. Your first logical error is not an error with Idealism. It is a problem with dualism. It is as much a problem for a materialist as an idealist.

But (and take note of this, please, because I was attempting to imply this before, but am stating it directly now that I've figured out how) this is only a problem for the Materialist that has not rid him/herself of all Idealistic dispositions[/color].

The Materialist that is completely rid of Idealistic tendencies of thought (which have somehow become natural to humans over the course of time) can avoid the dualistic problem.

Besides, my first objection is to the idea that a non-physical entity interacts with a physical one. This is not logically possible, and only the Idealistic PoV requires it.

The second logical problem makes no sense. I cannot agree with it or refute it if I don't know what it means. I suspect I am not the only one.

Would you like me to try again?

The whole point of the kind of philosophies that we are discussing is to determine how one becomes conscious. Now, if one believes that the mind is something "within" the brain, instead of a process of many parts of the brain, then they fall into the homunculan problem. The homunculan problem is the problem of determining how it is that the "inner mind" can make sense of the information that is being related to it by the brain. The only way to account for that is to say that the "inner mind" is conscious. But, the whole point of this philosophy was to determine how something is conscious (as I said in the first sentence), and so we thus have to figure out how this "inner mind" is conscious. So, now we postulate (since it is our opinion that conscious beings have "inner minds" (that is, after all, how we arrived at the problem of describing the consciousness of the "inner mind" ITFP)) that the "inner mind" has an "inner inner mind". Well, obviously our problem is only getting worse, since now this "inner inner mind" must also be conscious (or else it would be useless in processing and understanding the information given it by the "inner mind"), and we must thus postulate an "inner inner inner mind", and this cycle will continue ad infinitum.

Maybe I haven't made it any clearer, but I'm trying as hard as I can. If it helps at all, remember that this has been a philosophical Achilles' heel for Idealistic philosophies of the mind for many centuries, and is a real problem (I didn't make it up).

Basically, all it says is that, for Idealists:

1) The way a human is conscious, is not through just the brain, but through an "inner mind" (or "inner observer") which "makes sense" of the input from the brain. This is, in fact, how all things are conscious.

2) The "inner mind" must (logically) be conscious, otherwise it would have no use at all for the input from the brain, and would be useless to philosophies of the mind.

3) According to #1 the "inner mind" (in order to be conscious) must have, within it, an "inner inner mind" (not a techincal term, I know, but it illustrates the point that this next postulate is of a mind within the "inner mind").

4) This "inner inner mind" must also (logically) be conscious, according to #2.

5) Again, according to #1, this new "inner inner mind" must (in order to be conscious) have an "inner inner inner mind".

This process will continue in infinite regress, which signals to logicians and philosophers alike that it is wrong.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Mentat
1) The way a human is conscious, is not through just the brain, but through an "inner mind" (or "inner observer") which "makes sense" of the input from the brain. This is, in fact, how all things are conscious.

btw, I meant here "This is, in fact, how all conscious things are conscious. That may have been obvious, but I wanted to leave no room for misunderstanding (if that's possible).

 

[sascha]

Mentat, do you realize that you are merely trying to find excuses in ever new pirouettes? When you say "... we think about laws, but we are not applying the thought to new circumstances, we are applying the law itself and (of course) resultant thoughts thereof", you say that we do e.g. not think when we apply the law of excluded middle (to quote just an example). So the law applies itself, or what?

And the next tidbit of Tom's means that doing logic, as you can advocate it, allows to express only logical validities, not truths -- as need for example to clarify the relation between thoughts and laws, etc. But I understand that you cannot see the connection.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
btw, the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is entirely dependent on whether the mind is physical or not, since, if the mind is physical then everything (or, rather, everything that pertains to philosophies of the mind (thoughts, consciousness, etc)) is physical, and there is thus no such thing as the primary/secondary distinction at all. However, if the mind is not physical (as the Idealist philosopher of the mind believes) then - and only then - the distinction of primary and secondary existence is a factor.

Why must the word 'secondary' imply another type of existence to you? Why can it not be used to describe the "effects" rather than the "cause"? If you look at it like this rather than as "physical" or not then all your objections of the definition go away and you have a much more functional definition for philosophy purposes as a result.

It seems you're denying the definition that isn't dependent on "physicality" by relying on the physicality distinction. This to me is just another example of assuming the conclusion.

But (and take note of this, please, because I was attempting to imply this before, but am stating it directly now that I've figured out how) this is only a problem for the Materialist that has not rid him/herself of all Idealistic dispositions[/color].

Certainly this is true. But surely you can see that the same applies to an Idealists who has rid themselves of Materialistsic dispositions? Must Idealists be dualists?

Also, a materialists who has rid themselves of idealistic dispositions avoids your problem #1 but they open up a whole new can of philosophical worms; as I said the first time you mentioned these 2 points.

Besides, my first objection is to the idea that a non-physical entity interacts with a physical one. This is not logically possible, and only the Idealistic PoV requires it.

Why? Why musts an Idealists be a dualists?

The whole point of the kind of philosophies that we are discussing is to determine how one becomes conscious. Now, if one believes that the mind is something "within" the brain, instead of a process of many parts of the brain, then they fall into the homunculan problem. The homunculan problem is the problem of determining how it is that the "inner mind" can make sense of the information that is being related to it by the brain. The only way to account for that is to say that the "inner mind" is conscious. But, the whole point of this philosophy was to determine how something is conscious (as I said in the first sentence), and so we thus have to figure out how this "inner mind" is conscious. So, now we postulate (since it is our opinion that conscious beings have "inner minds" (that is, after all, how we arrived at the problem of describing the consciousness of the "inner mind" ITFP)) that the "inner mind" has an "inner inner mind". Well, obviously our problem is only getting worse, since now this "inner inner mind" must also be conscious (or else it would be useless in processing and understanding the information given it by the "inner mind"), and we must thus postulate an "inner inner inner mind", and this cycle will continue ad infinitum.

Ok, I think I understand that. I hate to say it but it seems like it just backs the debate up one more step. In order for this point to work, it seems you are assuming that consciousness is a complex thing that requires parts and an explanation. What this point is essentially claiming is that Idealism doesn't answer the question of consciousness. It merely begs the question and makes you go back one more step and ask the same question. But I don't think Idealism is attempting to explain consciousness. The idealistic assumption is that consciousness is the fundamental substance of existence(as opposed to matter) so no more explanation is required. You find infinite regress because you are looking at it materialistically. An idealists can ask the same questions of matter.

So if I've understood this correctly, it is no different then the old argument about god that I see here all the time. If people use god as an explanation for existence then the next question is simply "Then how do you explain god?" i.e. god explains nothing. But this argument can be made against most anything. "Consciosness"(and god in the previous example) seems more vulnerable than "matter" because you materialisitcally perceive those things to be more complex and made up of matter.

 

[sascha]

Mentat, maybe it is time to realize that this discussion is getting a bit boring. There is no point in insisting so doggedly on something as fallible as 'materialism'! Let me recapitulate briefly, to show you why.

The title and basic question of this thread is "Why this bias against materialism?"

Long ago I showed that in fact materialism itself introduces a bias, by its postulates for approaching matter, which influence how matter is being understood. But postulates are always a form of prejudice. Some may gradually be overcome (e.g. primitive forms of atomism, in later forms of QT), but this does not warrant that all of them are overcome.

Moreover these postulates are conceptual, not material -- contradicting the postulate that everything must be material.

Moreover they lead to no totally secure conclusion: in the end, they are subject to undecidability (e.g. as the crux of the continuum hypthesis, the indeterminism of QT, the floating character of RT, etc.).
So it is perfecly reasonable to refuse this biased world view. Refusing it is therefore not a bias, as the thread question accusingly claims.

But one could also argue from the other side than the systematic buildup: from the side of the result.
The argument that this biased world view actually works is not totally conclusive: being able to do things with this world view does not imply having understood fully what one is moving. Any ape can move matter but does not need to know the ultimate reason why it happens. He can imagine reasons, but they would be secure only once he can prove them with absolute certainty. Yet undecidability makes the absolute certainty impossible. The certainty remains relative, partial, pragmatic, provisional.

On the other hand, all you are asking for is that others should accept this relative, partial, pragmatic, provisional view as if it were an absolute. In other (somewhat metaphorical) words, you chose to look through a piece of green glass, see the world as green, and ask everybody else to adopt the same view, i.e. to take the same piece of glass for looking at the world -- merely because indeed everything can be seen through it (also e.g. consciousness) and still appears somehow recognizable.

The argument is that the only alternative to the green glass (the materialist world view) is an even worse piece of glass (the idealist world view). This argument is perfectly well understandable. But one should not agree with it, because its authors have projected their categoreal problems into the realm of ideas, calling the 'opponent' idealism. In fact, the attack is donquichottesque, a result of psychological projection. (There is ample literature on that.)

You are so proud of the 'materialist' capacity to talk 'realistically' about the world (supposed to be only material), in what I call the language of manipulability (objects and their predicates). But at the very end of that line there is a snag, which you do not seem to even know of: The welcome structure that a concept can be predicated of the property which is its intensional content (e.g. 'is round' referring to 'roundness') has its shadow in the other fact that "is a property" can be predicated of the property denoted by "being a property" (the property of being a property is a property), which leads into one version of Russell's paradox, in this case of the property of being a non-self-predicable property, which is the intensional content of the concept represented by "is a non-self-predicable property". So the property of being a non-self-predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property -- or on the other side it both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable. The proposed solutions till now are of mere avoidance, while ever-more epicycles are necessary to take into account the newly arising borderline areas (this is what your growing number of words is documenting). The structure of the problem corresponds to what Goedel has shown on (in)completeness. (There is ample literature on the the problems of predication theory.)

So what is all this insistence supposed to be??

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, do you realize that you are merely trying to find excuses in ever new pirouettes? When you say "... we think about laws, but we are not applying the thought to new circumstances, we are applying the law itself and (of course) resultant thoughts thereof", you say that we do e.g. not think when we apply the law of excluded middle (to quote just an example). So the law applies itself, or what?

No, we apply the law, not the concept of the law, but the law itself. A law is based on the patter-recognition abilities of the brain (which I have already brought up numerous times before, as essential to conscious thought), and the brain can apply these laws to similar circumstances, if it recognizes the pattern. Thus, as I said before, it is not applying some non-physical thought to the situation, but is applying a remembered pattern.

And the next tidbit of Tom's means that doing logic, as you can advocate it, allows to express only logical validities, not truths -- as need for example to clarify the relation between thoughts and laws, etc. But I understand that you cannot see the connection.

Could you restate this part of the post, please? I don't see why the fact that Deductive logic can only express validities and not absolute "truths" should have anything to do with the relationship between "thought" and "laws".

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Why must the word 'secondary' imply another type of existence to you? Why can it not be used to describe the "effects" rather than the "cause"? If you look at it like this rather than as "physical" or not then all your objections of the definition go away and you have a much more functional definition for philosophy purposes as a result.

No, I'm sorry, but I cannot (having taken the completely Materialistic side of the argument) accept the existence of any so-called "effects". I have been saying throught my entire participation in this thread that the problem of communication is not what status to give to the "effects" of physical processes in the brain, but is instead a disagreement on whether there are "effects" at all. I have been saying that there are no such effects of physical processes, but there are only the physical processes themselves. So, when someone refers to the "effects" as being secondary, they have assumed the existence of these "effects", which is a step that the Materialist will not take.

It seems you're denying the definition that isn't dependent on "physicality" by relying on the physicality distinction. This to me is just another example of assuming the conclusion.

Not really, Fliption. I'm not realying on the physicality distinction in order to deny your definition. I would be just as happy to use your definition if it fit logically, but I don't think it does (as I've said before). My argument against your definition is simply that it makes reference to the status of "..." (nothing). It doesn't make reference to the status of anything, as far as the pure Materialist is concerned, and is thus useless to the pure Materialist since it's not referring to anything.

Trying to define the status of "effects of physicality", to a Materialist, would be like trying to define "nothingness". It just doesn't have meaning.

Certainly this is true. But surely you can see that the same applies to an Idealist who has rid himself of Materialistsic dispositions?

Not at all, and Idealistic philosopher of the mind is either a dualist or a solipsist.

Must Idealists be dualists?

No, they can be Solipsists.

Seriously, if they believe that there is a physical brain, and are still Idealists, then they must believe that there is a physical brain, and a non-physical mind...dualism.

Also, a materialists who has rid themselves of idealistic dispositions avoids your problem #1 but they open up a whole new can of philosophical worms; as I said the first time you mentioned these 2 points.

What "can of worms"?

Why? Why musts an Idealists be a dualists?

Let's clarify again that when we refer to "Idealists" in this thread, we are referring to Idealistic philosophers of the mind. IOW, a person can be an Idealist in other matters, but not in the matter of philosophies of the mind, and would thus be irrelevant to this discussion, since we are talking about the philosophies of the mind for the time being.

Anyway, an Idealist philosopher of the mind must be a dualist because s/he believes that there is a non-physical mind. If there is a non-physical mind and a physical brain, then they must correspond somehow...again, dualism.

As to the subject of Materialism and Idealism altogether (not just restricted to philosophies of the mind), it becomes not a matter of what status is given to occurances "inside consciousness" (since such a thing makes no sense to a Materialist), but rather a matter of whether anything non-physical exists(as my definition indicates). Thus, philosophy of the mind is both an example of where Materialism and Idealism contend with each other (and I believe, currently, that Materialism must win, since dualism (which is the only alternative to Solipsism, if you take the Idealistic stance) is logically impossible) and an issue that will be raised every time someone puts forth the idea that the distinction between Idealism and Materialism is what status is given to phenomenological events (you are not the first, as you have said before; it is an old mistake (IMO)).

Ok, I think I understand that. I hate to say it but it seems like it just backs the debate up one more step. In order for this point to work, it seems you are assuming that consciousness is a complex thing that requires parts and an explanation. What this point is essentially claiming is that Idealism doesn't answer the question of consciousness. It merely begs the question and makes you go back one more step and ask the same question. But I don't think Idealism is attempting to explain consciousness. The idealistic assumption is that consciousness is the fundamental substance of existence(as opposed to matter) so no more explanation is required.

But, that's the point of what I've posted just above this quote (which you've hopefully read): The subject of Idealism vs. Materialism is NOT resolved by saying that Idealists believe the fundamental substance is "consciousness", since there is a logical flaw in postulating that something exists "in consciousness" in the first place (since it would be non-physical, and thus incapable of interacting with the physical brain). So, the resolution comes instead (IMO) from saying "The Idealist believes in something non-physical. The Materialist does not".

You find infinite regress because you are looking at it materialistically. An idealists can ask the same questions of matter.

Not exactly, they'd still have to contend with the issue of non-physical things interacting with physical ones (unless they are Solipsists, but I'd really rather not address that issue, since Solipsism is a philosophy that negates philosophizing, and is utterly worthless for rational debate (for the obvious reason that a Solipsist has no one to argue with )), while the Materialist has completely avoided that logical flaw.

So if I've understood this correctly, it is no different then the old argument about god that I see here all the time. If people use god as an explanation for existence then the next question is simply "Then how do you explain god?" i.e. god explains nothing. But this argument can be made against most anything. "Consciosness"(and god in the previous example) seems more vulnerable than "matter" because you materialisitcally perceive those things to be more complex and made up of matter.

I didn't understand this last sentence, but I think I get what you are saying. I disagree, however, since the idea consciousness (as anything other than a physical process, of course) is inherently flawed, while the idea that all is physical is not (AFAIK).

 

[Fliption]

[

Originally posted by Mentat
No, I'm sorry, but I cannot (having taken the completely Materialistic side of the argument) accept the existence of any so-called "effects". I have been saying throught my entire participation in this thread that the problem of communication is not what status to give to the "effects" of physical processes in the brain, but is instead a disagreement on whether there are "effects" at all. I have been saying that there are no such effects of physical processes, but there are only the physical processes themselves. So, when someone refers to the "effects" as being secondary, they have assumed the existence of these "effects", which is a step that the Materialist will not take.

Not really, Fliption. I'm not realying on the physicality distinction in order to deny your definition. I would be just as happy to use your definition if it fit logically, but I don't think it does (as I've said before). My argument against your definition is simply that it makes reference to the status of "..." (nothing). It doesn't make reference to the status of anything, as far as the pure Materialist is concerned, and is thus useless to the pure Materialist since it's not referring to anything.

Trying to define the status of "effects of physicality", to a Materialist, would be like trying to define "nothingness". It just doesn't have meaning.

Please take a moment and really think about what I'm saying Mentat. I never said that "effects" are non physical. You keep assuming this because you are preoccupied with "physical" as the distinction, when I'm suggesting to you that it isn't. Do you believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process? If you say 'yes', then you DO believe in "effects". Therefore, to you the materialist, the physical processes that you call consciousness are the effects of other physical processes. An Idealists would simply reverse the order of those 2 processes. Whether it is physical or not is not the distinction. It isn't even relevant. Once we rid ourselves with this pre-occupation with the "physical" concept, then we can accept this definition.

Not at all, and Idealistic philosopher of the mind is either a dualist or a solipsist.

Seriously, if they believe that there is a physical brain, and are still Idealists, then they must believe that there is a physical brain, and a non-physical mind...dualism.

When did we assume that we are only talking about non-solipsist idealism here?

What "can of worms"?

This is a topic for another thread. This one is too long. For starters I suggest reading the thread by hypnagogue on the existence of an Objective reality. Hynogoue and Heusdens have a great dialogue around the can of worms that you seem to ignore.

Anyway, an Idealist philosopher of the mind must be a dualist because s/he believes that there is a non-physical mind. If there is a non-physical mind and a physical brain, then they must correspond somehow...again, dualism.

But when did we assume that Idealists believe in physical brains?

(and I believe, currently, that Materialism must win, since dualism (which is the only alternative to Solipsism, if you take the Idealistic stance) is logically impossible) and an issue that will be raised every time someone puts forth the idea that the distinction between Idealism and Materialism is what status is given to phenomenological events (you are not the first, as you have said before; it is an old mistake (IMO)).

Logically Impossible? Then how did you do you conclude that a physical brain exists when all you have ever seen is a subjective, conscious representation of it? Who's making the leap in logic?

So, the resolution comes instead (IMO) from saying "The Idealist believes in something non-physical. The Materialist does not".

But then this means different things to different people and no meaningful conversation can be had. I'll reference most of the threads in this forum(including this one) as evidence.

Not exactly, they'd still have to contend with the issue of non-physical things interacting with physical ones (unless they are Solipsists, but I'd really rather not address that issue, since Solipsism is a philosophy that negates philosophizing, and is utterly worthless for rational debate (for the obvious reason that a Solipsist has no one to argue with )), while the Materialist has completely avoided that logical flaw.

I think you use the phrase "logical flaw" too carelessly. But then everyone thinks the opponent view has logical flaws.

Just because you think solipsism is meaningless to discuss means it is illogical? What if it's actually true?

I didn't understand this last sentence, but I think I get what you are saying. I disagree, however, since the idea consciousness (as anything other than a physical process, of course) is inherently flawed, while the idea that all is physical is not (AFAIK). [/B]

Inherently flawed? Whether it is flawed or not depends completely on how one defines the word "physical". This has been my COMPLETE point. There is nothing "inherent" in definitions. They are arbitrary concepts assigned by man for the purposes of communication. People who do not define "physical" the same way you do will not see this flaw that you see. Whatever it is.

Overall I think your pre-disposition to focus on "physical" is getting in your way of understanding my point about it's inability to serve as a good basis for distinction.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Please take a moment and really think about what I'm saying Mentat. I never said that "effects" are non physical.

You didn't have to say those words, you just have to look at the meaning of the word "effect". If there are both physical processes, and their effects, then their effects are not physical processes. (Deductive Logic, I think).

You keep assuming this because you are preoccupied with "physical" as the distinction, when I'm suggesting to you that it isn't. Do you believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process? If you say 'yes', then you DO believe in "effects".

Yes, I believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process, however that is not really relevant. My problem with your using the term "effect" is that these "effects" must be the results of the physical processes in the brain. But if they are the effects of the physical processes, then they themselves are not the physical processes, but something else.

Therefore, to you the materialist, the physical processes that you call consciousness are the effects of other physical processes. An Idealists would simply reverse the order of those 2 processes. Whether it is physical or not is not the distinction. It isn't even relevant. Once we rid ourselves with this pre-occupation with the "physical" concept, then we can accept this definition.

Not true, and attempt to say that there is an "effect of physical processes" is against the rule of Materialism (that all things be physical). The Materialist cannot assume that there is anything other than the physical brain function to consciousness. Where would such a process occur (not in the brain, since we already said that they are only "effects" of what happens in the brain)? In another part of the body? That would defy most of the scientific study that's been done in the fields of cognitive science and neurology.

When did we assume that we are only talking about non-solipsist idealism here?

Sorry, I made that assumption when I assumed that you believed you were conversing with someone other than yourself . Seriously, we can consider Solipsism, if you want, but must either agree that it cannot be true or that I don't exist.

This is a topic for another thread. This one is too long. For starters I suggest reading the thread by hypnagogue on the existence of an Objective reality. Hynogoue and Heusdens have a great dialogue around the can of worms that you seem to ignore.

Fine, I'll try. I've a throbbing headache and inflamation of the throat, right now, so I don't think I'll be doing that today, but maybe tomorrow.

But when did we assume that Idealists believe in physical brains?

That's a completely other matter, since any Idealist that doesn't believe in a physical brain is (I think) a Solipsist.

Logically Impossible? Then how did you do you conclude that a physical brain exists when all you have ever seen is a subjective, conscious representation of it? Who's making the leap in logic?

You and I both are. You think that I have only seen a subjective conscious representation of it. I don't make that assumption at all, but instead only believe that I've processed the light coming from an actual brain or picture thereof.

I think you use the phrase "logical flaw" too carelessly. But then everyone thinks the opponent view has logical flaws.

Just because you think solipsism is meaningless to discuss means it is illogical? What if it's actually true?

Fliption, please. It's not that we can't have a meaningful conversation, we can't have a conversation at all. There is no point in continuing any discussion of any kind, when it is even possible that Solipsism is true, since I'd merely be talking to myself (which is in itself something of a non-sequitor to the Solipsist, since one doesn't ever talk (outputting of information through any external media)).

I'm sorry, I just don't see the point of discussing anything that deals with the possibility of Solipsism being true, since in that case you don't even exist, and have nothing to offer me that is not already in my mind.

Inherently flawed? Whether it is flawed or not depends completely on how one defines the word "physical". This has been my COMPLETE point. There is nothing "inherent" in definitions. They are arbitrary concepts assigned by man for the purposes of communication. People who do not define "physical" the same way you do will not see this flaw that you see. Whatever it is.

The flaw is only "inherent" since it is a flaw in the use of concepts, not in the use of words. You are right, unbiased definitions which use only neutral words cannot be inherently flawed, but the use of biased terms makes them inherently flawed (doesn't it?).

 

[Fliption]

I have no idea why you cannot see what I'm saying. I can tell from this response that you have not understood me.

Physical processes can result from other physical processes. You said so yourself... So why can't you accept that consciousness is a physical process that results from another physical process? I do not understand why you cannot see this point. It seems basic to me. That's why I asked that you think about what I was saying before you responded. Maybe you've been at this too long and now cannot see the forest for the trees?

Originally posted by Mentat
You didn't have to say those words, you just have to look at the meaning of the word "effect". If there are both physical processes, and their effects, then their effects are not physical processes. (Deductive Logic, I think).

How can you say that the effects of physical processs cannot be physical processes themselves when you claim that they can be below? Right here...

Yes, I believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process, however that is not really relevant.

If it isn't relevant then why deny it in the previous quote? I'm completely lost.

My problem with your using the term "effect" is that these "effects" must be the results of the physical processes in the brain. But if they are the effects of the physical processes, then they themselves are not the physical processes, but something else.

Of course they are something else. They are different physical processes. What's so hard about this?

Not true, and attempt to say that there is an "effect of physical processes" is against the rule of Materialism (that all things be physical). The Materialist cannot assume that there is anything other than the physical brain function to consciousness. Where would such a process occur (not in the brain, since we already said that they are only "effects" of what happens in the brain)? In another part of the body? That would defy most of the scientific study that's been done in the fields of cognitive science and neurology.

And I don't know where any of this came from since I never said anything of the sort.

Sorry, I made that assumption when I assumed that you believed you were conversing with someone other than yourself . Seriously, we can consider Solipsism, if you want, but must either agree that it cannot be true or that I don't exist.

Now I'm really confused Mentat. If the distinction between Materialism and Idealism is the belief in physical versus non physical, then why would an Idealists who does not believe that anything physical exists be a solipsist? Why would the belief in only non-physical things mean that I am the only mind that exist?

You and I both are. You think that I have only seen a subjective conscious representation of it. I don't make that assumption at all, but instead only believe that I've processed the light coming from an actual brain or picture thereof.

You are the only person I have ever met that denies the problem of Objective knowledge.

Fliption, please. It's not that we can't have a meaningful conversation, we can't have a conversation at all. There is no point in continuing any discussion of any kind, when it is even possible that Solipsism is true, since I'd merely be talking to myself (which is in itself something of a non-sequitor to the Solipsist, since one doesn't ever talk (outputting of information through any external media)).

So I ask again, this means it isn't true?

I'm sorry, I just don't see the point of discussing anything that deals with the possibility of Solipsism being true, since in that case you don't even exist, and have nothing to offer me that is not already in my mind.

So if I don't see the point in a meaningless materialistic view of the world, does that mean I don't have to argue against it?

The flaw is only "inherent" since it is a flaw in the use of concepts, not in the use of words. You are right, unbiased definitions which use only neutral words cannot be inherently flawed, but the use of biased terms makes them inherently flawed (doesn't it?).

Definitions of words cannot be "inherently" flawed. Like Zero's original definition. There is nothing wrong with that definition if everyone agrees with it. But everyone doesn't. That definition cannot be used to distinguish 2 opposing views and allow for philosophical discussion. Your definition is better but it has the same weakness eventually.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
I have no idea why you cannot see what I'm saying. I can tell from this response that you have not understood me.

Physical processes can result from other physical processes. You said so yourself... So why can't you accept that consciousness is a physical process that results from another physical process? I do not understand why you cannot see this point. It seems basic to me. That's why I asked that you think about what I was saying before you responded. Maybe you've been at this too long and now cannot see the forest for the trees?

Maybe. The problem is I constantly get the same feeling you are getting (that you are not understanding me).

How can you say that the effects of physical processs cannot be physical processes themselves when you claim that they can be below?

Wait a minute, I'm not saying that the effects of a physical process cannot be physical processes. I'm saying that if I say there is process A, which is the collection of physical processes of the brain (electrochemical transmissions through neurons and synapses), then I say that process B is an "effect" of process A, then I imply that process B is something other than process A.

Of course they are something else. They are different physical processes. What's so hard about this?

The fact that it all has to be processes of the brain. It is one thing to say that this or that collection of physical processes in the brain are necessary for one to think of a purple cow, and quite another to imply the existence (any kind of existence) of a purple cow; no matter what status you give its existence (primary, secondary, infinitesimal, whatever).

And I don't know where any of this came from since I never said anything of the sort.

Well, that part of the post was directed at the idea that there are A (=electrochemical processes of the brain) and B (=phenomenological events). If you separate one from the other than where does the other occur?

Now I'm really confused Mentat. If the distinction between Materialism and Idealism is the belief in physical versus non physical, then why would an Idealists who does not believe that anything physical exists be a solipsist?

What do you mean? Anyone who doesn't believe that anything physical exists (i.e. that reality is just their own thoughts) must be a Solipsist. How can you believe that everything is just a thought of your own mind and yet not be a Solipsist?

Why would the belief in only non-physical things mean that I am the only mind that exist?

I don't understand. If I only believe in the non-physical, then I have no physical body, thus I need no home, no environment, no planet, no Universe, since I am not a living replicating being, but an immaterial mind.

You are the only person I have ever met that denies the problem of Objective knowledge.

And?

So I ask again, this means it isn't true?

Probably. I can't say for sure, since I cannot experience anything outside of my own experience. Thus, I cannot state with 100% accuracy that you definitely exist, much like you cannot state with 100% accuracy that I definitely exist. However, there is still no point in debating the possibility that we are not debating at all.

So if I don't see the point in a meaningless materialistic view of the world, does that mean I don't have to argue against it?

It's not about what I think of Solipsism, it's about that Solipsism itself. As I said above, any debate with a Solipsist might just as well not have happened, since you don't really exist, as far as s/he's concerned.

Definitions of words cannot be "inherently" flawed. Like Zero's original definition. There is nothing wrong with that definition if everyone agrees with it. But everyone doesn't. That definition cannot be used to distinguish 2 opposing views and allow for philosophical discussion.

That's the point. According to you, the definition is unusable...I call that "flawed".

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Wait a minute, I'm not saying that the effects of a physical process cannot be physical processes. I'm saying that if I say there is process A, which is the collection of physical processes of the brain (electrochemical transmissions through neurons and synapses), then I say that process B is an "effect" of process A, then I imply that process B is something other than process A.

Ok, I can agree with all of this. So if we can agree one process (let's say Process A) can cause another process(process B), then why can't a distinction between 2 views be made based on this? In other words, why can't Person X claim that Process A causes Process B and then Person Y claim that Process B causes process A? Why is this not an acceptable distinction?

The fact that it all has to be processes of the brain.

And processes of the brain are merely the effects of processes of evolution, sex(of the parents), digestion, etc. depending on what level you want to look at it. But this really isn't relevant so don't let this comment bog you down.

The fact that it all has to be processes of the brain. It is one thing to say that this or that collection of physical processes in the brain are necessary for one to think of a purple cow, and quite another to imply the existence (any kind of existence) of a purple cow; no matter what status you give its existence (primary, secondary, infinitesimal, whatever).

Great! The first part is all I'm saying! That it takes a collection of processes for one to think of a purple cow. The existence of that purple cow has no place in the definition discussion. Let's keep the philosophical discussion of Materialism versus Idealism separate from the discussion about the definition/distinction of the 2 views. This is part of the confusion I think.

What do you mean? Anyone who doesn't believe that anything physical exists (i.e. that reality is just their own thoughts) must be a Solipsist. How can you believe that everything is just a thought of your own mind and yet not be a Solipsist?

What? Why does a person who doesn't believe in anything physical believe that everything is just a thought of their own mind? You talk of these things as if they are synonymous. I don't see it.

I don't understand. If I only believe in the non-physical, then I have no physical body, thus I need no home, no environment, no planet, no Universe, since I am not a living replicating being, but an immaterial mind.

But if one non-material mind can exists, why can't 2? Why does the belief in nothing physical limit the number of non-physical minds?

HINT: By defining solipsism the way you are, you are using my definition of Materialism/Idealism which says that the distinction between the 2 views is a belief of what's inside the mind versus outside. So you're right, the extreme Idealists using this definition is a solipsists. But if you insist on the distinction being "physical" or "non-physical" then an Idealists and a solipsist are 2 different things.

That's the point. According to you, the definition is unusable...I call that "flawed".

Flawed, yes. Inherently flawed, no. That is the point. The usefulness is contingent on whether everyone can agree to the terminology to allow for proper communication. Otherwise, it is not flawed. "Inherent" implies an attribute that is separate from anything else. It's kinda like saying liver inherently taste bad.(Although I probably wouldn't argue against this too much )

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Ok, I can agree with all of this. So if we can agree one process (let's say Process A) can cause another process(process B), then why can't a distinction between 2 views be made based on this? In other words, why can't Person X claim that Process A causes Process B and then Person Y claim that Process B causes process A? Why is this not an acceptable distinction?

Because person X, the Materialist does not believe that A causes B, s/he believes that A is B[/color].

Forgive me if that sounded angry, I was just trying to stress the point.

Anyway, as to that whole part about the "effects" also being physical, that still leads to the homonculan problem, which I still don't think I've explained well enough to you.

Great! The first part is all I'm saying! That it takes a collection of processes for one to think of a purple cow. The existence of that purple cow has no place in the definition discussion. Let's keep the philosophical discussion of Materialism versus Idealism separate from the discussion about the definition/distinction of the 2 views. This is part of the confusion I think.

I'm sorry, my dear fellow, but that first point is not all you were saying. If it were all you were saying than we wouldn't be speaking of the "effects of physical processes", since the logical Materialist cannot believe in such effects.

To put the homunculan problem simply: What would be the point of a monitor screen inside your PC?

What? Why does a person who doesn't believe in anything physical believe that everything is just a thought of their own mind? You talk of these things as if they are synonymous. I don't see it.

My apologies, I simply assumed we were still on the subject of philosophies of the mind. A person can be an Idealist in some manners and a Materialist in others. However, in order for them to be an Idealist in the matter of philosophies of the mind, they must believe there is some non-physical aspect to thought.

But if one non-material mind can exists, why can't 2? Why does the belief in nothing physical limit the number of non-physical minds?

Because, Solipsism is only a philosophy of mind. It is not a philosophy of anything else, and doesn't need to be, because all that exists is the individual's mind. Thus, Idealists can believe in many non-physical minds floating about, but if they are dealing directly with the philosophy of the workings of the mind, and choose to believe that nothing is physical, then they choose Solipsism, and nothing else can exist.

HINT: By defining solipsism the way you are, you are using my definition of Materialism/Idealism which says that the distinction between the 2 views is a belief of what's inside the mind versus outside.

Fliption, please pay attention to what I'm actually saying. If the distinction between the Materialistic view and the Idealistic view were the belief about what's "inside the mind" versus what's "outside the mind", then the Materialist would believe that there is something "inside the mind" (otherwise the very distinction on which his belief system hinges would be unintelligible to him).

And, btw, when I define Solipsism the way I do I am merely showing the most extreme example of an Idealistic philosophy of the mind. If the distinction between Materialistic and Idealistic philosophies of the mind is (as I still hold) the distinction between whether there is something non-physical to it or not, then Solipsism follows as the most extreme example of Idealism (it holds that there is nothing but the non-physical to it ("it" being the workings of the mind)).

So you're right, the extreme Idealists using this definition is a solipsists. But if you insist on the distinction being "physical" or "non-physical" then an Idealists and a solipsist are 2 different things.

Not at all. See my above comment, and remember that Solipsism is only a philosophy of mind, while Idealism has many different applications (the part that relates to philosophies of mind, being the one that we are discussing right now).

Flawed, yes. Inherently flawed, no. That is the point. The usefulness is contingent on whether everyone can agree to the terminology to allow for proper communication. Otherwise, it is not flawed. "Inherent" implies an attribute that is separate from anything else. It's kinda like saying liver inherently taste bad.(Although I probably wouldn't argue against this too much )

Alright, I can drop the term "inherent", and hold that it is merely "flawed".

 

[Fliption]

I have been trying to wipe the slate clean and start over with a new example. Just when I think we can't help but make progress, you keep going back and inserting things from the prior discussion. Please let's stick with the example and explain to me why it doesn't follow.

Originally posted by Mentat
Because person X, the Materialist does not believe that A causes B, s/he believes that A is B[/color].

No, this was not our assumption. Remember, we both agreed that physical processes can be caused by other physical processes. They are different processes from each other. One of them is the effect of the other. I fully expected this assumption to be used when I asked my question about process A and B. SO given this as an assumption, my earlier question still stands. Why can't a distinction between 2 views be made on which process causes the other? Given the assumption that we're talking about, it doesn't make sense to say that the Materialist believes process A is process B. The assumption establishes them as separate processes as I've already explained.

I hope you aren't going to respond to this by now claiming that there is no physical process that causes the physical process of consciousness. I hope we aren't going to disagree that the physical process of consciousness is caused by more basic physical process in the brain. Are we?

Anyway, as to that whole part about the "effects" also being physical, that still leads to the homonculan problem, which I still don't think I've explained well enough to you.

Well Mentat the only way to avoid this problem is for the entire universe to be one big, non-reductive process with no cause. You're saying that we cannot claim a physical process is created by other more basic physical processes?

I'm sorry, my dear fellow, but that first point is not all you were saying. If it were all you were saying than we wouldn't be speaking of the "effects of physical processes", since the logical Materialist cannot believe in such effects.

I keep getting lost with your words Mentat. First you agree that physical processes can cause other physical processes and then you turn right around and keep saying things like above. Just for clarification, a physical process that is caused by another physical process I'm calling an "EFFECT". That's been my terminology. You seem to be using this word differently. For purposes of progressing, please use it this way.

To put the homunculan problem simply: What would be the point of a monitor screen inside your PC?

So are you claiming that processes cannot cause other processes?

However, in order for them to be an Idealist in the matter of philosophies of the mind, they must believe there is some non-physical aspect to thought.

I disagree, obviously.

Because, Solipsism is only a philosophy of mind. It is not a philosophy of anything else, and doesn't need to be, because all that exists is the individual's mind. Thus, Idealists can believe in many non-physical minds floating about, but if they are dealing directly with the philosophy of the workings of the mind, and choose to believe that nothing is physical, then they choose Solipsism, and nothing else can exist.

I do not understand this distinction you keep making about "philosophy of mind" as if it's relevant to my point. Solipsism is hardly limited to an opinion on mind since it clearly is making a statement about all of reality. If somehow this "philosophy of mind" point is relevant (and I don't see how) then let's drop it and refer to the definition of Materialism and Idealism as a whole.

Fliption, please pay attention to what I'm actually saying. If the distinction between the Materialistic view and the Idealistic view were the belief about what's "inside the mind" versus what's "outside the mind", then the Materialist would believe that there is something "inside the mind" (otherwise the very distinction on which his belief system hinges would be unintelligible to him).

This is why I have tried to change the terminology for you to show you that your being entirely too picky and missing the point. I have been trying to step you through slowly how we can drop this "inside the mind" terminology and pick up terminolgy like "as a result of the process of consciousness".

You and I can agree that there is a process called Consciousness, right? I hope we can. You and I can agree that the purple cow is a result of or a representation of this process, right? You believe that the purple cow does not exists, therefore you are a materialist. If I believe that the purple cow does exists then I am an Idealist. Notice that the distinction between our 2 views is a belief about the results of a process called "consciousness". Notice how I was able to distinguish between the 2 views and there is no reference to physical or non-physical? Notice that whether or not "the process of consciousness" itself is a physical process or not doesn't interfere with our ability to discern the 2 views. As long as both views recognize the process.

Earlier I was using the word "mind" and you would claim that it doesn't work because "inside the mind" doesn't mean anything to a materialist. So I've tried to change the approach to use "physical processes" to get us past that point and show how the definition can work to distinguish the 2 views. Whether the "mind" was non-physical or not is not relevant and never was but I never could get you past that point. So as I said above, replace the word "mind" with the name of whatever physical process you think creats the purple cow and see how the distinction works.

And, btw, when I define Solipsism the way I do I am merely showing the most extreme example of an Idealistic philosophy of the mind. If the distinction between Materialistic and Idealistic philosophies of the mind is (as I still hold) the distinction between whether there is something non-physical to it or not, then Solipsism follows as the most extreme example of Idealism (it holds that there is nothing but the non-physical to it ("it" being the workings of the mind)).

So you're saying that a solipsist believes in nothing but the non-physical? How does this tie to the belief that a solipsist mind is the only mind that exists? This was my original question and you still haven't linked the two.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
No, this was not our assumption. Remember, we both agreed that physical processes can be caused by other physical processes. They are different processes from each other. One of them is the effect of the other.

Fine, this is true. Physical processes can be produced by others, but if thought was a physical process that was produced by other physical processes in the brain, then you would have a full-blown homunculun regression.

I fully expected this assumption to be used when I asked my question about process A and B. SO given this as an assumption, my earlier question still stands. Why can't a distinction between 2 views be made on which process causes the other?

Because the homunculun regression will come up either way. The truth is, Materialism can also fall into the dualistic problem, but only Idealism can ever fall into the "non-physical/physical" problem.

Given the assumption that we're talking about, it doesn't make sense to say that the Materialist believes process A is process B. The assumption establishes them as separate processes as I've already explained.

But I never agreed that we should assume there to even be a process B. If there is, you have infinite regress, so I don't see myself accepting that assumption in the near future .

I hope you aren't going to respond to this by now claiming that there is no physical process that causes the physical process of consciousness. I hope we aren't going to disagree that the physical process of consciousness is caused by more basic physical process in the brain. Are we?

Consciousness is caused by more basic physical processes in the brain, but so are many subsonscious activities (even ones as simple as breathing). Nothing occurs from just one "piece" of the brain working alone, there needs to be cooperation.

Well Mentat the only way to avoid this problem is for the entire universe to be one big, non-reductive process with no cause. You're saying that we cannot claim a physical process is created by other more basic physical processes?

No, I'm not. I'm saying that consciousness (including any kind of "thought") cannot be a physical process that is caused by other physical processes in the brain.

I keep getting lost with your words Mentat. First you agree that physical processes can cause other physical processes and then you turn right around and keep saying things like above. Just for clarification, a physical process that is caused by another physical process I'm calling an "EFFECT". That's been my terminology. You seem to be using this word differently. For purposes of progressing, please use it this way.

Yes, but the "effect" can be physical or non-physical and it will still fall into infinite regress. That is why I was using it somewhat differently from you: I have been aware of the homunculun problem from the beginning (I added the non-physical/physical distinction due to having read "Consciousness Explained", and it is a real problem, but I guess it's no longer relevant if you want the "effect" to be physical (now you've got the problem of why these physical "effects" don't take up space - not to mention the homunculun problem which I believe is completely insurmountable after having taken your approach)).

I do not understand this distinction you keep making about "philosophy of mind" as if it's relevant to my point. Solipsism is hardly limited to an opinion on mind since it clearly is making a statement about all of reality.

Wrong. Solipsism doesn't describe any reality except that which exists "in the mind", since it's primal principle is that there is nothing else.

If somehow this "philosophy of mind" point is relevant (and I don't see how) then let's drop it and refer to the definition of Materialism and Idealism as a whole.

I can't do that. The discussion of philosophies of the mind is an essential step, since one can constantly refer to things that occur "inside the mind" or "within consciousness", unless the point is cleared up from the get-go.

This is why I have tried to change the terminology for you to show you that your being entirely too picky and missing the point. I have been trying to step you through slowly how we can drop this "inside the mind" terminology and pick up terminolgy like "as a result of the process of consciousness".

But there can be no "resultant" or "emergent" properties. There can be no monitor in the PC. It would fall into infinite regress, and what would be its purpose be anyway?

You and I can agree that the purple cow is a result of or a representation of this process, right?

NO!

That's the whole point, I don't believe a purple cow results from any process of the mind, just as I don't believe an actual cow has any representation in your brain when you see one with your eyes. There are electrochemical processes and nothing else (unless you leave the Materialistic paradigm, and I can't (currently) do that).

You believe that the purple cow does not exists, therefore you are a materialist.

What purple cow?

If I believe that the purple cow does exists then I am an Idealist. Notice that the distinction between our 2 views is a belief about the results of a process called "consciousness". Notice how I was able to distinguish between the 2 views and there is no reference to physical or non-physical?

But you did it wrong (no offense), and so of course you were able to do it without reference to the non-physical/physical distinction.

Earlier I was using the word "mind" and you would claim that it doesn't work because "inside the mind" doesn't mean anything to a materialist. So I've tried to change the approach to use "physical processes" to get us past that point and show how the definition can work to distinguish the 2 views. Whether the "mind" was non-physical or not is not relevant and never was but I never could get you past that point.

Because the homunculun problem is a reflexively expressed problem in my mind. It does not go away, even if I don't express it "out loud" all the time.

So you're saying that a solipsist believes in nothing but the non-physical? How does this tie to the belief that a solipsist mind is the only mind that exists?

Because, if only some singular mind exists, then there are no physical realities.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Fine, this is true. Physical processes can be produced by others, but if thought was a physical process that was produced by other physical processes in the brain, then you would have a full-blown homunculun regression.

I do not understand why you keep bringing up this homunculun problem. I am trying to accommodate your materialistic assumptions by claiming that the mind, consciousness etc is nothing special and is nothing more than physical processes. These physical processes are no different then the physical process of an automobile working. The process of an automobile working is of course dependent on the less complex processes involving fuel consumption, lubrication, frictionless revolution and shock absorbtion of wheels, etc etc. What is wrong with this comparison? Why does this homunculun problem only a problem when I'm talking about the brain and no other physical process? It seems you are the one glorifying consciousness.

Because the homunculun regression will come up either way. The truth is, Materialism can also fall into the dualistic problem, but only Idealism can ever fall into the "non-physical/physical" problem.

Perhaps this is getting close to a response of what I've written above but I don't understand exactly what you mean.

But I never agreed that we should assume there to even be a process B. If there is, you have infinite regress, so I don't see myself accepting that assumption in the near future .

So you're saying that everything in the universe is just one big process and cannot be reductively separated? This just doesn't make sense to me.

You said this...

Consciousness is caused by more basic physical processes in the brain, but so are many subsonscious activities

Then you said this...

I'm saying that consciousness (including any kind of "thought") cannot be a physical process that is caused by other physical processes in the brain.

Tell me why these don't contradict one another. I'm not trying to be difficult, I really just don't understand your point. These 2 quotes seem like contradictions so I cannot grasp what your trying to say.

Yes, but the "effect" can be physical or non-physical and it will still fall into infinite regress. That is why I was using it somewhat differently from you: I have been aware of the homunculun problem from the beginning (I added the non-physical/physical distinction due to having read "Consciousness Explained", and it is a real problem, but I guess it's no longer relevant if you want the "effect" to be physical (now you've got the problem of why these physical "effects" don't take up space - not to mention the homunculun problem which I believe is completely insurmountable after having taken your approach)).

Here I don't think you've understood what I'm saying. I'm not claiming the existence of any effects and trying to called them physical. It seems you think I am because you're asking me "why don't they take up space?". I'm just restating what you've told me. I'm saying let's assume consciousness is nothing but a physical process. Do you not agree with this?

Wrong. Solipsism doesn't describe any reality except that which exists "in the mind", since it's primal principle is that there is nothing else.

To claim there is nothing else but what is in my mind is making statements about reality, Mentat.

I can't do that. The discussion of philosophies of the mind is an essential step, since one can constantly refer to things that occur "inside the mind" or "within consciousness", unless the point is cleared up from the get-go.

But I'm not using that terminology anymore. I've moved from that terminology several posts ago. My position isn't changing but I'me having to jump through semantic hoops to get you to see that you're definition doesn't work. So I'm not using things like "inside the mind" anymore.

NO!
That's the whole point, I don't believe a purple cow results from any process of the mind, just as I don't believe an actual cow has any representation in your brain when you see one with your eyes. There are electrochemical processes and nothing else (unless you leave the Materialistic paradigm, and I can't (currently) do that).

I just do not understand this point. It seems like a semantic nightmare.

What purple cow?

You tell me Mentat. You're the one that initially brought it up. Why would you do that if it communicates nothing?

Because, if only some singular mind exists, then there are no physical realities.

Ahh but see you reversed it. This definition is not what you said an idealist believes. Of course, if a person believes they are the only mind to exists then you could conclude that they also believe there is nothing physical.But the definition is flipped in that example.

You said that an idealists believes there is nothing physical. So you have to begin with this belief! Not the belief that "I am the only mind". If you start with that belief then you're using my definition of ldealism.

I'm trying to get you to make the connection from the belief that nothing is physical(first!) to one that says "I am the only mind". You'll notice that if you reverse your statement above, it is no longer true. It would read

"Because, if there are no physical realities then only some singular mind exists. This is not necessarily true.

If you go back to how this discussion started, you'll see that this is the more relevant order.

 

[Esoteric]

“Scientific reasoning,” Alfred North Whitehead wrote, is itself — and must be — “completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature.” The assertion that they are part of nature is self-refuting, because it robs all thoughts and statements of any possible rational validity or truth."

oppinions?.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Esoteric
“Scientific reasoning,” Alfred North Whitehead wrote, is itself — and must be — “completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature.” The assertion that they are part of nature is self-refuting, because it robs all thoughts and statements of any possible rational validity or truth."

oppinions?.

It sounds like wishful thinking to me...

 

[sascha]

I guess what Whitehead means is that if thinking were fully determined by nature, thinking about nature would be self-limited, because the mental instance could only experience being fully determined. In other words, being determined (in this case by nature) excludes being 'above' that thing, i.e. non-determined. What do you mean, Zero, by "wishful thinking" in this respect?

I guess there can only be much misunderstanding in these questions as long as the will (required for the act of thinking to be reasonable) as a subjectively necessary element is mixed up (con-fused) with the contents of thinking, which have to relate to each other in an objective way. The brain is an inevitably necessary condition too, but this does not mean that it is 100.00% causal -- unless one remains in the mentioned conceptual mixup, as is widely the case in the current mainstream of philosophy of mind too (which can't account for the will, it simply disregards it). So that's precisely where the interpretations of empirical facts are clashing, also in this debate.

For whoever believes the will is irrelevant: try empirically to think clearly about something without directing your will so the result will be reasonable.

What Whitehead says, on the other hand, accounts for the self-limitedness of many positions in the current debate, who can't see their own 'blind spot', precisely because they let themselves be determined by aspects of what they would like to talk about.

 

[Zero]

Here we go with the blah blah blah about 'will' not being accounted for. Again, the entire point of the arguments agaist reality is hoping for a special exemption for people.

 

[Loren Booda]

Be a Material Conservative. You can't take it with you, and most don't have it to begin with.

 

[Zero]

I'll say again; 'will' is like 'propulsion'...we don't claim that a rocket's movement is apart from the workings of the rocket, so why do we treat the actions of the brain as apart from the brain itself?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
I do not understand why you keep bringing up this homunculun problem. I am trying to accommodate your materialistic assumptions by claiming that the mind, consciousness etc is nothing special and is nothing more than physical processes. These physical processes are no different then the physical process of an automobile working. The process of an automobile working is of course dependent on the less complex processes involving fuel consumption, lubrication, frictionless revolution and shock absorbtion of wheels, etc etc. What is wrong with this comparison? Why does this homunculun problem only a problem when I'm talking about the brain and no other physical process? It seems you are the one glorifying consciousness.

Oh boy. Forgive me if I get a little impatient, it's been a long day...somebody actually misused the Exercise in "nothing" semantics - that's never happened before - and then somebody else reiterated the same misunderstanding of another topic on at least three different threads...anyway, I'll try to remain good-spirited in my response .

Alright, you can't see why I keep bringing up the homunculun problem. Here's why: every time you mention a process that occurs in the brain, as a result of the processing functions of the brain, and call it (this new process, which is an effect of the brain's electrochemical processes) "consciousness", you introduce the idea of a "mind's eye". It's inevitable, because what good would it do me to have an inner display of "qualia" of there was no viewer on the inside to "see" them? And if there is such a viewer (no matter what form he takes) then you have infinite regress.

Perhaps this is getting close to a response of what I've written above but I don't understand exactly what you mean.

I mean that I still like my definitions of Materialism and Idealism, since either of them could fall into the dualistic problem (which the problem that your definition focuses on) but only one can fall into the non-physical/physical problem.

So you're saying that everything in the universe is just one big process and cannot be reductively separated? This just doesn't make sense to me.

I wasn't making a statement about everything in the Universe, just the things in the brain.

You said this...


Then you said this...


Tell me why these don't contradict one another. I'm not trying to be difficult, I really just don't understand your point. These 2 quotes seem like contradictions so I cannot grasp what your trying to say.

Alright, I see what the problem is, and apologize. No, they are not contradictory, but I may have slightly mis-stated the second one. You see, a particular thought or a particular "picture in the mind" (or anything of this nature, which I refer to as phenomenological events, hypnagogue prefers the term "qualia", it doesn't really matter, as long as you understand what I'm saying) does not exist, either physically or non-physically; there's just no such thing. Now, consciousness itself (being aware and self-conscious, and all that) is a physical process of the brain, but when one refers to an individual thought they fall into logical error, which means that we should eliminate the idea of an individual thought and replace it with Dennett's model (or another that does the same job better, I suppose).

Thus, what I'm saying is that phenomenological events don't exist. In fact, when I refer to "phenomenological events" I'm using words to describe...absolutely nothing - except, of course, a misconception that is commonly engrained in the human mind, of the actual processes of the mind.

Here I don't think you've understood what I'm saying. I'm not claiming the existence of any effects and trying to called them physical. It seems you think I am because you're asking me "why don't they take up space?". I'm just restating what you've told me. I'm saying let's assume consciousness is nothing but a physical process. Do you not agree with this?

Oh. I agree that we should just assume that consciousness is nothing but a physical process, but I don't think that we have quite the same vision. In my (currently Materialistic) concept, there are no thoughts at all, merely the question/answer "game" of the different neurons and sets thereof in the brain.

So, basically, my concept of "consciousness as nothing but a physical process" is: Look at the brain, see the neurons and synapses, there is nothing else.

To claim there is nothing else but what is in my mind is making statements about reality, Mentat.

Yes, statements about reality, but reality would only be that which went on in your mind, and thus every statement about reality (to the Solipsist) is merely (only, and nothing but) a statement about their own mind (since nothing else exists).

But I'm not using that terminology anymore. I've moved from that terminology several posts ago. My position isn't changing but I'me having to jump through semantic hoops to get you to see that you're definition doesn't work. So I'm not using things like "inside the mind" anymore.

It doesn't matter if you've changed the terminology in these particular posts. The matter still stands that your definitions from before require a distinction between that which occurs "inside the mind" and that which occurs outside the mind, which is the wrong distinction (a logically non-existent one). My definitions, OTOH, have been rooted in the distinction between belief in only the physical or something else. The only reason we are still discussing philosophies of the mind, instead of tackling the big picture (the whole paradigms of Materialism and Idealism) is because of your definitions (and all those like it which come from a (IMO) misconception about the issue at hand).

I just do not understand this point. It seems like a semantic nightmare.

In many senses, it is. However, I can attempt to simplify it for you: Materialist belief on philosophies of the mind = there are electrochemical activities involving synapses and neurons, and, in order for this to become conscious it also requires...nothing. It doesn't require anything, because those synaptic activities are consciousness.

You tell me Mentat. You're the one that initially brought it up. Why would you do that if it communicates nothing?

To illustrate the confusion that is brought up from assuming that there is such a thing as a phenomenological event.

Ahh but see you reversed it. This definition is not what you said an idealist believes. Of course, if a person believes they are the only mind to exists then you could conclude that they also believe there is nothing physical.But the definition is flipped in that example.

You said that an idealists believes there is nothing physical. So you have to begin with this belief!

What?? I never said an Idealist believe there is nothing physical. I said a Solipsist believes there is nothing physical. An Idealist believes that there is something non-physical (the amount of things that are non-physical is greater than or equal to 1).

Not the belief that "I am the only mind". If you start with that belief then you're using my definition of ldealism.

I'm trying to get you to make the connection from the belief that nothing is physical(first!) to one that says "I am the only mind". You'll notice that if you reverse your statement above, it is no longer true. It would read

"Because, if there are no physical realities then only some singular mind exists. This is not necessarily true.

Actually, it is. If there are no physical realities, and yet I'm still conscious of something, then my mind must exist, while nothing else does.

 

[Esoteric]

Heres more...

http://magazines.enews.com/easterbrook.mhtml?pid=717

90% OF THE UNIVERSE ISN'T REALLY MISSING, JUST MISPLACED: Today is the first day of a University of Chicago conference at which cosmologists are mapping out plans to attempt to locate "dark matter" and "dark energy." I don't wish to alarm you, but at least 90 percent of the universe is missing. Astronomers hope to find it.

When cosmologists measure the gravitational attraction on heavenly bodies, at least two-thirds of the matter in the cosmos appears to be missing; that is, stars move as if acted upon by much more gravity than can be accounted for by observed amounts of normal matter. For years this has led to speculation that there is "dark matter" or "missing mass" throughout the firmament--perhaps as strange forms of subatomic particles not present in this solar system, perhaps as huge numbers of black holes, perhaps as huge numbers of almost-stars hard to see because they don't shine. There are other theories. Searching for the missing mass has for several decades been an obsession of astrophysics.

Then, a few years ago, astronomers made the unexpected discovery that not only are the galaxies rushing away from each other, they are speeding up. It had been assumed that the Big Bang provided the impetus for the movement of the galaxies, and across the eons, momentum from the Big Bang would wear off, causing the galaxies to slow down. Instead they're speeding up: the evidence looks solid. Cosmic acceleration cannot be happening unless something is pushing on the galaxies, that is, adding energy to them. Hence, dark energy.

The new betting line among scientists is that the luminous, observable forms of energy in the universe--shining stars, natural radio waves and X-rays and so on--actually constitutes only a small share of total energy. Something much more potent, dark energy, carries most of the power in creation; dark energy has so much power that it's speeding up unfathomable numbers of galaxies across unfathomable distances. The existence of dark energy would answer the riddle of why gravity does not cause everything in creation to crush together: Dark energy is repelling the components of the universe at the same time that gravity attracts them. And it's looking like dark energy is stronger than gravity--stronger, perhaps, by orders of magnitude.

Here's the rub. While there are theories about what dark matter might be, no one has the slightest clue what dark energy is. No instrument can detect it. No one knows where it comes from or how it works. Dark energy appears strong enough to push the entire universe, and yet science can't locate it.

Bear this in mind when you're tempted to think Homo sapiens already understands the physical world, or even has the slightest idea what's going on. Combining missing dark matter and missing dark energy, science can't so much as locate 90 percent of the universe! Bear this in mind, as well, when you're tempted to think we "know" there is no nonmaterial world. An energy strong enough to push the entire universe is pulsing through your body right now; you can't feel it, and science has no idea how it works or where it originates. How many other nonmaterial forces might there be?

As for the University of Chicago conference, you won't want to miss the session: "APEX-SZ, a Millimeter-wavelength galaxy cluster survey using the Sunyaev-Zel'dovich Effect."

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Here's why: every time you mention a process that occurs in the brain, as a result of the processing functions of the brain, and call it (this new process, which is an effect of the brain's electrochemical processes) "consciousness", you introduce the idea of a "mind's eye".

OK, I think I see the problem we're having. The problem we seem to be having is with the phrase "processes of the brain". You define them as all being on the same level and I do not. The processes that you are referring to are the processes dealing with neurons etc etc. I'm claiming that the processes of neurons are themselves made up of less complex physical processes. So if I agree that consciousness is exactly the same thing as the process of neurons working in the brain, then I can claim that consciousness is caused by those simpler processes. Perhaps you wouldn't even call these simpler processes "processes of the brain" but it would be a small matter to clear up if you don't.

Going back to the automobile analogy, you claim that an "automobile" is not the result of the "process of the engine on wheels". It "IS" the "process of the engine on wheels". I am not claiming that the "process of the engine on wheels" produces this non-physical thing called the automobile. I am agreeing that they are one and the same thing. But I then am going further to say that the "process of the engine on wheels" or the "automobile" is the result of less complex physical processes (fuel consumption, shock absorption etc.)

Do you follow this? I'm going in a different direction from you. I'm not projecting anything new as a result of processes. I am simpler stepping back in the heiarchy of processes and assigning labels. This is all so semantic it's almost funny.

Oh. I agree that we should just assume that consciousness is nothing but a physical process, but I don't think that we have quite the same vision. In my (currently Materialistic) concept, there are no thoughts at all, merely the question/answer "game" of the different neurons and sets thereof in the brain.

OK and I'm agreeing with this and now asking the question "Isn't the process of thought, the question/answer game, made up of even simpler physical processes? I realize this is dependent on how you define process but, again, this is merely semantics and surely we can overcome that.

So, basically, my concept of "consciousness as nothing but a physical process" is: Look at the brain, see the neurons and synapses, there is nothing else.

I ask again for emphasis, what is the science behind the workings of neurons and synapses? There should be some more fundamental process within this process.

In many senses, it is. However, I can attempt to simplify it for you: Materialist belief on philosophies of the mind = there are electrochemical activities involving synapses and neurons, and, in order for this to become conscious it also requires...nothing. It doesn't require anything, because those synaptic activities are consciousness.

It requires nothing but the processes that make up the synaptic process.

What?? I never said an Idealist believe there is nothing physical. I said a Solipsist believes there is nothing physical. An Idealist believes that there is something non-physical (the amount of things that are non-physical is greater than or equal to 1).

How is this distinction relevant? The point I'm trying to make is that the choices for an idealists are not just 1) the physical and non-physical exist together or 2)I am the only mind.

Actually, it is. If there are no physical realities, and yet I'm still conscious of something, then my mind must exist, while nothing else does.

So you're saying that if nothing physical exists, then 2 or more non-physical minds cannot exists? Please connect the dots for me.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
OK, I think I see the problem we're having. The problem we seem to be having is with the phrase "processes of the brain". You define them as all being on the same level and I do not. The processes that you are referring to are the processes dealing with neurons etc etc. I'm claiming that the processes of neurons are themselves made up of less complex physical processes. So if I agree that consciousness is exactly the same thing as the process of neurons working in the brain, then I can claim that consciousness is caused by those simpler processes. Perhaps you wouldn't even call these simpler processes "processes of the brain" but it would be a small matter to clear up if you don't.

Whoah, whoah, wait a minute. What simpler processes? You mean the typical cell division, or the currents of electricity in the axons, or the releasing of chemicals across the synaptic space? What exactly are you talking about?

Going back to the automobile analogy, you claim that an "automobile" is not the result of the "process of the engine on wheels". It "IS" the "process of the engine on wheels". I am not claiming that the "process of the engine on wheels" produces this non-physical thing called the automobile. I am agreeing that they are one and the same thing. But I then am going further to say that the "process of the engine on wheels" or the "automobile" is the result of less complex physical processes (fuel consumption, shock absorption etc.)

Do you follow this? I'm going in a different direction from you. I'm not projecting anything new as a result of processes. I am simpler stepping back in the heiarchy of processes and assigning labels. This is all so semantic it's almost funny.

What about it though? You can use reductionism on a car if you want, that has no bearing whatsoever on brain functions. The functions of the brain are those of any other cell, except that which occurs in the axons and dendrits or across the synaptic space. How are the "simpler processes" relevant at all?

OK and I'm agreeing with this and now asking the question "Isn't the process of thought, the question/answer game, made up of even simpler physical processes? I realize this is dependent on how you define process but, again, this is merely semantics and surely we can overcome that.

I ask again for emphasis, what is the science behind the workings of neurons and synapses? There should be some more fundamental process within this process.

I've already listed the "more fundamental" processes, but they are not, on their own, even brain functions, since brain functions require all of them to work together (electricity has to be conducted along axons, which have to stimulate packets of sodium ions to travel across the small synaptic space...these processes on their own are irrelevant, but the sum product is a very adaptable being).

It requires nothing but the processes that make up the synaptic process.

What processes?!?

I re-iterate that which you must already know, but have stored somewhere in the far reaches of your memory (no offense), an atom is the simplest form of matter which still retains the properties of the element. Therefore, if you try to get any simpler than the sodium ions propogated across the synaptic space, you have left the realm of philosophies of the mind.

How is this distinction relevant? The point I'm trying to make is that the choices for an idealists are not just 1) the physical and non-physical exist together or 2)I am the only mind.

Their only choices are 1) the physical and the non-physical exist together; or 2) there is only the non-physical.

So you're saying that if nothing physical exists, then 2 or more non-physical minds cannot exists? Please connect the dots for me.

Spacetime is physical, Fliption. If I am a Solipsist, then I believe that there is nothing physical, and that includes space...which means, of course, that there can be no "other people" since those would be separated from me by space. And you can't get around that by saying that "they could be separated by 'something else'" or some other such rebuttal, since Relativity dictates that there is really no such thing as "space or time" independent of reference points; thus, if there are two beings, there are two reference points, and there is thus space.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Whoah, whoah, wait a minute. What simpler processes? You mean the typical cell division, or the currents of electricity in the axons, or the releasing of chemicals across the synaptic space? What exactly are you talking about?

I'm saying that the brain is no different from an automobile in that the process that you call consciousness is made up of less complex processes. It is not so relevant to my point exactly what these processes are, only that they exists. Those that you mentioned may qualify.

If I can get you to agree to this very simple idea then I will explain why it is relevant. I don't want to do that now because I feel I need to move slowly due to the amount of resistance I'm getting on every single step.

Their only choices are 1) the physical and the non-physical exist together; or 2) there is only the non-physical.

Agreed. But neither of these necessarily mean solipsism.

Spacetime is physical, Fliption. If I am a Solipsist, then I believe that there is nothing physical, and that includes space...which means, of course, that there can be no "other people" since those would be separated from me by space. And you can't get around that by saying that "they could be separated by 'something else'" or some other such rebuttal, since Relativity dictates that there is really no such thing as "space or time" independent of reference points; thus, if there are two beings, there are two reference points, and there is thus space.

I can't believe you're claiming that an idealist can't believe in the existence of 2 non-physical minds in a non-physical world. The 2 minds don't need to be separated by space to be separate minds. Space is meaningless to immaterial entities. They just need to have 2 different senses of being. We're not talking about "people", as you put it, with bodies and heads. We're talking about "minds" as an idealist might define it.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
I'm saying that the brain is no different from an automobile in that the process that you call consciousness is made up of less complex processes. It is not so relevant to my point exactly what these processes are, only that they exists. Those that you mentioned may qualify.

Yes, of course. The process of consciousness is a process that involves many different parts of the brain, each of which is composed of neurons and synapses.

If I can get you to agree to this very simple idea then I will explain why it is relevant. I don't want to do that now because I feel I need to move slowly due to the amount of resistance I'm getting on every single step.

Sorry ...this seems to be deeply ingrained in me.

Agreed. But neither of these necessarily mean solipsism.

Correct.

I can't believe you're claiming that an idealist can't believe in the existence of 2 non-physical minds in a non-physical world. The 2 minds don't need to be separated by space to be separate minds. Space is meaningless to immaterial entities. They just need to have 2 different senses of being. We're not talking about "people", as you put it, with bodies and heads. We're talking about "minds" as an idealist might define it.

Alright, let me clarify: The statement "All things exist in my mind" (the statement that the Solipsist makes) requires the statement "All things are non-physical", however the inverse is not true.