I Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[Lord Jestocost]

There has been a lot of work done in this field since William James.

To my mind, William James’ argument is somehow in line with Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"This general pattern of inference is applied to the thesis of causal determinism to yield a powerful argument for incompatibilism. The argument requires the assumption that determinism is true, and that the facts of the past and the laws of nature are fixed. Given these assumptions, here is a rough, non-technical sketch of the argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

According to the Consequence Argument, if determinism is true, it appears that no person has any power to alter how her own future will unfold."

 

[Elias1960]

Because they say that the wave function is real, i.e. not merely a representation of our subjective incomplete knowledge.

That is not a requirement for a realist interpretation. An interpretation where the trajectory $q(t) \in Q$ exists all the time is realistic even if the wave function is interpreted as epistemic, as describing incomplete knowledge of that real trajectory.

An example of such a realist psi-epistemic interpretation is Caticha's entropic dynamics.

Caticha, A. (2011). Entropic Dynamics, Time and Quantum Theory, J. Phys. A44:225303,
arxiv:1005.2357

 

[PeterDonis]

According to the Consequence Argument, if determinism is true, it appears that no person has any power to alter how her own future will unfold."

All three of the given statements are false. People are not separate from the rest of the universe. People themselves are facts (or, if you want to be particular, the states of their brains and bodies and the actions they take are facts) and can "have power" over other facts because people are part of the universe and can interact with other parts.

 

[DrChinese]

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

One point that often gets discussed is exactly what "independent" should mean in the above. Should it just mean "statistically independent"? Or is some stronger condition required? It's impossible for it to mean causally independent, since the choice of measurement settings must be in the past light cone of the measurement result.

Is there any requirement here that IF Alice/Bob's settings are NOT independent of whatever is determining the measurement results, THEN the results CHANGE from what they otherwise would be?

The thing I get confused about is this: Alice and Bob can set their settings at anything, by whatever means they like. They can change them quickly, or they can leave them set static for hours. We can get thousands of people to participate in the decisions. No matter what is done, the results always confirm the same basic relationship and that relationship matches expectation values from theory. How is that not good science? How is that requiring us to make some assumption other than "the very large sample is representative of the true universe"?

So I guess I don't see that free will is really a significant factor in that equation. And further: why would this be a burning assumption for Bell tests, when it doesn't seem to be much of an issue when we test force of attraction of an object to the Earth? (Or any other experimental result in physics?) I can't tell from the previous comments whether my viewpoint is common here or not. Thanks...

 

[PeterDonis]

Is there any requirement here that IF Alice/Bob's settings are NOT independent of whatever is determining the measurement results, THEN the results CHANGE from what they otherwise would be?

As far as I can tell from Zeilinger's quotes, what he is trying to rule out is superdeterminism:

"If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature."

I'm not sure this sort of thing is testable; I don't think Zeilinger is saying that we would expect Alice and Bob's measurement results to be different if his "free will" assumption were false than if it were true. I think he's just saying that his "free will" assumption is necessary if we are going to deduce laws of physics from experimental results at all; if his assumption were false, we would have no valid grounds for believing, for example, that QM is true simply because all of our experimental results are consistent with it.

why would this be a burning assumption for Bell tests, when it doesn't seem to be much of an issue when we test force of attraction of an object to the Earth?

I don't think Zeilinger intends for his claims to only apply to QM, or to Bell tests; it just happens to be a historical fact in our universe that the kinds of questions he is addressing were prompted by QM and Bell tests.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Alice and Bob can set their settings at anything, by whatever means they like. They can change them quickly, or they can leave them set static for hours... So I guess I don't see that free will is really a significant factor in that equation...

See: https://www.physicsforums.com/threa...eing-required-for-science.989803/post-6351422

And from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism:

"In the 1980s, John Bell discussed superdeterminism in a BBC interview:[3][4]

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

[3] BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985
[4] The quotation is an adaptation from the edited transcript of the radio interview with John Bell of 1985. See The Ghost in the Atom: A Discussion of the Mysteries of Quantum Physics, by Paul C. W. Davies and Julian R. Brown, 1986/1993, pp. 45-46"

 

[A. Neumaier]

But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will.

Identifying these two items is a hidden assumption. Assuming it is very questionable.

 

[EPR]

Identifying these two items is a hidden assumption. Assuming it is very questionable.

What does this mean? We need something like 'free will'(whatever that is) to do science. Otheriwse, superdeterminism ends all our endeavors to understand reality. If we are just process-driven, nothing we ever say can be taken to be truth as it can just be the way determinism plays out(for reason encoded in the low entropy at the BB). Luckily, determinism fails at the lowest scale and even at the macro scales at times. You don't know what is fundamental - there is no general coherent picture of how the world works at all scales.
Sorry if i misunderstood your comments - this is why i ask for clarification.

 

[A. Neumaier]

We need something like 'free will'(whatever that is) to do science.

No. We have been successfully doing science for five centuries but the problem of free will is unsettled since at least twice that time. So there cannot be a significant relation between science and free will.

Sorry if i misunderstood your comments - this is why i ask for clarification.

I was saying that equating absolute determinism with the complete absence of free will is very questionable.

 

[DrChinese]

"In the 1980s, John Bell discussed superdeterminism in a BBC interview:[3][4]

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

[3] BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985
[4] The quotation is an adaptation from the edited transcript of the radio interview with John Bell of 1985. See The Ghost in the Atom: A Discussion of the Mysteries of Quantum Physics, by Paul C. W. Davies and Julian R. Brown, 1986/1993, pp. 45-46"

Yes, I previously saw your quote of that, and it is a good one.

Superdeterminism purports to say that the "answers" to Bell statistical tests are embedded somewhere in a fashion that entangled particles can both draw upon*. Further, there is to be no counterfactual definiteness as the future settings are similarly embedded in the macroscopic (non-quantum) world so that the "answers" are always matched to the right "questions". So the assumption of superdeterminism requires a lot more than something that affects the experimenters' free will, it also affects/controls the system being tested as well, and it must match the theoretical statistical values that physicists predicted (developed without any knowledge of all this mechanism). And presumably, superdeterminism affects other areas of physics/science as well, but we just haven't guessed that yet.

I realize that Bell was in no way arguing for superdeterminism as a viable interpretation. But if you assume instead that the test data is a representative sample of the full universe, then superdeterminism just becomes another interpretation to consider**.

So I am not really trying to argue against superdeterminism (although my thoughts on it are fairly obvious). I just don't see that assuming free will itself is needed to get us past the idea that our science is valid. Just the assumption, common to all experimental work in all scientific fields, that our sample is representative of the whole.*Even if they had never existed in a common light cone. As presumably, even such particles would have been created by macroscopic entities that could pass on this embedded programming.

**Then someone could start with that, and attempt to describe exactly how it would actually work. Which I don't think is actually possible, since it requires a lot to link quantum particles with macroscopic experimental setups and all possible decision making devices.

 

[DrChinese]

No. We have been successfully doing science for five centuries but the problem of free will is unsettled since at least twice that time. So cannot be a significant relation between science and free will.

I was saying that equating absolute determinism with the complete absence of free will is very questionable.

Agreeing with you about making scientific progress without solving the issue of free will.

If there is some kind of (super)determinism that is somehow fooling us, then we are still doing science. Certainly, scientists look at most every type of variation on what is studied precisely so as to make sure we are not fools. It wouldn't be our fault if there was an elaborate conspiracy to hide nature's true self from us behind a veil. In fact, some believe there is such a veil* - although perhaps not so elaborate.

And regardless, our science is useful... it's not like we can't use it to make or predict things.*Maya, illusion.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Hans Primas in „Hidden Determinism, Probability, and Time’s Arrow“:

„At present the problem of how free will relates to physics seems to be intractable since no known physical theory deals with consciousness or free will. Fortunately, the topic at issue here is a much simpler one. It is neither our experience of personal freedom, nor the question whether the idea of freedom could be an illusion, nor whether we are responsible for our actions. The topic here is that the framework of experimental science requires a freedom of action in the material world as a constitutive presupposition. In this way “freedom” refers to actions in a material domain which are not governed by deterministic first principles of physics.

To get a clearer idea of what is essential in this argument we recall that the most consequential accomplishment by Isaac Newton was his insight that the laws of nature have to be separated from initial conditions. The initial conditions are not accounted for by first principles of physics, they are assumed to be “given”. In experimental physics it is always taken for granted that the experimenter has the freedom to choose these initial condition, and to repeat his experiment at any particular instant. To deny this freedom of action is to deny the possibility of experimental science.

In other words, we assume that the physical system under investigation is governed by strictly deterministic or probabilistic laws. On the other hand, we also have to assume that the experimentalist stands out of these natural laws. The traditional assumption of theoretical physics that the basic deterministic laws are universally and globally valid for all matter thus entails a pragmatic contradiction between theory and practice. A globally deterministic physics is impossible.“
[Italics in original, LJ]

 

[A. Neumaier]

In experimental physics it is always taken for granted that the experimenter has the freedom to choose these initial condition,

This is far from generally true.

Experimenters must respect the laws of Nature, and can choose only initial conditions over which they have actual control. Indeed, much of the progress of experimental science is about finding better ways to gain control over desired initial conditions!

Moreover, even automatic experimenters such as Mars rovers can choose experimental conditions that produce scientific information, although as far as the preparation of experiments is concerned, these are completely deterministic automata.

Thus there is no relationship between determinism and the limited freedom of choice needed for science

 

[Lord Jestocost]

The point is: Those who think that both the inanimate and animate nature are exclusively ruled by deterministic physical laws ("not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork"), have to submit themselves to their own ideological belief that a globally deterministic physics rules everything. They themselves cannot escape from their own doctrine because of wishful thinking. Even if they believe that they have the freedom of choice, that would be a mere illusion from the viewpoint of – so to speak – Laplace’s demon: It would be irrelevant what they think or do, because they have to think and it have to do it.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science.

I find this quote not as free of ambiguity as it is intended to be. There are several plausible interpretations, particularly: what does it means for both Alice and Bob to exercise free will in choosing the position of their respective spin determining apparatus. The following is my attempt at describing several examples of what the quote might intend.

Each of a series of experiments has a series of trials. Each trial involves determining each of the spins of the pair of entangled photons. I am assuming that when a pair of entangled photons are created, and they move in opposite directions, their paths may not take them from the creation apparatus to the spin determining apparatus. That means that randomly only some of the created pairs of photons get measured for spin by the apparatus. As the spin of a photon is determined, the time of the occurrence of the measurement is recorded along with whether the spin is "up" or "down". The distance between the entangled photon pair creating apparatus and each spin determining apparatus is the same. Also the two clocks which record the time of spin determination are synced. That means that for every recorded spin and time at Alice's apparatus will have a corresponding recorded spin and time as Bob's apparatus, and the two recorded times will be identical, and vice versa.

The distances between the apparatus which creates the photon pairs and the two measuring setups are identical. Assuming the size of the measuring setup is fixed, say for example a circle of diameter 20 m, the farther apart this distance is, the fewer photons will be measured. If Alice and Bob's setups are 100 m apart, then only 1% of the created pairs of photons will be measured.

The spin determining apparatus has two possible settings.
(1) Vertical. Normally this means the direction is relative to the direction of Earth's gravity. This implies that the two apparatus setups will not have the vertical settings exactly parallel. However, assuming the 100 m separation, this should not matter significantly.
(2) Horizontal. This is perpendicular to the direction of the separation, and perpendicular to the local vertical direction. The two horizontal settings will be parallel.

For each experiment, the principal scientist, Jessie, who is in charge of the research will calculate p the fraction of times Alice's apparatus and Bob's apparatus agree on "up"/"down". It is of course expected that the p value will either be close to zero or close to some value I am not sure about, but I think it is either 50%, or 70.7%, or 29.3%.

For each of the a first series of experiments Alice and Bob will set the orientation of the spin direction detector according to the Jesse's instructions. The following are the options. Some of these are (a) consistent with "Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch", and some are (b) not consistent. I think different readers here might disagree which the of the options are consistent and which not.

(1) Both are instructed to choose vertical.​

(2) Both are instructed to choose horizontal.​

(3) Alice is instructed to choose vertical and Bob is instructed to choose horizontal.​

(4) Alice is instructed to choose horizontal and Bob is instructed to choose vertical .​

(5) Both Alice and Bob are instructed to flip a coin, and if heads, choose vertical, and if tails choose horizontal.​

The following options give instructions Jesse will use for a second series of experiments. For each of these options Alice and Bob will use identical copies of a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). Each use of a PRNG involves entering (a) a key multi-digit number which controls the sequence of pseudo random numbers generated, and (b) an integer that determines the number of pseudo random numbers to be generated and printed out. The specific random numbers generated with be a "1" or a "2".

(6) Jessie gives Alice and Bob different key numbers to use. If a "1" is the next Pseudo random number to use, use horizontal on the apparatus. If a "2" is the next Pseudo random number to use, use vertical on the apparatus.​

(7) Same as (6) except Alice and Bob independently choose whether "1" is for horizontal and "2" is for vertical, or vice versa.​

(8) Same as (7) except both Alice and Bob choose the key number they will use with no consulting with each other. Some examples might be (a) a date of birth for someone she/he knows personally , (b) a telephone number of someone she/he knows personally, or (c) other choices the reader might think of.​

​

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote? I suspect that different responders will give different answers.​

​

Regards,​

Buzz​

​

​

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Hi
@A. Neumaier,
@Demystifier,
@DrChinese,
@Elias1960,
@EPR,
@jfizzix,
@Lord Jestocost,
@martinbn,
@mattt,
@nrqed,
@PeterDonis,
@Pony,
@user30, and
@vanhees71:

I have enjoyed reading your posts in this thread, in particular your various disagreements. I am a bit disappointed though, that none of you have responded to the question in my post #116 in the three days since it was posted.

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote?​

I would like to prepare a poll of all your answers with respect to the 8 options I presented regarding Alice and Bob exercising free will, or not. What I have in mind is each responder replies with 8 numbers (1 through 8)
and with each number a letter: Y for "yes", N for "no", and P for "pass" meaning no choice.

I think such a poll would be interesting to all of you. If any of you hae a reason why you do not want to participate in the poll, I would appreciate receiving your reason, either in a post or a conversation.

If you prefer to sending me your answer using a "conversation" rather than a post,
that would be better since it would avoid having one answer influencing another.

I am hoping to get your responses soon.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote?

All of them. In all of your examples, whatever it is that causes the Alice and Bob measurement settings to be what they are is, by assumption, independent of whatever it is that generates the entangled photon pairs. That is what "free will" means in this setup, and that's all it means. Zeilinger is simply saying that, if we can't make that assumption in a setup like this, we can't infer anything from the results we get.

 

[nrqed]

Hi
@A. Neumaier,
@Demystifier,
@DrChinese,
@Elias1960,
@EPR,
@jfizzix,
@Lord Jestocost,
@martinbn,
@mattt,
@nrqed,
@PeterDonis,
@Pony,
@user30, and
@vanhees71:

I have enjoyed reading your posts in this thread, in particular your various disagreements. I am a bit disappointed though, that none of you have responded to the question in my post #116 in the three days since it was posted.

Which of these 8 options (if any) involve free will choices by Alice and Bob in the sense intended by the quote?​

I would like to prepare a poll of all your answers with respect to the 8 options I presented regarding Alice and Bob exercising free will, or not. What I have in mind is each responder replies with 8 numbers (1 through 8)
and with each number a letter: Y for "yes", N for "no", and P for "pass" meaning no choice.

I think such a poll would be interesting to all of you. If any of you hae a reason why you do not want to participate in the poll, I would appreciate receiving your reason, either in a post or a conversation.

If you prefer to sending me your answer using a "conversation" rather than a post,
that would be better since it would avoid having one answer influencing another.

I am hoping to get your responses soon.

Regards,
Buzz

Thanks for your post.

I have given up posting on this subject when I was accused of "believing in magic" and being completely anti-scientific when I stated that in a deterministic world, there can't be no free will. Apparently, my "accusers" decided to define free will as something possible when everything is deterministic. Which does not make sense to me. They would agree that a tree does not "decide" to fall. But somehow they consider than if a system is complex enough, free will magically appears at some point. They say that humans have free will but a tree does not. I don't know at what point free will magically appears. Does a mouse have free will? What about a cockroach? I don't know, and I won't ask them because they will just say that I believe in "magic", somehow.

 

[PeterDonis]

my "accusers" decided to define free will as something possible when everything is deterministic. Which does not make sense to me.

Which does not entitle you to simply dismiss the idea out of hand, as you have been doing. What does not make sense to you does make sense to a lot of other people, who have written many papers, articles, and books on the subject. If you have not read them, you should do so before making dogmatic pronouncements simply because something doesn't make sense to you.

somehow they consider than if a system is complex enough, free will magically appears at some point. They say that humans have free will but a tree does not. I don't know at what point free will magically appears. Does a mouse have free will? What about a cockroach? I don't know, and I won't ask them because they will just say that I believe in "magic", somehow.

This is a perfect example of the dismissive attitude that has gotten you into trouble. First, you misrepresent what advocates of the position that doesn't make sense to you are actually saying. Then, when you ask questions based on your misrepresentation instead of on what they are actually saying, you wonder why you get responses that don't seem helpful.

If this is the best you can do at participating in the discussion, you would have done better to stick to your resolve to give up posting on the subject. Particularly as your complaints are completely irrelevant to the question @Buzz Bloom was asking. You could have answered his question just fine without dragging in any of your complaints. Since you chose to complain instead, which adds nothing of value to the discussion, you are now banned from further posting in this thread.

 

[A. Neumaier]

They would agree that a tree does not "decide" to fall.

Because a tree has no internal mechanism for making a choice, while a computer program containing an if-then-else command or a random number generator has one. This is the relevant difference in complexity.

Both if-then-else and the random number generator are deterministic in the strict sense, though the latter behaves in practice probabilistically.

Thus choices and decisions (in the common sense of these words) have nothing to do with determinism.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In all of your examples, whatever it is that causes the Alice and Bob measurement settings to be what they are is, by assumption, independent of whatever it is that generates the entangled photon pairs. That is what "free will" means in this setup, and that's all it means. Zeilinger is simply saying that, if we can't make that assumption in a setup like this, we can't infer anything from the results we get.

Hi Peter:

Do you know whether or not there is exist in reality a physically possible way for "whatever it is that generates the entangled photon pairs" to influence Alice and Bob when they choose how to setup their respective spin measurement apparatus?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

Do you know whether or not there is exist in reality a physically possible way for "whatever it is that generates the entangled photon pairs" to influence Alice and Bob when they choose how to setup their respective spin measurement apparatus?

I didn't say "influence". I said "independent". The question is not whether whatever it is that generates the photon pairs "influences" the measurement settings. The question is whether whatever it is that generates the photon pairs is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement settings.

One could of course change the hypothetical scenario to have the two not be independent. For example, one could set things up so there are two pairs of entangled photons instead of one, with states correlated in some way, and one pair determines the measurement settings while the other pair gets measured after the settings are determined. There is no "influence" from one to the other in this case; they are simply correlated because of a prior process.

However, we are talking about the scenario as you described it. In the scenario as you described it, we all assume that we can set up the experiment so that whatever it is that generates the photon pairs that will be measured is guaranteed to be independent of the measurement settings. Zeilinger is simply saying that the reason we all assume that is that the assumption is necessary to make sense of what we are doing when we do experiments to try to figure out what the laws of physics are.

Of course, to assume that something is true is not the same as it actually being true. It could be that, even in experiments where we have taken every precaution to keep the generation of photon pairs independent from the determination of the measurement settings, the two are not really independent. This possibility is called "superdeterminism", and does not appear to be a popular position, but I don't see that it can be ruled out on logical grounds.

 

[bhobba]

But to a certain extent I understand you, because those people write in a quite vague manner, because they don't want to be too explicit about non-realism (because it's philosophically unappealing) and at the same time they need some kind of non-realism to avoid Bell nonlocality.

I agree. You can see it in the language used by each side. It was liberally prent in what I thought a confused discussion on QM I posted just because some people may be interested in seeing the 'convolutions' intelligent people can get into about it. We need further breakthroughs like Bell made by using exact terms like counterfactual definiteness. I think it will eventually be sorted, but it's going to be a long, hard slog.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

I have given up posting on this subject when I was accused of "believing in magic" and being completely anti-scientific when I stated that in a deterministic world, there can't be no free will.

I am surprised. Of course there is no free will if the world is totally deterministic - that's not magic. However if it is deterministic because of the phenomena of chaos FAPP free will is still quite possible.

Thanks
Bill

 

[PeterDonis]

Of course there is no free will if the world is totally deterministic - that's not magic. However if it is deterministic because of the phenomena of chaos FAPP free will is still quite possible.

What does "totally deterministic" mean?

 

[bhobba]

What does "totally deterministic" mean?

It means that if the laws of nature are such that if you know the initial conditions of the whole universe, then you can, in principle, predict all instants of time into the future. We know of course that the initial conditions would likely involve real numbers that you can never express to infinite precision; the small errors in computing the future will accumulate, so it's of no practical value.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Minnesota Joe]

Summary:: Questioning a remark by Anton Zeilinger that free will is required by science

I'm not following the above quote about free will "This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science"

If I perform experiments and find that conditions X are followed by conditions Y and Y=F(X) (or the probabilistic analog for QM), haven't I done science, independent of how much my free will impacted X?

Hey all. I'll put this out there for discussion and my own enlightenment. This thread has me wanting to understand what people really mean by super-determinism undermining science/free-will and there is this quote from Tim Maudlin on Sabine Hossenfelder's blog that I found interesting:

What the superdeterminist needs to deny is this. It is like a shill for the tobacco industry first saying that smoking does not cause cancer, rather there is a common cause that both predisposes one to want to smoke and also predisposes one to get cancer (this is already pretty desperate), but then when confronted with randomized experiments on mice, where the mice did not choose whether or not to smoke, going on to say that the coin flips (or whatever) somehow always put the mice already disposed to get lung cancer into the experimental group and those not disposed into the control. This is completely and totally unscientific, and it is an embarrassment that any scientists would take such a claim seriously. Bell didn't. Read his paper "free variables and local causality" in Speakable and Unspeakable.

None of this has a thing to do with "free will", which is a complete red herring and has done nothing but muddy the waters.

Here https://backreaction.blogspot.com/2...howComment=1547123640904#c1013268308689700203. See also: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2020.00139/full here where she tries to defend it.

So I guess Zeilinger is taking loss of free will to mean something like the loss of the ability to properly randomize experiments if super-determinism is true. And that, rather than determinism, does seem potentially devastating to science. Also, the reasoning that Maudlin parodied in the quote seems problematic on its own.

In a small sample size experiment you really might need to ask whether or not all the mice disposed to get lung cancer were put into the experimental group and those not disposed put into the control group, just by bad luck. So it doesn't seem like the question is inherently unscientific. But in that context you are asking the question because you want to rule out a bad experiment. You are not offering it as an explanation of all results in all such experiments. Thoughts?

 

[bhobba]

Do you know whether or not there is exist in reality

I don't even know what is meant by reality. I think science is a description of reality - but what reality actually is .

Thanks
Bill

 

[Buzz Bloom]

However if it is deterministic because of the phenomena of chaos FAPP free will is still quite possible.

Hi Bill:

I am hoping you can clarify a couple of points for me.
1. What is FAPP?
2. What would the mechanism be for "chaos FAPP" to be-the-reason-for/create/cause/allow-for/imply determinism?
I apologize for the five verbs, but I have no confidence that anyone of them would properly convey the desired concept related to "because".

Regards,
Buzz

 

[bhobba]

I am hoping you can clarify a couple of points for me.

FAPP - For all practical purposes.

All I am saying is it's quite likely if the laws of nature are fully deterministic those laws likely will involve real numbers in some way. You can't represent a real number exactly, so small errors will accumulate to the point in practice you can't actually predict the future. Because of that it is possible that practically you can still have free will. For how I think you would need to consult neurologists, but my little understanding of the area is that our current knowledge in that area is in its infancy.

Thanks
Bill

 

[PeterDonis]

It means that if the laws of nature are such that if you know the initial conditions of the whole universe, then you can, in principle, predict all instants of time into the future.

This is true for systems that are chaotic; if you have exact knowledge of initial conditions, you can make predictions for all time. So I don't understand the distinction you appear to be drawing between "totally deterministic" systems and "chaos".

 

[Buzz Bloom]

small errors will accumulate to the point in practice you can't actually predict the future.

if you have exact knowledge of initial conditions, you can make predictions for all time.

Hi Bill and Peter:

I gather that both of you are saying that determinism mean that predictions can be reliably made. I do not understand the logical reasoning for this view. Wiipedia says:

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events are determined completely by previously existing causes.​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism​

This definition seems to me to clearly say that prediction is not relevant.

A prediction ..., or forecast, is a statement about a future event. They are often, but not always, based upon experience or knowledge.​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction​

This definiton seems to me to imply that there must be a conscious being to make a prediction. For a very long period of time in the history of our universe there were no conscious beings to do this, However, determinism (if it is a correct philosophy) could still be making future events happen in a way completely determined by the "laws" of nature based on previous events, even with no conscious being to know these laws, or to use these laws to make predictions.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[mattt]

FAPP - For all practical purposes.

All I am saying is it's quite likely if the laws of nature are fully deterministic those laws likely will involve real numbers in some way. You can't represent a real number exactly, so small errors will accumulate to the point in practice you can't actually predict the future. Because of that it is possible that practically you can still have free will. For how I think you would need to consult neurologists, but my little understanding of the area is that our current knowledge in that area is in its infancy.

Thanks
Bill

Predictability it's not very relevant here.

If I drop a leaf from the Empire State Building in a windy day, no one will be able to predict exactly where it is going to land. But normal people would never think that the leaf has a free will to decide where to land.

I think a better question is the following: do you believe that the physical laws that we have discover, apply to everything except for "living things", or apply to everything including "living things"?

 

[A. Neumaier]

the loss of the ability to properly randomize experiments

This is experimentally very well disproved.

 

[bhobba]

This is true for systems that are chaotic; if you have exact knowledge of initial conditions, you can make predictions for all time. So I don't understand the distinction you appear to be drawing between "totally deterministic" systems and "chaos".

Ok, I think I see your point. I will rephrase it - a system can be deterministic, but in practice it's not possible to measure exactly the initial conditions well enough to reliably know the future because even very close initial conditions soon diverge by a lot ie chaotic behavior. This means even though it is deterministic, in practice it is of not much use. It's the old butterfly flaps its wings thing. As summarized by Edward Lorenz:

'Chaos: When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.'

In practice mostly we can only know the approximate present.

Thanks
Bill

 

[mattt]

In other words: do you believe that the fundamental physical laws, as we know them today, are enough to account for everything that happens inside our brains (our thoughts, our sensations, desires, our dreams, our imagination...) just as they are enough to account for chemistry (for example, as approximations and particular conditions) , or do you believe that we will have to change our fundamental physical laws to be able to account for those phenomena?

 

[bhobba]

I think a better question is the following: do you believe that the physical laws that we have discover, apply to everything except for "living things", or apply to everything including "living things"?

I think it's even better to let neurologists sort it out. I was simply showing a system can be deterministic but we still can not predict the future in practice.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

In other words: do you believe that the fundamental physical laws, as we know them today, are enough to account for everything that happens inside our brains (our thoughts, our sensations, desires, our dreams, our imagination...) just as they are enough to account for chemistry (for example, as approximations and particular conditions) , or do you believe that we will have to change our fundamental physical laws to be able to account for those phenomena?

I do not know. Further neurological research is required.

Thanks
Bill

 

[mattt]

I think it's even better to let neurologists sort it out. I was simply showing a system can be deterministic but we still can not predict the future in practice.

Thanks
Bill

Of course, but what does it have to do with "free will", (in the sense most people think of it) ?

 

[mattt]

Just to clarify: "Free Will" (in the sense most people think of it, not in Dennett's sense) is compatible neither with deterministic nor with stochastic (nor any combination of both) evolution of a dynamical system, and as far as I know, no one has ever tried successfully to create a model of such a thing or how it works.

 

[A. Neumaier]

Just to clarify: "Free Will" (in the sense most people think of it, not in Dennett's sense) is compatible neither with deterministic nor with stochastic (nor any combination of both) evolution of a dynamical system, and as far as I know, no one has ever tried successfully to create a model of such a thing or how it works.

Only because "Free Will" (in the sense most people think of it) is a very poorly defined notion that cannot be made precise enough for scientific investigation - unless one is willing to approximate it in a way more or less like Dennett's.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

I think a better question is the following: do you believe that the physical laws that we have discover, apply to everything except for "living things", or apply to everything including "living things"?

Hi mattt:

I suggest that your distinction between living things and every thing else as it applies to freewill vs. determinism can be improved upon. It helps to have a good understandable definition of "free will".
My 19th edition of the Merriam Webster dictionary (1962) gives two definitions. Number 1 is complex and includes religious aspects. Number 2 is the following.

the ability to choose between alternative possibilities in such a way that the choice and action are to some extent creatively determined by the conscious subject at the time.​

With this definition in mind, in order to have free will the "living things" must have consciousness. The implication is that determinism does not, at least not all the time, influence consciousness. I am aware of two books discussing this, for both of which I am unable to remember sources.
1. QM phenomena are not deterministic with respect to prediction of a specific single value state, like for example, the "up" or "down" state of a photon. I remember a book (but not title or author) presenting the idea that free will can take place because of QM's non-deterministic limitations.
2. Free will can take place because the laws of nature are limited to relatively simple interactions of relatively low level organized compositions. Examples: physical items like atoms and energy, and the chemistry of molecules including proteins and DNA, and maybe also possibly single cells. These examples illustrate a hierarchy of complexity, and higher levels have properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents. Creatures with consciousness are at a much higher level in the hierarchy, say maybe level 8 or level 10, or maybe even higher. The lower levels laws do not in any way apply to these higher level organizations with very complex emergent properties, like for example consciousness.

To summarize, (2) says determinism is valid up to some level of complexity, but not higher. Therefore there is the possibility of free will existing with respect to the higher levels. However, it is also a possibility that there may be some constraints on this free will because the nature of consciousness may involve some limitations. One possible example might be that as a being with the potential for consciousness matures, habits are formed that influence choices subconsciously. In some situations, choices are made entirely by the subconscious, and according to the definition, this would not be a free will choice, but it would also not be a deterministic result either.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[A. Neumaier]

higher levels have properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents.

In a scientific context, this is not the meaning of "emergent". For example, phase transitions are emergent properties of bulk matter, but they emerge (arise) from statistical mechanics and have a full microscopic explanation.

That something is emergent just means that at the higher level of organization, a new concept is needed to describe the collective behavior in a useful way.

For example, the notion of computation in a computer is emergent (and necessary for understanding the latter) but can be fully explained by the computer's lower level constituents.

Similarly, programming languages allow computers to make choices - another emergent property fully understood in terms of lower level constituents.

Whether these choices are called 'free' or are attributed to 'free will' is a matter of how the latter terms are defined operationally. It is very questionable whether there is a fully operational definition of these terms that applies to human beings but not to sophisticated computer programs viewed (like the human brain) in a black box fashion.

 

[mattt]

Hi mattt:

I suggest that your distinction between living things and every thing else as it applies to freewill vs. determinism can be improved upon. It helps to have a good understandable definition of "free will".
My 19th edition of the Merriam Webster dictionary (1962) gives two definitions. Number 1 is complex and includes religious aspects. Number 2 is the following.

the ability to choose between alternative possibilities in such a way that the choice and action are to some extent creatively determined by the conscious subject at the time.​

​

​

For me, that definition is problematic to say the least. To many people, based on their understanding of that definition, a frog (for example) would have it.​

​

I really don't see its usefulness.​

With this definition in mind, in order to have free will the "living things" must have consciousness. The implication is that determinism does not, at least not all the time, influence consciousness. I am aware of two books discussing this, for both of which I am unable to remember sources.
1. QM phenomena are not deterministic with respect to prediction of a specific single value state, like for example, the "up" or "down" state of a photon. I remember a book (but not title or author) presenting the idea that free will can take place because of QM's non-deterministic limitations.

Having to religiously obey deterministic or stochastic laws don't seem to me to be very compatible with the ability to take decisions "creatively determined" by the "conscious agent" ( though that depends of course on what everyone understands of that last sentence).

2. Free will can take place because the laws of nature are limited to relatively simple interactions of relatively low level organized compositions. Examples: physical items like atoms and energy, and the chemistry of molecules including proteins and DNA, and maybe also possibly single cells. These examples illustrate a hierarchy of complexity, and higher levels have properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents. Creatures with consciousness are at a much higher level in the hierarchy, say maybe level 8 or level 10, or maybe even higher. The lower levels laws do not in any way apply to these higher level organizations with very complex emergent properties, like for example consciousness.

To summarize, (2) says determinism is valid up to some level of complexity, but not higher. Therefore there is the possibility of free will existing with respect to the higher levels. However, it is also a possibility that there may be some constraints on this free will because the nature of consciousness may involve some limitations. One possible example might be that as a being with the potential for consciousness matures, habits are formed that influence choices subconsciously. In some situations, choices are made entirely by the subconscious, and according to the definition, this would not be a free will choice, but it would also not be a deterministic result either.

Regards,
Buzz

So at one point in biological evolution, the atoms just stop obeying the laws of physics, simply because they are now forming a living body with a complex nervous system?

I would need a lot of evidence to entertain that possibility.

 

[Minnesota Joe]

This is experimentally very well disproved.

I certainly agree if I understand you correctly. The success of science seems to be very strong evidence against it.

I have not read enough superdeterminists to understand how they respond to this. There are arguments in the second link I gave to the effect that it is only for quantum systems and maybe only certain types of experiments that the statistical independence assumption breaks down. That sounds like an attempt to evade the kind of evidence (I think) you are referring to.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

So at one point in biological evolution, the atoms just stop obeying the laws of physics, simply because they are now forming a living body with a complex nervous system?

For me, that definition is problematic to say the least. To many people, based on their understanding of that definition, a frog (for example) would have it.

Hi mattt:

I think you misunderstood my post regarding "emergence".

In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own. These properties or behaviors emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. For example, smooth forward motion emerges when a bicycle and its rider interoperate, but neither part can produce the behavior on their own.​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence​

What I interpret this to mean is that the laws of physics and the behavior of atoms continue their role with respect to the atoms in the nervous system, but the behavior of the atoms are irrelevant to the emergent behavior of the nervous system.
BTW: I found a book on the topic.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0738201421/?tag=pfamazon01-20​

This is not the book I remember I think from the 1990s, but it seems to be on the same topic, and it is about the same period.

Regarding the definition of "free will" and frogs, I do not understand the point you are making. Can you clarify it?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In a scientific context, this is not the meaning of "emergent". For example, phase transitions are emergent properties of bulk matter, but they emerge (arise) from statistical mechanics and have a full microscopic explanation.
...
For example, the notion of computation in a computer is emergent (and necessary for understanding the latter) but can be fully explained by the computer's lower level constituents.

Hi Neumaier:

If you were to tell me that in a physics context, "emergent" has a different meaning than the Wikipedia definition, it would not surprise me at all. Perhaps you might post a physics definition with a suitable reference (rather than examples) to help clarify the issue.

Regarding your computer example, how much does the Electrical Engineering of the computer contribute to the detals of computer's ability to compute and be programmed.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[mattt]

Hi mattt:

Hi Buzz

I think you misunderstood my post regarding "emergence".

In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own. These properties or behaviors emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. For example, smooth forward motion emerges when a bicycle and its rider interoperate, but neither part can produce the behavior on their own.​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence​

What I interpret this to mean is that the laws of physics and the behavior of atoms continue their role with respect to the atoms in the nervous system, but the behavior of the atoms are irrelevant to the emergent behavior of the nervous system.

My conception of emergence is just as Arnold Neumaier described in his post.

At some circumstances, a new language (new definitions of new concepts and relations) is more useful, more practical, (at least for us humans), even if these new concepts are completely explained by the low level theory.

Examples are Thermodynamic <-- Statistical Mechanics, or even Chemistry <-- Physics.

Regarding the definition of "free will" and frogs, I do not understand the point you are making. Can you clarify it?

Regards,
Buzz

I meant that the behavior of a frog is complex enough, so that it is maybe more useful to be described in terms of internal goals. Frogs can exhibit very complex behaviours, in that they are able to overcome all kinds of obstacles to achieve their goals.

Even if the fundamental laws of physics were all that is needed to explain those complex behaviors of frogs, it is anyway more useful or more practical, for us humans, to explain them in terms of internal states of the frog, goals and strategies of the frog to achieve its goals.

This kind of language used to better describe the frog's behavior, is quite similar to the definition of free will that you cited earlier, so some people would ascribe free will to the frog, based on that definition.

 

[PeterDonis]

emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own

This is different from the definition you used previously:

properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents

An entity can have properties that its parts do not have, and still have those properties be fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents. For example, a gas has the properties of temperature and pressure, which indivdual molecules do not have, but the temperature and pressure of the gas are fully explainable in terms of the properties of the individual molecules.

So you need to make up your mind which definition of "emergent" you want to use.

What I interpret this to mean is that the laws of physics and the behavior of atoms continue their role with respect to the atoms in the nervous system, but the behavior of the atoms are irrelevant to the emergent behavior of the nervous system.

I don't see how you would get this from the quote you gave. For example, as the quote you gave says, smooth forward motion is a property that a bicycle and its rider can produce together, but which neither one can produce on its own, so it is emergent; but the individual properties and behaviors of the bicycle and the rider are certainly not irrelevant to the emergence of smooth forward motion from both together. Similarly, in my gas example, the behavior of individual molecules that do not have temperature or pressure is certainly not irrelevant to the emergence of temperature and pressure as a property of the gas.

Perhaps you might post a physics definition

The physics definition is basically the one quoted at the start of this post. Note that the bicycle and rider example given in what you quoted is a physics example. So, of course, is the gas example I gave.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

This kind of language used to better describe the frog's behavior, is quite similar to the definition of free will that you cited earlier, so some people would ascribe free will to the frog, based on that definition.

Hi mattt:

I find the above very helpful to out mutual discussion. The source of differences about regarding "free will" is its definition in terms of "consciousness", which is well known to be a very confusing concept.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness​

​

The philosophy of mind has given rise to many stances regarding consciousness. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy in 1998 defines consciousness as follows:​

Consciousness—Philosophers have used the term 'consciousness' for four main topics: knowledge in general, intentionality, introspection (and the knowledge it specifically generates) and phenomenal experience... Something within one's mind is 'introspectively conscious' just in case one introspects it (or is poised to do so). Introspection is often thought to deliver one's primary knowledge of one's mental life. An experience or other mental entity is 'phenomenally conscious' just in case there is 'something it is like' for one to have it. The clearest examples are: perceptual experience, such as tastings and seeings; bodily-sensational experiences, such as those of pains, tickles and itches; imaginative experiences, such as those of one's own actions or perceptions; and streams of thought, as in the experience of thinking 'in words' or 'in images'. Introspection and phenomenality seem independent, or dissociable, although this is controversial.[28]

In a more skeptical definition of consciousness, Stuart Sutherland has exemplified some of the difficulties in fully ascertaining all of its cognate meanings in his entry for the 1989 version of the Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology:​

Consciousness—The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousness with self-consciousness—to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it has evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written on it.​

​

Since different people would often disagree regarding whether a frog has consciousness, it is clear that they would also disagree about whether a frog has free will.​

​

Regards,​

Buzz​