Recent content by iste

Yes, but I would be assuming this anyway if we are talking about beables. And the emergeable / beable distinction isn't necessarily relevant either because a beable is an emergeable when the system is viewed from a different perspective, e.g. position vs. momentum basis.

But positions at different times is also clearly contextual. Either way, if beables are always belong to a specific measurement context, the theorydoes not talk about them outside of a specific measurement context.

Yes, in https://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.10778 he seems to acknowledge that there is no meaning to trajectories without constructing higher-order conditional probabilities which he says he leaves to future work: "To the extent that quantum theory is empirically adequate, the higher-order conditional...

But surely this happens all the time elsewhere in science?

Well, I guess there is nothing more to be said. I can only reiterate that with Barandes' stochastic-quantum dictionaries like the one given at the bottom of Morbert's #51 having PVMs baked into the correspondence, I find it hard to justify that the unistochastic transition probabilities can be...

Then make rebuttles to my points: e.g. The unistochastic marginal probabilities are just the Born probabilities: i.e. measured probabilities in QM. The stochastic-quantum correspondence matches the unistochastic transition properties to a Hilbert space representation in terms of projectors...

Sure, but its preferable to have a description of the system when its not being measured if you are going to make that speculation, otherwise imo it becomes more difficult to argue against the idea that the formulation itself entails no more than a phenomenology description of the measurement...

I don't think Bohmian mechanics is the correct interpretation or approach either, I just like this example. Maybe Barandes' might arguably be superior as just a general formulation. But interpretationally I think its arguably worse than Bohmian mechanics because I equally don't see the point in...

I think you and Barandes are overinterpreting what the formalism can possibly say. There is no stochastic process here where the system is not being measured. The stochastic process spits out definite configurations, but this is only random variables describing the physical system when in the...

Yes, there is a unistochastic transition matrix at all times, but effectively it is just telling you what would happen  if you were to make a measurement in a counterfactual sense. The time evolution is an evolution about counterfactual measurements. When you actually perform a measurement, that...

But it doesn't tell you what the system is doing between measurements. Everything thing the unistochastic system is describing is the system when it is being measured. Look at around 45:00 - 47:00 Thats why I think the unistochastic system tells you what would happen  if you were to measure...

But Barandes' formalism doesn't work without measurement devices. He has even said in one lecture that the reason you no longer need the phase in the unistochastic description is because it has been substituted by introducing the measurement device into the description. It cannot tell you what a...

Only if they don't tell you whats going on between measurements. Something like Bohmian mechanics tells you. Maybe empirically it would be the same, but people want explanation of how an underlying realistoc description produces those measurement outcomes, which Barandes does not provide.

Not sure I follow. His local causality just seems to correspond to non-signalling. Not sure I agree because it cannot telling us anything more about observable quantum behavior than is already known, so its not even reqly required as a checkpoint, if I understamd you properly. At the same time...

Could you elaborate on this? I thought that it at least deflates it. The wavefunction no longer seems essential as an ontology for physical events if it corresponds to this stochastic process. The measured system and measuring device both would represent physical things; albeit, as I have said...