Morbert
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The classical configuration space is not inherently a measurement basis. It is a space of definite arrangements the system can be in. You are implicitly smuggling in an instrumentalist interpretation by calling it a measurement basis. As I have already explained: When the sample space is a space of measurement outcomes, that is a straightforwardly instrumentalist use of this formalism. When the sample space is instead a classical configuration space, the formalism gives us a microphysical conceptualization for kinematics and dynamics.iste said:Again, the point is that in other measurement bases, the stochastic-quantum correspondence results in generalized stochastic processes that are difficult to interpret in terms of some freely-evolving system imo.
I don't understand "to me it is not coherent". By "to me it is not coherent", do you mean you do not personally understand the formalism as a means of interpreting quantum theory as a theory of unistochasatic processes on a microphysical level? Or do you mean you find it personally distasteful that the the formalism can have other purposes?Sure, it may be plausible in a certain case; but if that is not general, then to me it is not coherent to use this formulation for a physical interpretation.
By "I believe" are you saying it is your own personal conviction that sample spaces should be limited to measurement outcomes, as opposed to microphysical configurations independent of measurement?I mean "meant" for something else in the sense that I believe the indivisible stochastic process is a model that predicts the states of a system probabilistically if you were to measure it.
You can build a sample space of measurement outcomes from a configuration space, but configuration space itself is not inherently a sample space of measurement outcomes. You are bringing in your personal insistence limiting the formalism to measurement outcomes but it is still not clear why other than it is "incoherent to you" to do otherwise.I don't think classical configurations are an issue because its completely coherent to say what is being described is predictions about configurations of a system if you were to measure it. At the same time, the reason why I think there are cases which are very ambiguous as to interpretation has nothing specific to do with configurations. I can envision a physical system described in terms of configuration space that has similar properties to spin in terms of the outcomes of measurements being inextricably entwined to the measurement interaction. Spin itself even conceivably can be given a configuration space.
[edit] - Consistent histories as presented by Griffiths is also a stochastic, realist, measurement-independent interpretation, and uses sample spaces in the formalism (see this chapter from his book). Do you also believe this is incoherent?