Why the bias against materialism?

[sascha]

There is one more point in this discussion, Mentat and Zero, where things are not yet clear because we have not fully come to grips with the implications of your stance: The more I think through the idea about life as entropy machines (and hence maximizers), the less it convinces me. It is easy to expound some perspective, some assumed basis of ideas, but then comes the nitty-gritty of going to the very end of its implications. And here I think your stance about life being "a very good way to increase entropy, and that is what the Universe tends toward" has an inconsistency at the very bottom. Simply consider that the law of entropy (whether Shannon or Boltzmann) is itself not subject to entropy -- while there are universal laws: eg. the principle of truth is subject to truth. I knew a physicist who ended up in suicide out of not fully coming to grips with such ideas. Somehow he hit against the sound barrier of his beliefs (i.e. he spouted out ever more epicycles to keep afloat his flawed assumptions, until having to kill himself). He did not notice his blind spot, while blind spots are what one does not see in one's way of seeing, or rather, not-seeing...

And just for the sake of overcoming the useless opposition of Materialism against Idealism, I wanted to give a more complete account on the other positions. Some years ago I came across a book where a guy tried to go systematically through all possible positions. He came up with the following sequence (which has an inner link, closing the circle in itself): Phenomenalism, Psychism, Sensualism, Pneumatism, Materialism, Spiritualism, Mathematism, Monadism, Rationalism, Dynamism, Idealism, Realism. His point was that none of these stances can finally, at the very end of their implications, be consistent with reality. All of them have some flaw. Wisdom is to become capable of somehow integrating the whole business. One goes through the whole maze as long as necessary, maybe winding up in a craze for a while, but then things continue, etc., etc...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
You don't know anything about it so you don't know exactly what the premises are.

I don't need to, I have already pointed out the logical flaw in the most basic of it's premises. Again, remember that I plan to get more educated on this matter (please also remember that such a thing doesn't happen over-night, I have to find the sources, and then (much more difficult) I have to find the time), but until then my argument stands.

I cannot imagine the confidence one must have to think out a logical problem with a certain view and then not allow that view to respond. Dangerous! Get used to the taste of your toes . I used to have to brush my teeth often.

Oh, come on. If I understand nothing about the topic except it's most basic premise, and can point out a logical flaw in that very premise, then I don't really need (though I do seek to acquire) a greater understanding of the whole belief system, until someone proves that the flaw I found isn't really a flaw.

Zero's definition is crap Mentat. It may be useful in a casual conversation but it does not lend itself to a philosophical discussion.

Careful, let's not be insulting, it distracts from rational debate. Save that energy for the point that really matters in this thread (as this is not my main point of debate with you).

First of all Zero's definition doesn't mention anything about being "physical" as you are claiming.

No, but it implies it. It is impossible to show someone that something non-physical exists. Thus, if something fits the materialistic criteria that it be physical, then it can be shown to exist. Otherwise it cannot.

Second of all, what is physical? (you answered this in a previous post. I'm just pointing out the never ending semantic questions.)

I don't understand why this needs to be never-ending, if I've already attempted to define it.

And thirdly, whether Idealism is true or not does not mean that you get to assume your conclusion in the definition.

I still don't think that Zero's definition assumes it's conclusion in the definition. I don't see why you think so (though I do see why your definition (OTOH) does assume it's own conclusion (what with all of the implications to "emergent properties" and things that exist "inside consciousness", and other such purely Idealistic concepts)).

Oh, btw. I have been re-reading a few of my posts, and realized that, when I use scare-quotes it may sound sarcastic or imply a mocking tone. I never intended this, and would just like to clear that up (I only use scare-quotes to denote that I don't really believe whatever's within them to denote a concept...they are just words to me).

Yep that's what it all hinges on. And an idealists would make the same claim about a materialists. I can hear them saying "If they were only open to reason." Just as you did.

I don't know how much philosophy you've studied but great care must be used on definitions if the discussion is ever going to get out of the semantic realm. So much of what gets discussed in this forum is problems with semantics. In this case, the best course of action is to arrive at a definition that doesn't require the opposite view to "use reason" and agree with your conclusion in order to agree with the definition.

And that cannot happen if certain people make reference to certain completely Idealistic concepts in their definitions, now can it ?

As I said before, I have seen no other definition except for this one. What exactly is your definition?

Oh, I'm sorry, I thought I just assumed you'd read it when I posted it some time ago.

The Idealist believes that there is such a thing as a non-physical entity.

The Materialist does not.

Pretty simple, eh?

AND HERE IS OUR PROBLEM! I do not believe that a concept must exist in the objective world for it to exist as a subjective idea. And you apparently don't agree. More below...

That's because you are an Idealist , I (currently) am taking the Materialistic standpoint. Thus, we will not agree on that point, because that is what it all hinges on (according to my definition of Idealism and Materialism, that is).

I have not missed your point as you will see by going back and re-reading what I'm saying. I'm saying your point is irrelevant. Over and over again I have said it. I understand that materialist don't believe anything exists "inside consciousness". But it is irrelevant.

In the immortal words of Royce: WRONG!

I'm not going to leave it at that though, but am going to re-iterate the undeniable fact that your definition directly imlies the existence of things "inside consciousness", which makes yours a biased definition.

I think the problem we're having is linked to this word-concept issue. You claim that color does not exists and if we assign a word to it then we are assuming the concept it represents does exists. But color doesn't have to exist. What DOES exists is the perceived subjective experience of color. There is something distinctive that people perceive and are referring to when they refer to color. For the purposes of communication "color" is a useful word because it refers to the character of a subjective experience. The word "wavelength" just won't do. Whether this perceived thing objectively exists or not does not need to be decided at the stage of assigning a word to refer to the idea.

This is a very dicy issue. You see, they may subjectively experience color, but they have never actually seen it (any more than this computer has ever actually seen a world or a picture (remember my analogy?)).

We have a word for 'GOD' to. But using the word 'god' doesn't mean you believe it exists. Does it? The word is used to describe a "conceptual idea" that people find useful.

But the materialist doesn't really believe in conceptual ideas. Sure s/he can take a heterophenomenological approach, and speak as though such things existed (not just "really existed" as in objective reality, but "existed" as in "there is such a thing as..."), but that is merely for same purpose that I might correct someone for saying that Sherlock Holmes lives on Butcher Street, since he (in his own world, which doesn't exist at all (not subjectively, not objectively)) actually lives on Baker Street.

This is all about communication. All I am trying to do is find a definition that uses words that people can all understand and interpret exactly the same. after doing that, the "REAL" debate can procede.

Very true. However, I think it severely hinders logical discussion for any part of the conclusion to be built into the definition (which is what you yourself have also been saying, though (hypocritically? perhaps unknowingly) commiting that very sin in your definition), which is what I mean by "biased definition".

If I have to insert a chinese word into help I will. It's not about proclaiming truths etc etc. It's about communicating what your view actually is so that a person who uses words differently from you can understand your view.

Yes, I understand this completely, but I think you have (currently) failed at this attempt. Ironically (and I mean that in the definitive sense of the word), I think you have done so in exactly the manner that you accused Zero of.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
What criteria would I use if I wanted to know if something qualified as energy or not?

If it can be interacted with (changed) by energetic means.

As you stated in another post, quoting Descarte...all you can know is what is in your own mind. So to claim that there is something else is an assumption. The person who is assuming that there is something material to represent the subjective experience of the world is creating the dualism and thus has issue number one to resolve.

I'm sorry, but I will not wait to read Hypnagogue's thread, before responding (though I do intend to finally read it soon (I finally feel almost "caught up" - I was gone for a month)) as what you are saying only even makes sense from an Idealistic standpoint. Remember, Descartes himself was an Idealist (there were no true materliasts at the time, AFAIK).

Anyway, it's Idealistic because it directly states that the mind is something other than the brain. Yes, I can only ever be conscious of my own conscious experience (that's a practically redundant statement), but part of my conscious experience is logic, and that logic dictates (currently) that my mind can be nothing other than the physical brain.

You'll see that your number one is more of a problem for a materialist (if you have an open mind that is)

No, only for the materialist that makes the same mistake that Descartes made, but that Dennett and Le Doux have scrupulously (Dennett more so than Le Doux, which makes me prefer Dennett when it comes down to utter specifics) avoided. They are true materialists, Descartes was not.

You are correct if you say that Descartes' (so-called) materialism runs into the Dualist problem even more so than main-stream Idealism, but mine is not Descarteian materialism.

I don't see it. Sascha has posted that there is information on it. I'll have to read on it. But at the moment I don't see why the logical chain is necessarily true.

I can try again, if you'd like :

For there to be something going on in my mind, and for me to be conscious of it, there must be an "inner observer" (someone that is conscious of that which is going on inside my head). Understand? Agree?

Now, in order for this sub-system (or inner homunculus) to be conscious of these things that are going on in my mind, he too must have someone in his own mind (since the inner person is how I'm conscious ITFP), who views that which occurs therein. But that new inner inner homunculus must also be conscious, and so must have someone within his mind, observing all of the phenomenological events from within, and so on, ad infinitum.

If I have again failed to explain it, then I refer you to one of the first (not sure if it was the first, or just one of the first) chapters of Consciousness Explained. I'm also sure that sascha could produce numerous references to the "inner homunculus" problem.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, concerning your saying "you really can't show anything non-physical to exist", what is a teacher doing who can make a pupil understand (and thus 'see' the logical existence of) for example the law of Pythagoras?

Nothing if he gives no example that is grounded in physical occurance. Even the showing of the laws as just mathematical properties requires that he use physical means and incite physically stored memories of other patterns that the student has seen before.

It's really the same thing that he (the teacher) would be doing if we wished to program the Law of Pythagoras into a PC: feeding the appropriate information (physical stimulus) to the input channels of the computer (the keyboard, for example), causing it to encode the new information into memory (please take note of the term "encode").'

I can accept that in your view e.g. color doesn't exist. But it does, and is a word and a concept, for thinkers holding other positions (and as mentioned, there is not just Materialism and Idealism around). In your claim of holding the only possible world-view you forget the relativizing effect of fundamental beliefs and assumptions (not only the conscious ones).

I didn't quite understand this last sentence, but I do feel compelled to point out that any opinion that is no Materialistic is Idealistic, unless you can show how it could be otherwise (which is kind of like proving how something can both not be physical and not be non-physical either).

Mentat, you ask: are laws and forces physical? But what is it to be "physical"? You say "composed of energy or capable of interacting energetically", as if this were the final solution. Well, as also this thread showed, the constitution of matter is not such a simple thing. We have been discussing how physics is presently trying out the ideas of "energy" and "information", and I have drawn the attention to the fact that even these terms are not yet strictly primal -- apart from not being very "material". So what IS physical, after all? -- My point is that understanding fully the reality of things leads into ideas / notions / concepts / categories (call them as you may) that are precisely not any more in the realm which is associated with materiality -- such as existence, measurability, palpability, etc. One can remain in less 'ethereal' terms, but then the grasp of reality is reduced. This may not please some, but there are reasons why this is so.

This is not so, at least not necessarily. I can use exactly the same terms as you would, provided I know that my audience will not take the non-physical connotations literally. They are but illustrations of the reality; indications that relate to something our brain is already familiar with, in order to bring the point across.

My definition of physical requires that we remove literal interpretation of the root-word "material" from the term "materialism", since the true materialist has no problem excpeting that most energy just hasn't manifested itself in the form of matter. Matter is energy, just another form.

In my understanding, matter finally consists of laws and forces, and in this sense they are material indeed. But as your answer shows, you cannot conceive this. Well, what can I do?

You can change your understanding. As far as Science is concerned, the "laws" are just observations of patterns (which Logic dictates to be inconclusive, since they are always based on Inductive reasoning) and "forces" may just be curvatures of spacetime (which is as physical as anything else (just not material)).

To the other point of that question: the "inner observer" has not much to do with the "emergent properties"; these are not really part of a phenomenological or idealist terminology (you will find none of that with Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, etc., or with Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc., but only with some post-linguistic-turn interpretations of phenomenology or idealism). "Emergent properties" are only final conceptual needs, as a consequence of having chosen assumptions, in the last decades. Under the condition of choosing to consider a topic (e.g. consciousness) only from outside -- which is not the phenomenological position, nor the idealist, if you read the said authors -- one can be in seeming need of postulating "emergent properties" in the hope of solving certain self-made riddles (self-made by the assumptions).

Exactly, that is what prompts Dennett to take the heterophenomenological approach, and the "intentional stance", at all times. This allows him to remove the assumptions, while still being able to describe the same phenomena.

The homunculus is such a postulate; but it has to do with a 'modern' way of approaching the subject matter, it is by far not the absolute truth about it.

It needn't be in homunculus form, it can be referred to as "mind's eye", or any other such reference to the same false concept; but it remains, nevertheless, illogical (since it always leads to infinite regress, as you well know).

Mentat, when I drew your attention to the fact that you must choose which thing or thought you want to be attentive to (because no material contraption does this for you), you said you had explained before how you can have choices, by referring to Dennett (i.e. by believing in his hypotheses). But you had merely indicated some invented algorithm, you gave no real explanation (strictly tracking back phenomena to laws of nature).

What is wrong with the explanation. Just read Le Doux's Synaptic Self if you want an explanation of the self (including both the conscious and the subconscious) in terms of the actual synaptic occurance in the brain. Dennett's is perfectly sound (or so it seems to me currently) in terms of Philosophy, and that is what he is (a philosopher) and what this Forum and this particular thread are about (philosophies of mind).

On the other hand you maintain that the mind is determined by material contraptions. So to me your point of view is still contradictory -- less in your explicit arguments, but rather in consequnce of the tacit assumptions.

How so? Dennett's explanation - which I out-lined in my post - is intended to lead to a scientific understanding of consciousness, but is still in itself a purely materialistic conceptualization. Re-read it if you disagree, perhaps quoting it and posting where it fails to remain completely materialistic.

Consciousness does not explain all of mental life, because it does not react on its own. There is a use of consciousness. In the end, either the intentional activity is determined by the claimed mechanism, which relativates the invented theories, or it is a free choice, which invalidates the presupposition that the determinations are material / mechanical.

This another serious problem that you (and, IIRC, Iacchus32) have had. Let me make this absolutely clear: Showing consciousness and choice as being purely material does not indicate, or even imply, that they are "mechanical" or that we are automatons. It shows that we do make choices, and that we really are conscious of them, but that both of these things (consciousness and choices) are utterly physical operations.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
There is one more point in this discussion, Mentat and Zero, where things are not yet clear because we have not fully come to grips with the implications of your stance: The more I think through the idea about life as entropy machines (and hence maximizers), the less it convinces me. It is easy to expound some perspective, some assumed basis of ideas, but then comes the nitty-gritty of going to the very end of its implications. And here I think your stance about life being "a very good way to increase entropy, and that is what the Universe tends toward" has an inconsistency at the very bottom. Simply consider that the law of entropy (whether Shannon or Boltzmann) is itself not subject to entropy -- while there are universal laws: eg. the principle of truth is subject to truth.

Actually, though I was not initially opposed to this concept of "universal truths" that you speak of, the more I examine it the more it seems like it violates Godels' Incompleteness (or, rather, the basic logical barrier to self-reference).

Aside from that, I don't see why a law (which doesn't itself exist as physical entity (except in the brains of those that have learned it) but is really just an observation) should be subject to physical laws (especially not the law that it itself proposes, since that would be self-reference (remember Russel's paradox?)).

I knew a physicist who ended up in suicide out of not fully coming to grips with such ideas. Somehow he hit against the sound barrier of his beliefs (i.e. he spouted out ever more epicycles to keep afloat his flawed assumptions, until having to kill himself). He did not notice his blind spot, while blind spots are what one does not see in one's way of seeing, or rather, not-seeing...

I am sorry for your former aquaintance. I hope you were not close, but if you were I am sorry for you as well. As to the lesson to be learned from this experience, the problem was with your friend, he didn't see that universal laws not only didn't need to be found, but probably don't exist.

And just for the sake of overcoming the useless opposition of Materialism against Idealism, I wanted to give a more complete account on the other positions. Some years ago I came across a book where a guy tried to go systematically through all possible positions. He came up with the following sequence (which has an inner link, closing the circle in itself): Phenomenalism, Psychism, Sensualism, Pneumatism, Materialism, Spiritualism, Mathematism, Monadism, Rationalism, Dynamism, Idealism, Realism.

Surely you can see, by a quick check at my definitions of Idealism and Materialism, that all of these choices (except "Materialism") fall into the realm of Idealism.

His point was that none of these stances can finally, at the very end of their implications, be consistent with reality. All of them have some flaw. Wisdom is to become capable of somehow integrating the whole business. One goes through the whole maze as long as necessary, maybe winding up in a craze for a while, but then things continue, etc., etc...

Hmm, well I disagree with his "point", a truth should be "findable" (if that's a word) amongst these possibilities.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
I don't need to, I have already pointed out the logical flaw in the most basic of it's premises. Again, remember that I plan to get more educated on this matter (please also remember that such a thing doesn't happen over-night, I have to find the sources, and then (much more difficult) I have to find the time), but until then my argument stands.

I'm not really interested in when you are able to educate yourself. I'm not a demanding person in that respect. I only ask that you do it before claiming a view is wrong. Contrary to what you have typed, you DO have to learn the opposing view before you insist there is a logical flaw.

Careful, let's not be insulting, it distracts from rational debate. Save that energy for the point that really matters in this thread (as this is not my main point of debate with you).

I have insulted no one. I said the definition was crap. If we're going to slap hands let's do it to those that actually require it.

No, but it implies it. It is impossible to show someone that something non-physical exists. Thus, if something fits the materialistic criteria that it be physical, then it can be shown to exist. Otherwise it cannot.

To a materialists it cannot. But to an idealists it can. This point flies over your head quite a bit.

I still don't think that Zero's definition assumes it's conclusion in the definition. I don't see why you think so (though I do see why your definition (OTOH) does assume it's own conclusion (what with all of the implications to "emergent properties" and things that exist "inside consciousness", and other such purely Idealistic concepts)).

Mentat the aim is to use a word such as "mind" so that we are able to make the following statements:

"A materialist does not believe the mind exists"
"An Idealist believes the mind does exists"

Your view won't allow the use of this word because a mind doesn't exists. Then to say this sentence "A materialists does not believe the mind exists" is assuming the mind exists, therefore the statement cannot be true. Ridiculous. This whole view of yours is so radical and unreasonable for philosophy that I'm about to give up. Even your definition is not the philophical definition. You have made up your own view and called it materialism.

That's because you are an Idealist , I (currently) am taking the Materialistic standpoint. Thus, we will not agree on that point, because that is what it all hinges on (according to my definition of Idealism and Materialism, that is).

I am not an idealists. Never have I ever said I was. So you aren't debating with an idealists. You're debating with someone who understands philosophy just enough to know when it is being done poorly. Trying to find a definition that is unbiased and will allow a fair philosophical discussion doesn't require me to hold either view. The fact that you think I'm an idealists is just more proof that you have not been able to separate semantics from philsophy. And it is becoming clear that you probably won't.

In the immortal words of Royce: WRONG!

I'm not going to leave it at that though, but am going to re-iterate the undeniable fact that your definition directly imlies the existence of things "inside consciousness", which makes yours a biased definition.

WRONG!

This is a very dicy issue. You see, they may subjectively experience color, but they have never actually seen it (any more than this computer has ever actually seen a world or a picture (remember my analogy?)).

What does "seeing" have to do with anything? This seems like an intentional dodge almost as if you don't want to accept what I'm saying because you think I'm an idealists.

But the materialist doesn't really believe in conceptual ideas.

This is just nonsense Mentat. No offense, but you don't have a clue what you're talking about. This very extreme position you are taking is basically saying that no one should ever use any word like "god", "Utopia", "Philosophy", "Mind", "Free enterprise". You are basically saying that none of these things actually exists so we cannot use the words.

You don't understand why Zero's definition assumes it's conclusion and even HE said it was circular! This is a bit frustrating because anyone who has had a 101 level course in philosophy can see this is obviously true and I've wasted over 40 pages trying to explain the obvious. As far as I'm concerned, we haven't even gotten to the topic of materialism versus Idealism yet.

No hard feelings, but it is obvious that you are not willing to try to understand what I'm saying. I don't feel I'm learning very much from this discourse and that is the reason I participate here. So I'm done.

 

[Zero]

Ok, hold on...something can exist, but can't be shown to exist? If it can't be shown to exist, what logical basis does anyone have to discuss it?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption


No hard feelings, but it is obvious that you are not willing to try to understand what I'm saying. I don't feel I'm learning very much from this discourse and that is the reason I participate here. So I'm done.

We'll be here awhile, fell free to come back when you feel like *self censored* some more.

 

[Zero]

And, I have decided that my definition isn't circular after all...

 

[sascha]

Mentat, Do you realize that your answer to Fliption's question "What criteria would I use if I wanted to know if something qualified as energy or not?", which is "If it can be interacted with (changed) by energetic means" does not work, because by far not all forms of energy interact directly. This is precisely the interesting thing about the structure of energy and matter. So you need some additional criteria.

Then you say "For there to be something going on in my mind, and for me to be conscious of it, there must be an "inner observer" (someone that is conscious of that which is going on inside my head)." Understand? YES. Agree? NO! Because you forget your act of choosing what you think. If you let your mind do everything, i.e. wander where IT wants, you finally end up in the loony bin. You have doggedly been negating this fact of your own choice -- which you can only do by CHOOSING to doggedly negate it. It is as if you would not want to be responsible for your own thoughts. Strange.

The situation is quite funny. In philosophy this type of act is called "performative self-contradition". But you are in good company: all the authors you mention do the same. They believe in it, because they believe objectivity is warranted by looking from outside at something (playing God as a mind hovering over the thing) -- and they seem to believe nobody else notices the flaw. Yes, science now has chosen this position -- but it is increasingly getting into trouble for just this reason (on the whole, not in the many details). The homunculus problem does not objectively exist, it is merely the result of this one-eyed approach. Maybe now you can understand why all your "explanations" of this point are in vain: they only reiterate the one-eyedness, which obviously not everybody needs to share.

Concerning the demonstration of laws, you forget that encoding information about mathematical properties works only where there is a reader who refers to the law as a law, not only to the encoded information. Letters and numbers alone won't do a single thing. The computer alone can't think the Law of Pythagoras, or any other one. Without the actively thinking writer and reader, nothing happens. Even if somebody programs the most advanced self-replicating and self-repairing AI device, the programmer, manufacturer, etc. is not at all eliminated, only shifted away until forgetting about all that. It is again the role of playing God without wanting to be caught in the game. This is self-delusion. The situation is the same as above: you doggedly defer and negate the actual agency. No wonder some people refuse this approach. The fact that many believe in it proves nothing.

You seem to think that I am wrong in saying "understanding fully the reality of things leads into ideas ... that are precisely not any more in the realm which is associated with materiality -- such as existence, measurability, palpability, etc. One can remain in less 'ethereal' terms, but then the grasp of reality is reduced. This may not please some, but there are reasons why this is so." On the other hand, wanting to eliminate the root-word "material" from the term "materialism" won't get you to where you want, because again the necessary influence, which makes energy become matter, is eliminated from your view.

The problem is mirrored also in your view that "the "laws" are just observations of patterns (which Logic dictates to be inconclusive, since they are always based on Inductive reasoning) and "forces" may just be curvatures of spacetime (which is as physical as anything else (just not material)). As I have been expressing often on this thread, the approach of Inductive reasoning can account only for some partial laws, but precisely not for the overall order (which your saying purports to know), because no amount of Inductive reasoning can ever secure any strictly universal laws. This is one of the main problem of physics. -- So I have no reason at all to change my understanding.

Dennett's "intentional stance" is a "doing-as-if" attitude, one of pretending-that, for suiting his pet ideas. This is no real proof at all of his stance. One can juggle endlessly with words for nudging things some way or other. Do you know the Duhem-Quine Thesis?

Sure, the homunculus problem does not depend on the name tag "homunculus". Maybe I should repeat some of my post of 11 September to you:

"As I had expressed several times, more clearly than the usual account of the Cartesian Split, it arises every time concretely where a world view or activity is ruled by adopting the principle of distinguishing, describing, observing, measuring. This method logically inevitably entails a blind spot as to what can be distinguished, described, observed, measured. Your argument of my implying "a 'mind' that exists separate from the 'brain'" is a mechanical repetition of what is often handed around as the Cartesian idea."

The homunculus / "mind's eye" / onlooker position is just one more variation of the same theme, the basic Split of Science (which is often referred to as Cartesian Split, because that is where the idea became prominent). It is true that this Split entails infinite regresses. But when you get bad news, the solution is not in killing the messenger, amputating the symptom, e.g. saying that the concept is false. You must get to the real root, which is in the type of approach. Till now the problem of the blind spot is surprisingly underestimated in the scientific community. Maybe they are too helpless or ashamed to admit it? What do you think?

The solution for shame or helplessness will not come from more of the same type of approach that had led into the problem in the first place -- like with Dennett's or Le Doux's writings. Just like so many, they too offer nice detailed descriptions, and many take these vivid images for explanations. It is obvious that one can "see" the conscious and the subconscious in that perspective, but so what. It is like I can look at everything through green glass and doggedly maintain the world is green and that everybody must only look through my beautiful green glass to see that green is what is real; I can even start selling green glasses...

Yes, there is no doubt in the very end result consciousness and choices have physical appearances. But do you know that Chinese story: A traveler comes to a village and meets the village sage and the village fool. He shows them a shining star. The sage sees an element of the universe, while the fool sees only the pointed finger.

This is indeed the problem with Goedel and so on. Yes, propositional structures (sign systems, etc) are doomed to the limitation of decidability, which metamathematics is busy with. But this concerns only the signs, not to the laws which humans ultimately try to refer to, by means of signs (as a symbolic Ersatz of perception). The point is to keep the laws as such in focus, not to lose oneself in the maze of mere signs. Whoever negates the laws as such can of course doi that (there is no limit to errors), but has to face the produced maze of self-made problems. By "universal truths" I mean pure laws -- and they do (like all laws) indeed not fit totally any language. One can only approximate them in language -- like one can only approximate e.g. the law of the geometrical circle by definitions of the geometrical circle (which are indeed material structures, even as personal representations). Of course laws never exist as physical entity, except in the brains of those that have learned it. But the addressed person can be led to think of the law as such, if the communication is good enough. If the person does not think of laws, but only of signs of laws, in the end there are problems of understanding complete reality. -- Does this seem more clear now? I am not sure, because you say quite correctly "I don't see why a law ... should be subject to physical laws". This is an interesting point, into which we could get: What is the interrelation between pure laws?

To say laws probably don't exist is of course a way of formulating a law, moreover a universal one -- and is thus a self-defeating assertion. Nevertheless yes, a truth is "findable" -- but in remaining open to the whole, not in remaining in the mere signs. Truths in signs -- as you correctly noted with Goedel etc. -- are limited.

The discussion lately about something exists or does not exist, and can or cannot be shown to exist, is turning wildly around classic stuff. Kant already had noted that existence cannot be a predicate, it is something over and beyond. Indeed, nobody can show anything to exist other that through enabling an experience of it. Nobody can show that America exists, or that Zebras exist, unless by offering an actual experience. Signs are Ersatz forms of experience, allowing to recall content for handling ideas. The other fact that experience inevitably occurs in the realm of interpretatiion, and thus in the conceptual realm (which mirrors laws) may exasperate some, but that's only y question of getting used to it. Some need a lot of time. But the universe is far more patient than some ardent souls.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by sascha
Yes, there is no doubt in the very end result consciousness and choices have physical appearances. But do you know that Chinese story: A traveler comes to a village and meets the village sage and the village fool. He shows them a shining star. The sage sees an element of the universe, while the fool sees only the pointed finger.

Yes, the evidence has always been there, it's just a matter if one has the means to make the association or not.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
I'm not really interested in when you are able to educate yourself. I'm not a demanding person in that respect. I only ask that you do it before claiming a view is wrong. Contrary to what you have typed, you DO have to learn the opposing view before you insist there is a logical flaw.

Not if I have found a flaw in it's very premise. Why should a person continue with the Bible (for example) if they have believe there to be a scientific flaw with the very first chapter (the creation account)?

I have insulted no one. I said the definition was crap. If we're going to slap hands let's do it to those that actually require it.

Whatever man, I just thought that less insulting terms could be used (especially in light of the fact that you haven't proven your side yet).

To a materialists it cannot. But to an idealists it can. This point flies over your head quite a bit.

An Idealist can say that it can be shown to exist, but I challenge them to actually do it. Deductive and Inductive Logic rule in my favor, since I have deduced why something non-physical cannot be shown to exist, and I have debunked the examples given.

Mentat the aim is to use a word such as "mind" so that we are able to make the following statements:

"A materialist does not believe the mind exists"
"An Idealist believes the mind does exists"

Your view won't allow the use of this word because a mind doesn't exists. Then to say this sentence "A materialists does not believe the mind exists" is assuming the mind exists, therefore the statement cannot be true. Ridiculous. This whole view of yours is so radical and unreasonable for philosophy that I'm about to give up. Even your definition is not the philophical definition. You have made up your own view and called it materialism.

I have "made up" that view from having read the philosophies of materialists. Unfortunately(?) I haven't been exposed to any true Idealist teaching, except to be shown flaws by the materialists that I've read. No, I haven't dealt with the philosophical definition of materialism, but I know that the philosophers I've read are considered materialists, and they hold that there is no such thing as a non-physical entity.

Besides, all I'm saying is that you shouldn't have used the word "mind" as though it were established that it is something other than the brain, in your definition. That is making the same mistake that you accused Zero of: Putting your conclusion in your definition.

I am not an idealists. Never have I ever said I was.

You didn't have to say it. Your reference to emergent properties and the mind (as something other than the brain) make your current position an Idealistic one. I make no claims about your personal belief system, because that is irrelevant to the discussion. All that matters is the position that we are currently taking (which is why I contantly put "currently" in parentheses after stating that I am taking the materialist position).

So you aren't debating with an idealists. You're debating with someone who understands philosophy just enough to know when it is being done poorly. Trying to find a definition that is unbiased and will allow a fair philosophical discussion doesn't require me to hold either view.

Exactly, in fact it requires that you hold neither view, or at least that you not let that view influence the definition at all. Yet you have persisted in your reference to phenomenological events as though there were such a thing, putting your conclusion right in your definition.

The fact that you think I'm an idealists is just more proof that you have not been able to separate semantics from philsophy. And it is becoming clear that you probably won't.

As I already said, I don't care whether you yourself are an Idealist, but your stance has been one that is in contrast to all of the Materialist philosophies that I've read, and is thus Idealistic.

WRONG!

Royce is my buddy, so I witheld from him. But I think it only right to express that I think it utterly childish to plug your ears and scream "I'm right, your wrong, you don't understand enough philosophy", which is what you are (figuratively) doing (not just when you type "WRONG!" and leave it at that, but when you restate that I don't know enough, instead of addressing my point head-on). Alexander and Lifegazer did the same thing, and they are gone. Way before that, Scandium did the same thing, and he's gone too.

It is a hinderance to logical and open-minded discussion.

What does "seeing" have to do with anything? This seems like an intentional dodge almost as if you don't want to accept what I'm saying because you think I'm an idealists.

No offense, but did you think you "heard" color?

This is just nonsense Mentat. No offense, but you don't have a clue what you're talking about. This very extreme position you are taking is basically saying that no one should ever use any word like "god", "Utopia", "Philosophy", "Mind", "Free enterprise". You are basically saying that none of these things actually exists so we cannot use the words.

Just because they don't exist, doesn't mean that we can't use the words as short-cuts. IOW, we don't have to change the way we speak, the point is to recognize that these are short-cuts toward understanding the reality, they are not real in themselves. The fact that you (and most other people) don't "like it" or find it counter-intuitive is almost completely irrelevant.

You don't understand why Zero's definition assumes it's conclusion and even HE said it was circular! This is a bit frustrating because anyone who has had a 101 level course in philosophy can see this is obviously true and I've wasted over 40 pages trying to explain the obvious. As far as I'm concerned, we haven't even gotten to the topic of materialism versus Idealism yet.

What difference does it make if Zero admits his definition is circular?! That just means that he didn't understand his own definition as well as I do (or that I have misunderstood something, though I keep asking you to tell me what I could have possibly misunderstood and you keep re-iterating the same flawed argument). If you want, since there's obviously a personal issue, let's not call it Zero's definition, but just "definition 1" or "attempt 1".

No hard feelings, but it is obvious that you are not willing to try to understand what I'm saying. I don't feel I'm learning very much from this discourse and that is the reason I participate here. So I'm done.

I would ask you not to leave this discussion open like this, but if you stayed you'd probably continue to get more and more frustrated about how counter-intuitive my "radical" ideas are (though they are not my own, but those of very highly respected Philosophers; not that that matters to me, but it seems to matter to you), instead of addressing my arguments head-on. It's probably a waste of your time and mine (though an excellent way to increase post-count ) to continue as we are, but I don't have anything else to say until you counter what I've alread said (and "it's radical" or "it's not the traditional definition" or "you haven't studied the opposite position enough" are not counters they are dodges, and weak ones at that since you also have not studied the positions that I'm holding (those of Dennett, Le Doux, and Schwartz (sort of, though he's less materialistic)), and your ideas seem equally "radical" to me, since they imply a way for the physical to interact (physically? metaphysically?) with the metaphysical).

I am ready to continue discussion whenever you are.

 

[Zero]

I'm just thinking that there cannot be a coherent, logical discussion of non-material concepts, that can lead anywhere but in circles. Is that such a wrong idea, and if so, why?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, Do you realize that your answer to Fliption's question "What criteria would I use if I wanted to know if something qualified as energy or not?", which is "If it can be interacted with (changed) by energetic means" does not work, because by far not all forms of energy interact directly. This is precisely the interesting thing about the structure of energy and matter. So you need some additional criteria.

Not really, it doesn't need to be able to effect other energy, of it's own accord, but can use other forms of energy to accomplish this task. Besides, if you want to get real technical, then the criteria are that it has to be composed of subatomic particles. Is that easier to deal with?

Then you say "For there to be something going on in my mind, and for me to be conscious of it, there must be an "inner observer" (someone that is conscious of that which is going on inside my head)." Understand? YES. Agree? NO! Because you forget your act of choosing what you think.

What does my choice have to do with it? If there was something going on "inside my mind" then there would have to be an inner observer, who "sees" these things - my eyes don't turn that way . Do you still disagree?

If you let your mind do everything, i.e. wander where IT wants, you finally end up in the loony bin. You have doggedly been negating this fact of your own choice -- which you can only do by CHOOSING to doggedly negate it. It is as if you would not want to be responsible for your own thoughts. Strange.

I am not "letting my mind do everything", I am my mind. And my mind is my brain. You are making to many (Idealistic) distinctions that needn't be made, and are really detrimental if you are trying to avoid the Cartesian traps.

The situation is quite funny. In philosophy this type of act is called "performative self-contradition". But you are in good company: all the authors you mention do the same. They believe in it, because they believe objectivity is warranted by looking from outside at something (playing God as a mind hovering over the thing) -- and they seem to believe nobody else notices the flaw.

Balderdash! (No offense.) It is obvious (to anyone who's actually examined it) that the heterophenomenological stance does not remove one from oneself, but simply studies others like oneself. It's like Dennett's illustration of the anthropologist and the tribes that believe in the god, Feenoman. Do you remember that (from Consciousness Explained)?

Yes, science now has chosen this position -- but it is increasingly getting into trouble for just this reason (on the whole, not in the many details). The homunculus problem does not objectively exist, it is merely the result of this one-eyed approach. Maybe now you can understand why all your "explanations" of this point are in vain: they only reiterate the one-eyedness, which obviously not everybody needs to share.

I'm sorry but that doesn't make any sense. Is your problem with Science as a whole, or with applying it to consciousness? Besides, the homunculus problem is the inevitable result of saying that something "occurs within my mind", surely you can see that.

Concerning the demonstration of laws, you forget that encoding information about mathematical properties works only where there is a reader who refers to the law as a law, not only to the encoded information. Letters and numbers alone won't do a single thing. The computer alone can't think the Law of Pythagoras, or any other one.

It could if it were capable of consciousness (and that just may be possible in the near future). Consciousness is a more refined (in some ways) version of exactly these same processing laws. The analogy of the "Joycean" machine is often used (Dennett makes very good use of it in the same book I've been referring you to this entire time), and it does nothing that can't be handled by any material (organic or otherwise), but is conscious (as Dennett's scheme shows).

Without the actively thinking writer and reader, nothing happens. Even if somebody programs the most advanced self-replicating and self-repairing AI device, the programmer, manufacturer, etc. is not at all eliminated, only shifted away until forgetting about all that. It is again the role of playing God without wanting to be caught in the game. This is self-delusion. The situation is the same as above: you doggedly defer and negate the actual agency. No wonder some people refuse this approach. The fact that many believe in it proves nothing.

The "actual agency"? The actual agency is the brain, until you can prove otherwise (which I severly doubt, since you quickly run into both the infinite regress problem and the physical/non-physical problem before any coherent stance can even be made). You might as well try to prove the Earth may still be flat (you immediately run into the observations and calculations that prove otherwise).

On the other hand, wanting to eliminate the root-word "material" from the term "materialism" won't get you to where you want, because again the necessary influence, which makes energy become matter, is eliminated from your view.

There is no "necessary influence" it is just the path of least resistance. I hate to say it, but you really don't seem to understand even the most basic concepts of matter and energy (I really mean no offense by this, it's just an observation). I (humbly) suggest The Universe, the Tenth Dimension and Everything by Richard Morris, as a good introduction to what is known in the Scientific paradigm, or perhaps "A short history of nearly everything" (or something like that) by Bryson.

The problem is mirrored also in your view that "the "laws" are just observations of patterns... As I have been expressing often on this thread, the approach of Inductive reasoning can account only for some partial laws, but precisely not for the overall order (which your saying purports to know), because no amount of Inductive reasoning can ever secure any strictly universal laws. This is one of the main problem of physics. -- So I have no reason at all to change my understanding.

But "universal laws" don't exist. They can't logically exist (Russel's paradox, Godel's Theorem, even one of Zeno's paradoxes... do these mean nothing to you?).

I will continue my response tomorrow, as I have run out of space in this post, and run out of time for the day. 'Till then, I refer you to my responses to hypnagogue in "The implications of a materialistic consciousness on telepathy".

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
I'm just thinking that there cannot be a coherent, logical discussion of non-material concepts, that can lead anywhere but in circles. Is that such a wrong idea, and if so, why?

I guess it's not necessarily a wrong (though I haven't ever had a conversation about non-physical concepts without eventually dead-ending or going in circles before) observation, but it is based on Inductive reasoning, and is thus could thus be wrong in any occasion in the future. IOW, we can logically say (if it's true) that we have not had such a conversation, but can incompletely reason that such a conversation cannot occur.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
I guess it's not necessarily a wrong (though I haven't ever had a conversation about non-physical concepts without eventually dead-ending or going in circles before) observation, but it is based on Inductive reasoning, and is thus could thus be wrong in any occasion in the future. IOW, we can logically say (if it's true) that we have not had such a conversation, but can incompletely reason that such a conversation cannot occur.

True enough, but, as I stated about nine hundred pages ago, this is more of a working viewpoint, rather than ultimate truth.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
True enough, but, as I stated about nine hundred pages ago, this is more of a working viewpoint, rather than ultimate truth.

You mean kind of like an easy way of referring to much more complicated issues?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
You mean kind of like an easy way of referring to much more complicated issues?

Kind of as a useful guide, considering the likelihood that we will never know everything, and the fact that treating the universe as though every effect has a physical cause is the only consistantly successful method of finding useful answers.

 

[sascha]

Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

When you think like me, your brain is working correctly.

 

[sascha]

Interesting. So you are proposing yourself as my guru?

Seriously: what is your answer to my question?

 

[Zero]

Brain fuction would be judged on...hmmm, I'm not sure. Accurate processing of external stimulus, internal cohesion, and not hearing strange voices?

 

[sascha]

Okay, but the problem is that all these functions require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part ... ?

Note that in philosophy there is a section called predication theory, and it has a problem: predicating leads finally into a version of Russell's paradox (the property of being a non-self-predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property -- or on the other side it both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable. The proposed solutions till now are of mere avoidance ...).

More in the field which you probably know better, you have the crux of the continuum hypthesis, the indeterminism of QT, the floating character of RT, etc...

In the last resort things are not as easy as many believe. We must be very careful. That's what I am advocating here, since quite a while and in many ways of expressing it -- including positive proposals. I mean: I don't think we have to postulate some barrier, or limit, or so ...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

How do "I" know when my brain "does it correctly"? I am fully confused by this question.

First off, "I" cannot know anything that my brain doesn't because I am my brain.

But, more importantly, I don't think it's possible for my brain to "do it wrong", who would be the judge? What would be the criteria (I really don't know since I never said (I don't think I said, anyway) anything about whether it thought "correctly" or "incorrectly")?

 

[sascha]

That's why this question is so interesting. If (as you seem to believe) it is not possible for your brain to "do it wrong", and you "are" your brain, you are compelled to feel infallible, isn't it. This reminds me of Zero's sneering remark on 11 September "There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways... except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?"

If you tell me the brain knows, then you are at the mercy of whatever happens to go on in your brain. And if you have to check, it is not the brain that has the ultimate word, and hence it is not the brain that thinks.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
That's why this question is so interesting. If (as you seem to believe) it is not possible for your brain to "do it wrong", and you "are" your brain, you are compelled to feel infallible, isn't it. This reminds me of Zero's sneering remark on 11 September "There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways... except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?"

The brain is mechanical (it is an organic machine), but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exert self-control. It obviously does, or else we humans wouldn't have free will (and we are assuming, for the purpose of this thread, that we do).

If you tell me the brain knows, then you are at the mercy of whatever happens to go on in your brain. And if you have to check, it is not the brain that has the ultimate word, and hence it is not the brain that thinks.

When will you stop seperating us from our brains? Seriously, you say that the "automaton human" is a result of our being the same thing as our brains, but then you speak of "us" being "at the mercy of our brains". You speak of "you" having "it" in check. This is a non-sequitor: "WE" ARE "IT"!

 

[sascha]

You should read my post a bit more attentively, especially for the second part of your answer. Or does your brain not want to?
I am not separating you from your brain. Or do you see some surgical instruments hovering over you?
Exactly how do you link self-control and free will?
When you say "WE" ARE "IT"!, you merely express a massive conflation: everything of "you" is one big mix of everything. But then why do you only declare being your brain and not also your toenails, your stomach, your excretions, etc?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
You should read my post a bit more attentively, especially for the second part of your answer. Or does your brain not want to?
I am not separating you from your brain. Or do you see some surgical instruments hovering over you?
Exactly how do you link self-control and free will?
When you say "WE" ARE "IT"!, you merely express a massive conflation: everything of "you" is one big mix of everything. But then why do you only declare being your brain and not also your toenails, your stomach, your excretions, etc?

Actually I have said, and do say, that the "self" is the entire organism. However, the conscious self is a part of the brain, and nothing more, that is the point that I was trying to get across.

Anyway, when I said that you keep "seperating me from my brain", it's because you continually refer to things like "keeping our brains under our control", which separates the concept of the conscious self (which would be the thing that "keeps things under control") and the brain.

 

[sascha]

Ugh, where did I continually "refer to things like 'keeping our brains under our control'"? Nobody can control his brain, but only his thoughts, and some have trouble even with that.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Ugh, where did I continually "refer to things like 'keeping our brains under our control'"? Nobody can control his brain, but only his thoughts, and some have trouble even with that.

Originally posted by you (if you don't believe me, look a few posts above this one):

If you tell me the brain knows, then you are at the mercy of whatever happens to go on in your brain. And if you have to check, it is not the brain that has the ultimate word, and hence it is not the brain that thinks.

When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

In the first one you speak of "us" having to check "our brains" (clear, obvious, separation of the "self" from the "brain").

In the second one you speak of "our brains" doing the thinking; and ask "how do you know when it does that correctly...?"[Italics mine].