SH: Thanks for the hint. This is what Rosenberg says:
APFC.pdf Rosenberg, page 77
"While Liberal Naturalism might feel liberating, we have too much
freedom. To find a place for consciousness, we need tests for the
minimal adequacy of proposed explanations, and also a class of...
Blindsight - the ability to respond appropriately to visual
inputs while lacking the feeling of having seen them - might
be something which only occurs in cases of brain damage, but
seems much more likely to be a significant phenomenon of
intact brain function as well. Indeed, it seems...
SH: I suppose you understand this better than I do. I will not dispute your
attribution of what is qualia. Rather, I have a problem with seeing this as
distinct types of consciousness; I guess the right way to put it is that they
seem like artificial categories constructed to advance a...
Originally Posted by Gödel, Escher, Bach
A classic example of the use-mention confusion in paintings is the occurence of a palette in a painting. Whereas the palette is an illusion created by the representational skill of the painter, the paints on the painted palette are literal daubs of paint...
It still seems to me this is a matter of definitions. This is not an introductory
book. So in the literature "consciousness" is divided into two aspects though
there is dispute about this and qualia. Consciousness is made up of the
psychological aspect and the phenomenal aspect which has...
SH: It occurred to me after I wrote my other post that you might
not be talking about whether consciousness=mind=self=ego=awareness
as synonamous and where non-mutual dichotimies appeared.
The basic dichotomy (dualism) , or premise of the book is between
physicalism and I think it is...
Honestrosewater wrote: "If Rosenberg doesn't have something like a two-level model, where the higher level is aware of the lower level, how does he fit in a "thinking about nothing" experience? In a two-level model, I could easily say that the content of my "thinking about nothing" experience...
honestrosewater wrote:
How is your "phenomena existing outside of the mind"
different from "phenomena existing independently of the brain"?
Rosenberg collaborated with Chalmers and I think they have similar
meanings for their technical terms. "Phenomenal consciousness" is
a technical...
Actually, I was a confirmed physicalist before starting Gregg's book. My
interest was in AI and I rejected any kind of dualism. In terms of the
philosophy of mind, physicalism means that the mind is created/generated
by the brain and that consciousness has a physical basis and that there
is...