A Understanding Barandes' microscopic theory of causality

[iste]

That's possible. However, absoluteness of observed events is closely related to a certain kind of relationality, and Barandes says: "This interpretation has a thoroughly realist orientation, and does not entail parallel universes, nor does it involve perspectival or relational notions of ontology."

Lucas.

They say in the article that formally-speaking the absoluteness assumption implies assumption of joint probability, which is the kind of assumption also violated in indivisibility. But I think the breakdown of this joint probability distribution would be cashed out in terms of mutually-exclusive measurement contexts that cannot occur at the same time, so yes, I guess one could say instead that the relationist perspective utilizes talk about joint probabilities that can be talked about in some other alternative way where there is not simultaneously different perspectives (and which is not inherently tied to the indivisibility approach).

 

[Davjamswell]

Great conversation. I had not seen it mentioned , forgive me if I missed it but Barandes does have a newer paper out, July 30th. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.21192

 

[Davjamswell]

I don’t think Barandas specifies the origin of the contingent ingredient in his stochastic–quantum correspondence. For that you would need something like this.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15603882

 

[Fra]

There are some interesting papers ("Quantum theory from rules on information acquisition" and Quantum theory from questions) that derive quantum mechanics from principles closely related to Rovelli's formulation. However, they do not go beyond a reconstruction of the formalism.

Lucas.

Just skimming the abstracts, the ideas in those papers certainly related to alot of my preferred thinking, with some differences. I see good things in many interpretations, RQM, Qbism and also Barandes. The relational notion for is also natural since any inference, or "information aquisition" is necessarily contextual or "relative" to the host system (which i think of as the agent) as the possible inferences and information encoding are constrained (but sometihng, requiring some additional hypothesis tough).

As they say in the abstract of the first paper

"from rules constraining an observer’s acquisition of information about physical systems"

So i see good things in many interpretations. But there are also some interpretations that never made much sense at all to me, this is for example mwi and also some of the objective collapse theories whose beauty or point I never got.

But given all this, there are MORE problems to solve than just QM, that for me also changes the preferences. This is for example fine tuning issues and understanding the hierarchy of interactions. The pure reconstructions gives us no insighs into this. I like Barandes because it gives a good handle, to the ABM perspective of things. Fine tuning comes from considering the set of all possible "constraints" of the observers/agents information processing. This must be tamed, or the theory space till diverge.

/Fredrik

 

[Morbert]

Your previous post to me. It just seems clear to me that is the indivisible approach cannot account for all the information in the quantum theory it is being translated to without evoking the measurement device, it doesn't make sense that the theory that can be talking about stuff in the external world when it is not interacting with a measurement device. Any further extrapolation is extra-theoretical interpretation, and not inside the theory itself.

I can't do much with "It just seems clear to me." but I am happy to respond to some substantive concern.

 

[iste]

I can't do much with "It just seems clear to me." but I am happy to respond to some substantive concern.

I don't understand what you mean, I have just pointed at a fact about the theory that it requires the measurement device as part of the indivisible stochastic process in order for it to produce quantum mechanics. If the theory described things when they were not being measured, this would not be the case. Its very simply.

In contrast, you just provided a list of quotes which amount to the kind of vague assertions you find in the introduction of discussion of a paper without pointing to some specific fact or feature of the theory for justification. You clearly don't want to actually analyze this point or demonstrate a more tangible justification of your beliefs so I don't understand why you initiated this exchange.

 

[Fra]

I mean  incomplete in the sense that Barandes says that the indivisible stochastic process cannot account for the phase in the quantum theory it is being translated to unless the measurement device is explicitly incorporated into the stochastic process. The stochastic process of the atuff you are measuring is inextricably connected to the measuring device. Its not a theory of stuff in the world free-floating around, its a theory of what happens when you measure stuff.

Is this good or bad in your opinion? (I ask to understand if what you wrote is intended as a clarification or critique of Barandes picture?

I personally think no agent or context can make any inference about anything without physical interaction. So that the context becomes deeply evolved with the "black box" is rational and unavoidable. This involes backreactions. On the contrary i would be sceptical about rhe opposite. Ie a theory claiming we can know and learn things without stepping into the game.

But I am not sure of this was related to your objection or clarification?

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

There are some interesting papers ("Quantum theory from rules on information acquisition" and Quantum theory from questions) that derive quantum mechanics from principles closely related to Rovelli's formulation. However, they do not go beyond a reconstruction of the formalism.

Lucas.

I you like those, there is also papers like this, which focus not only logical constructions but more inductive or algorithmic constructions, with addresses the emergence.

Law without law: from observer states to physics via algorithmic information theory, Markus P. Mueller​

https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826

That paper has an excellent perspective, but as the real thing is bound to be alot more complex, ever paper so far are more like sort of toy models. So the gap to connecting to SM phenomenology is huge. But there are useful ways of thinking.

Here one can loosely associate subsystem ~ agent, making inferences about its environment, and this whole inteactive game gives emergence of laws. I personally also see common traits with this

Precedence and freedom in quantum physics, Lee Smolin​

https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826

Where one can conceptually can associate precedene as beeing mediated by a kind of universal induction (by agents/subsystems).

All these ideas, brought together, and especially if you add Barandes corresondence and some of Rovellis ideas, to me at least, all indicate a common direction. Bot the connection to the logical correspondences, requiest extending them. But I find Barandes unistochastic to be more readily extendable, as it woul be natural to start by relaxting unistochasticy, in order to later recover it.

/Fredrik

 

[iste]

I can't do much with "It just seems clear to me." but I am happy to respond to some substantive concern.

Is this good or bad in your opinion? (I ask to understand if what you wrote is intended as a clarification or critique of Barandes picture?

I personally think no agent or context can make any inference about anything without physical interaction. So that the context becomes deeply evolved with the "black box" is rational and unavoidable. This involes backreactions. On the contrary i would be sceptical about rhe opposite. Ie a theory claiming we can know and learn things without stepping into the game.

But I am not sure of this was related to your objection or clarification?

/Fredrik

Nevermind, after thinking about it and looking at Albert's document I can see how my revised view was the wrong picture and can see how the stochastic process describes stuff between measurements but obviously in its limited and constrained way. Nonetheless, from my perspective, the reason the stochastic process looks like it does is still because measurement disturbance stops you from inferring more information about the system at those times given some conditioning time (because measurement causes the division events and reset of the process if im not mistaken), rather than a description of the system unfiltered by epistemic limitations.

Because of my realist inclinations, I find the "black box" perspective undesirable. I would like to see measurement distrubance not as an inherent aspect of knowledge generally but due to some specific physical property of the universe which diminishes as we move to larger scales. While the stochastic realizations between measurements would be existing objectively, they should not reflect a true God's eye perspective on the dynamical evolution, because God is going to see the actual underlying trajectories and is going to have access to their underlying chains of conditional probabilities that are due to fluctuations / randomness (at least at some level of coarseness) in the physical description rather than epistemic uncertainty. The quantum perspective on the other hand would only telling us what measurements allow us to see or infer, rather than the God's eye view.

(Edited for my own clarity approx. 4hrs later)

 

[Fra]

Because of my realist inclinations, I find the "black box" perspective undesirable.

Thanks, this clarifies things and now I understand your preferred perspective, even if it is different than mine.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

Because of my realist inclinations, I find the "black box" perspective undesirable. I would like to see measurement distrubance not as an inherent aspect of knowledge generally but due to some specific physical property of the universe which diminishes as we move to larger scales.

My perspective that that the "knowledge" of the black box is encoded in the physical microstate of the inferrer. So knowledge for me has a physical basis. But if one associates microstates of autonomous subsystems, then this locally, buy physically encoded "knowledge" take the form of subjective HV/beable.

So I distinguish between what is real and what is inferrable. Things that "just is", without beeing inferred, like subjective beables, are defined with respect to the "self". Ie. the subsystems real configuration (basic ontology), is real, and represents the knowledge, but other subsystems try to infer this, they can't just grab it from some shared global memory. And this "inference" is the actual physical interaction, ie the quantum interaction.
This how I see this, this entangled situation is not a "problem" in my view, my problem is rather how to determine the form of the microstructure ontology and thus it must also constrain the inferences allowed(in the spirit of the paper#1 in post 180). This is the open problem I see. But Barandes perspective is giving a fresh perspective, although it does not solve the problem.

/Fredrik

 

[iste]

I can't do much with "It just seems clear to me." but I am happy to respond to some substantive concern.

I have some questions I wonder what you think. What is the ontological status of emergeables? Are they as real as the beables but just implicit inside the evolving stochastic process for the real beable configurations that exist in the world? Subsequently to be revealed by measurement passively when it is performed? Or do you think they only have true "real" status in the moment measurement interaction?

Also, if the stochastic process of the world evolves on its own between measurements, then is this equally applicable to weak values and weak measurements. Do they carry information about the actual world evolvimg between initial time and the final conditioned projective measurement outcome. Weak values having negative values is an issue but Aharonov and Vaidman describes how some weak values entail specific projective measurement outcomes at intermediate-times, which I would assume suggest the stochastic process is behaving in that way between intermediate times even if it were not measured? And if you average the weak values (over the final outcomes; i.e. like marginalzing them out), they result in measurement expectations on the initial state, so I assume those averaged weak values meaningfully describe the underlying world between initial time and the final time (where we have averaged over the outcomes)?

 

[Morbert]

I have some questions I wonder what you think. What is the ontological status of emergeables? Are they as real as the beables but just implicit inside the evolving stochastic process for the real beable configurations that exist in the world? Subsequently to be revealed by measurement passively when it is performed? Or do you think they only have true "real" status in the moment measurement interaction?

Emergeables aren't real in the sense that they do not correspond to different possible configurations of the measured system the way beables do. As such, a measurement of an emergeable will not yield a division event in the measured system's transition map. It will, however, yield probabilities for the configuration of the quantum system conditioned on the configuration of the measurement device itself. Emergeables therefore have a flavour of instrumentalist accounts: They describe a response to a test on the quantum system, rather than a direct measurement of some property of the system itself.

Also, if the stochastic process of the world evolves on its own between measurements, then is this equally applicable to weak values and weak measurements. Do they carry information about the actual world evolvimg between initial time and the final conditioned projective measurement outcome. Weak values having negative values is an issue but Aharonov and Vaidman describes how some weak values entail specific projective measurement outcomes at intermediate-times, which I would assume suggest the stochastic process is behaving in that way between intermediate times even if it were not measured? And if you average the weak values (over the final outcomes; i.e. like marginalzing them out), they result in measurement expectations on the initial state, so I assume those averaged weak values meaningfully describe the underlying world between initial time and the final time (where we have averaged over the outcomes)?

Speaking specifically about Aharonov and Vaidman's position, I speculate about transition maps for post-selected experimental runs in post #162. They seem reliable to me, but they are not discussed in literature, and there may be some mathematical inconsistency if they are made rigorous. I suspect it is ultimately a homework problem for the formalism as opposed to a difficulty.

Speaking generally, a weak measurement yields an approximate division event. The weaker the measurement the less divisible the transition map.

 

[iste]

response to a test on the quantum system

What does a test mean?

 

[Morbert]

What does a test mean?

It is the vocabulary preferred by Asher Peres over "measurement". A measurement implies a reading of some pre-existing property of a system, while a test has a more operational definition: generating a classical datum that does not necessarily record a pre-existing property of the quantum system.

In this formalism, an emergeable is not an ontic property of the quantum system, and instead emerges from the interaction between the measurement device and the measured system.

 

[Fra]

I'll add my thinking on this, I think its a good question!

I have some questions I wonder what you think. What is the ontological status of emergeables? Are they as real as the beables but just implicit inside the evolving stochastic process for the real beable configurations that exist in the world? Subsequently to be revealed by measurement passively when it is performed? Or do you think they only have true "real" status in the moment measurement interaction?

If beables are by definition what is real or "what is", and this corresponds to the configuration of a subsystem, what is real must depend on how you decompose or encode the universe.

So I agree with Mobert that arbitrary emeargables genereally aren't guaranteed to be real, they are more arbitrary patterns of beables, even from different subsystems. But that does not exclude that it happens that some patterns(the have some distinguished role) might sometimes map onto some beables on some subsystem.

But, if one asks is this decomposition into subsystems unique?

If not, this to me means that different decompositions or encodings, can in principle turn beables into emergeables and vice versa if you choose a different decomposition. There is some sense of duality here, almost like a generalisation of conjugate variables, which correspondes to some sort of observational basis for encoding information.

As with any dual descriptions, which is "right"? I think that one might ask which descrpition gives the best stable description of reality during some suitable constraints? That something is allowed or possible, does not mean it's probable or abundant. Only in this sense I think there may be some level of optimal beables, but I doubt it is unique in the mathematical sense.

As I think of this conceptually, there must also be some types of emergables, coarse graining of beables (effectively like in classical statistics) or pointer variables, but some are encoding relations between subsystems, for example like entanglement. One could conceptually imaging a beable of one subsystem (seen as an observer) that encodes wether two other subsystems are entangled, or not - without knowing their respectives hidden beables (this can not be understood by classical statistics). In this sense I think a emergeable can "map" or emerge to a beable in another subsystem presuming the emergeable is stable.

These quesions become I think even more acute if one asks, where does beables come from in the first place? Are they always there, or have them in fact been emerged by some process? That is again beyond the correspondence, but the question you asked here, and when pondering about it seems to suggest some handles also to that thinking, which i think is great. Conceptual handles is something we need, the more the better.

/Fredrik

 

[iste]

I'll add my thinking on this, I think its a good question!

If beables are by definition what is real or "what is", and this corresponds to the configuration of a subsystem, what is real must depend on how you decompose or encode the universe.

So I agree with Mobert that arbitrary emeargables genereally aren't guaranteed to be real, they are more arbitrary patterns of beables, even from different subsystems. But that does not exclude that it happens that some patterns(the have some distinguished role) might sometimes map onto some beables on some subsystem.

But, if one asks is this decomposition into subsystems unique?

If not, this to me means that different decompositions or encodings, can in principle turn beables into emergeables and vice versa if you choose a different decomposition. There is some sense of duality here, almost like a generalisation of conjugate variables, which correspondes to some sort of observational basis for encoding information.

As with any dual descriptions, which is "right"? I think that one might ask which descrpition gives the best stable description of reality during some suitable constraints? That something is allowed or possible, does not mean it's probable or abundant. Only in this sense I think there may be some level of optimal beables, but I doubt it is unique in the mathematical sense.

As I think of this conceptually, there must also be some types of emergables, coarse graining of beables (effectively like in classical statistics) or pointer variables, but some are encoding relations between subsystems, for example like entanglement. One could conceptually imaging a beable of one subsystem (seen as an observer) that encodes wether two other subsystems are entangled, or not - without knowing their respectives hidden beables (this can not be understood by classical statistics). In this sense I think a emergeable can "map" or emerge to a beable in another subsystem presuming the emergeable is stable.

These quesions become I think even more acute if one asks, where does beables come from in the first place? Are they always there, or have them in fact been emerged by some process? That is again beyond the correspondence, but the question you asked here, and when pondering about it seems to suggest some handles also to that thinking, which i think is great. Conceptual handles is something we need, the more the better.

/Fredrik

My inclination is that emergeables must be as real as beables. In terms of measurement and the Born rule they seem on equal footing. The only difference is that one isn't explicit in the stochastic process; it seems implicit (e.g. in the averaged dynamics) but equally real property of the world, not just of a measuring device. I haven't seen anywhere to my knowledge Barandes' formulation actually picking some preferred beable perspective on the universe; I believe he has even said his formulation is open about ontology. Surely his dictionary would allow you to take any quantum observable and make it a beable. Position beable where momentum is emergeable. Momentum beable where position is emergent.

Spin is an interesting example. Personally, I think that the outcomes of a spin measurement plausibly may very well be entirely a property of spin "measurements" in the moment rather than outside of the measurement. But I don't actually know, obviously. Just seems plausible to me. But surely, even though Barandes talks about spin as an emergeable from dilation, couldn't you describe or directly translate quantum spin as a beable? If that is the case, what would the stochastic process of the unmeasured universe (the spin part) between measurements represent if spin outcomes really were something that only exists after the measurement interaction. In that case, the spin beable between measurements couldn't be real in general but would have an instrumentalist interpretation. It seems to me that even though cases like position and momentum beables / emergeables can be seen as equally real between measurements arguably (albeit measurements will be disturbing), the formulation doesn't seem able to in and of itself specify what the stochastic process representing something in the universe means if it is plausible that outcomes of spin measurements are created in the moment of measurement. How could that stochastic process mean something outside of measurement if the outcomes being described only turn up after the measurement interaction? But maybe they don't, you tell me.

 

[Morbert]

Barandes' formulation actually picking some preferred beable perspective on the universe; I believe he has even said his formulation is open about ontology.

He has said the ontology is downstream from the theory. If it is a theory of particles, then the ontology will be particles in definite configurations. If it is a theory of fields then the ontology will be fields in definite configurations etc. But for a given theory, the configuration space specifies the ontology.

How could that stochastic process mean something outside of measurement if the outcomes being described only turn up after the measurement interaction? But maybe they don't, you tell me.

It means there is an ontological model whereby a system, even in the absence of measurement by some ancillary system, will have a definite configuration at all times.

 

[iste]

It means there is an ontological model whereby a system, even in the absence of measurement by some ancillary system, will have a definite configuration at all times.

My contention is that if you take the stochastic-correspondence at face value, then presumably you can describe polarization in some measurement basis in terms of a configuration space with probabilities for H and V at all times. But if this system has a definite polarization state in some basis, then the image I get for the meaning of the outcomes described by the stochastic process is the macroscopic image of a polarized beam of light interacting with a beam splitter leading to the H and V outcomes.

It seems completely plausible to me from that description that the H and V outcomes did not exist prior to the measurement interaction; they were created in the moment of interaction. But the stochastic process would be telling me that from the moment of initial preparation, those H and V outcomes existed at all times before the eventual measurement, at least on the level of individual photons or spin 1/2. This could be the case, but is there anything stopping me from entertaining alternatives.

If ontology is downstream from the theory then I can postulate any ontology I want. What if my ontology is something strange like counterfactual outcomes of David Lewis' possible worlds at a given time. Could the stochastic process be describing not actual objective configurations that exist between measurements but instead, instrumentalist predictions of what would happen were one to perform a measurement. Is there anything stopping this kind if description? For instance, my indivisible stochastic process could be describing what would happen were a fisherman to put his fishing line and hook into a body of water at some specific time - what is the probability of a fish biting if he did that? There is a probability for every single point in time and the fisherman may only be able to catch one fish at a time if he does throw the hook in, but it doesn't mean the fisherman actually threw his line and hook into the water at any of those times; it just describes what would happen, and if he didn't put his fishing line in then nothing could have happened. Is there anything about indivisible stochastic processes that prevents something like this being a valid description, given the fact that ontology is completely downstream? Isn't this analogous to the double-slit somewhat in the sense that system will always produce fringes until a measurement, and the classical-like clumps on the screen do not precede the measurement interaction. Like how macroscopic image is of a polarization measurement is a beam being put through the beam splitter and the outcomes are only evident after the interaction.

Sure we still could say the stochastic process reflects uncertainty about individual photons (actually I think it would be more like the velocity emergeable, not necessarily a property of any individual photon) within a beam of light or when you repeat a single-photon experiment a lot. This seems closer to the kind of perspective I would like. But does the indivisible stochastic process entail one view or the other either way? If the ontologies are downstream, then can you not have an ontology which is completely counterfactual?

 

[Morbert]

My contention is that if you take the stochastic-correspondence at face value, then presumably you can describe polarization in some measurement basis in terms of a configuration space with probabilities for H and V at all times.

Beables have diagonal matrices wrt configurations, as they can be read off from the existing configuration (see equation 19 in the correspondence paper). Emergeables don't, and hence are given meaning by a measurement context.

If ontology is downstream from the theory then I can postulate any ontology I want.

If it is a theory of particles, then the ontology will be particles in definite configurations. If it is a theory of fields then the ontology will be fields in definite configurations etc. But for a given theory, the configuration space specifies the ontology.

 

[iste]

Beables have diagonal matrices wrt configurations, as they can be read off from the existing configuration (see equation 19 in the correspondence paper). Emergeables don't, and hence are given meaning by a measurement context.

But it doesn't seem to me that there is any preferred basis of configurations. Surely, Barandes formulation doesn't stop you from creating beables with a configuration space for any quantum observable? Moreover, the diagonal vs. non-diagonal aspect I am not sure is relevant because under Barandes' formulation, beables and emergeables act similarly with regard to the measurement device and you would assume always produce definite outcomes, and regardless of indivisibility or divisibility, your stochastic process always produces definite outcomes. I still don't understand how the distinction between beable and emergeable is anything other than perspectival.

Regarding your second quote, I don't see you refuting the idea that the configuration space can't be describing a counterfactual ontology like the fisherman example.

 

[Morbert]

But it doesn't seem to me that there is any preferred basis of configurations. Surely, Barandes formulation doesn't stop you from creating beables with a configuration space for any quantum observable? Moreover, the diagonal vs. non-diagonal aspect I am not sure is relevant because under Barandes' formulation, beables and emergeables act similarly with regard to the measurement device and you would assume always produce definite outcomes, and regardless of indivisibility or divisibility, your stochastic process always produces definite outcomes. I still don't understand how the distinction between beable and emergeable is anything other than perspectival.

Barandes's formalism involves a standard classical configuration space $\mathcal{C}$. Whether it is, for example, a space of particle or field configurations depends on the theory you are constructing a correspondence to. Observables that are not diagonal wrt these configurations cannot be read off from these configurations, and are hence not beables.

Regarding your second quote, I don't see you refuting the idea that the configuration space can't be describing a counterfactual ontology like the fisherman example.

You are free to construct alternative ontological models, just as you are free to construct them for ordinary Markovian stochastic processes. For the purposes of this thread I am discussing the one presented by Barandes.

 

[iste]

Barandes's formalism involves a standard classical configuration space $\mathcal{C}$. Whether it is, for example, a space of particle or field configurations depends on the theory you are constructing a correspondence to. Observables that are not diagonal wrt these configurations cannot be read off from these configurations, and are hence not beables.You are free to construct alternative ontological models, just as you are free to construct them for ordinary Markovian stochastic processes. For the purposes of this thread I am discussing the one presented by Barandes.

Yes, but my point is that surely position and momentum basis in quantum mechanics would each be translated to respective classical configuration bases where they are beables.

Again, I don't think diagonal nature matters because indivisibility and interference itself is characterized by non-diagonality and yet the stochastic process produces definite realizations of configurations regardless. In DOI: 10.31389/pop.186 Barandes describes a beable as having a non-diagonal density matrix several times with regard to coherence and uncertainty principle sections.

Barandes does not present a specific ontological model other than the use of classical configurations. My point is that there is nothing stopping you using them to represent counterfactual classical configurations describing something that can only said to exist as a consequence of a measurement interaction.

 

[Morbert]

Yes, but my point is that surely position and momentum basis in quantum mechanics would each be translated to respective classical configuration bases where they are beables.

Show me what that configuration space (note, not phase space) would look like.

Again, I don't think diagonal nature matters because indivisibility and interference itself is characterized by non-diagonality and yet the stochastic process produces definite realizations of configurations regardless. In DOI: 10.31389/pop.186 Barandes describes a beable as having a non-diagonal density matrix several times with regard to coherence and uncertainty principle sections.

It's the observable itself that is diagonal or not diagonal. See equation 19.

Barandes does not present a specific ontological model other than the use of classical configurations. My point is that there is nothing stopping you using them to represent counterfactual classical configurations describing something that can only said to exist as a consequence of a measurement interaction.

Barandes's kinematic axiom is clear. Let's stick to it for this thread.

 

[iste]

Show me what that configuration space (note, not phase space) would look like.

It's the observable itself that is diagonal or not diagonal. See

Barandes's kinematic axiom is clear. Let's stick to it for this thread.

i'm thinking that maybe the issue is that the stochastic correspondence clearly overs more than just what you are referring to in terms of configuration basis then. Clearly you can give momentum and anything else you want a representation which is as a beable in the configuration basis is described, using the dictionary; and from the indivisible perspective, that must actually be the explanation for different measurement bases (all representable as indivisible stochastic processes). But once you are able to do this, I think it does really make it questionable whether the stochastic process in the formalism always has to have a stringently realist ontology if plausibly you can use it to describe things which may not have that interpretation in a straightforward way (or its at least ambiguous whether they do). Sure you can postulate about a preference for a configuration basis and so thats where the only real beables are, but I guess thats a difference betwern an assumption about what you  want your formulation to represent and the capabilities of what the formulation can represent; after all, Barandes thinks this formulation can potentially be used to describe systems in the special sciences from neuroscience to psychology to even more abstract things like financial systems perhaps.

 

[Morbert]

@iste You keep straying from Barandes's literature.

i) Barandes presents a kinematic axiom which says the system always has a configuration $i,\ldots,N$ in the configuration space $\mathcal{C}$ we use to model the system.
ii) Beables are the random variables $A(t) = \sum_i^Na_i P_i = \mathrm{diag(\ldots,a_i,\ldots)}$ which can be read off from the configuration the system is in.
iii) Emergeables cannot be read off from the configuration the system is in. Instead they mix in dynamical information and determine the probabilities for the configurations an ancillary measurement apparatus can evolve into should it interact with the system.

If you want to posit an alternative model, which places beables and emergeables on equal ontic footing, I wish you the best of luck.

 

[Morbert]

PS this conversation is also straying from the recent paper by Albert. Unless there's something novel and specific in your response I'll leave it here.

 

[iste]

@iste You keep straying from Barandes's literature.

i) Barandes presents a kinematic axiom which says the system always has a configuration $i,\ldots,N$ in the configuration space $\mathcal{C}$ we use to model the system.
ii) Beables are the random variables $A(t) = \sum_i^Na_i P_i = \mathrm{diag(\ldots,a_i,\ldots)}$ which can be read off from the configuration the system is in.
iii) Emergeables cannot be read off from the configuration the system is in. Instead they mix in dynamical information and determine the probabilities for the configurations an ancillary measurement apparatus can evolve into should it interact with the system.

If you want to posit an alternative model, which places beables and emergeables on equal ontic footing, I wish you the best of luck.

You don't need another model because its in the theory. The stochastic-quantum correspondence surely says that momentum basis and any other observable are describable as and translatable to an indivisible stochastic process in the same way as one would for the configuration basis beable. This would then give you the division events for these other "emergeables".

 

[Morbert]

You don't need another model because its in the theory. The stochastic-quantum correspondence surely says that momentum basis and any other observable are describable as and translatable to an indivisible stochastic process in the same way as one would for the configuration basis beable. This would then give you the division events for these other "emergeables".

I wish you the best of luck in showing this. Please be specific with your example. And please cite the relevant literature.

 

[Morbert]

@iste Rereading the convo, I think the confusion might be you think a classical configuration space is like a Hilbert space with many spectral representations where different observables are diagonal.

My classical physics is rusty, but: While you can do coordinate transformations on a configuration space, none will diagonalize emergeables.