How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

[Pythagorean]

How is the mechanism for how something works.

It's a lot harder to explain what "why" is because it doesn't have a stable definition. It can be used for "how" or it can be used to assay motivation for humans/animals. The final and third way it's applied, I think, is a misattribution of human motivation to the universe: "why is there entropy?? Why anything at all". Some people will be satisfied with a how answer; others will bring up the hard problem.

 

[Ferris_bg]

It[/PLAIN] is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience".

The difference between the hard problem of consciousness and the other hard problems for science is in the way the questions "why" have arisen. If we have only our cognitive type of experience, we wouldn't ask questions like "how it feels", but we would still ask questions like "why is there gravity, cognition etc". Having the subjective experience of how it feels however totally changes the picture. You are certain about the existence of something, which you can't study objectively.

What[/PLAIN] makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

 

[pftest]

To your point, we would generally say there is a mind<>brain relationship in the same way there is a relationship between any phenomena which supervenes on its base.

Yes i think that's right. And because physically there are no such things as a "base level" and a "higher level", the whole supervenience relationship is always a conceptual one. Even in the case of a rock that supervenes on its molecules. Physically speaking, the only relationships that exist in a rock are the forces between the particles. Psychologically, a human mind can imagine the rock to exist at several different levels (the whole rock > its molecules > their atoms > their particles). Those latter psychological relationships are what we call supervenience. So my conclusion is that supervenience is to physicalism like what god is to atheism. I wanted to address this because i was under the impression that people generally believe supervenience to be a physicalist view on consciousness, whereas i think it is the exact opposite.

 

[pftest]

I agree with, and have stated in some way, everything you've said here. None of it seems to touch on my argument that the nature of gravity has the same explanatory gap as consciousness. The two phenomena are themselves different (action at a distance vs. subjective experience). But both phenomena can only be characterized, not "explained".

We ask "why" and the only answers we ever really get are "how".

There do exist questions that get "why-answers", for example: why did person X kill person Y (Y insulted him). Or why does person Z drink non-sparkling water (it tastes better). Basically any action that involves consciousness includes a "why-answer".

So "why-answers" do exist just as much as "how-answers". If we have an explanatory gap, we can insert either one. Or both, I think we can see in human beings that both types of answers can be at work at the same time.

And i should note that when science gives a "how-answer" it is agnostic on the presence of a "why-answer", it doesn't state such an answer is absent. A formula may describe how someone moves his legs while walking, but at the same time the person may be walking that way to avoid kneepain. So science may search for a "how-answer" for gravity, and even when it finds one it won't say anything about the involvement of a conscious state (as is the case in human brains). This is true for the most basic physical laws out there.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi pftest

Yes i think that's right. And because physically there are no such things as a "base level" and a "higher level", the whole supervenience relationship is always a conceptual one. Even in the case of a rock that supervenes on its molecules. Physically speaking, the only relationships that exist in a rock are the forces between the particles. Psychologically, a human mind can imagine the rock to exist at several different levels (the whole rock > its molecules > their atoms > their particles). Those latter psychological relationships are what we call supervenience. So my conclusion is that supervenience is to physicalism like what god is to atheism. I wanted to address this because i was under the impression that people generally believe supervenience to be a physicalist view on consciousness, whereas i think it is the exact opposite.

The discussion around the rock being made of particles is probably not the best example for the term "supervenience". A rock in this case is made of something and that's not really what supervenience is meant to pick out.

Standford encyclopedia of philosophy defines it this way:

A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/

Another good explanation is given by Maudlin, "Computation and Consciousness":

States of awareness and sensory events take place in time; they are fairly precisely datable. One can assert that Sam had a toothach at 12:05 or that Sheila spent five minutes wondering about Fermat's last theorem. A natural, indeed nearly inescapable, explanation for this is that conscious events and episodes supervene on concurrent physical events and processes. One's phenomenal state at a time is determined entirely by one's brain activity at that time. Hence, two physical systems engaged in precisely the same activity through a time will support the same modes of consciousness (if any) through that time. Let us call this the supervenience thesis.

The term 'supervenience' can also be used outside of the philosophy of mind. We can say the pressure of a gas supervenes on the molecules in the gas. The pressure is a property that depends on the molecules in the gas. We can't change the pressure without changing something to do with the molecules. Compressing them isentropically for instance, imparts energy to the molecules and changes the pressure. Expanding the molecules through a restriction in a pipe results in an isenthalpic expansion of the molecules and a subsequent change in the pressure. So the pressure can be said to supervene on the molecules.

We generally say the mind supervenes on the brain because we naturally assume that what we think or experience at any time is because of what's going on in the brain. So these mental states supervene on the physical states.

 

[madness]

You argument is that there is no gravity. That's really not satisfactory...
I don't see how you can selectively use that argument on gravity and not on consciousness.

They're both products of the same system of perceptions.

I think if you're to take Lowe's view, you can't be selective about it.

As I said before, I have direct knowledge of my conscious experiences. There is no way to gain knowledge of any "gravity" above and beyond the trajectories of the particles which it is said to act on. I haven't yet had the time to read the full Lowe paper, so can't know if I agree with him or not.

 

[Diracula]

It seems to me that supervenience is completely compatible with physicalism, and is probably even a necessary condition for a physical interpretation of mind/consciousness. You change the matter in the skull --> you change the mind. You change the mind --> something in the brain matter must change as well. What am I missing?

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Diracula,

It seems to me that supervenience is completely compatible with physicalism, and is probably even a necessary condition for a physical interpretation of mind/consciousness. You change the matter in the skull --> you change the mind. You change the mind --> something in the brain matter must change as well. What am I missing?

You're not missing anything. That's correct.

 

[Q_Goest]

Also, you know my position, it's a fairly common position: it's the physicalist position. Again a misrepresentation, claiming that these are my personal wishes and desires. I also share some views with Lowe.

Your views clearly don't coincide with Lowe's. Lowe is even less of a physicalist than Chalmers. He says in the very first sentance, that Chalmers "... concedes too much to such physicalists in allowing that some, at least, af these problems..." will fall prey to physicalist methods. Your views of hard physicalism clearly don't match his.

Lastly, it's unfair to post a reference and expect somebody to read it all. If you have a specific point to make from a reference, quote it, interperet it, and state how its relevant. Otherwise it's just more "oh the answers in there, you're just too ignorant to see it... but don't mind me not being able to state it".

Numerous people have now explained for you why gravity is not a "hard problem" as the term is defined in philosophy. You can read the original paper by Chalmers on line here:
http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
or just Google. You and I have discussed things on this forum for years and in my experience, you consistently come up with your own ideas about philosphy of mind instead of learning what is in the literature. Even when people have given you references, you still go back to arguing your own ideas. That results in threads getting hijacked - we end up going off on a tangent that never gets resolved. It's unfair and inconsiderate of you to continually insist on your own ideas about philosophy.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi John,

However, when it comes to why does mass curve space. Why can't some laws be fundamental and not need further explanation? Aristotle would refer to this as the concept of a first cause but this does not imply a God. Aristotle thought that there should be some principles which existed at the beginning of the universe. He called these principles, "Unperishable Principles" and he discusses this in his book Metaphysics:
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/

You might be interested in the "psychophysical laws" that Chalmers has suggested. He argues that there must be fundamental laws, similar to relativity or quantum mechanics for example, that have no further explanation.

The question then arises: how do these novel fundamental properties relate to the already acknowledged fundamental properties of the world, namely those invoked in microphysics? In general, where there are fundamental properties, there are fundamental laws. So we can expect that there will be some sort of fundamental principles — psychophysical laws — connecting physical and phenomenal properties. Like the fundamental laws of relativity or quantum mechanics, these psychophysical laws will not be deducible from more basic principles, but instead will be taken as primitive.

Ref: Chalmers, "Consciousness and its place in nature"
http://consc.net/papers/nature.html

The flip side to that comes from the physicalist view that every phenomena can be explained in purely physical terms.

 

[Maui]

Your views clearly don't coincide with Lowe's. Lowe is even less of a physicalist than Chalmers. He says in the very first sentance, that Chalmers "... concedes too much to such physicalists in allowing that some, at least, af these problems..." will fall prey to physicalist methods. Your views of hard physicalism clearly don't match his.

You mean the Big Bang is not the Explanation for everything? But I drank a coffee and the reason for that is obviously the infinitely low entropy at the time of the BB. Similarly, the nature of consciousness is easily explained by causality and easily traceable to the BB by physicalists. Physicalism and the BB possesses at least a million times more answers than any religion ever did. And the reason for that is guess what? The reason why reasons exist at all is the same - the Big Bang is by far the most powerful explanatory tool ever devised by men. Big Bang Akbar! (at least both positions share the same common beginning - consciousness is observered to arise only after a BB, same with the physical, you need a BB :) )

 

[pftest]

The term 'supervenience' can also be used outside of the philosophy of mind. We can say the pressure of a gas supervenes on the molecules in the gas. The pressure is a property that depends on the molecules in the gas. We can't change the pressure without changing something to do with the molecules. Compressing them isentropically for instance, imparts energy to the molecules and changes the pressure. Expanding the molecules through a restriction in a pipe results in an isenthalpic expansion of the molecules and a subsequent change in the pressure. So the pressure can be said to supervene on the molecules.

We generally say the mind supervenes on the brain because we naturally assume that what we think or experience at any time is because of what's going on in the brain. So these mental states supervene on the physical states.

Isnt the gas pressure example identical to the rock<>molecules example? Gas pressure consists of moving molecules in the same way as the rock consists of its molecules. After all, there is nothing more to gas pressure than what it consists of, so it is reducible without remainder to that.

 

[Maui]

Isnt the gas pressure example identical to the rock<>molecules example? Gas pressure consists of moving molecules in the same way as the rock consists of its molecules. After all, there is nothing more to gas pressure than what it consists of, so it is reducible without remainder to that.

Not quite so, your idea would reduce well if there were classical ball-like solid particles, instead of fields. Nothing is really well reducible to anything remotely similar to what we experience as an observable world. That's why it is often said that qm isn't a description of our world.

But Q_quest might have meant another point - something along the lines of weak supervenience - e.g. that individual molecules don't possesses a property that can be labeled "pressure".

 

[Q_Goest]

Isnt the gas pressure example identical to the rock<>molecules example? Gas pressure consists of moving molecules in the same way as the rock consists of its molecules. After all, there is nothing more to gas pressure than what it consists of, so it is reducible without remainder to that.

You could say there is some property of the rock that is supervenient on the molecules, but simply saying that a rock is supervenient on its molecules doesn't pick out something that will differ in a rock when its molecules change. The statement is a bit too generic.

We could, for example, say the hardness of a diamond is supervenient on its molecules if we're referring to the molecule's crystalline structure, thus a change to that crystalline structure leads to a change in the hardness. Or we could say that my pet rock that I keep in my window is supervenient on its molecules perhaps because my pet rock depends on it being a certain set of molecules. It's a matter of identifying something about this particular rock which, when changed, changes that particular something.

 

[pftest]

It's a matter of identifying something about this particular rock which, when changed, changes that particular something.

But that is exactly what happens in "consists-of" relationships. Change some molecules in the rock, and of course the rock changes, because the rock = its molecules. The same goes for gas pressure or the hardness of a diamond. I do not see how supervenience is anything more than that. Your example of your pet rock puzzles me but you must have a reason for mentioning it. How is it different from an example of a normal rock? In both cases the rocks consist of their molecules, what am i missing?

 

[pftest]

Not quite so, your idea would reduce well if there were classical ball-like solid particles, instead of fields. Nothing is really well reducible to anything remotely similar to what we experience as an observable world. That's why it is often said that qm isn't a description of our world.

I don't think it makes a difference for my argument that supervenience is a mental abstraction, whether a rock consists of particles or fields, in both cases it is a "consist-of" relationship. Change the molecules and the rock changes. Change the fields and the rock changes.

 

[pftest]

It seems to me that supervenience is completely compatible with physicalism, and is probably even a necessary condition for a physical interpretation of mind/consciousness. You change the matter in the skull --> you change the mind. You change the mind --> something in the brain matter must change as well. What am I missing?

My argument is that supervenience relationships are actually " = " relationships. So when someone says that "mind supervenes on brain" he is actually saying "mind = brain". May sound physicalist, except that the "=" sign works both ways, so it can also be read as "your brain consists of consciousness". We know the brain consists of ordinary particles and forces, so it would also imply that those particles and forces consist of consciousness. The end result is no longer physicalism.

 

[Diracula]

I don't think supervenience relationships are actually equality relationships precisely because statements like "your brain consists of consciousness" don't make sense. Can you link to your post where you originally argued that supervenience relationships are actually "=" relationships? I don't see how:

The end result is no longer physicalism.

follows from the definition of supervenience.

 

[pftest]

I don't think supervenience relationships are actually equality relationships precisely because statements like "your brain consists of consciousness" don't make sense. Can you link to your post where you originally argued that supervenience relationships are actually "=" relationships? I don't see how:
follows from the definition of supervenience.

Heres my post:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3893753&postcount=142
and
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3899854&postcount=203

 

[madness]

I don't think supervenience relationships are actually equality relationships precisely because statements like "your brain consists of consciousness" don't make sense. Can you link to your post where you originally argued that supervenience relationships are actually "=" relationships? I don't see how:



follows from the definition of supervenience.

Logical supervenience, in which the supervenient properties are logically necessitated by the base properties, can be understood as an equality relationship. "Your brain consists of consciousness" is not a valid supervenience relationship, a physicalist would probably state that "your consciousness consists of your brain", i.e. consciousness supervenes on your brain state, but your brain state does not supervene on your conscious state. This is due to the supposed multiple realisability of consciousness.

On the other hand, it is argued by Chalmers that consciousness does not supervene logically on brain states, but has a weaker type of relationship called natural supervenience. This type of supervenience does not require the supervenient properties to be logically necessitated by the base properties. So long as the supervenient properties are fixed from the base properties by some naturally observed laws, we can say there is natural supervenience.

Logical supervenience is an equality relationship, whereas natural supervenience is an empirically observed correspondence.

 

[Q_Goest]

But that is exactly what happens in "consists-of" relationships. Change some molecules in the rock, and of course the rock changes, because the rock = its molecules. The same goes for gas pressure or the hardness of a diamond. I do not see how supervenience is anything more than that. Your example of your pet rock puzzles me but you must have a reason for mentioning it. How is it different from an example of a normal rock? In both cases the rocks consist of their molecules, what am i missing?

I think what bothers me about the way you've worded it is the "consists of" wording. The phrase "consists of" means 'to be made up of' or 'composed of'. We could say a rock consists of molecules or is composed of or made up of molecules, but everything is made up of molecules. So it doesn't really pick out a specific property of the rock that would 'supervene' on the molecules. Consists of is more like a list of ingredients. The rock consists of carbon, silicone, etc... The term supervenience is used to pick out one property that is dependent on or a function of some other set of properties. The hardness of the rock or the density would supervene on the molecules, but even that statement, although correct IMHO, is not a particularly good use of the word. I guess it also has to do with typical usage of the word. We don't generally use the word in physics or the natural sciences as much as we use it in philosophy to refer to a specific relationship between mind and brain.

You might try reading through the Wiki or Stanford PE entries for the term as well:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/

Hope that helps.

Logical supervenience, in which the supervenient properties are logically necessitated by the base properties, can be understood as an equality relationship. "Your brain consists of consciousness" is not a valid supervenience relationship, a physicalist would probably state that "your consciousness consists of your brain", i.e. consciousness supervenes on your brain state, but your brain state does not supervene on your conscious state. This is due to the supposed multiple realisability of consciousness.

On the other hand, it is argued by Chalmers that consciousness does not supervene logically on brain states, but has a weaker type of relationship called natural supervenience. This type of supervenience does not require the supervenient properties to be logically necessitated by the base properties. So long as the supervenient properties are fixed from the base properties by some naturally observed laws, we can say there is natural supervenience.

Logical supervenience is an equality relationship, whereas natural supervenience is an empirically observed correspondence.

I think that's nicely worded. Thanks.

 

[Pythagorean]

Your views clearly don't coincide with Lowe's. Lowe is even less of a physicalist than Chalmers. He says in the very first sentance, that Chalmers "... concedes too much to such physicalists in allowing that some, at least, af these problems..." will fall prey to physicalist methods. Your views of hard physicalism clearly don't match his.

I said some. I agree with Lowe that there are really no easy problems with phenomenological problems (of which consciousness is only one class). Note, I am NOT using the philosophical definition of phenomenology here, I am using the science one. It's just a coincidence that it has a word in both disciplines.,

Numerous people have now explained for you why gravity is not a "hard problem" as the term is defined in philosophy.

Not really. It's been more of tautology, as I will demonstrate below

you consistently come up with your own ideas about philosphy of mind instead of learning what is in the literature. Even when people have given you references, you still go back to arguing your own ideas. That results in threads getting hijacked - we end up going off on a tangent that never gets resolved. It's unfair and inconsiderate of you to continually insist on your own ideas about philosophy.

I'm not coming up with any philosophy, I'm pointing out what I see as flaws and arguments in reasoning. A good argument should stand on its own, whether it's quoted or not. I haven't even seen clearly defined premises from which a conclusion follows.

The majority of hijacking in this thread (called, how do physicists handle... I have a degree in physics, btw, so I'm at least the animal being studied here) was done when you started making personal conversation with me.

Let's look at Ferris_bg's quote:

What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

The first paragraph states the conclusion and gives the phenomenon (experience). Now the second paragraph gives an example of a "conceptual mistake" but it does not explain why the question is a conceptual mistake. It follows by trivializing a gene "All it means to be a gene..."

Then it gives the consciousness example and simply states it's "not a conceptual mistake" and that this is a "nontrivial further question"

And you really think I should be satisfied with this kind of argument?

 

[Maui]

I don't think it makes a difference for my argument that supervenience is a mental abstraction, whether a rock consists of particles or fields, in both cases it is a "consist-of" relationship. Change the molecules and the rock changes. Change the fields and the rock changes.

You failed at "can't be well reduced to anything remotely similar". When you say that a rock consist of fields, you really mean that it's in a supperpostion of all possible states(remember we're talking about fields) and being everywhere all at once. If you were to make a logical inference, you could say that it(the rock) is everything that exists(or more strictly that it's the only thing we could say anything meaningful about). I don't think you'd find it logical that a rock is composed of the environment or blends into it when certain conditions are not met. That's not a good argument for reductionism or 'consists of' relationships. They don't appear fundamental but more like a side-effect when considering fields, which is science best explanation to date of matter and physicalism. The universe of classically reducible solid particles is a misconception. It never existed. Nothing is really redicible to anything, you could say it just happens, or that's unknowable why it happens.

 

[Pythagorean]

There do exist questions that get "why-answers", for example: why did person X kill person Y (Y insulted him). Or why does person Z drink non-sparkling water (it tastes better). Basically any action that involves consciousness includes a "why-answer".

So "why-answers" do exist just as much as "how-answers". If we have an explanatory gap, we can insert either one. Or both, I think we can see in human beings that both types of answers can be at work at the same time.

And i should note that when science gives a "how-answer" it is agnostic on the presence of a "why-answer", it doesn't state such an answer is absent. A formula may describe how someone moves his legs while walking, but at the same time the person may be walking that way to avoid kneepain. So science may search for a "how-answer" for gravity, and even when it finds one it won't say anything about the involvement of a conscious state (as is the case in human brains). This is true for the most basic physical laws out there.

please see post 201

 

[Pythagorean]

As I said before, I have direct knowledge of my conscious experiences. There is no way to gain knowledge of any "gravity" above and beyond the trajectories of the particles which it is said to act on. I haven't yet had the time to read the full Lowe paper, so can't know if I agree with him or not.

This is kind of confusing, as the arguments other people are making is that we can gain knowledge about gravity but not about conscious experience and what you've said appears backwards from that.

I'm also curious why the particles were allowed past your knowledge barrier, but gravity is not?

 

[Pythagorean]

Q_Goest: from your link (which I have actually read once already in the past in discussion with you)

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one

(my emphasis)

These are exactly where science can't answer other problems besides consciousness. Let's just change a word:

"It is widely agreed that entropy arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a entropy at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does."

 

[Diracula]

Pythagorean,
One can theoretically measure entropy by counting the number of microstates a given system can be in. How would a scientist measure my experience of "fear" or "happiness" or "red"?

I think this is the difference Q_Goest (and others) are getting at, not that other problems "cannot be answered" either. Consciousness cannot even be physically measured.

 

[Ferris_bg]

How does it feel to be entropy? I suppose good. :)

 

[Diracula]

Heres my post:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3893753&postcount=142
and
https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3899854&postcount=203

Thanks. I will probably need to read the links in the following posts on supervenience as I was only going by the definition given earllier. There seems to be multiple kinds of supervenience.

 

[Pythagorean]

Pythagorean,
One can theoretically measure entropy by counting the number of microstates a given system can be in. How would a scientist measure my experience of "fear" or "happiness" or "red"?

I think this is the difference Q_Goest (and others) are getting at, not that other problems "cannot be answered" either. Consciousness cannot even be physically measured.

again, you're comparing easy problem of entropy to the hard problem of consciousness. I gave the hard problem of entropy above, where I changed the word consciousness to entropy.

To catch you up, the point I'm making is that the physicalist isn't obligated or claiming to explain the hard problem. People in this thread have stated that it is a serous flaw of physicalism. But it's not; physicalism is still logically self-consistent without explaining ANY hard problems.

 

[Q_Goest]

Let's look at Ferris_bg's quote:

What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

The first paragraph states the conclusion and gives the phenomenon (experience). Now the second paragraph gives an example of a "conceptual mistake" but it does not explain why the question is a conceptual mistake. It follows by trivializing a gene "All it means to be a gene..."

Then it gives the consciousness example and simply states it's "not a conceptual mistake" and that this is a "nontrivial further question"

And you really think I should be satisfied with this kind of argument?

The post by Ferris is well written and follows a line of reasoning well established in the literature regarding phenomenal experience. It is on topic, and it addresses the discussion point regarding the knowledge argument. Ferris is one of the knowledgeable folks here regarding philosophy of mind. Yes, I think you should be satisfied with the response.

That isn't to say you need to agree with it. But you should be able to recognize and understand exactly what he's saying, just as you'd recognize and understand someone in the physics forum talking about the three body problem. If you don't recognize the argument and understand what he's saying, you should first ask and find out. Ask for references and try to point out what it is you don't understand. Another tactic is to put what he's saying in your own words, and say, "is this what you mean?".

If you DO understand what he's saying, you might still feel he's not understanding something in the literature. You might correct where you feel he's mistaken something in the literature. Or you may disagree with the line of reasoning and suggest a counter example that is also covered in the literature such as Dennett's work suggesting there is nothing above and beyond the psychological states that requires explanation. There's nothing wrong with disagreeing, but don't rely on your own philosophical ideas to try and persuade someone that the concepts founded in the literature are incorrect. That's as arrogant as walking into a physics forum and suggesting you have your own theory of physics when you don't even understand what the existing theory is.

 

[Pythagorean]

Q_goest, I went through and interpreted the post. Rather then telling me what was wrong with my interpretation, you continue to lecture on 101, appeal to (now Ferris's authority). Why not tell me where my interpretation went wrong instead of continue to make this discussion personal?

All of your posts to me have been "no, he's right, you're wrong, no... you're just ignorant" You're not making any arguments are participating in the discussion.

 

[Diracula]

again, you're comparing easy problem of entropy to the hard problem of consciousness. I gave the hard problem of entropy above, where I changed the word consciousness to entropy.

I thought the consensus among those familiar with philosophy is that there is no hard problem of entropy?

 

[Q_Goest]

These are exactly where science can't answer other problems besides consciousness. Let's just change a word:

"It is widely agreed that entropy arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a entropy at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does."

We can explain entropy in different ways and we may not have a perfect understanding of entropy or other some physical phenomena (although I would say we certainly have a sufficiently good understanding of entropy). But the point is, objectively observable phenomena can be explained and understood to the degree we can understand them by examining the physical basis. It seems clear, at least to some of those philosophers who have written about p-consciousness in the literature, that there is something that CAN'T be explained by explaining the physical basis. Anyone arguing that we CAN understand p-consciousness by understanding the physical basis first needs to understand what the counter argument is getting at and then address the argument with counter arguments in the literature.

 

[Pythagorean]

I thought the consensus among those familiar with philosophy is that there is no hard problem of entropy?

Yes, everybody appeals to authority ("it's accepted") but nobody can explain it.

What is wrong with post #226? That would help a lot, thanks.

 

[Diracula]

"It is widely agreed that entropy arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a entropy at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does."

And I would argue statistical mechanics and thermodynamics offer pretty good physical explanations for why entropy arises.

 

[Pythagorean]

We can explain entropy in different ways and we may not have a perfect understanding of entropy or other some physical phenomena (although I would say we certainly have a sufficiently good understanding of entropy). But the point is, objectively observable phenomena can be explained and understood to the degree we can understand them by examining the physical basis. It seems clear, at least to some of those philosophers who have written about p-consciousness in the literature, that there is something that CAN'T be explained by explaining the physical basis. Anyone arguing that we CAN understand p-consciousness by understanding the physical basis first needs to understand what the counter argument is getting at and then address the argument with counter arguments in the literature.

Nobody is saying that we CAN understand p-conscoiusness though...

And we can't explain the physical basis of entropy! It is observed empirically, not predicted! We can only accept it as an axiom and move forward.

 

[Q_Goest]

Q_goest, I went through and interpreted the post. Rather then telling me what was wrong with my interpretation, you continue to lecture on 101, appeal to (now Ferris's authority). Why not tell me where my interpretation went wrong instead of continue to make this discussion personal?

All of your posts to me have been "no, he's right, you're wrong, no... you're just ignorant" You're not making any arguments are participating in the discussion.

I don't see any interpretation of his post. I just see someone that's upset about being told he should understand the literature.

 

[Diracula]

Yes, everybody appeals to authority ("it's accepted") but nobody can explain it.

Going with the experts is a pretty sound strategy when you don't have the time to read 10-20 papers on philosophy of mind. I would say the burden of proof is on you if you want to convince someone else that the experts are wrong.

What is wrong with post #226? That would help a lot, thanks.

See above.

 

[Pythagorean]

And I would argue statistical mechanics and thermodynamics offer pretty good physical explanations for why entropy arises.

It doesn't though, it's axiomatic. Clausius did it to make conservation of energy hold, that's all.

Just like descritization of energy. Planck did it as a mathematical trick to make theory match observation. There is no reason these physical properties HAVE to be. We accept them as axiomatic and then move forward.

 

[Diracula]

Nobody is saying that we CAN understand p-conscoiusness though...

And we can't explain the physical basis of entropy! It is observed empirically, not predicted! We can only accept it as an axiom and move forward.

What? It follows from basic laws of probability applied to a physical system.

 

[Evo]

Locked.