Postulates of many worlds interpretation of QM

ueit
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I am interested to see a clear enumeration of the postulates of this interpretation. There seem to be something fuzzy about how MWI describes what we call "reality". It might be a problem with the theory or, more probable, a misunderstanding of my part.

Here is a list I found on Google:

http://vergil.chemistry.gatech.edu/notes/quantrev/node20.html"

Tell me if you agree with this list, and if not, what needs to be rejected/added/modified or give a link to a better one. Thanks.
 
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Dmitry67 said:
Check here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Axiomatics

"The existence of many worlds in superposition is not accomplished by introducing some new axiom to quantum mechanics, but on the contrary by removing the axiom of the probabilistic collapse of the wave pack"That is why you can't add any.

I usually avoid interpretational questions but I am also trying to avoid work right now so here goes:

I never really understood the argument that Many worlds theory reduces the number of axioms by dropping the measurement postulate. I mean I understand that it assumes the observer becomes entangled with the system in a way that the combined system is in a superposition |observer_a>|eigenstate a> + |observer_b>|eigenstate_b> but I still feel like there needs to be some postulate that tells us how the observer experiences being in such a superposition.. I mean, so I do an experiment and I evolve into a superposition.. then why do I only experience one result? and what determines the probability of experiencing this result? I suppose the answer to these questions is the subject of the interpretation, but something must still be said (postulated) about how the probability of experiencing one or the other result is related to the superposition (i.e. amplitude of eigenstate a/b squared).
Or am I missing something?
 
jensa said:
I mean, so I do an experiment and I evolve into a superposition.. then why do I only experience one result?

You experience BOTH results
So YOU (observer_a) is asking "But why I observe eigenstate a, not eigenstate b?"
Observer_b is asking "But why I observe eigenstate b, not eigenstate a?"
The total picture is deterministic and symmetrical in terms of the result.

Regarding the probability check the same Wiki article

Hartle[35] showed that in Everett's relative-state theory, Born's probability law

The probability of an observable A to have the value a in a normalized state is the absolute square of the eigenvalue component of the state corresponding to the eigenvalue a:

no longer has to be considered an axiom or postulate. It can rather be derived from the other axioms of quantum mechanics
 
Thanks for the reply Dimitry, although I am not sure it addressed the point (or maybe it did).

Dmitry67 said:
You experience BOTH results
So YOU (observer_a) is asking "But why I observe eigenstate a, not eigenstate b?"
Observer_b is asking "But why I observe eigenstate b, not eigenstate a?"

This quote illustrates the question... So I exprience both results but at the same time only one?

I understand that from a birds view it can be interpreted that the observer experiences both results since he/she is in a superposition but since I am the observer it makes it suddenly very unclear what being in a superposition means... what can I expect to observe? It seems to become somewhat of a philosophical question. I don't see how anything about what I can expect to experience follows logically from the mathematical result of me being in a superposition without some extra postulate/interpretation. IMHO this is precisely what the "measurement postulate" is for... whether it is thought of as a collapse of the wave-function or if it is a recipe for the interpretation of being in a superposition... I still think one needs it.

EDIT: I should point out that when I say "measurement postulate" I don't refer to the collapse of the wave-function but simply the recipe for finding the probability of observing result a or b. I am pretty sure that it can be stated in a interpretation-unspecific way.
Regarding the probability check the same Wiki article

I suppose I should read the reference Hartle[35] someday when I have time. Maybe all the answers are there. Anyway, thanks for help.
 
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jensa said:
1 So I exprience both results but at the same time only one?
2 what can I expect to observe?

There are 2 YOU's. Each YOU observes only one result, not a superposition
 
Dmitry67 said:
There are 2 YOU's. Each YOU observes only one result, not a superposition

Well, I feel like this is getting nowhere, so I will drop my question. thanks anyway.
 
This is a good article about axioms of many-worlds interpretations.
 
Posted in a parralel thread:

Frederick, BOTH articles were published in 1997.

Before major improvement in the understandig of the Quantum Decoherence
And before
"The many worlds interpretation has, controversially, been seen by some as offering the possibility of deriving the Born rule and the appearance of quantum probabilities from simpler assumptions. In fact, this was first attempted by Everett and DeWitt in the 1950s. In a September 2007 conference[11] David Wallace reported on what is claimed to be a proof by Deutsch and himself of the Born Rule starting from Everettian assumptions[12]. "

In fact, both articles are very pro-MWI because it appears that 1997 is the last year when there were any anti-MWI articles :)

---------------

But it appears that since Sept 2007, MWI was able to get rid of TWO, not ONE axiom: both apparent "collapse" AND Born rule can be derived from the pure QM.
 
  • #10
Dmitry67 said:
Check here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Axiomatics

That is why you can't add any.

In the above link there is no clear statement of the MWI postulates. So, I will repeat my question:

Here is a list I found on Google:

http://vergil.chemistry.gatech.edu/n...ev/node20.html

Tell me if you agree with this list, and if not, what needs to be rejected/added/modified or give a link to a better one.

I understand that you will not add anything but remove one postulate. It's OK. Can you tell me if you agree to the rest of them? Are they correctly formulated as far as MWI is concerned?
 
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  • #11
COuld you check the link?
It does not work.
At least now, I will check later
 
  • #12
Dmitry67 said:
COuld you check the link?
It does not work.
At least now, I will check later

Sorry, this is the good one:

http://vergil.chemistry.gatech.edu/notes/quantrev/node20.html"
 
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  • #13
Dmitry67 said:
But it appears that since Sept 2007, MWI was able to get rid of TWO, not ONE axiom: both apparent "collapse" AND Born rule can be derived from the pure QM.
Other articles have pointed out that the reasoning used in Zurek's derivation of the Born rule was circular. He derived the Born rule using the technique of "tracing out" other degrees of freedom, but the justification for that technique is...the Born rule.

The "tracing out" technique is also used in derivations of the apparent collapse of the wave function. This means that you can't take the MWI axioms to be what you get by taking the Copenhagen axioms and removing the collapse axiom including the Born rule. It seems to me that what you can do is to take the Copenhagen axioms and just weaken the collapse axiom a bit. Instead of postulating that the collapse is exact, you postulate that it's approximate. But you absolutely have to keep the Born rule in the axioms of the MWI.

Now, if you do this, the existence of "many worlds" is not implied by the axioms. It's just one of several possible interpretations of the statement that a measurement entangles the eigenstates of the measured system with macroscopically distinguishable states of a system that can be described as classical to a very good approximation. A measurement of an observable B changes the density matrix \rho=|\alpha\rangle\langle\alpha| according to

\rho\rightarrow\sum_b P_b\rho P_b

where P_b is the projection operator onto the eigenspace of B corresponding to eigenvalue b. If the spectrum is non-degenerate, we have P_b=|b\rangle\langle b|.

I don't think decoherence has weakened Kent's arguments against the various MWIs in any way.
 
  • #14
I didn't notice this before, but Tegmark actually included a few comments about Kent's paper in his. (There's no link to the Tegmark paper in this thread, so I'm putting one here. His article is actually a very good). This one is interesting:

In Section II.A, the author states that “one needs to define
[...] the preferred basis [...] by an axiom.” According
to what preconceived notion is this necessary, since
decoherence can determine the preferred basis dynamically?
I don't think this is correct. The "preferred" basis is defined as the one in which the density matrix is approximately diagonal. You find this basis by "tracing out" the environment's degrees of freedom, but that's a move that's justified by the Born rule, which is an axiom that we had supposedly dropped.

I haven't been through the details of the arguments and counterarguments, so it's possible that I'm wrong. Let's just say that I'm unconvinced, and that the anti-MWI argument above seems plausible to me. (Note that it's not really an argument against many worlds. It's an argument against dropping the Born rule).

I want to make it clear that I'm not advocating an exact collapse of the wavefunction. I'll try to explain how I think about QM: We should weaken the Copenhagen axioms by assuming that the collapse (as seen from the perspective that Tegmark calls "the inside view") is only approximate. This is sufficient to guarantee that the Born rule axiom doesn't contradict the axiom that Tegmark takes as the definition of the MWI: Any isolated system evolves according to the Schrödinger equation. So we keep the Born rule as an axiom, along with an approximate collapse. The real significance of decoherence is that it tells us what a measurement is: It's an interaction that entangles the eigenstates of some observable, selected dynamically by the interactions between the system and the environmen, with macroscopically distinguishable states of a system that's approximately classical. This process (which only exists in the theory if the axioms include the Born rule) defines the preferred basis, which defines the worlds in the MWI.

All of this is perfectly consistent with the idea of many worlds, but it doesn't imply that many worlds exist. A measurement turns a pure state into a mixed state, represented by a density matrix which is almost diagonal in the preferred basis, but this density matrix can be interpreted in many different ways. One of them is as an ensemble of systems (many worlds). Another is as a single system in a specific but unknown state. I actually prefer a third option: For a theory to be scientific, it's not necessary that it describes reality. It's sufficient that it tells us how to compute the probabilities of possible results of experiments. It's actually rather naive to expect that if science has something to say about a phenomenon, it's always in the form of a model with the property that every concept in the model has a counterpart in the real world. I just think QM is the first example of a theory that's non-trivial in the sense that it isn't a description of reality. (And no, this isn't quite the same as "shut up and calculate". It's a bit more sophisticated than that :smile:).
 
  • #15
Frederick,

Regarding the circularity issue, it does not mean that it is wrong. As a reminder, the very first (naive) explanations of HUP (using a though experiment with a microscope) were also circular: let's assume that the particles (say, photons) have the following dependency of momentum/position. Now we are trying to measure a position and momentum of another particle (a photon). We find the same HUP. Now we assume that ALL particles have the same property...

So I agree with you, it might not be a proof but it is a good indication that the theory is self-consistent. In order to finalize a proof, one need to assume that born rule is violated and show that it leads to incosistency.
 
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  • #16
Frederick,

I don't think that you can ever make a theory where other worlds are NOT real. This is because the Quantum Decoherence is a GRADUAL process. 2 systems exchage, say, the photons and they gradulally decohere (in each branch we observe this process as they become somehow 'synchronized' in terms of macroscopic reality - they become 'diagonal')

Based on experiments, to completely decohere you need several photons, about 5. I hope you don't want to claim that say after an exchange of 3 photons ohter branch is real, but then, after some treshold is reached it 'suddenly' becomes non real? This looks very artificial, right?
 
  • #17
ueit said:
Sorry, this is the good one:

http://vergil.chemistry.gatech.edu/notes/quantrev/node20.html"

If we don't discuss for not Born's rule (Sept 2007 issue) then most of these axioms are valid, except the word "measurement", because MWI explains what the measurement is hence it is not an 'atomic' operation and it CAN NOT be included in the axiomatic.

To be more specific, check Postulate 2. There are no 'observables' except the states of the measurement systems. So in MWI you can't simply say 'This is momentum'. instead, you need to show, that a measurement device, built to measure a what we call a momentum, after interaction with a particle will show on it's indicator the value we call a momentum and it is the same defined by the operator. What is more difficult, you need to show that ALL different apparatus designed to measure the momentum will do the same.

It is very close to the 'Physics from scrach' approach by Max Tegmark, so MWI can make his (and mine) dream come true.
 
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  • #18
Dmitry67 said:
Regarding the circularity issue, it does not mean that it is wrong.
It only means that there's still no proof of the claim that in QM without the Born rule as an explicit axiom, interactions between the system and the environment make the density matrix of the combined system approximately diagonal in a basis selected dynamically by the interactions.

Dmitry67 said:
In order to finalize a proof, one need to assume that born rule is violated and show that it leads to incosistency.
What we would need to do (What Zurek claimed to have done) is to prove that the Born rule* follows from the other axioms.

*) To be more specific: A version of the Born rule that says that the collapse is only approximate.

Dmitry67 said:
I don't think that you can ever make a theory where other worlds are NOT real. This is because the Quantum Decoherence is a GRADUAL process. 2 systems exchage, say, the photons and they gradulally decohere (in each branch we observe this process as they become somehow 'synchronized' in terms of macroscopic reality - they become 'diagonal')
I don't follow your argument here. If decoherence had been absolute and instantaneous instead of gradual, we would still have at least two possible interpretations: Wavefunction collapse, and many worlds. What the gradual nature of decoherence suggests is just that the collapse isn't absolute, and the universe doesn't actually split into many copies. It's more subtle than that.

Dmitry67 said:
Based on experiments, to completely decohere you need several photons, about 5. I hope you don't want to claim that say after an exchange of 3 photons ohter branch is real, but then, after some treshold is reached it 'suddenly' becomes non real?
I assume that what you mean by "completely" is "approximately". Otherwise it would contradict what you said about dechoherence being gradual. Of course I don't want to claim anything like what you're suggesting here. The "branches" are either never real or always real, even before the measurement.

By the way, I took a look at the 'Against "Against many worlds interpretations" ' preprint that Tegmark referenced. It looks like a bunch of incoherent nonsense. I wonder if Tegmark ever tried to understand a single sentence in that paper except for the ones that claimed (incorrectly) that Kent doesn't even understand what the MWI is. Sakaguchi didn't seem to understand what he was talking about, and this paper was never published anywhere as far as I can tell, so it's really weird that Tegmark used it as a reference.
 
  • #19
Regarding the derivation of the Born rule...This article looks interesting. I just found it, so I haven't read it yet, but I intend to.
 
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  • #20
According to Tegmark, the only axiom of many-worlds QM is that all isolated systems evolve in time according to the Schrödinger equation. But seriously, that can't possibly define a theory. I'm not referring to the fact that he didn't mention the usual stuff about how states are represnted by unit rays and so on. (He's obviously just thinking that that's so standard that it's not even worth mentioning). I'm talking about the fact that there are no axioms that tell us how to interpret the mathematics as predictions about results of experiments.

Let's say that we know that the "outside view" of the evolution of the universe (decomposed into the subsystems qubit+observer+environment) is

|q>|:approve:>|X> → |0>|:smile:>|X'>+|1>|:frown:>|X''>

Now what exactly is the justification for the claim that the first term describes an observer who's happy because she found the qubit to be in state |0>? I really don't see any. I don't even see any justification for the decomposition of the universe into subsystems. Maybe there's some theorem about Hilbert spaces that gurantees that it can be expressed as a tensor product of a bunch of subsystems, but even if that's the case, it only solves one of the smaller problems.

Kent pointed out that there's no mechanism that can select the basis that defines the "worlds". Tegmark dismisses Kent's arguments as if they were the incoherent ramblings of a madman, and references an unpublished article to support this. But that article is really bad and doesn't make much sense. That's probably why it wasn't published.

Tegmark claims that decoherence is the mechanism that dynamically selects the basis, but it seems to me (and to this guy) that decoherence relies on additional axioms. In particular, we need to be able to express the Hilbert space as a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of subsystems, and to compute the reduced density matrix of the qubit+observer system by "tracing out" the environment's degrees of freedom. The justification for these things is the Born rule, i.e. the axiom that says that if we measure an observable B when the system is in state |u>, the probability that we'll get the result b is |<b|u>|2.

So I think I have to metaphorically join the club of people who think that there is no many-worlds theory. It seems that no one has been able to properly define Everett's MWI, and the foreword to the 1997 version of Kent's article suggests that other many-worlds theories like consistent histories have similar problems.

One more thing...The many-worlds axiom is somewhat ill-defined, since the term "isolated system" hasn't been defined in advance. It seems more natural to take corollary 1 as the axiom (the universe evolves according to the Schrödinger equation) and then define a subsystem to be "isolated" if it evolves according to the Schrödinger equation.
 
  • #21
Fredrik said:
Tegmark claims that decoherence is the mechanism that dynamically selects the basis, but it seems to me (and to this guy) that decoherence relies on additional axioms. In particular, we need to be able to express the Hilbert space as a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of subsystems, and to compute the reduced density matrix of the qubit+observer system by "tracing out" the environment's degrees of freedom. The justification for these things is the Born rule, i.e. the axiom that says that if we measure an observable B when the system is in state |u>, the probability that we'll get the result b is |<b|u>|2.

So I think I have to metaphorically join the club of people who think that there is no many-worlds theory.

I'm in this club too. By the way, different choices of tensor product structures give even different physics. http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.3262"
 
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  • #22
Fredrik said:
1 According to Tegmark, the only axiom of many-worlds QM is that all isolated systems evolve in time according to the Schrödinger equation.

2 Now what exactly is the justification for the claim that the first term describes an observer who's happy because she found the qubit to be in state |0>? I really don't see any.

3 I don't even see any justification for the decomposition of the universe into subsystems. Maybe there's some theorem about Hilbert spaces that gurantees that it can be expressed as a tensor product of a bunch of subsystems, but even if that's the case, it only solves one of the smaller problems.

1 Check better the Wiki definition. MWI does not have any new axioms, instead, it denies the existence of some. What Tegmark was saying (as I understand) is just 'You don't need any sort of collapses' - so he just expressed the denial

Again,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many_worlds_interpretation#Axiomatics
The existence of many worlds in superposition is not accomplished by introducing some new axiom to quantum mechanics, but on the contrary by removing the axiom of the probabilistic collapse of the wave packet: All the possible consistent

2 You are happy because cat is not dead. This works that way because your brain works. For a sadist, for example, it can be vice verse, and MWI is not supposed to explain the psycology.

3 Again, I have to repeat (looks like we are going in circles)
Decomposition is a parameter for a quantum decoherence.
If you look at the Universe from birds view you don't need one at all.
If you ask "but wait, why do I see a dead cat..."
And I interrupt you immediately saying
"So admit that YOU, not MWI has just made a decomposition of a Universe into YOU as an observer, a cat and the rest of the Universe, and YOU, not MWI has just defined a preferred basis for a decoherence asking to calculate what YOU, not any other observer, would see.
 
  • #23
Hmmm, didn't Kent himself do a lot of work on Consistent Histories? :confused:
 
  • #24
Dmitry67 said:
1 Check better the Wiki definition. MWI does not have any new axioms, instead, it denies the existence of some. What Tegmark was saying (as I understand) is just 'You don't need any sort of collapses' - so he just expressed the denial
I don't know what gave you the idea that I don't know that. :confused: I didn't say that Tegmark or anyone else has suggested additional axioms. What I'm saying is that if you remove the "collapse according to the Born rule" axiom, what you have left isn't even a theory. If you disagree, then please tell me how to make a prediction in the MWI framework. Any prediction.

The Wikipedia section you linked to has a reference to an article by Hartle that claims to derive the Born rule. I haven't read it yet, so I can't really comment, except that to say that if he did in fact prove this back in 1968, then it's pretty weird that these newer articles I've come across haven't mentioned it (at least not in a way that caught my attention).

Dmitry67 said:
2 You are happy because cat is not dead. This works that way because your brain works. For a sadist, for example, it can be vice verse, and MWI is not supposed to explain the psycology.
I'm definitely not talking about psychology, and I don't know why you are. I think you're missing my point. What makes you think that the Hilbert space of the universe can even be decomposed into a tensor product of Hilbert spaces that represent subsystems? There isn't even any justification for that, so we don't even know that the left-hand side of what I wrote makes sense. And even if it does, we still don't have any justification for the interpretation of the individual terms on the right as representing how you would describe the cat.

Dmitry67 said:
3 Again, I have to repeat (looks like we are going in circles)
Decomposition is a parameter for a quantum decoherence.
If you look at the Universe from birds view you don't need one at all.
If you ask "but wait, why do I see a dead cat..."
And I interrupt you immediately saying
"So admit that YOU, not MWI has just made a decomposition of a Universe into YOU as an observer, a cat and the rest of the Universe, and YOU, not MWI has just defined a preferred basis for a decoherence asking to calculate what YOU, not any other observer, would see.
I don't think that makes sense. If you're going to derive the Born rule from the time evolution axiom, that axiom (or a general theorem of Hilbert spaces, but definitely not you or I) must imply that a tensor product decomposition of the Hilbert space exists. If you choose to assume that such decompositions exist, you have essentially reintroduced the axiom we dropped, because the Born rule is the reason why a tensor product is the appropriate way to represent a composite system.
 
  • #25
Count Iblis said:
Hmmm, didn't Kent himself do a lot of work on Consistent Histories? :confused:
Yes, I read parts of this paper some time ago. It was pretty interesting. I think I'm going to have to read the rest soon. As I recall, they did come to some disturbing conclusions about the consistent histories formalism as well, but I may have misunderstood that since I didn't read it carefully enough. I remember something about how dinosaur fossils in the ground don't imply that dinosaurs once lived on Earth. (Just wait until the creationists get hold of that one :smile:). But maybe that was just Smolin's interpretation of this whole thing. He mentioned that he attended a talk about this article in his book.

This quote suggests that if they think consistent histories have problems, they are even more critical of Everett's MWI. I'm emphasizing the if, because I really didn't read enough to know what they think.

Briefly, our view is that although the ideas of Everett et al. have motivated interesting work, including some of the papers we shall discuss, no welldefined scientific theory has yet been described in the many-worlds literature except for Bell’s intentionally pathological Everett-de Broglie-Bohm hybrid,[15] and that most of the ideas hinted at in earlier many-worlds papers can more naturally be understood in the language of consistent histories.
 
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  • #26
Fra, I am trying to understand your question.

So, you are not sure that a decomposition is possible. Definitely, we know how separate systems spacially, like saying, here is a table, and here is a chair, table ends here, and a chair starts there.

But we are not sure that we can separate systems in an information space. Entangled particles share the same qbits no matter how far the particles in space are, and as all particles were born sometimes... there are probably entanglement links connecting everything in our Universe like spahetti in a way we can't imagine, so decomposition based on just some location is space is not valid.

Is my understanding correct?
 
  • #27
Dmitry67 said:
Fra, I am trying to understand your question.
I knew that guy would eventually get someone to confuse the two of us by ending all his posts with "/Fredrik". :smile:

Dmitry67 said:
So, you are not sure that a decomposition is possible. Definitely, we know how separate systems spacially, like saying, here is a table, and here is a chair, table ends here, and a chair starts there.
Yes, we can decompose the real world into systems in an intuitive way, and that suggests that we should look for a theory in which the mathematical model of the universe can be decomposed into mathematical models of the subsystems.

Dmitry67 said:
But we are not sure that we can separate systems in an information space. Entangled particles share the same qbits no matter how far the particles in space are, and as all particles were born sometimes... there are probably entanglement links connecting everything in our Universe like spahetti in a way we can't imagine, so decomposition based on just some location is space is not valid.

Is my understanding correct?
Those things are not what concern me. Consider the standard ("Copenhagenish") formulation of QM, which contains the axiom that if a system is in state |u> (in Hilbert space H1) and we measure observable B, the probability of result b is

Pu(b)=|<b|u>|2.​

Now consider a second system that's isolated from the first, and in state |v> (in Hilbert space H2), as we measure observable C. The probability of result c is

Pv(c)=|<c|v>|2.​

The probability that simultaneous measurements of B and C will yield results b and c is of course

Pu(b)Pv(c)=|<b|u>|2|<c|v>|2 =|<b|u><c|v>|2 =| (<b| ¤ <c|) (|u> ¤ |v>) |2,​

where I'm using the symbol ¤ as "tensor product" (LaTeX code "\otimes").

This identity is the reason why we use the tensor product to represent the combined system. In this case, the Hilbert space of the combined system is H=H1¤H2. It's very important to realize that this is a consequence of the Born rule.

Now, if we instead start with the axiom that the Hilbert space of the combined system is H, and that its states evolve in time according to the Schrödinger equation, then how can we possibly justify writing H=H1¤H2? My answer to that question is that the assumption that we can write H=H1¤H2 is a new axiom in the theory, and it's essentially equivalent to the Born rule.

So it isn't really surprising or at all remarkable that people have been able to derive the Born rule from these two axioms. What I'm objecting to is that people (not just you, but also e.g. Tegmark and Wikipedia), are claiming that the first axiom is all we need, when they have in fact used an alternative axiom which seems to be equivalent to the one they dropped.
 
  • #28
I think what is less controversial is that in the MWI you can derive the Born rule from the special case that measuring an observable if the system is in an eigenstate of that observable, will yield the corresponding eigenvalue with certainty.

This is weaker form of the Born rule actually is a more "realistic" rule for the MWI, because one should not invoke probablities to define a deterministic theory, so all statements about probabilities must be derived from rules that do not invoke probabilities.
 
  • #29
Yes, that makes a lot more sense. I'd like to read Hartle's article about this, but I'm not going to pay 21 USD for it. Who pays for this kind of stuff anyway?
 
  • #30
Dmitry67 said:
Again, I have to repeat (looks like we are going in circles)
Decomposition is a parameter for a quantum decoherence.
If you look at the Universe from birds view you don't need one at all.
If you ask "but wait, why do I see a dead cat..."
And I interrupt you immediately saying
"So admit that YOU, not MWI has just made a decomposition of a Universe into YOU as an observer, a cat and the rest of the Universe, and YOU, not MWI has just defined a preferred basis for a decoherence asking to calculate what YOU, not any other observer, would see.

It's not me who makes the decomposition. The decomposition has to be real for MWI to make sense as a realistic interpretation.

In http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.4657" i show not only that different decompositions exist, but also that they are physically different, and that it is extremely improbable that we are one random choice of these.
 
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  • #31
Ilja,

1. Sure, there are as many different decompositions as observers.
2. You should define what means 'physically different'. And this part is slippery. I don't find it in your paper. What I mean, it is not enough to say that 'physics is different'. Of course it is different

An it is not something new: as I learned, the number of gluons in proton depends on the scale, and Unruh effects shows that even the particle content of macroscopic events is different in different frames.

What you need to show is that the 'different physics' are different macroscopically in the same branch. Note that the very notion of a 'branch' is decomposition-dependent, so it is absolutely not clear how you can 'compare' different physics.

Again, it is not enough to show that physics is 'different'. You need to show that it is INCONSISTENT. For example, looking the same same object from different angles you see a different picture but it is ok.

Here is a well-known example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner's_friend
In 2 different basis (inner and outer observer) the events are different. Inner observer is decoherenced immediately, so for the inner observer cat is dead OR alive, while for the outer observer (in his basis) the cat (and the inner observer) are in the superposition.
 
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  • #32
Dmitry67 said:
1. Sure, there are as many different decompositions as observers.

If there is some equivalence, explain. For every observer a decomposition? How, in this case, is the observer defined? For every decomposition an observer? In this case, is the Earth an observer?

As I understand the situation, it is completely different. One postulates that there is some decomposition of the universe into systems. Then one starts with this decomposition, applies decoherence, and after this we obtain some decoherence-preferred basis which allows to define everything else, in particular observers.

2. You should define what means 'physically different'. And this part is slippery. I don't find it in your paper. What I mean, it is not enough to say that 'physics is different'. Of course it is different

For defining what is physically different I simply rely on the standard shut up and calculate interpretation, and I have presented an experiment which gives, in this interpretation, different physical predictions.

An it is not something new: as I learned, the number of gluons in proton depends on the scale, and Unruh effects shows that even the particle content of macroscopic events is different in different frames.

Of course the theory of the KdV equation is nothing new, it is already quite old. But what do your examples have to do with my argument? I have not got the point. In relativity, the effects for different observers follow the same physical laws. This is the content of various equivalence principles. In my situation, where is no such equivalence principle. The physical Hamiltonian (as expressed in terms of p and q) for different decompositions is different.

What you need to show is that the 'different physics' are different macroscopically in the same branch. Note that the very notion of a 'branch' is decomposition-dependent, so it is absolutely not clear how you can 'compare' different physics.

I don't have to care about branches. To show that the physics is different for different decompositions, different physics in the shut up and calculate interpretation is sufficient. You can choose: Or MWI agrees with shut up and calculate or not. That choice is not my problem. As well, it is not my problem how to prove which choice is correct. In the first case, my consideration is sufficient, in the second, MWI will be ruled out empirically, because it is shut up and calculate which is used in calculations, and which is empirically successful.

Again, it is not enough to show that physics is 'different'. You need to show that it is INCONSISTENT. For example, looking the same same object from different angles you see a different picture but it is ok.

In standard quantum theory, the p and q operators are part of the definition of the theory. They are not observer-dependent. Using different operators H=H(p,q) means different physics.

I have given an argument in the paper why the "many worlds solution" of this does not work. The alternative Hamilton operators do not have the symmetries of the operators we postulate, like p_i^2+\sum 1/|q_i-q_j|. If we would be in a typical of the many physically different worlds, our world would be less symmetric.

Here is a well-known example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner's_friend
In 2 different basis (inner and outer observer) the events are different. Inner observer is decoherenced immediately, so for the inner observer cat is dead OR alive, while for the outer observer (in his basis) the cat (and the inner observer) are in the superposition.

It seems this difference is on a completely different level.
 
  • #33
Ilja said:
1
If there is some equivalence, explain. For every observer a decomposition? How, in this case, is the observer defined? For every decomposition an observer? In this case, is the Earth an observer?

2
As I understand the situation, it is completely different. One postulates that there is some decomposition of the universe into systems. Then one starts with this decomposition, applies decoherence, and after this we obtain some decoherence-preferred basis which allows to define everything else, in particular observers.

3
For defining what is physically different I simply rely on the standard shut up and calculate interpretation, and I have presented an experiment which gives, in this interpretation, different physical predictions.

4
I don't have to care about branches.

1
An observer is defined based on the question asked.
"I am going to see a dead or alive cat?" defines YOU as an observer, and a CAT
The very need for a Decoherence starts from the question. You can not ask any question bout physics without already making some sorts of decompositions - into you, cat, moon, earth, accelerator etc.

2
Correct, we get some results for the given basis. But this basis is not special in any way. We can chose any other basis based on our needs.

3
But of course it gives! It is like in CI where wavefunction is just a 'knowledge' so different observers can get different values for all operators. In the example with Wigners friend, there are different results: for multiple copies of the already-decoherenced observer and for the distant not-decoherenced observer.

4
You can't talk about MWI ignoring the branches.
As events in different branches are different then of course they MUST have different physics, and of course before an observer is decoherenced with an observable his pre-calculated (based on his previous knowledge) values of p, r etc should not agree with the values observed by the decoherenced observer!

However note that p, r are not observables until you get decoherenced with a system. If I pre-calculate them in advance based on the system setup (the system itself can be in Andromeda) is a one thing, but MEASURE a position (hence beging decoherenced = forced to 'chose' one branch) is another thing.

In that sense pre-calculated values based on the knowledge in MWI is almost CI-like - a non-physical thing, calculated based on the 'knowledge'. So different observers should not automatically agree on it.
 
  • #34
Fredrik said:
Dmitry67 said:
Fra, I am trying to understand your question.

I knew that guy would eventually get someone to confuse the two of us by ending all his posts with "/Fredrik". :smile:

Sorry for the confusion here :) My actual first name is Fredrik which is the simple reason I have it as my sig. [ Why I do that? I guess I've always done that. I do it it emails and in general, it's a long story that began way back (before my time on this forum). It's just an old habit I have, that I rarely think about. Some people have long quotes or links to their fave website in their signatures - I simply use a slash followed by my actual first name as s sort of code for "end of message". ]

Given that I had some slight discussions with Dmitry67 in some other threads, I could imagine the resulted confusion :)

/Fredrik
 
  • #35
Not to mention that user=Fredrik is a superhero, user=Fra is a yeast cell :)

/Fredrik
 
  • #36
Yes, sorry for the confusion :)
 
  • #38
Fra said:
Sorry for the confusion here :) My actual first name is Fredrik which is the simple reason I have it as my sig.
No problem. It's a common name (in Sweden). By the way, I didn't mean to sound upset about it. :smile: (I'm not).

Back on topic... I read Hartle's paper. It contains some good stuff, and is definitely an interesting read, but he's assuming that if the states of a system are represented by the rays of a Hilbert space H, and you combine several such systems into a larger system, then the Hilbert space of the larger system is the tensor product H¤...¤H. He offers no justification for this. So his derivation of the Born rule has the same problem as everyone else's. (See #27).

Also, he doesn't mention the MWI at all. In fact, he spends half the paper arguing that states are not objective properties of systems. This is of course less relevant. If he had been able to derive the Born rule without assuming that we should use tensor products, it would have been very relevant for the MWI, regardless of whether he says it is.

Fra said:
Not to mention that user=Fredrik is a superhero,...
You just made me picture myself in spandex and a cape...it wasn't pretty.
 
  • #39
Dmitry67 said:
1
An observer is defined based on the question asked.
"I am going to see a dead or alive cat?" defines YOU as an observer, and a CAT
The very need for a Decoherence starts from the question. You can not ask any question bout physics without already making some sorts of decompositions - into you, cat, moon, earth, accelerator etc.

Sorry, but I don't follow. I exist independent of the questions I ask. I can ask a lot of different questions, but these questions do not define me. Not even metaphorically. If your point of view would be true, it would be one more reason to object against its use of various notions as confusing, but in this case MWI seems innocent, and it seems to be your personal confusion.

2
Correct, we get some results for the given basis. But this basis is not special in any way. We can chose any other basis based on our needs.

That's also not the standard understanding of MWI. Instead, MWI people have tried a lot to get some preferred basis (this problem is known as the preferred basis problem, and they were very happy finding that decoherence can give them a preferred basis. Unfortunately, it cannot give a preferred basis, because it depends on the decomposition into systems.

3
But of course it gives! It is like in CI where wavefunction is just a 'knowledge' so different observers can get different values for all operators. In the example with Wigners friend, there are different results: for multiple copies of the already-decoherenced observer and for the distant not-decoherenced observer.

The question is not if different observers see different things. This is so even in classical physics and was known already in Ancient Greece. Different physics means that for the same experiment, observed by the same observer, we obtain different statistics of measurement results. That means different Born rule distributions.


4
You can't talk about MWI ignoring the branches.
As events in different branches are different then of course they MUST have different physics, and of course before an observer is decoherenced with an observable his pre-calculated (based on his previous knowledge) values of p, r etc should not agree with the values observed by the decoherenced observer!

Different physics means different laws of physics, leading to different predictions about probabilities of measurement outcomes. And, again, regarding the probabilistic measurement outcomes I'm talking about the shut up and calculate interpretation. I don't see that talking about branches and MWI gives in any way the Born distributions, therefore I'm not talking about branches. But because I don't plan to prove that it is really impossible in MWI to obtain somehow the Born rule, I can accept, for the purpose of the argument, that MWI can recover somehow the shut up and calculate predictions based on the Born rule.

However note that p, r are not observables until you get decoherenced with a system. If I pre-calculate them in advance based on the system setup (the system itself can be in Andromeda) is a one thing, but MEASURE a position (hence beging decoherenced = forced to 'chose' one branch) is another thing.

I disagree. The observables are (and have to be) well-defined without decoherence - they are self-adjoint operators, and such self-adjoint operators are defined once the Hilbert space is defined. In particular, the Hamilton operator is well-defined without any decoherence. What decoherence can do (given the decomposition into systems) is to make a choice among the preexisting observables - it prefers some subset of observables as especially easy to measure - the decoherence-preferred observables. The other observables remain observable, but measuring them does not give much, because interaction of the measured system with the environment changes the state in short time, and after this the information you have obtained during your measurement is of not much value.

Then, decoherence has nothing to do with some force to choose a branch. There is no such force, and decoherence does not lead to such a force. All what decoherence does is to define, for a given decomposition into systems, a preferred q-like basis, something which is a necessary prerequisite for the definition of the branches.
 
  • #40
Fredrik said:
You just made me picture myself in spandex and a cape...it wasn't pretty.

Wolverine has a cape :confused:
 
  • #41
Ilja said:
1
That's also not the standard understanding of MWI. Instead, MWI people have tried a lot to get some preferred basis (this problem is known as the preferred basis problem, and they were very happy finding that decoherence can give them a preferred basis. Unfortunately, it cannot give a preferred basis, because it depends on the decomposition into systems.

2
The question is not if different observers see different things. Different physics means that for the same experiment, observed by the same observer, we obtain different statistics of measurement results. That means different Born rule distributions.

3
I disagree. The observables are (and have to be) well-defined without decoherence - they are self-adjoint operators, and such self-adjoint operators are defined once the Hilbert space is defined. In particular, the Hamilton operator is well-defined without any decoherence.

1,2
Well, may be I am really believe in a slightly different flavor or MWI?
For me it was absolutely obvious that you can't discuss 'what X is observing' without using X as 'preferred basis'. And you can't use any other basis if you are discussing X's impressions of the world. Hence your argument is valid for those whole believe in some 'preferred basis' (for me it is a nonsense) but in my flavor of MWI there is no paradox, because you are not free in chosing the basis.

Wiki article states that the choice of basis is arbitrary. Do you have any links about 'how standard MWI defines a preferred basis'?

3
This is what was called an observable in good old QM which did not include measurement. But you can't 'observe' it, it is just a mathematical operatior. You can observe an arrow of a voltmeter. The only true observables are the macroscopic events. Only thermodynamically irreversible events can be remembered (as memory is irreversible by definition) and hence be a part of your consciousness, hence, a particle must be irreversibly absorbed in order to say something about p, r etc.

But of course, you can calculate the result of these operators based on your knowledge about the wavefunction, but you don't know exactly your branch and wavefunction, so you should not be surprised that different observers get different results.
 
  • #42
Dmitry67 said:
1,2
Well, may be I am really believe in a slightly different flavor or MWI?
For me it was absolutely obvious that you can't discuss 'what X is observing' without using X as 'preferred basis'. And you can't use any other basis if you are discussing X's impressions of the world. Hence your argument is valid for those whole believe in some 'preferred basis' (for me it is a nonsense) but in my flavor of MWI there is no paradox, because you are not free in chosing the basis.

Wiki article states that the choice of basis is arbitrary. Do you have any links about 'how standard MWI defines a preferred basis'?

I take Wallace and Zurek as the writers which explain MWI in the best way. I have no links, but use arxiv.org search for Zurek or Wallace on quant-ph, and you will find among them what are the IMHO best articles about MWI.

But this is only a personal opinion, and, as you can judge from the style of my papers, I try to avoid mentioning details of MWI. The reason is that my picture of MWI does not really make sense, at least I'm unable to understand how one can take MWI (given in my understanding) seriously. Because this may be the flaw of my understanding of MWI, I prefer to be careful. Here I can be a little less careful, I think.

About the preferred basis: If there exists a preferred basis, one is, of course, not free to choose one, but has to use the preferred one. If you don't want a preferred basis, you end up with (in)consistent histories, which is even worse, because it is a rejection of classical logic without necessity.

The main problem with your scheme - an observer defining a decomposition of the universe, and, then, consequently a preferred basis by decoherence - is that no such standard decomposition exists, because there are states of the universe without me, but no states of a decomposition of the universe without a state of all the subsystems. Such a decomposition makes sense only in some environment of the actual state of universe, described not by the state vector, but by some branch in MWI jargon. Thus, all this looks heavily circular.

This is what was called an observable in good old QM which did not include measurement. But you can't 'observe' it, it is just a mathematical operatior. You can observe an arrow of a voltmeter. The only true observables are the macroscopic events. Only thermodynamically irreversible events can be remembered (as memory is irreversible by definition) and hence be a part of your consciousness, hence, a particle must be irreversibly absorbed in order to say something about p, r etc.

I disagree that only decoherence-preferred observables are observable. There may be operators which are not observable - those with macroscopic superpositions as eigenstates. But in pure quantum theory we can measure lot's of different operators, for sufficiently small ones you can even measure every operator, not only the decoherence-preferred ones (as far as this notion makes sense for small pure quantum systems), because decoherence needs some time, is only an approximate mechanism.
 
  • #43
Ilja said:
The main problem with your scheme - an observer defining a decomposition of the universe,
That choice of words makes the problem with that scheme pretty clear. A "decomposition of the universe" is a way to express the Hilbert space of states of the universe as a tensor product: \mathcal H=\mathcal H_1\otimes\mathcal H_2. But the "observer" here is the physical system with Hilbert space \mathcal H_2. So to say that the observer defines the decomposition is essentially the same thing as saying that \mathcal H_2 defines \mathcal H_2, and that doesn't really say anything.
 
  • #44
Ilja said:
1
If you don't want a preferred basis, you end up with (in)consistent histories, which is even worse, because it is a rejection of classical logic without necessity.

2
The main problem with your scheme - an observer defining a decomposition of the universe, and, then, consequently a preferred basis by decoherence - is that no such standard decomposition exists, because there are states of the universe without me, but no states of a decomposition of the universe without a state of all the subsystems.

3
I disagree that only decoherence-preferred observables are observable. There may be operators which are not observable - those with macroscopic superpositions as eigenstates. But in pure quantum theory we can measure lot's of different operators, for sufficiently small ones you can even measure every operator, not only the decoherence-preferred ones (as far as this notion makes sense for small pure quantum systems), because decoherence needs some time, is only an approximate mechanism.

1
Again, it is possible (and very likely) that in act different observers do not agree on what you call an 'observables', and even on the number of the elementary particles, but they Do agree ont he microscopic events. Unruh effect is a good example

2
in the Universe without YOU there is no need to calculate a decoherence in some basis at all: you can be satisfied with a unitary evolution of the 'universe' wavefunction.

3
Note the words I highlighted
So, you do not get the values of these 'observables' directly.
At first, you must decoherence your system (or a particle) with some macroscopic device, right?
 
  • #45
Fredrik said:
That choice of words makes the problem with that scheme pretty clear. A "decomposition of the universe" is a way to express the Hilbert space of states of the universe as a tensor product: \mathcal H=\mathcal H_1\otimes\mathcal H_2. But the "observer" here is the physical system with Hilbert space \mathcal H_2. So to say that the observer defines the decomposition is essentially the same thing as saying that \mathcal H_2 defines \mathcal H_2, and that doesn't really say anything.

My problem with this is not that it is in some sense tautological. In \mathcal H=\mathcal H_1\otimes\mathcal H_2 the "observer" is always in some state. But what is my state if the wave function is localized around a state of the universe where the Earth does not exist? It could be, at best, something like the state of my immortal soul or so.
 
  • #46
Dmitry67 said:
Again, it is possible (and very likely) that in act different observers do not agree on what you call an 'observables', and even on the number of the elementary particles, but they Do agree on the microscopic events. Unruh effect is a good example

In standard semiclassical gravity they can agree about the observables as well as in classical relativity, where everybody agrees about the showings of a traveling clock from A to B along a given trajectory.

One can associate some observables with some observers, but this association is quite arbitrary. If one considers a particle detector in some state of movement, say, along a given trajectory, the prediction about the resulting average particle numbers measured by this detector is unique, well-defined.

in the Universe without YOU there is no need to calculate a decoherence in some basis at all: you can be satisfied with a unitary evolution of the 'universe' wavefunction.

You have not got the point. The wave function is a function on the space of all possible universes. From this birds view there are only particular branches with or without me, the multiverse is not with or without me.

Now I have a wave function, and want to know what I can expect to observe. How does this work? You would like to look at branches which contain me. But the branches are simply not defined before decoherence has finished its job. You need decoherence to define the branches. To define decoherence, you need a decomposition into systems. This decomposition into systems has to be defined on the full Hilbert space, the one which contains all these superpositions of something close to our own branch (better, what becomes our own branch, everything else appropriately defined) to something where Earth does not exist.

The "decomposition into systems" means some H=H_{rest}\otimes H_{obs}. Then, every basic state (branch) is a product \psi=\psi_{rest}\psi_{obs}. What is \psi_{obs} supposed to describe if the Earth does not exist? H_{obs} is always the same, independent of the question if \psi_{rest} describes a state where the Earth exists or not.

Note the words I highlighted
So, you do not get the values of these 'observables' directly.
At first, you must decoherence your system (or a particle) with some macroscopic device, right?

If you want to talk about the standard applications of decoherence outside many worlds, no problem. You have some classical Copenhagen part of the world, and this part defines nicely a decomposition into various systems, in part classical, in part quantum. The observer is, in this case, classical, thus, fixed at every moment of time. States where the Earth does not exist are simply not part of such considerations.

MWI has the problem how to obtain all this background in a consistent way. It cannot start with me or some other systems here on Earth to define a decomposition into systems to start decoherence, because these systems are only defined in some small subset of the small part of the multiverse which contains our Earth.

Now about the usual way to apply decoherence: I measure what I like, by rotating variouos devices in various ways. If the measurement device is rotated in one way, the decoherence-preferred observable is, say, S1, if it is rotated in another way it may be something different, S2. Thus, for small quantum systems all quantum observables may appear observable, one simply has to use some appropriate environment, with appropriately rotated devices, where it appears decoherence-preferred.
 
  • #47
I don't understand the arguments about decoherence being necessary to define observers. Suppose you have a quantum computer that can implement internal observers. I.e. observers are computer programs that can observe their virtual world. Then one can always project out the sectors of the individual programs to compute the probabilities of what they observe.

Here you do have a definiton of each program in some standard basis and you can argue that you could map arbitrary states to computational states of any program. This problem also exist in purely classical models. You can always invent a mapping from the states of one physical system (say a gas) to another system (say a brain). Then the reason why a gas in a container is not conscious is presumably because what matters is the program the brain is running. The mapping from the gas to the brain would contain all the nontrivial aspects of that program.

This then suggests that observers would always have to be defined as algorithms.
 
  • #48
Ilja,
I understand what you are saying now and I agree - yes, it is a little bit recursive. While I am thinking about "what is a probability in MWI" I can give you a short answer. Just to explain, why I am not worrying about that recursion.

Yes, you exist only in some subset of branches. We don't have a formal definition of a human, or an observer, that notion is fuzzy. Hence, we can't define what branches you 'occupy' precisely. It is even possible that some deep things like 'what is an observation?' can be explained only it very high level terms which require a definition of consciousness. Yes, I have to admit that everything fuzzy, recursive and observer-dependent. The way Fra likes it :)

Why I am still optimistic?

In MWI the only and ultimate reality is the global wavefunction. And our 'sense of reality' is just an illusion. There is no classical behavior at all, it is one of the biggest illusions we have.

For that reason I do not really care about the problem with the 'preferred basis', because basis and decoherence are not needed to define physical laws or reality - they are just needed to explain the illusion a particular frog has.

For that very reason I am sure that all frogs impressions are consistent - because frogs impression is just a mapping of the bird's view using some basis. And when we map the same thing we always get the consistent partial views. To repeat, decoherence does not explain the reality, it explains an illusion

Even may be MWI requires a definition of an observer and may be even consiousness to explain all the observations, it is much much better then CI because CI uses these high level things (like 'knowledge of an observer') to explain the microscopic world, while MWI uses it to explain only high level things, so it might require a definition of consciousness to explain, what we 'feel', but we don't need all that stuff in the microscopic world.

But I have to agree with you, there are some deep questions in MWI which are not clear right now.
 
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  • #49
Count Iblis said:
I don't understand the arguments about decoherence being necessary to define observers. Suppose you have a quantum computer that can implement internal observers. I.e. observers are computer programs that can observe their virtual world. Then one can always project out the sectors of the individual programs to compute the probabilities of what they observe.

Here you do have a definiton of each program in some standard basis and you can argue that you could map arbitrary states to computational states of any program. This problem also exist in purely classical models. You can always invent a mapping from the states of one physical system (say a gas) to another system (say a brain). Then the reason why a gas in a container is not conscious is presumably because what matters is the program the brain is running. The mapping from the gas to the brain would contain all the nontrivial aspects of that program.

This then suggests that observers would always have to be defined as algorithms.

That's the way Wallace explains how MWI works. There are no observers in general, but the notion of an observer is derived, follows from decoeherence, appear only in the classical limit, as some emergent subjects. It's not me who has invented this, it is the (IMHO wrong) idea of the many worlders that they can derive everything from the wave function taken alone.

About quantum programs able to observe something none-classical I don't even want to speculate in a forum. I don't know enough about them.
 
  • #50
Dmitry67 said:
Yes, I have to admit that everything fuzzy, recursive and observer-dependent. The way Fra likes it :)

Why I am still optimistic?

In MWI the only and ultimate reality is the global wavefunction. And our 'sense of reality' is just an illusion. There is no classical behavior at all, it is one of the biggest illusions we have.

For that reason I do not really care about the problem with the 'preferred basis', because basis and decoherence are not needed to define physical laws or reality - they are just needed to explain the illusion a particular frog has.

Sorry, but I could not resist to transform this argument into a theological one:

UnknownTheolog said:
Yes, I have to admit that everything fuzzy.

Why I am still optimistic?

In religion the only and ultimate reality is God. And our 'sense of reality' is just an illusion. There is no classical behavior at all, it is one of the biggest illusions we have.

For that reason I do not really care about the problem with human reality, because human reality is not needed to define Gods laws or Gods reality - they are just needed to explain the illusion a particular frog has.


For that very reason I am sure that all frogs impressions are consistent - because frogs impression is just a mapping of the bird's view using some basis.

They are inconsistent with each other - the inconsistent histories interpretation uses an explicit consistency condition to define consistent parts of it. For some given preferred basis, they become consistent, this is why MWI needs one preferred, and not some.

And when we map the same thing we always get the consistent partial views. To repeat, decoherence does not explain the reality, it explains an illusion

The shadows on the wall seen by Plato's prisoners are real shadows. Because they follow from the really existing objects, the really existing source of light, and the really existing wall. Naming them illusion explains nothing. An explanation has to describe how the illusion emerges, in a logically consistent way.


Even may be MWI requires a definition of an observer and may be even consiousness to explain all the observations, it is much much better then CI because CI uses these high level things (like 'knowledge of an observer') to explain the microscopic world, while MWI uses it to explain only high level things, so it might require a definition of consciousness to explain, what we 'feel', but we don't need all that stuff in the microscopic world.

CI uses high level things, but gets the real answers. MWI has yet to show that it gets them. With my counterexample, the job of the many worlders becomes (I think) much harder. I think I have shown that MWI needs some additional structure to fix the physics, thus, to become equivalent as a physical theory to QM.

I have today received the journal ref:

Found Phys (2009) 39: 486–498
DOI 10.1007/s10701-009-9299-4
Why the Hamilton Operator Alone Is not Enough
I. Schmelzer
 
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