In my experience, people who think that "a lot needs to be revised" in EP "in the light of such studies as those done with the !Kung" are not people who are terribly familiar with the field - familiar, that is, with the (mostly critical) rhetoric, but not with the science. I've tried to expand...
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I have a cat. He's morbidly obese. :frown:
Well, I don't really agree with that. Questions about the "purpose" or "function" of this or that are asked and answered in biology all the time, and not surprisingly, such questions help us capture certain patterns of relations in the...
I'm not sure where you get that, but as far as I know, people who lack emotions tend be cognitively impaired in many other respects. They do fine solving logic problems, but they fall far below par with rational decision making and planning ahead. Logical but not reasonable, if you will.
Apparently, in your race to find a new label for what I have once called "psychological contextualism", but what we may as well call "externalism" and leave it at that, you have overlooked the fact that "radical behaviorism" is a label that is already in use, a label applied to views of the...
It's getting increasingly difficult nowadays to figure out just what it is that people mean when they throw around the label "behaviorism". Generally speaking, though, one hears a certain sort of story, a story about the fall of behaviorism and the rise of the cognitive revolution. Behaviorists...
But users' idiosyncratic input historoies aren't programmed into VR simulations. What is programmed are the VR responses to possible inputs. This is precisely why a VR program that was as good as the Matrix would run into combinatorial explosion while trying to figure out how to respond to the...
Not at all. Suppose you go to a VR lab in Australia, where a bunch of programmers explain to you that they are testing a new video game. They wire you up, push a few buttoms, and you suddenly discover yourself in the middle of a dungeon with a sword in your hand. In this situation, it would be...
You might find while reading Dennett that he is much more interested in "practical" constraints than he is in "principled" constraints. I think Dennett is basically a functionalist, so I can't see any reason why he would say that Matrix scenarios are impossible in principle.
But what does...