I Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[nrqed]

Because saying that free will is real, but is not what you thought it was, is not the same as saying free will is an illusion. Dennett's opinion (with which I tend to agree) is that people who think compatibilism means that free will is an illusion, have not really thought through the implications of the intuitions that underlie that thought. If they did, they would realize that those intuitions do not form a consistent set: it is impossible for anything real to actually have all the properties those intuitions say free will should have. The compatibilist view preserves everything that is worth wanting about free will, while still making free will something that can actually exist. (Dennett has similar views about consciousness.)

I am trying to make sense of this. Especially "preserves everything that is worth wanting about free will, while still making free will something that can actually exist."

Sounds like they redefine free will to be something else than what is usually understood. My point what the usual definition of free will is inconsistent with physical laws. But I will certainly look at what Dennett says.

 

[A. Neumaier]

I am trying to make sense of this. Especially "preserves everything that is worth wanting about free will, while still making free will something that can actually exist."

Sounds like they redefine free will to be something else than what is usually understood. My point what the usual definition of free will is inconsistent with physical laws. But I will certainly look at what Dennett says.

There is no 'usual definition'; it depends on whom you ask.

Philosophical notions like 'free will' are always defined by their usage, not by an authoritative definition. This means that the meaning is necessarily somewhat fuzzy.

Attempts to define them in a way that can be used to make logical deductions necessarily idealize the issue, which can be done in many ways.

These attempts are prone to throwing out the baby with the bath water unless one takes care to preserve 'everything that is worth wanting about free will, while still making free will something that can actually exist.'

 

[nrqed]

There is no 'usual definition'; it depends on whom you ask.

Philosophical notions like 'free will' are always defined by their usage, not by an authoritative definition. This means that the meaning is necessarily somewhat fuzzy.

Attempts to define them in a way that can be usded to make logical deductions necessarily idealize the issue, which can be done in many ways.

They are prone to throwing out the baby with the bath water unless one takes care to preserve 'everything that is worth wanting about free will, while still making free will something that can actually exist.'

Thanks. I would be very curious to have an example of something that is "worth wanting about free will" while not being in contradiction with physical laws.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

It is one thing to claim that a given theory does not describe reality, and another to claim that there is no reality (irrespective of our theories). Taking non-realism seriously means the latter, not the former.

In “Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics: Twenty-First-Century Perspectives” (edited by Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse), Arkady Plotnitsky defines realism and the non-realist’s attitude in the following way (chapter 8):

I define "realism" as a specific set of claims concerning what exists and, especially, how it exists. In this definition, any form of realism is more than only a claim concerning the existence, or reality, of something, but rather a claim concerning the character of this existence. Realist theories are sometimes also called ontological theories. The term "ontological" carries additional connotations. They are, however, not important for the present discussion, and these terms will be used interchangeably here. What defines realism most generally is the assumption that a structure of reality, rather than only reality itself, exists independently of our interactions with it, or at least that the concept of structure would apply to reality. In Other words, realism is defined by the assumption that the ultimate constitution of the domain considered possesses attributes and the relationships among them, which may be either (a) known in one degree or another and, hence, represented, at least ideally, by a theory or model; or (b) unknown or even unknowable.

Non-realist interpretations of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, at least that of Bohr and others in the spirit of Copenhagen, not only do not make any of these realist assumptions, but also, in Bohr's ([1958] 1987b, 62) language, "in principle [exclude]" them. Quantum Objects exist, are real, but the nature of this existence places them beyond representation, at least by quantum theory, or even conception, although Bohr might not have been willing to go that far. The reality of quantum Objects is a reality without realism.

[Italics in original]

 

[Demystifier]

The reality of quantum Objects is a reality without realism.

This reminds me of Mermin's correlations without correlata.

 

[mattt]

(BTW, when it comes to consciousness, I agree with Chalmers.)

In that regard I am closer to Paul and Patricia Churchland.

 

[PeterDonis]

he says that consciousness is an illusion, doesn't he?

No. He has been repeatedly misquoted as saying that, and he has repeatedly tried to correct such misquotations. His actual position is that consciousness is real, but does not have all of the properties that most people's untutored intuitions think it has.

 

[PeterDonis]

I would be very curious to have an example of something that is "worth wanting about free will" while not being in contradiction with physical laws.

When you made the post I have just quoted above, I assume you weren't forced to make the post: nobody held a gun to your head. Nobody dictated the words you wrote. You weren't under the influence of any drug or any device implanted in your brain that made it tell your body to do things you didn't choose. You chose to make the post and chose what it would say, and your body made the post happen in accordance with your choice. In other words, your making the post was an example of you exercising your free will.

And yet all of this is perfectly consistent with physical laws, even deterministic physical laws. What I called "choice" above is a process in your brain. It's not magic. Your brain took all the inputs that came into it up to the point of you choosing to make your post and what it would say, and your brain made those choices using those inputs. Whatever process took place inside your brain could be deterministic from the standpoint of physical law, but it's still your brain, using the inputs from your experiences and choosing what to say, without any other influence. That's a kind of free will worth wanting, and it's perfectly consistent with physical laws.

 

[mattt]

When you made the post I have just quoted above, I assume you weren't forced to make the post: nobody held a gun to your head. Nobody dictated the words you wrote. You weren't under the influence of any drug or any device implanted in your brain that made it tell your body to do things you didn't choose. You chose to make the post and chose what it would say, and your body made the post happen in accordance with your choice. In other words, your making the post was an example of you exercising your free will.

And yet all of this is perfectly consistent with physical laws, even deterministic physical laws. What I called "choice" above is a process in your brain. It's not magic. Your brain took all the inputs that came into it up to the point of you choosing to make your post and what it would say, and your brain made those choices using those inputs. Whatever process took place inside your brain could be deterministic from the standpoint of physical law, but it's still your brain, using the inputs from your experiences and choosing what to say, without any other influence. That's a kind of free will worth wanting, and it's perfectly consistent with physical laws.

Yes, but that's not what most people think about free will. Most people really think that they could have done otherwise in such and such situation...for example.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

"Those who maintain a deterministic theory of mental activity must do so as the outcome of their
study of the mind itself and not with the idea that they are thereby making it more conformable with our experimental knowledge of the laws of inorganic nature."

Arthur Stanley Eddington in "THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD"

 

[PeterDonis]

Most people really think that they could have done otherwise in such and such situation...for example.

Dennett has a long discussion of "could have done otherwise" in both of his books on free will (Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves).

The TL;DR is that "could have done otherwise" can have at least two different meanings, and neither of them have the implications that most people intuitively think of when they think that deterministic physical laws rule out "could have done otherwise".

If "could have done otherwise" means "could have done otherwise under the exact same physical conditions", which is the only case for which "could have done otherwise" is actually false for deterministic physical laws, then it's meaningless, because the exact same physical conditions will never occur again.

If "could have done otherwise" means "could have done otherwise under the same relevant conditions", then deterministic physical laws permit this to be true, because "the same relevant conditions" comprises a huge set of different physical conditions, and therefore allows a huge set of possible different physical processes to occur in your brain. In fact, your brain, in order for it to support any meaningful kind of free will (i.e., that your brain can actually reliably tell your body to make happen what you choose), has to ignore most of the microphysical variation in states inside it.

To put it another way, what is important for free will is that, if you make a choice you later believe to have been a bad one, you can change how you make choices so that, under the same relevant conditions in the future, you can make a better choice. And this is perfectly possible with deterministic physical laws, because changing how you make choices doesn't require you to change any physical laws; it only requires you to change the configuration of your brain. And as long as that change in your brain's configuration happens because you choose it--i.e., because of other processes happening in your brain, not because someone held a gun to your head or implanted a chip in your brain that skews its function, etc.--then you have free will in the sense that matters.

 

[mattt]

Dennett has a long discussion of "could have done otherwise" in both of his books on free will (Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves).

The TL;DR is that "could have done otherwise" can have at least two different meanings, and neither of them have the implications that most people intuitively think of when they think that deterministic physical laws rule out "could have done otherwise".

If "could have done otherwise" means "could have done otherwise under the exact same physical conditions", which is the only case for which "could have done otherwise" is actually false for deterministic physical laws, then it's meaningless, because the exact same physical conditions will never occur again.

If "could have done otherwise" means "could have done otherwise under the same relevant conditions", then deterministic physical laws permit this to be true, because "the same relevant conditions" comprises a huge set of different physical conditions, and therefore allows a huge set of possible different physical processes to occur in your brain. In fact, your brain, in order for it to support any meaningful kind of free will (i.e., that your brain can actually reliably tell your body to make happen what you choose), has to ignore most of the microphysical variation in states inside it.

To put it another way, what is important for free will is that, if you make a choice you later believe to have been a bad one, you can change how you make choices so that, under the same relevant conditions in the future, you can make a better choice. And this is perfectly possible with deterministic physical laws, because changing how you make choices doesn't require you to change any physical laws; it only requires you to change the configuration of your brain. And as long as that change in your brain's configuration happens because you choose it--i.e., because of other processes happening in your brain, not because someone held a gun to your head or implanted a chip in your brain that skews its function, etc.--then you have free will in the sense that matters.

All that is coherent and sensible, but I wouldn't use the term Free Will to refer to that. I would prefer to create a new term.

Why?

First, because most people (at least most people with whom I speak about these things) think about free will in a totally different way. They really think Free Will is non-physical, that is, beyond the realms of Physics.

Second, precisely because of this, most of them also think that a non-biological machine will never have and cannot ever have this "non-physical ability" that they supposedly have to make "non physical choices".

 

[PeterDonis]

I would prefer to create a new term.

So would many people. That doesn't mean it should actually be done. At least not if we're going to be discussing science. The reasons you give for people having a different definition of Free Will are manifestly non-scientific, so a scientific discussion cannot and should not take notice of them.

most people (at least most people with whom I speak about these things) think about free will in a totally different way. They really think Free Will is non-physical, that is, beyond the realms of Physics.

Whatever people might claim when they are asked for an explicit definition, the operational definition of "free will" that people use in their everyday lives is not based on any claims about "free will" being beyond the realm of physics, but on everyone's common sense notion of what it means to make a free choice as opposed to a coerced one, which is what the more elaborate discussion I gave, which you agree is "coherent and sensible", is based on. So, for example, if you are asked if you signed a legal document of your own free will, you're not being asked whether you have some magical non-physical ability. You're being asked a straightforward question about whether you were coerced or not.

precisely because of this, most of them also think that a non-biological machine will never have and cannot ever have this "non-physical ability" that they supposedly have to make "non physical choices".

If robots with human-like intelligence are ever developed, I suspect a lot of people's intuitions about this will drastically change once they have interacted with such robots and seen what their actual capabilities are.

 

[A. Neumaier]

most of them also think that a non-biological machine will never have and cannot ever have this "non-physical ability" that they supposedly have to make "non physical choices".

How would a biological machine or a human being make "non physical choices"?

 

[nrqed]

When you made the post I have just quoted above, I assume you weren't forced to make the post: nobody held a gun to your head. Nobody dictated the words you wrote. You weren't under the influence of any drug or any device implanted in your brain that made it tell your body to do things you didn't choose. You chose to make the post and chose what it would say, and your body made the post happen in accordance with your choice. In other words, your making the post was an example of you exercising your free will.

And yet all of this is perfectly consistent with physical laws, even deterministic physical laws. What I called "choice" above is a process in your brain. It's not magic. Your brain took all the inputs that came into it up to the point of you choosing to make your post and what it would say, and your brain made those choices using those inputs. Whatever process took place inside your brain could be deterministic from the standpoint of physical law, but it's still your brain, using the inputs from your experiences and choosing what to say, without any other influence. That's a kind of free will worth wanting, and it's perfectly consistent with physical laws.

I don't understand what you mean by "chose" or "did not choose".

If the inputs and the connections on my brains determined what I would post, what do you mean by saying that I "chose" to post it?? At what point did I have the choice to not post it if everything was deterministic?? If you say that my brain made a choice even though everything was deterministic, then would you say that a tree "choses" to fall if I cut it? If not, what is the difference between me being able to choose and the tree not being able to choose?

 

[PeterDonis]

I don't understand what you mean by "chose" or "did not choose".

I mean whatever process happens in you (mostly your brain) when you, for example, think of what to write in your post, and then write it and click "Post Reply" to post it.

If the inputs and the connections on my brains determined what I would post, what do you mean by saying that I "chose" to post it??

That it was the inputs and connections in your brain that determined what you would post, not something else.

what is the difference between me being able to choose and the tree not being able to choose?

That a tree doesn't have a brain. Which means a tree is not even sensitive to all the complex information that your brain is sensitive to. A tree can't post on PF, not just because it doesn't have hands or eyes, but because it can't even process the information that is conveyed to you and I by reading PF, let alone form the kind of context that you and I have for reading PF by spending years learning about physics and other abstract topics.

When you compare what goes on in your brain when you post on PF to a tree falling, you are simply ignoring the huge difference in complexity between the two cases, and assuming it can't make any real difference. But it does. Enough additional complexity is a qualitative change. As Philip Anderson famously said, "More is different".

 

[A. Neumaier]

When you compare what goes on in your brain when you post on PF to a tree falling, you are simply ignoring the huge difference in complexity between the two cases, and assuming it can't make any real difference. But it does. Enough additional complexity is a qualitative change. As Philip Anderson famously said, "More is different".

It is not the complexity (hence not just ''more'') but the structure of the brain that allows sufficiently detailed information processing to create choices that are for practical purposes free.

 

[PeterDonis]

It is not the complexity (hence not just ''more'') but the structure of the brain that allows sufficiently detailed information processing to create choices that are for practical purposes free.

I think this is just a matter of choice of words. I agree the structure of the brain is important; I would say that an important reason why the structure of the brain is important is that it is complex and heterogeneous. If the brain were just three pounds of jello it would not support information processing.

 

[nrqed]

It is not the complexity (hence not just ''more'') but the structure of the brain that allows sufficiently detailed information processing to create choices that are for practical purposes free.

I find it extremely strange that one would assign free will to something just because it is very complex. I don't understand how to define "choices that are for practical purposes free". How can someone not be a choice but can be a choice "for practical purposes"? It is a choice only because we cannot reproduce the system on a computer?
If I am free to choose if I post this or not, explain to me at what point am I making a decision? In a deterministic system, it is impossible. Even including quantum effects, there is no such instant. So I don't see how one can say that free will exists if no choice is ever made.

 

[PeterDonis]

I don't understand how to define "choices that are for practical purposes free".

When you post here, is anyone coercing you? Is anyone holding a gun to your head? Is there a chip implanted in your brain that's causing your hands to move and type things that you don't intend to type?

If the answers to those and all questions along similar lines are "no", then your posts here, for all practical purposes, are your free choice. If you want to agonize over whether your posts are your free choice in some magical non-physical sense, that's your free choice too, and I can't stop you, but I don't see what relevance it has to this discussion. We are discussing science here, and any view that only allows "free choice" to exist if it is a magical, non-physical property that can't be analyzed by science, is irrelevant here.

 

[mattt]

I think we all here agree on the fundamentals but we don't agree on the use of English words.

 

[nrqed]

When you post here, is anyone coercing you? Is anyone holding a gun to your head? Is there a chip implanted in your brain that's causing your hands to move and type things that you don't intend to type?

If the answers to those and all questions along similar lines are "no", then your posts here, for all practical purposes, are your free choice. If you want to agonize over whether your posts are your free choice in some magical non-physical sense, that's your free choice too, and I can't stop you, but I don't see what relevance it has to this discussion. We are discussing science here, and any view that only allows "free choice" to exist if it is a magical, non-physical property that can't be analyzed by science, is irrelevant here.

It's funny that you accuse me of being unscientific while using an example of having a gun or not pointed at me as definition of free will or not. Are you saying that free will suddenly cease to exist if someone is pointing a gun at me? How can that be a scientific statement? It sounds like a legal statement, not a statement based on science.

You accuse me of using a "magical non-physical sense" for free will. I am saying that free will does not exist because it is inconsistent with physical laws. You are saying that free will exist even in a completely deterministic world. That seems way more magical than my position.

If you are free to decide if you post or not, tell me when this occurs if everything in your brain is deterministic?

 

[mattt]

You accuse me of using a "magical non-physical sense" for free will. I am saying that free will does not exist because it is inconsistent with physical laws. You are saying that free will exist even in a completely deterministic world. That seems way more magical than my position.

He's just using the words "free will" to mean something different than what you think. I myself don't like that way of using those words.

 

[nrqed]

He's just using the words "free will" to mean something different than what you think. I myself don't like that way of using those words.

Maybe, but then he accuses me of being unscientific and using a "magical" sense. I am trying to have a scientific discussion, not a discussion based on a legal definition of free will.

 

[mattt]

How would a biological machine or a human being make "non physical choices"?

That's exactly my reply to them. If they have a theory about it, they should explain the details and mechanisms of those "non-physical entities" to us.

 

[PeterDonis]

You accuse me of using a "magical non-physical sense" for free will.

And you yourself agree with me:

I am saying that free will does not exist because it is inconsistent with physical laws.

In other words, the only meaning you can understand for the term "free will" is something that is inconsistent with physical laws. That's what I mean by you using a magical, non-physical sense of "free will".

You are saying that free will exist even in a completely deterministic world.

I am saying that the kind of "free will" that anybody actually cares about is whatever it is that is causing you to make your posts here. If you don't think "free will" is the right term for that, so what? It's still what people actually care about. Nobody cares about a kind of "free will" that doesn't exist and can't because it's inconsistent with physical laws. They might say they do, but they actually don't when it matters.

In ordinary everyday situations this is easy to overlook because there is no real dispute involved. All of us are posting here, and we each assume everyone is posting of their own free will, and not because Dr. Evil is standing over them with a gun to their head or has implanted a chip in their brains. But that's because nothing is really at stake except discussion. We can each have our own ideas about what would "really" count as free will, and whether such a thing actually exists, and it doesn't matter.

But when real disputes are involved, with real things at stake, nobody cares about whatever kind of concept of "free will" you are using that term to mean, because you say whatever that is doesn't exist anyway. What people actually care about is, for example, whether your signature on a legal document was coerced or not, or whether you pulled the trigger of the gun that shot someone by accident or with intent. In other words, if people care about "free will" at all when real things are at stake, what they care about is something that actually exists and can actually be assessed in real situations.

That seems way more magical than my position.

If you think that using the term "free will" to mean something that can actually exist, and that people actually care about in real situations with real things at stake, is more "magical" than using the term to mean something that, by your own admission, can't exist at all because it's inconsistent with physical laws, then I think we disagree on what "magical" means as well as on what "free will" means.

 

[PeterDonis]

I am trying to have a scientific discussion

How can we have a scientific discussion about a concept that you yourself claim is inconsistent with physical laws? Why should anyone bother discussing such a concept?

 

[mattt]

Maybe, but then he accuses me of being unscientific and using a "magical" sense. I am trying to have a scientific discussion, not a discussion based on a legal definition of free will.

Read carefully what he wrote. I think that it is clear for him that there is no solid reason to believe in non physical entities.

It is just that he (and Daniel Dennett and some others) like to use those words, free will, to describe some physical (deterministic or stochastic) processes that occur in the nervous systems of some animals (especially mammals) to differentiate them from other physical processes.

Of course, even used that way, it's a fuzzy term to say the least.

 

[nrqed]

How can we have a scientific discussion about a concept that you yourself claim is inconsistent with physical laws? Why should anyone bother discussing such a concept?

Because some people say that free will exist. And they don't realize that it is inconsistent with physics.

You are basically saying that discussing free will is not worth it? You don't think that it is worth our time to share what physics has to say about it? I disagree.

I see from your previous post that you are using a legal type of definition for free will. I thought we could have a scientific discussion on the issue, but you attack me for being anti scientific when I want to focus on what science can say about it (which I find extremely strange). Since it's not possible to discuss the scientific aspect of the issue without being told essentially that no one should bother, then I will stop.

Thanks for the open minded and respectful discussion.

 

[nrqed]

Read carefully what he wrote. I think that it is clear for him that there is no solid reason to believe in non physical entities.

It is just that he (and Daniel Dennett and some others) like to use those words, free will, to describe some physical (deterministic or stochastic) processes that occur in the nervous systems of some animals (especially mammals) to differentiate them from other physical processes.

Of course, even used that way, it's a fuzzy term to say the least.

Interesting. But from a physics point of view, this seems completely undefined. I wish that given we are supposed to have a scientific debate here, with very smart people, that they would at least acknowledge that their definition of free will is, and that it is not well defined. Instead I am the one accused of believing in magic. Strange.