Fukushima Management and Government Performance

[NUCENG]

interesting Reuters story that indicates Fukushima had warning signs.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf

 

[swl]

interesting Reuters story that indicates Fukushima had warning signs.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf

How could this be considered a warning of the Fukushima disaster?

 

[NUCENG]

How could this be considered a warning of the Fukushima disaster?

After I read the article, the thought process was like this:

First, keeping worker dose ALARA is a key indicator in safety conscious work environments.

From the Reuters story (p1):

“For five years to 2008, the Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for worker exposure to radiation and one of the five worst nuclear plants in the world on that basis.”

Second, Safety consciousness is a process of continuing improvement: Contrary to this on p5.

““We had largely reached our target by 2009,” said Tokyo Electric’s Sakai. At that point, some of the urgency behind the safety campaign appeared to drain. “We’ll continue to try to reduce occupational exposures by every possible measure after cost performance evaluations,” Shunsuke Hori, a Tokyo Electric safety manager, said at a September 2009 conference in Aomori, Japan." In other words they declared victory and went back to business as usual. They achieved their goal of improving to below average.

At that point they were just under their goal of 2.5 Sv total exposure to their workforce.

Compare that with reports of US plant doses reported in NRC NUREG-0713.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0713/v31/

in 2009 the Average BWR (out of 35 BWRs) total workforce dose was 151 Rem or 1.51 Sv. Less than half the dose in 1994 while production increased from 22 GW/yr to over 30 GW/yr. US plants have worked at Cobalt reduction, zinc injection, hydrogen injection, and noble metal chemistry to reduce corrosion and activation of plant systems. The result is clear evidence of continuous improvement.

As Reuters points out the TEPCO promises of a new safety culture after the shroud cracking coverup scandals were not kept. Further it points out the differences in the way the Japanese regulators ignored the Fukuahima performance while NRC came down on the US Perry plant for similar poor performance.

In a short 5 page story, Reuters has pointed out a TEPCO culture of cost over safety, regulatory collusion and neglect. They wrote this in a factual style without a lot of fear-mongering, but didn't pull any punches either. That is one of the better reports I have seen.

 

[Luca Bevil]

...
In a short 5 page story, Reuters has pointed out a TEPCO culture of cost over safety, regulatory collusion and neglect. They wrote this in a factual style without a lot of fear-mongering, but didn't pull any punches either. That is one of the better reports I have seen.

Agreed, completely

 

[swl]

...First, keeping worker dose ALARA is a key indicator in safety conscious work environments.

From the Reuters story (p1):

“For five years to 2008, the Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for worker exposure to radiation and one of the five worst nuclear plants in the world on that basis.”...

Thank you for explaining http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf" .

So if I take a look at their list (top p3) of the "five worst plants in the world", what should I think about the number 1 worst plant in the world being the Perry, Ohio BWR?

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

 

[Astronuc]

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

The article is a bit sensational and misleading in terms of 'dangerous'. It's comparing particular plants to the global fleet. Someone has to be on the top in terms of expsoure, but that doesn't mean that the environment is necessarily dangerous. Generally, exposure at plants is well below industry safety standards, but certainly above levels that one would find outside the plant. Those rankings reflect those particular plants cited. All facilities strive to reduce exposure to employees, and some do a better job than others.

 

[NUCENG]

Thank you for explaining http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf" .

So if I take a look at their list (top p3) of the "five worst plants in the world", what should I think about the number 1 worst plant in the world being the Perry, Ohio BWR?

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

Perry has had a significant negative performance issues since Davis Besse took the attention of FENOC management in 2002. Their ALARA planning and performance were poor and resulted in at least four near overexposure events right about the beginning of the period researched by Reuters. They still are averaging about 2.8 Sv total occupational dose over the last 3 cycles, although they did have some moisture separator repairs in their last outage that didn't help. However in the last few years they have had "White" Performance indicators for ALARA and mitigating systems, and Human Performance issues that have not yet been solved. They have made progress moving from "Multiple Degraded Cornerstones" to "Regulatory Response" and now "Licensee Response" which bring less regulator attention as improvements are made. They are currently all green in performance indicators, but their human performance issues persist. Since this is considered a "Substantive Cross-Cutting Theme" that could affect multiple safety cornerstones.

If you want to explore performance for a specific plant start here:

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html

Performance Indicators give a Graphical summary of performance and other links allow you to read the Assessment Reports for each plant. Finally the Inspection Reports link allows you to read all inspection reports performed by NRC except those related to security.

So is Perry the worst plant in the world? As Astronuc pointed out the Reuters Report looked at Occupational Dose and Perry was high on that list. They still have performance improvements to make and they are still getting a lot of expensive "help" to get there. Based on what we've learned lately the "worst" plant may be another TEPCO plant.

Edit: Another way to look at this is that the most dangerous plant in the world may be the one at the top of the performance list. One of the surest ways for performance to degrade is complacency or an attitude that you don't need to continue to improve.

 

[tsutsuji]

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said the operator informed it just four days before Japan's massive March 11 earthquake and tsunami that waves exceeding 10 meters (33 feet) could hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant.
[...]
In 2009, TEPCO notified NISA of a separate calculation showing that a six-meter (20-foot) tsunami could hit the plant, based on studies of a tsunami that occurred in the year 869.
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110825p2g00m0dm050000c.html

TEPCO says it didn't mean to disclose the assessment since it was a tentative calculation for research purposes based on a simulation.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/24_36.html

Why wasn't this story told in the Japanese government's report to IAEA in June ? The tsunami safety design story in that report ends with

At the 32nd Joint Working Group for Earthquake, Tsunami, Geology, and Foundations
under the Seismic and Structural Design Subcommittee (June 24, 2009) held in order to
conduct examination related to earthquake, it was pointed out that although the
investigation report about tsunami by the Jogan earthquake in 869 was made by National
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology and Tohoku University, the
earthquake causing the tsunami was not dealt with. Regarding this, NISA requested
TEPCO at the 33rd Joint Working Group (July 13, 2009) to take into account the Jogan
earthquake for evaluating design tsunami height when new knowledge on the tsunami of
the Jogan earthquake is obtained.

III-31 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/pdf/chapter_iii-2.pdf

Was Mr Makoto Takao of Tepco aware of the "over 10 m" estimate when he presented his O.P. + 5.7 tsunami, "we assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf page 14 slide at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium on seismic safety of nuclear installations (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html ) ? Isn't this kind of symposium a place where people are supposed to talk about the latest available research ?

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011082500390 On 25 August, Junichi Matsumoto insisted that Tepco's earlier comment that the March 11 tsunami is beyond expectations/assumptions ("想定外" sotei-gai) is not a problem. "I want to consistently maintain that it was a trial calculation. It was not something that could cause a change in the design assumptions (想定 sotei)". When the Earthquake Research Promotion Division of the government announced in July 2002 the probability of an earthquake off the coast of the Boso Peninsula and off the coast of Sanriku, Tepco made a trial calculation based on the hypothesis of an earthquake of the same level as the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake occurring off the Fukushima coast, concluding that there is a risk that a tsunami might surge with a maximum of 15.7 meters. The trial calculation assuming an earthquake of the same level as the 869 Jogan earthquake concluded with the possibility of a maximum of 9.2 meters. After receiving these results, Tepco asked the Society of Civil Engineers to revise the tsunami evaluation criteria, and at that time the officers in charge of nuclear power in the top management knew about these estimates. Former president Masataka Shimizu learned about them after the disaster at the latest.

29 March Reuters :

Over the past two weeks, Japanese government officials and Tokyo Electric Power executives have repeatedly described the deadly combination of the most powerful quake in Japan’s history and the massive tsunami that followed as “soteigai,” or beyond expectations.
(...)
The tsunami research presented by a Tokyo Electric team led by Toshiaki Sakai came on the first day of a three-day conference in July 2007 [2006 (1)] organized by the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering [in Miami].
(...)
Sakai's team determined the Fukushima plant was dead certain to be hit by a tsunami of one or two meters in a 50-year period. They put the risk of a wave of 6 meters or more at around 10 percent over the same time span.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-japa-nuclear-risks-idUSTRE72S2UA20110329

The research disclosed yesterday seems to be different from the one presented in Miami in 2006(1), as it was made in the Autumn of 2008, according to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110824005905.htm

(1) Reuters was wrong about the year. The Sakai presentation was made in Miami in 2006 :

It is meaningful for tsunami assessment to evaluate phenomena beyond the design basis. Because once we set the design basis tsunami height, we still have possibilities tsunami height exceeds the determined design tsunami height due to uncertainties regarding the tsunami phenomena. It is apparent that probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) gives us an effective clue. PRA is enlarging its usage for seismic design, but rarely used for tsunami risk evaluation due to its underdevelopment.

Sakai et al. Abstract available by clicking "expand all sessions in track" after "TRK 6 Safety and Security" and then the "ICONE14-89183 Development of a Method for Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis in Japan" link below "Monday, July 17, 2006 10:30 AM-12:30 PM" at http://archive.asmeconferences.org/ICONE14/TechnicalProgramOverview.cfm

 

[NUCENG]

Why wasn't this story told in the Japanese government's report to IAEA in June ? The tsunami safety design story in that report ends with



Was Mr Makoto Takao of Tepco aware of the "over 10 m" estimate when he presented his O.P. + 5.7 tsunami, "we assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf page 14 slide at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium on seismic safety of nuclear installations (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html ) ? Isn't this kind of symposium a place where people are supposed to talk about the latest available research ?

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011082500390 On 25 August, Junichi Matsumoto insisted that Tepco's earlier comment that the March 11 tsunami is beyond expectations/assumptions ("想定外" sotei-gai) is not a problem. "I want to consistently maintain that it was a trial calculation. It was not something that could cause a change in the design assumptions (想定 sotei)". When the Earthquake Research Promotion Division of the government announced in July 2002 the probability of an earthquake off the coast of the Boso Peninsula and off the coast of Sanriku, Tepco made a trial calculation based on the hypothesis of an earthquake of the same level as the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake occurring off the Fukushima coast, concluding that there is a risk that tsunami might surge with a maximum of 15.7 meters. The trial calculation assuming an earthquake of the same level as the 869 Jogan earthquake concluded with the possibility of a maximum of 9.2 meters. After receiving these results, Tepco asked the Society of Civil Engineers to revise the tsunami evaluation criteria, and at that time the officers in charge of nuclear power in the top management knew about these estimates. Former president Masataka Shimizu learned about them after the disaster at the latest.

29 March Reuters :


The research disclosed yesterday is different from the one presented in Miami in 2007, as it was made in the Autumn of 2008, according to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110824005905.htm

During the earthquake design review following the Kashiwazaki Karawa earthquake the issue came up about the tsunami in 869. See the referenced article in post #125

 

[tsutsuji]

During the earthquake design review following the Kashiwazaki Karawa earthquake the issue came up about the tsunami in 869. See the referenced article in post #125

Thank you.

Found this about evaluation of tsunami and earthquake at Fukushima:

http://msquair.wordpress.com/2011/04/28/common-cause-at-daiichi-fukushima/

That March 28 blog page refers to a "2011/03/22" URL, "Published: March 24" Washington Post article:

The Daiichi panel wrapped up its review and, on June 24, 2009, presented its findings to a larger working group of 40, which included just two tsunami experts.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world...t-of-tsunami/2011/03/22/AB7Rf2KB_story_1.html

which is not very different from what is said page III-31 of http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/...pter_iii-2.pdf and where we understand that some non-Tepco people like seismologist Yukinobu Okamura raised the 869 tsunami issue. What we learn from the 29 March Reuters news and from the 24 August NISA announcement is that Tepco had developed research internally on the tsunami issue which concluded that the risk existed with some non-negligible probability. We can no longer summarise the story by saying that while some non-Tepco people were aware of the risk, Tepco was unaware of the risk or dismissing the claims: the blogger, Matthew Squair, talks about "symptoms of a collective view or ‘groupthink‘ that denied the possibility of a hazard to the plant from a tsunami event". The story seems now to be more complicated than that.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110825/0430_iaea.html Tepco vice-president Ichiro Takekuro was communicated the above 10 metres tsunami assessment results at the time when a study was commissioned to the Society of Civil Engineers. Junichi Matsumoto said: "The estimate was a calculation resulting from an accumulation of hypotheses, therefore it had no concrete basis, which is why we did not publicly release it". Yoshinori Moriyama, senior NISA official in charge of measures against nuclear disasters [the NISA spokesman in Fukushima Daiichi press conferences], said: "Even if it is a trial calculation, it constitutes material for [safety] evaluation. Tepco should have reported it early. In hindsight, I think the tsunami countermeasures were not sufficient".

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011). [It includes the Toshiaki Sakai presentation at the ICONE-14 Miami conference in 2006, but it is not saying a word about Makoto Takao's presentation at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium]

I found the links to the following research papers :

* Sawai et al. (2008) : "Marine incursions of the past 1500 years and evidence of tsunamis at Suijin-numa, a coastal lake facing the Japan Trench" The Holocene 18,4 (2008) pp. 517–528 http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/S11/Sawai et al 2008 .pdf (in English)

* Satake et al. (2008) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains" by Kenji Satake, Yuichi Namegaya and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 8, 71-89, 2008 http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h19seika/pdf/03.satake.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

* Namegaya et al. (2010) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland" by Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake, and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 10, 1-21, 2010 : http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h21seika/pdf/namegaya.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

 

[NUCENG]

Thank you.


That March 28 blog page refers to a "2011/03/22" URL, "Published: March 24" Washington Post article:


which is not very different from what is said page III-31 of http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/...pter_iii-2.pdf and where we understand that some non-Tepco people like seismologist Yukinobu Okamura raised the 869 tsunami issue. What we learn from the 29 March Reuters news and from the 24 August NISA announcement is that Tepco had developed research internally on the tsunami issue which concluded that the risk existed with some non-negligible probability. We can no longer summarise the story by saying that while some non-Tepco people were aware of the risk, Tepco was unaware of the risk or dismissing the claims: the blogger, Matthew Squair, talks about "symptoms of a collective view or ‘groupthink‘ that denied the possibility of a hazard to the plant from a tsunami event". The story seems now to be more complicated than that.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110825/0430_iaea.html Tepco vice-president Ichiro Takekuro was communicated the above 10 metres tsunami assessment results at the time when a study was commissioned to the Society of Civil Engineers. Junichi Matsumoto said: "The estimate was a calculation resulting from an accumulation of hypotheses, therefore it had no concrete basis, which is why we did not publicly release it". Yoshinori Moriyama, senior NISA official in charge of measures against nuclear disasters [the NISA spokesman in Fukushima Daiichi press conferences], said: "Even if it is a trial calculation, it constitutes material for [safety] evaluation. Tepco should have reported it early. In hindsight, I think the tsunami countermeasures were not sufficient".

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011). [It includes the Toshiaki Sakai presentation at the ICONE-14 Miami conference in 2006, but it is not saying a word about Makoto Takao's presentation at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium]

I found the links to the following research papers :

* Sawai et al. (2008) : "Marine incursions of the past 1500 years and evidence of tsunamis at Suijin-numa, a coastal lake facing the Japan Trench" The Holocene 18,4 (2008) pp. 517–528 http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/S11/Sawai et al 2008 .pdf (in English)

* Satake et al. (2008) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains" by Kenji Satake, Yuichi Namegaya and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 8, 71-89, 2008 http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h19seika/pdf/03.satake.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

* Namegaya et al. (2010) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland" by Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake, and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 10, 1-21, 2010 : http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h21seika/pdf/namegaya.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

Wow! I just skimmed those articles and I want you on my team for research!

Here is another challenge. Back in the early days I saw some references to another earthqauake/tsunami in the area of Fukushima that left a geological record that was dated back to around 200 BCE. I looked for that when I wrote my previous reply, but didn't find it. I do know that the scientists raised the 869 event with TEPCO, but have no idea if they discussed the earlier event.

Going back that far, there also may be differences in where the coastline was, but that would give three events with about a 1000 to 1100 year recurrence rate. In any case that information was known at least in the scientific community.

There was a clear opportunity to question the 5.7 m design basis tsunami. But that brings me back to NISA's statement to the Convention on Nuclear Safety that they didn't review design basis information unless a utility wanted to build a new plant.

 

[clancy688]

Did anyone of our japanese speaking forum members notice http://www.stippy.com/japan-life/155-days-earthquake-tsunami-and-nuclear-disaster-fuji-tv-documentary/" Fuji TV documentary about the earthquake disaster?

The report about the nuclear part of the disaster is starting around 1:09h, they're showing many pictures and images I haven't seen before, for example workers handling 40tons of ice (?). Perhaps there are informations we haven't had before? Unfortunately I don't speak japanese, so I don't know what they're talking about...

 

[NUCENG]

Here is a link to a story about one of the robot operators at Fukishima. This is a summary because a blog the operator was writing has been deleted. Perhaps another example of trying to prevent communication in a world where the internet makes that impossible and foolish.

http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/fukushima-robot-operator-diaries

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20110821/t10015043651000.html 21 August : a Hokkaido University team found geological strata near Kesennuma, Miyagi prefecture, providing evidence of 5 large tsunamis in the past over more than 5000 years. In Miyako, Iwate prefecture, 6 tsunami strata have been found. With the 2011 tsunami, this is roughly one large tsunami every 1000 years. Evidence of the Jogan tsunami had not been previously found as far in the North. If some of the strata found by the Hokkaido University team are confirmed to belong to the Jogan tsunami, the Jogan tsunami's magnitude could be revised to 9 instead of 8.3 as was previously thought. See also http://www.kahoku.co.jp/news/2011/08/20110822t75007.htm (with photograph) and http://channel6newsonline.com/2011/08/massive-tsunamis-hit-japans-eastern-coast-every-1000-years/ (in English)

http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/bbagS11.htm Oregon State University, Geomorphology Brown Bag - Spring 2011 "Geomorphology of Tsunamis" is a gold mine of tsunami research literature.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20110824-OYT1T00991.htm Tepco's claim that that the tsunami was beyond expectation "has collapsed".

http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90920019&sid=as3_8zR_CaQs In the 25 August joint press conference, the confrontation of points of views between Tepco and the NISA "has sharpened". Although the NISA says it orally instructed Tepco to perform back checks upon receiving the tsunami estimate on 7 March, in the morning press conference, Junichi Matsumoto denied that the NISA provided Tepco any oral instruction. Concerning the discrepancy between Tepco and the NISA, Yoshinori Moriyama said that the NISA provided documents for the investigation panel to review.

http://www.nikkei.com/news/category...E7E2E2938DE0E7E2EAE0E2E3E39790E0E2E2E2;at=ALL Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano expressed regret concerning the fact that the over 10 metres tsunami risk at Fukushima Daiichi was not publicly released by Tepco and the NISA, and was finally found by the investigation panel: "The cabinet's position is that we want to inspect by which process, and where [the information] was stopped".

 

[tsutsuji]

August 4:

Most recently, it was revealed that NISA, the nuclear watchdog, asked utilities to stage supportive questions at a METI-hosted symposium on the controversial use of plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in an apparent attempt to manipulate public opinion in favor of nuclear power.
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110804x1.html

August 13:

Chubu Electric Power Co. and Shikoku Electric Power Co. said they were ordered to do so by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, ostensibly the government's chief nuclear watchdog. Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Banri Kaieda, who oversees the agency, admitted to, and apologized for, those actions by officials. At a parliamentary hearing where he was berated by opposition lawmakers for his handling of the mushrooming scandal, Mr. Kaieda broke down in tears.

The disclosures prompted Prime Minister Naoto Kan last week to label NISA a "lobby" of the utilities, and spurred the government to propose breaking up NISA by removing its nuclear industry oversight responsibilities and handing them over to the environment ministry.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904823804576499942442007306.html

August 30:
http://www.47news.jp/CN/201108/CN2011083001000703.html Independent panel releases interim report on the involvement of top level NISA officials in recruitments of NPP personnel to attend and influence public opinion in symposiums on the future of Genkai NPP and Hamaoka NPP.

http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/20110831k0000m040063000c.html NISA director-general Hiroyuki Fukano apologises.

http://www.mbs.jp/news/jnn_4814083_zen.shtml The independent panel will release its final report at the end of September after conducting further hearings about what happened concerning Onagawa and Sendai NPPs.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0902/TKY201109020749.html It was revealed by the NISA on 2 September that after receiving from JNES at 01:57 AM, 12 March 2011, the Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) results for Fukushima Daiichi unit 1 containing predictions about water level, pressure, and when meltdown and reactor damage would occur, the NISA failed to communicate those results to the Kantei (Prime minister residence).Yoshinori Moriyama (NISA) commented that he "does not know the reason" why. The SPEEDI data received at 06:07 AM on the same day were not communicated to the Kantei either.

http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20110903k0000m040137000c.html The ERSS results have been disclosed by the NISA on 2 September. Those for units 2 and 3 were sent to Kantei, but they were not used to build evacuation plans. Those for unit 1 failed from being sent.
The ERSS data for unit 2, predicting fuel rod exposure at 22:50 and meltdown at 24:50 were received by NISA on 11 March at around 9:30 PM and given by hand to a cabinet staff member at 10:45 PM, 11 March and after midnight on 12 March. Those for unit 3 were received by NISA at 6:30 AM on 13 March and sent to Kantei 20 minutes later. At the 2 September press conference, Yoshinori Moriyama explained that these data were not exploited to build evacuation plans because they were not based on real facts.

http://www.47news.jp/CN/201109/CN2011090201001046.html No detailed explanation was provided to the Kantei together with the unit 2 ERSS data. Yoshinori Moriyama explained that, as they are not based on real facts, they were provided to the Kantei only as a reference/footnote. The 11 March around 10 PM data predicted fuel damage 2 hours later, meltdown 3 hours later, and the necessity to perform venting with radiation release at 3:20 AM, 12 March.

 

[zapperzero]

Yoshinori Moriyama explained that, as they are not based on real facts, they were provided to the Kantei only as a reference/footnote. The 11 March around 10 PM data predicted fuel damage 2 hours later, meltdown 3 hours later, and the necessity to perform venting with radiation release at 3:20 AM, 12 March.

Fantastic. So, there is no actual data, but we have these simulations. They are the best we have, but we'll just go ahead and ignore them, basing our decisions on gut feeling instead.

 

[tsutsuji]

Copies of the documents sent by the NISA to the Kantei are available in http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/09/20110902005/20110902005-6.pdf (13 pages, 6MB)

 

[tsutsuji]

From the September issue of ATOMOΣ　:

That the information about the core status was not released until mid-May, is highly deplorable, he [a former head of American Nuclear Society] says. Everybody in Japan feels the same.
(...)
He says the meltdown of units 1 ~ 3 could be predicted out of a simple heat balance, and it was supported by the evidence of radioactive substance releases, so he felt considerable despair over the fact that although considerable damage had been done to the citizens, Tokyo Electric and the public authorities admitted meltdown for the first time two months after the accident. To stretch it a little, the citizen's confidence has been betrayed, and this could be an important factor damaging the use of nuclear energy in Japan in the future, he warns.

Hisashi Ninokata, "The Reception of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident by the ANS: How key members of the ANS perceived accident information", ATOMOΣ, vol. 53 No.9 (September 2011) p.602.
http://www.aesj.or.jp/atomos/tachiyomi/2011-09mokuji.pdf (my translation)

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201109060244.html "In his first interview since leaving office (...) Kan offered new insights into the stresses at the top of government as it struggled to cope with the March 11 earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear disaster".

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110906004963.htm "Kan revealed that the off-site emergency response center near the plant, though supposed to serve as a front-line command center in the event of a crisis, was vacated soon after the accident" (...) Kan: "All the crisis-management arrangements that had been made prior to the accident failed to function properly."

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/region/news/110906/fki11090602100002-n1.htm (Fukui regional page)　A committee working on the revision of Fukui prefecture nuclear emergency manual which is planned to be completed by the end of this year, had a meeting on 5 September discussing issues such as the cooperation from surrounding prefectures with personnel and equipments to help with people radiation screening operations (Fukushima prefecture had to rely on surrounding prefectures' help), and whether to use a separate front-line base (like J-Village) in addition to the off-site centre.

(TBS news) & http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110908p2a00m0na022000c.html "TEPCO submits heavily redacted copy of Fukushima nuke accident manual"

 

[zapperzero]

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110906004963.htm "Kan revealed that the off-site emergency response center near the plant, though supposed to serve as a front-line command center in the event of a crisis, was vacated soon after the accident" (...) Kan: "All the crisis-management arrangements that had been made prior to the accident failed to function properly."

We knew that already. Everyone left as it appeared that Unit 1 was ready to blow, but they returned later.

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110908p2a00m0na022000c.html "TEPCO submits heavily redacted copy of Fukushima nuke accident manual"

As in, 90% or more is blanked out.

 

[tsutsuji]

We knew that already. Everyone left as it appeared that Unit 1 was ready to blow, but they returned later.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20110316-866921/news/20110905-OYT1T01170.htm (in Japanese) summarizes Naoto Kan as saying that "personnel failed from gathering at the offsite center". What is meant is, I suppose, the Offsite Center located in Shimonogami, Ookuma (map http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/genshiryoku/jimusho/1_shoukai_6_fukushima1.html ).

I could find the following in the Japanese government report to IAEA :

In relation with the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, since the accident events rapidly proceeded in a situation where communication with the Off-site center was difficult due to the disaster, the initial collection of information and communication were conducted mainly by ERC.
(...)
As preparation for earthquakes and tsunamis, etc. in power supplies, communication and reserves, etc. was not sufficient at the Off-site Center (OFC) where the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was set up, and also, as enough information on the plant was not obtained as an external factor, expected function of information gathering and communication was not performed from the beginning.
(...)
Meanwhile, convening related parties and dispatching them to the site planned in the framework of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness was also insufficient in the initial startup stage. This was partly because advanced notices and the register of members to be convened was not fully performed and is to be improved. There is also a background factor that many of current members are planned to be convened from a long distance and improvement should be made for realistic response to a case in which a disaster event proceeds rapidly as in this time.

This time it is contemplated that OFC failed to effectively function under such combined conditions leading to a delay in full-fledged operation of the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
Pages V-42, V-43 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/pdf/chapter_v.pdf (my boldening added)

See also page V-4 : "Plant information, ERSS, SPEEDI and others were still unavailable at the Off-site Center for some period of time"

 

[NUCENG]

We knew that already. Everyone left as it appeared that Unit 1 was ready to blow, but they returned later.



As in, 90% or more is blanked out.

OK, hope this doesn't come as a shock, hearing this from me.

Claiming that emergency procedures are protected as intellectual property and refusing to provide them in unredacted form to the regulator and the grovernment is just plain bovine excrement. Even if that could be justified, the standard practice in the US is to provide an original unredacted version for official use and a redacted vesion for public release.

And if the exerpts are typical of the detail of those procedure, I doubt that they would be of use even to the operators during an accident. Bad procedures would definitely make mistakes by operators more likely.

"When reactor pressure rises, stabilizes the pressure at (redacted) Mpa by using an emergency condenser and other techniques, and report."

"Other techniques?" Please, the next step was probably "Do what you can and hope that a miracle occurs."

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110930/1600_seiritsu.html The law creating a 10 member nuclear accident investigation commission with investigative powers has been enacted. It is the first time in history that an investigation commission composed of experts is created at the Diet of Japan.

The above commission is different from the "Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company" ( http://icanps.go.jp/eng/about/ ) whose legal basis is a cabinet decision.

http://jp.wsj.com/Japan/Politics/node_317037 Contrasting with the investigation committee appointed by the cabinet in May, the new investigation commission will have a legally binding power to request documents or hear witnesses.

 

[tsutsuji]

Another major difference:

According to the legislation enacted Friday, the new panel will be open to the press,

(...)

The government panel, meanwhile, is not open to the media.

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20111001a5.html

 

[tsutsuji]

25 August:

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said the operator informed it just four days before Japan's massive March 11 earthquake and tsunami that waves exceeding 10 meters (33 feet) could hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant.
[...]
In 2009, TEPCO notified NISA of a separate calculation showing that a six-meter (20-foot) tsunami could hit the plant, based on studies of a tsunami that occurred in the year 869.
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110825p2g00m0dm050000c.html

TEPCO says it didn't mean to disclose the assessment since it was a tentative calculation for research purposes based on a simulation.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/24_36.html

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011).

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111003/1305_tsunamishisan.html The 7 March Tepco report to NISA has been publicly released in answer to a NHK request. All documents are marked with "handle with care" and "for preliminary consultation purposes". Based on the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake, it predicts tsunamis from 8.4 to 10 metre at Fukushima Daiichi units 1 ~ 6. It plans to start studying tsunami countermeasures in April, so that tsunami safety evaluation and countermeasures would match the October 2012 update of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society manual. Tepco's Junichi Matsumoto commented: "At the time of 7 March, the probability of occurrence of such a tsunami was not known, such calculated estimate was in a research phase, and there was no thought that a prompt response was needed". The NISA's Yoshinori Moriyama commented: "I think that three years after producing the calculated estimate, it should have been publicly discussed by specialists, and tsunami countermeasures should have been carried out. Retrospectively it is highly disappointing that this didn't take place".

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/1003/TKY201110030186.html The 7 March Tepco report to NISA has been publicly released on 3 October by the NISA in answer to an Asahi Shimbun request. The report's title is "Fukushima Daiichi and Daini nuclear power plant tsunami evaluation". It is made of one A4 format page and two A3 format pages. Taking into account the deliberations of the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion and of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society, it provides three kinds of estimates. All of them are above the 5.7 metre level, and two are above 10 metre. Upon reception of this report, the NISA's office manager in charge requested Tepco to deliver a report and to take countermeasures at the facilities. Concerning the mega-tsunami of the past (Jogan earthquake), it quotes a specialist as saying "it is necessary to expand knowledge further, and this shall take 2~3 years". It plans the scientific publication in October 2011 of research concluding that tsunami vestiges above 4 metres cannot be found in Fukushima prefecture. Based on the above, it plans to reassess tsunami estimates in time with the expected October 2012 update of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society manual.

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0918/TKY201109180217.html (18 September) The Atomic Energy Society of Japan has just created a draft probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. Until now, there was a probabilistic manual for earthquakes, but not for tsunamis. Tsunami safety was relying on the standards of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society published in 2002, but in the present accident, those were largely exceeded, the emergency diesel generators were flooded, reactor cooling became impossible, and large amounts of radioactive substances were released. In response, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan decided in May to create a probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. In the draft, tsunami heights and frequencies are predicted using data such as tsunamis of the past and active faults' sizes. The manual provides a method to calculate for each tsunami wave height, the probability of seawater flooding, of building and pipe damages caused by shocks of floating objects. It provides a method to calculate scenarios and related frequencies as regards the accumulation of failures and damages of every equipment leading to core damage. The purpose is to find out which equipment changes or reinforcements can lower the accident probability and to use these results in real safety countermeasures.

 

[zapperzero]

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111002p2g00m0dm083000c.html
TEPCO finds own nuclear accident manual useless

 

[gmax137]

...

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0918/TKY201109180217.html (18 September) The Atomic Energy Society of Japan has just created a draft probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. Until now, there was a probabilistic manual for earthquakes, but not for tsunamis. Tsunami safety was relying on the standards of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society published in 2002, but in the present accident, those were largely exceeded, the emergency diesel generators were flooded, reactor cooling became impossible, and large amounts of radioactive substances were released. In response, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan decided in May to create a probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. In the draft, tsunami heights and frequencies are predicted using data such as tsunamis of the past and active faults' sizes. The manual provides a method to calculate for each tsunami wave height, the probability of seawater flooding, of building and pipe damages caused by shocks of floating objects. It provides a method to calculate scenarios and related frequencies as regards the accumulation of failures and damages of every equipment leading to core damage. The purpose is to find out which equipment changes or reinforcements can lower the accident probability and to use these results in real safety countermeasures.

tsutsuji, can you find a link to the actual draft document? All I can find is the story that the draft was created. I'd like to see the actual draft. Thanks

 

[tsutsuji]

tsutsuji, can you find a link to the actual draft document? All I can find is the story that the draft was created. I'd like to see the actual draft. Thanks

I am afraid I can't find the document either. All I could find is the following presentation http://www.aesj.or.jp/information/20110919yamaguchi.pdf (which is linked on http://www.aesj.or.jp/information/session.html ). Pr Yamaguchi seems to be the head of the relevant committee.

Incidentally, I found "A Probabilistic Risk Assessment Practioner looks at the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami" by Woody Epstein, 29 April 2011 at http://woody.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/A-PRA-Practioner-looks-at-the-Great-East-Japan-Earthquake-and-Tsunami.pdf which is asking interesting questions such as "If the TAMNPP methodology is correct, why did TEPCO’s implementation of it indicate a tsunami wall of 5.7m was sufficient ?"

 

[Astronuc]

I have not been able to find the AESJ draft standard for tsunami PRA on their website, but I have found the Epstein paper and other more recent discussions of 'what happened'.

Epstein comments (pg 23/55): "I am also not sure how TEPCO applied the JSCE guidelines. The presentation made by TEPCO in 2008, after their preliminary tsunami risk assessment, only indicates that they used the Chilean Tsunami of 1960 as the scenario tsunami for the far field study; there is no mention of the scenario for the near field study which produced the results of a 5.7m design basis for Daiichi. Perhaps the correct application of the JSCE methods, both historical data collection and implementation of the mathematics, was beyond the scope of TEPCO PRA analysts."

Earlier, Epstein states (pg 13/55) "Dr. Geller correctly points out that one of the leading contributors to “what went wrong” at Fukushima Daiichi was an inability by anyone involved in decision making or regulation to “expect the unexpected”."

I think such a large earthquake and tsunami were forseeable, based on earthquakes since 1900, in addition to historical information. Governments need look at changes in frequencies/trends of such natural phenomena.

This might also be of interest (Nov 24-26, 2010) - http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html

and particularly - Session C - http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-10.pdf (Seismic PSA Implementation Standard in Japan)

See also paper B-06, "Tsunami Assessment method for NPP in JSCE, Japan"

and http://committees.jsce.or.jp/ceofnp/system/files/JSCE_Tsunami_060519.pdf

Those papers/presentations represent the thinking prior to March 11, 2011. Obviously, things have changed.

There is also this - Members of nuclear academic society voice repentance over Fukushima disaster
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110920p2a00m0na001000c.html

Hisashi Ninokata, a professor with the Tokyo Institute of Technology, said, "A myth that nuclear plants were completely safe took on a life of its own and delayed efforts to improve their safety. We experts, too, were overconfident that a nuclear disaster of such magnitude would never happen."
. . . .
One audience member asked, "Does it take a disaster like this to make you notice problems?" In reply, Hosei University visiting professor Hiroshi Miyano said, "We need to reflect on our lack of imagination (regarding possible dangers to nuclear plants)."

Osaka University professor Akira Yamaguchi said, "I think we were in an environment that did not encourage us to exercise our imaginations."
. . . .

Unfortunately, such revelations come after the fact.

 

[gmax137]

...Osaka University professor Akira Yamaguchi said, "I think we were in an environment that did not encourage us to exercise our imaginations."

Unfortunately, such revelations come after the fact.

We in the nuclear industry must aspire to exercise our imaginations, and I hope we don't all focus on earthquakes, tsunamis, and SBO -- we need to take this lesson and apply it to all areas of analysis and operations -- we must question and re-question our assumptions and the validity of all our design bases. The same sneaky complacency can exist in areas completely unrelated to natural events.

 

[Astronuc]

We in the nuclear industry must aspire to exercise our imaginations, and I hope we don't all focus on earthquakes, tsunamis, and SBO -- we need to take this lesson and apply it to all areas of analysis and operations -- we must question and re-question our assumptions and the validity of all our design bases. The same sneaky complacency can exist in areas completely unrelated to natural events.

Folks (e.g. US NRC) are already looking at beyond design basis events (BDBE), but I see that the goal posts are starting to move - which is a good thing.

I would caution those who seem to think certain things can't happen. I've heard comments to the effect that some folks "don't look, because they might find something, and then have to deal with it."


In the Fukushima case, had the tsunami protection been more robust, they might have survived. Or, had the EDG fuel tanks, the EDGs, and electrical equipment been better protected from effects of flooding - we would be reading a thread with over 11,300 posts and 1.6 million views.

 

[rmattila]

Examples of the things that are currently being studied in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident can be found in the http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaista_ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaiset_uutinen/fi_FI/uutinen_15092011/_files/86251419958379456/default/eu-stress-tests-national-progress-report-finland.pdf concerning the European "stress tests". The final results are to be expected by the end of the year.

 

[gmax137]

Examples of the things that are currently being studied in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident can be found in the http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaista_ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaiset_uutinen/fi_FI/uutinen_15092011/_files/86251419958379456/default/eu-stress-tests-national-progress-report-finland.pdf concerning the European "stress tests". The final results are to be expected by the end of the year.

Yes, I am aware of the ENSREG-specified 'stress tests.' Earthquake, flooding, SBO/loss of heat sink, severe accident guidelines. These are all fine things to look at, I am simply wishing that we don't stop looking once these areas are evaluated.

 

[zapperzero]

ZDF report on Fukushima (subtitles in English)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=V1T4Ac9nHeY

highlight of the piece: workers required to sign NDAs and waive their right to sue for compensation if they get sick.

Also a bit of ground-level footage from J-village. People standing around in a line with no masks on.