Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[learningphysics]

You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale.

I'm finding this thread confusing. I thought the "sensation" was qualia. Which would make its existence indubitable. Or is the existence of "sensations" in question?

Can someone post what the definition of "qualia" is, as used in this thread?

 

[StatusX]

That is not true according to the definition of "qualia" that you gave me in your second post to this thread. "As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist." As such, the only event that you have direct access to is the occurence of a given sensation. Whether this sensation is simply a brain event or a quale is not yet known. There is no pretheoretical way to directly apprehend the truth of either claim. You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale. If this was indeed a pretheoretical fact and not an inference drawn from within a theoretical (in this case, antiphysicalist) framework, then there would be no disagreement.

It may have been misleading to talk about what they might "turn out to be." I was just referring to how you aren't taking a stand now, but would rather wait until there's more evidence. I was saying that this stand on qualia is too indecisive, because believing in them is believing that whatever we might find out about physical brain states, they can't completely account for qualia (of course, that renders the second option in the poll inconsistent, but this is just my understanding of qualia). Maybe I should have said that if you are open to the possibility that brain states could explain all there is to qualia, then you really don't believe in qualia as defined above.

 

[StatusX]

Can someone post what the definition of "qualia" is, as used in this thread?

The defintion is in the first post. You can go to the wikipedia article on qualia for more detail.

 

[learningphysics]

The defintion is in the first post. You can go to the wikipedia article on qualia for more detail.

Thanks.

Wikipedia:
"Qualia (singular: "quale", pronounced KWAHL-ay) are most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them"

So ok... redness is not qualia, but "what it is like to see red"... that is qualia?

If we admit that there is "seeing of red"... how can there be any doubt that there is "something it is like to see red".

The fact that we remember and can refer to a particular sensation as redness, shows that there is "something it is like to see red". The property of "what it is like to see red" is incommunicable, but it certainly exists.

Wikipedia
"The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind."

I strongly question the above statement in Wikipedia. Either I'm still misunderstanding what if being referred to by qualia, or wikipedia is wrong here.

 

[StatusX]

So ok... redness is not qualia, but "what it is like to see red"... that is qualia?

If we admit that there is "seeing of red"... how can there be any doubt that there is "something it is like to see red".

The fact that we remember and can refer to a particular sensation as redness, shows that there is "something it is like to see red". The property of "what it is like to see red" is incommunicable, but it certainly exists.

Wikipedia
"The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind."

I strongly question the above statement in Wikipedia. Either I'm still misunderstanding what if being referred to by qualia, or wikipedia is wrong here.

It is true, it seems pretty obvious that red looks like something. If this fact could be easily reconciled with physicalism, I doubt anyone would question the existence of qualia. But it can't be, so many people go against their intuition to protect their metaphysical doctrine.

The reason physicalism can't account for qualia (of course, this is also debatable) is that physics only deals with functional roles. Mass is nothing more than how any object responds to a force. Charge is how it responds to an electric or magnetic field. Everything in physics is relationships like this. But a qualia, say, the experience of the color red, is absolute. It is intrinsic, and is not just described by functional roles. Some argue that this "experience" is nothing more than a physical state in which we are more inclined to say things like "that apple is red" and "I am experiencing a red qualia." Physics undoubtedly could explain such a state, but I think we all know that there is more to it than that. There is something it is like to be seeing red, something that red looks like to us. The stand you take just depends on what you value more highly: preserving physicalism or describing how the universe truly is.

 

[Tournesol]

There definitely exists a very important circumstance where they cannot disagree. That particular circumstance is the case when they agree on the axioms behind the logical proposition.

grandmother.

egg.

suck.

Under it, what is real is no more than an opinion the speaker has squinked up:

Which now means we have another way of saying "personal opinion" ...
and no way of saying "really real". Great.

As I said, I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective, but I certainly won't pay any attention to someone who says they know what is really "real".

Does that mean we should't pay any attention to you when you claim
to know what is really real ? Well, yes, it does.

What you seem to be missing is the idea that "qualia" is being put forth as an answer

Nope. I have already explained that they are not: "The point of 'qualia' is to put a problem on the table."

Gee guys, when I look at a rainbow, I see it as stripes of various colors. When I measure the wave lengths of the light, I get a smooth continuous transition. Now how do I explain that? Is it reasonable to suggest that associations with certain colors are important to our survival: red with blood and berries, green with vegetables, yellow with heat. And that our interest and concern with different colors has evolutionarily produced a striking awareness of specific colors? (I point out that, decision wise, that donkey halfway between two bales is an exceedingly rare event: the brain is an organ devoted to making decisions on whatever information it has.) Or perhaps this should be taken as evidence of the "reality" of "qualia".

That is the Easy Problem. Now: what about the relationship of of those
"strinking" colours to brain-states ?

Again, what I am preaching against is naming something in order to acquire the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous anti scientific illusion.

No one is doing that.

 

[loseyourname]

I was saying that this stand on qualia is too indecisive, because believing in them is believing that whatever we might find out about physical brain states, they can't completely account for qualia (of course, that renders the second option in the poll inconsistent, but this is just my understanding of qualia).

This sounds to me like you're advocating a leap of faith. On what basis can you firmly believe that any physical explanation of consciousness cannot explain the sensations associated with brain events? You needn't repost all of the arguments that have convinced you, seeing as how we've gone over them many times, but I think I (and others) have demonstrated that none of these arguments is particularly conclusive. They all rely on at least one premise that can only be believed due to intuition, an intuition that is not even shared amongst all of the posters here.

Maybe I should have said that if you are open to the possibility that brain states could explain all there is to qualia, then you really don't believe in qualia as defined above.

Well, heck, I guess I don't believe in qualia then. I never realized that the term necessarily excluded the possibility of a physical basis. I figured a physical explanation would be a case of reduction rather than elimination.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, heck, I guess I don't believe in qualia then. I never realized that the term necessarily excluded the possibility of a physical basis

As originally (and IMO authentically defined), it doesn't:-

C.I Lewis's original definition of qualia:-

"There *are* recognizable qualitative characters of the
given, which may be repeated in different experiences,
and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia."
But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being
recognized from one to another experience, they must
be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion
of these two is characteristic of many historical
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories.
The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the
subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."


The way not to argue for qulia is to load the ontological dice at the outset.

 

[Canute]

Speaking of the intrinsic base of the physical, it has a couple of properties in common with qualia that I think should be explored. First, if we take the view that rules cannot exist by themselves, but must act on something, then we know that there is an intrinsic basis, even though we can't observe it. However, we can't say exactly what it is. Similarly, we know qualia exist, but we can't describe them. Does anyone see any significance to this parallel?

Yes, very much so. I feel it should be treated as a highly significant fact. But it seems to be generally overlooked.

As solipsism is unfalsifiable we know that although we can be certain that our conscious sensations/qualia exist we can never show that anything else exists. Under the circumstances it seems a bit unlikely that anybody will ever manage to show that qualia do not exist but brains do. In fact it is logically impossible.

What is intrinsic to both mental phenomena and corporeal phenomena is, going strictly on the available evidence, meta-physical. While we are forced to accept that what is intrinsic to matter is 'beyond science', it seems that few yet accept that what is intrinsic to consciousness is likewise metaphysical. I suspect that we will all have to face this as a fact sooner or later.

Always there will be two things beyond science. The first is what is fundamental to the 'objective' physical universe, the second is what is fundamental to the 'subjective' mental universe. Perhaps this is a coincidence, or perhaps it is not two things.

 

[StatusX]

This sounds to me like you're advocating a leap of faith. On what basis can you firmly believe that any physical explanation of consciousness cannot explain the sensations associated with brain events? You needn't repost all of the arguments that have convinced you, seeing as how we've gone over them many times, but I think I (and others) have demonstrated that none of these arguments is particularly conclusive. They all rely on at least one premise that can only be believed due to intuition, an intuition that is not even shared amongst all of the posters here.

It isn't just intuition. The problem is that physics can only explain functions and structure. So if you are a physicalist, you believe that's all there is to the universe. The vast majority of the world is covered by physics, but consciousness is a little different.

First, what aspects of the human brain can physics explain? It seems likely that anything we say or do can be attributed to atoms interacting in our heads, since these are just functions. Qualia is the name given to those mental phenomena that can't be explained by physics, if they exist. So what are they?

When you look at a pumpkin, photons hit your retina which gives rise to electro-chemical signals that travel through your brain. All kinds of processing is done on these signals, and any number of possible actions can result. You can say "That is orange" or "I am experiencing an orange qualia, and I am certain it cannot be explained by physics" or you can throw the pumpkin out the window. All of this can, in fact, be explained by physics. So the question you have to ask yourself is "Is that all?"

Or is there also an experience? I'm not talking about sound waves corresponding to talk about experience, or even brain waves corresponding to thought about it. I'm talking about that inner, subjective experience. It exists, so what is it? Can it be identified with the physics of firing neurons? Not a priori, certainly, but empirically? No, because all this will cover is causal relationships between physical structures. Qualia is not just relationships, it is absolute. Orange looks like something. What we say or think about orange is one thing, but the experience of it is something different. You can know everything we say and think about orange , but you can't know what it looks like until you experience it yourself. It is intrinsic, in that the experience of orange is what it is, regardless of the particular context it is presented.

I don't think anyone claims there is no inner subjective world, many just feel that this is nothing more than neurons, somehow. But neurons are defined entirely by structure and function. There is no intrinsic "neuron." There is a structure made of protein and other biological chemicals which performs certain roles, like metabolism and passing on of electric signals. This is all a neuron is. But qualia aren't defined this way. They do not have functions, and they do not have to have structure. These can't possibly be the same thing.

 

[loseyourname]

It isn't just intuition. The problem is that physics can only explain functions and structure.

You've just made a variation on the same argument. Physical facts are facts about structure and function. Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function. Therefore, facts about experience are not physical facts. Can you really not see how question begging that is? 'Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function.' Says who? If it is so evident that this is the case, then why is there still any debate? It seems to me that this is what the antiphysicalist camp is seeking to prove. You can't just presuppose it as revealed truth and then use your revelation to divorce experience from science. It isn't that easy.

You say that because orange is "like something," that it cannot be the result of anything physical? Why? How do you make the leap? Who says that physical things can't be "like something?" This just goes to the question of whether qualitative content can be entailed by physicality alone. I brought up in another thread the question of whether novels written and read only by zombies could have themes and tones and such. The answer seemed to be yes. But these are all "like something." They are all qualities that cannot be expressed in scientific language. This just means that there are multiple ways to explain things. Take this quotation from Roger Scruton from a discussion of Spinoza:

• What I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigments smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. In doing so, I do not mention the other thing that I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable: I cannot cross from one to the other in midstream, so to speak. I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre, or the area of yellow fused with oxydised lindseed oil as resting on a huntman's knee. In some such way, Spinoza is saying, the complete description of the body described the very same thing as the complete description of the mind . . .

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts? Why do simply assume that a physical account that doesn't talk about qualia is incomplete, or vice versa? Given that Spinoza wrote his major works several hundred years ago, it's not like this is a new idea.

 

[StatusX]

You've just made a variation on the same argument. Physical facts are facts about structure and function. Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function. Therefore, facts about experience are not physical facts. Can you really not see how question begging that is?

To be fair, it isn't question begging. I really think that experiences are more than structure and function, and it is because of this that I think they are unphysical, not the other way around.

'Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function.' Says who? If it is so evident that this is the case, then why is there still any debate?

Because it means giving up physicalism, something many people don't want to do.

You say that because orange is "like something," that it cannot be the result of anything physical? Why? How do you make the leap? Who says that physical things can't be "like something?" This just goes to the question of whether qualitative content can be entailed by physicality alone. I brought up in another thread the question of whether novels written and read only by zombies could have themes and tones and such. The answer seemed to be yes. But these are all "like something." They are all qualities that cannot be expressed in scientific language. This just means that there are multiple ways to explain things. Take this quotation from Roger Scruton from a discussion of Spinoza:

• What I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigments smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. In doing so, I do not mention the other thing that I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable: I cannot cross from one to the other in midstream, so to speak. I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre, or the area of yellow fused with oxydised lindseed oil as resting on a huntman's knee. In some such way, Spinoza is saying, the complete description of the body described the very same thing as the complete description of the mind . . .

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts? Why do simply assume that a physical account that doesn't talk about qualia is incomplete, or vice versa? Given that Spinoza wrote his major works several hundred years ago, it's not like this is a new idea.

There is a big difference between the qualitative content of a novel and that of an experience. The former can be phrased in the language of structure/function, while the latter cannot. The tones and themes of a novel can be completely described by referring to how they affect our physical brain. The way an author's words affect our emotions are quantifiable, albeit well beyond any current methods. The reason is that the whole chain of events, from photons bouncing off ink to neural signals, is physical. Once we have accounted for every possible effect a tone or theme can have on us, we have exhaustively accounted for it.

Experiences, on the other hand, are not just difficult to describe. The best poets in the world, or the best neuroscientists in the world, can only give a functional account. They can describe how an experience affects our mood, what it causes us to do or say, or relate it to other experiences to evoke similar feelings. But this does not exhaust what that experience is, because there is still something it is like to be having it.

 

[loseyourname]

To be fair, it isn't question begging. I really think that experiences are more than structure and function, and it is because of this that I think they are unphysical, not the other way around.

Thinking that experiences are more than structure and function and thinking that experiences are more than physical are exactly the same thought! "Structure and function" is just another way of saying "physical." That is exactly why it is question-begging to prove one by presupposing the other.

Because it means giving up physicalism, something many people don't want to do.

Why is it that you think this? What exactly does a physicalist give up by giving up physicalism? His science will be just as effective and useful, and still just as dictatorially in control of its realms, as it was when he was a physicalist. The reason there is debate isn't because one side or the other is being obstinate in not wanting to let go of a cherished world-view. To suggest that is simplistic and bordering on insulting. The reason there is debate is because the matter isn't as cut-and-dry obvious as you want to think.

There is a big difference between the qualitative content of a novel and that of an experience. The former can be phrased in the language of structure/function, while the latter cannot.

I disagree. A description of the qualities of a novel in neuroscientific language isn't going to do it for me, just as a neuroscientific description of the qualities of experience won't do it for you.

Experiences, on the other hand, are not just difficult to describe. The best poets in the world, or the best neuroscientists in the world, can only give a functional account. They can describe how an experience affects our mood, what it causes us to do or say, or relate it to other experiences to evoke similar feelings. But this does not exhaust what that experience is, because there is still something it is like to be having it.

Now you seem to be saying that no qualitative or physical description will do it for you, that experience is simply inexplicable by any means.

 

[StatusX]

I disagree. A description of the qualities of a novel in neuroscientific language isn't going to do it for me, just as a neuroscientific description of the qualities of experience won't do it for you.

But don't you see, that really is all there is to it. What could there possibly be to the theme or tone besides every possible reaction we might have to it? The only thing that can't be accounted for is the subjective experience of the emotions and thougts the novel gives rise to.

Now you seem to be saying that no qualitative or physical description will do it for you, that experience is simply inexplicable by any means.

That may be, but it should at least be acknowledged. The reason I think many physicalists are so stubborn is that we want to believe we can understand every facet of nautre, and consciousness is at least one area where it's not so obvious this can be done, so they deny the hard problem.

 

[Canute]

Status X

I agree with most of what you've said here. In particular I agree that it is only stubbornness or wishful thinking that keeps alive the idea that qualia can be explained scientifically.

Still, what seems obvious to you and me does not appear at all obvious to many others. Perhaps it's worth coming at this from another angle by trying to imagine what a scientific explanation of qualia would look like.

How would the explanation make the leap from physical and observable brain process to non-physical and unobservable qualia? Anyone who tries to sketch out such an explanation must soon discover, whatever form their explanation takes, that there is in principle no way to leap across the explanatory gap between brain functions and processes to subjective experiences. There just isn't a scientific way of doing it, however much we learn about the brain. If there was a way then by now we'd at least expect to have one or two acceptable working hypotheses as to how brain and mind are related.

Even if we knew everything there is to know about the brain states that correlate to the appearance of various qualia we would be no closer to explaining why these states give rise to qualia as opposed to just further brain functions and processes.

 

[Tournesol]

I don't think anyone claims there is no inner subjective world, many just feel that this is nothing more than neurons, somehow. But neurons are defined entirely by structure and function.

Nothing that concretely exists is 'just' structure and function...S & F are abstractions. They are a way of talking about things, not stuff tht things can be made of.

Qualia do not have functions,

Subjectively, they do have causal roles. Note that a 'causal role' is on
the concrete side of the abstract/concrete divide.

 

[loseyourname]

But don't you see, that really is all there is to it. What could there possibly be to the theme or tone besides every possible reaction we might have to it? The only thing that can't be accounted for is the subjective experience of the emotions and thougts the novel gives rise to.

Does a novel then cease to have any qualities if there aren't any people around to read it? Does the painting only contain pigments, and no hunt scene, if no person is there to view it?

That may be, but it should at least be acknowledged. The reason I think many physicalists are so stubborn is that we want to believe we can understand every facet of nautre, and consciousness is at least one area where it's not so obvious this can be done, so they deny the hard problem.

And you give no creedence whatsoever to the possibility presented by Spinoza that both descriptions are complete descriptions that are simply looking at the same thing in different ways?

 

[Tournesol]

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts?

Well, it happens to be the case that physical accounts don't capture the
what-it-seems-like aspects of experience, and if we suppose that
physical accounts are inherently extrinsic and quantative, and that
subjectivity is inhernetly intrinsic and qualiative, both of which seem
reasonable in their own right, we can see why the explanatory gap should arise. OTOH, both descriptions can account for the production of behaviour, so in that sense they overlap, and there is no danger of epiphenomenalism.

 

[StatusX]

Nothing that concretely exists is 'just' structure and function...S & F are abstractions. They are a way of talking about things, not stuff tht things can be made of.

That's true, but physics is just structure and function. Basically, physics is a very specific kind of math, with the extra axiom that "this is all real." In fact, maybe qualia is what makes physics real. The difference between a universe where the fine structure constant is 1/731 and one where it is 1/137 is that we experience the latter but not the former.

Subjectively, they do have causal roles. Note that a 'causal role' is on
the concrete side of the abstract/concrete divide.

The subjective feeling of a causal role is not a causal role. But I do agree, they must have some kind of causing power because we can talk about them. What I'm talking about when I say "non-functional" is the specifc nature of the qualia. Exactly what it is that red looks like is not related to its functional role, or at the very least, not exhaustively described by it.

 

[StatusX]

Does a novel then cease to have any qualities if there aren't any people around to read it? Does the painting only contain pigments, and no hunt scene, if no person is there to view it?

It isn't important to the general definition whether a specific instance of a painting or novel is being observed. If you're asking whether theme would still be a meaningful concept if there were no humans in the universe, yes it would. It would be described in terms of hypothetical creatures called humans and the way they would express their thoughts and emotions with language, if they existed. On the other hand, "qualia" is not a meaningful conept in a universe without experiencers, because to know what a qualia is is to experience it.

And you give no creedence whatsoever to the possibility presented by Spinoza that both descriptions are complete descriptions that are simply looking at the same thing in different ways?

Well of course they are. We experience what is in our brain. The question is how are they aspects of that thing, and what it is. The claim physicalists make is that they are the same thing looked at the same way, and that to explain how neurons work is to explain experience.

 

[Tournesol]

Exactly what it is that red looks like is not related to its functional role, or at the very least, not exhaustively described by it.

Of course not. A functional (computational functionalism) role is just an abstract description, and as
such abstracts away the concrete properties of whatever system
implements it. The 'explanatory gap' is just a special case of not
being able to get back from the abstract to the concrete, because in
going from the concrete to the abstract a certain amount is left out.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Anyone see the irony in trying to rationally justify what by definition can only be experienced? One doesn't "think" the taste of a pizza, and one doesn't "feel" logic. So how is one going to prove or logically justify the existence of qualia?

 

[loseyourname]

One doesn't "think" the taste of a pizza, and one doesn't "feel" logic. So how is one going to prove or logically justify the existence of qualia?

That's fine, but experience alone doesn't lead us to the conclusion that what we experience is non-physical in nature. Experience only leads us to the conclusion that what we experience is yellow, or hot, or painful or whatever. It tells us nothing about the origin and/or nature of these experiences. Theory is required to make the leap to the definition that Status posted, which overtly stated that, in order to qualify as qualia, the content of an experience must not have any physical explanation. We can, of course, reason about our experiences and come to these conclusions in light of the theoretical framework that we develop. Most here think that they've reasoned to the conclusion that the contents of their experiences must be non-physical qualia. I think that their reasoning is not sound, and furthermore that there is absolutely nothing in my experience itself to lead me in either direction. I experience yellow, hot, and pain, not physical or non-physical.

 

[Canute]

Are you arguing that pain is physical? That doesn't make much sense to me. The causes of pain can be physical and can be invetigated by theorising, but how can the pain itself, without which any theory of its cause cannot get off the ground, be physical? If it is then I'd want to ask what you mean by 'physical'?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Theory is required to make the leap to the definition that Status posted, which overtly stated that, in order to qualify as qualia, the content of an experience must not have any physical explanation.

I believe he's correct, that's always how I've understood qualia.

We can, of course, reason about our experiences and come to these conclusions in light of the theoretical framework that we develop. Most here think that they've reasoned to the conclusion that the contents of their experiences must be non-physical qualia. I think that their reasoning is not sound, and furthermore that there is absolutely nothing in my experience itself to lead me in either direction. I experience yellow, hot, and pain, not physical or non-physical.

I understand the argument, I just don't agree that reason is going to provide the final answer on this question. Rather, it is through deepening one's experience of consciousness that one understands the mysterious character we're labeling "qualia." I say you will never get it by thinking because you are missing information about the nature of consciousness which you can only acquire through experience itself. And the irony is, the more one tries to figure it out, the further away from knowing anything about it one becomes.

 

[Billy T]

a third choice

I voted yes, not physical. Read the thread back to post 40 and was impressed by its quality. It may not be completely accurate, but in this and the question of consciousness etc. there seem to be two camps. The physicalists (mind is brain etc.) and the idealists (no it is not). Few non-religious idealists now days want to go as far as to claim the existence of a soul, thinking non-material matter (Descarte et al), but only that no machine/ computer could be conscious, have qualia, or for those of you familiar with the term, "intentionality."

Several of the posters here have participated in thread I started (What Price Free Will) but as some have not, I will attach here the "third way" - Namely in the physical brain, specifficly the parietal cortex, a real-time simulation of the physical world is running when we are awake or dreaming. In my view we are only information, nothing physical, in that simulation. We expereince only the things created in that simulation. Most of the things relate to (model) objects in the physical world, but not all. The often cited example of "red experience" being one. (If not familiar with Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" - Mary knows everything possible (factual) about red, but has never seen it, then does. - Is persuasive to me that qualia are something over and above facts / physical states.)

As I believe everything I experience is only non-physical information, I have no problem with qualia being non physical, but real. In fact, the things I experience are the only reason I can (perhaps erroneously, but I think not) infer there is a physical world. That is, for me, qualia, have a better claim to being "real" than the inferred physical world. I experience them directly, I do not infer their existence.

Read attachment, if you have not already done so, for more details, and three proofs that the current view of cognitive scientists about perception is wrong.

 

[Tournesol]

I believe he's correct, that's always how I've understood qualia. [as inherently nn-physical]

But the term was coined by C.I Lewis, and he does not require them to
be non-physical in his definition.

Rather, it is through deepening one's experience of consciousness that one understands the mysterious character we're labeling "qualia."

The only mystery about qualia is their relation to the physical , which is an
issue that arises with reason and must presumably be resolved by it. People
in ancient times never bothered about qualia becuase they just vaguely assumed that colours and so-on were just 'out there'. Qualia, as a concept,
arose in response to the scientific world-view.

 

[Les Sleeth]

But the term was coined by C.I Lewis, and he does not require them to be non-physical in his definition.

True. I suppose I meant what the term has come to stand for in two main divisions of the consciousness studies debate.

The only mystery about qualia is their relation to the physical , which is an issue that arises with reason and must presumably be resolved by it. People in ancient times never bothered about qualia becuase they just vaguely assumed that colours and so-on were just 'out there'. Qualia, as a concept, arose in response to the scientific world-view.

I see it as two different issues: 1) the relationship of consciousness to the physical, and 2) the fact that subjective experience exists at all. I agree the first issue is solvable by reason (most effectively, IMO, in the context of empirical research), but I don't believe the basis of subjective experience can be understood through reason or any objective discipline alone.

I don't know how you can say there is no mystery when we all have subjective experience, but we don't know what it is. How can that possibly be? It is a constant presence, the heart of consciousness, there is no "I" without it. It IS us, yet we are mystified as to how it came about or even what its nature is.

Apart from subjectivity is reason. I say it is apart because one needn't think anything to exist subjectively, and no thinking machine produces subjectivity (not yet anyway). So while intertwined, they are existentially independent as well, and consequently each has different rules for realization. If we want to know the taste of pizza, can we realize that by reason? We might be able to figure out how to make a more stretchy dough, or if we should go to one pizzeria or another, but there is no possible way to realize the taste of pizza through reason.

My overall point, then, is that the attempt to know the nature of qualia through reason employs the wrong method of realization. To realize the source of subjective experience, to really understand its nature, first one must learn to directly experience it (i.e., not reason about it sans that direct experience).

 

[Les Sleeth]

In fact, the things I experience are the only reason I can (perhaps erroneously, but I think not) infer there is a physical world. That is, for me, qualia, have a better claim to being "real" than the inferred physical world. I experience them directly, I do not infer their existence.

Good point.

 

[Tournesol]

True. I suppose I meant what the term has come to stand for in two main divisions of the consciousness studies debate.

I agree that is has acquired that implication, but I think it is very unfortunate -- it leads people to deny the obvious about their own
experience because they don't want consider anythign that smacks
of non-physicalism.

I see it as two different issues: 1) the relationship of consciousness to the physical, and 2) the fact that subjective experience exists at all. I agree the first issue is solvable by reason (most effectively, IMO, in the context of empirical research), but I don't believe the basis of subjective experience can be understood through reason or any objective discipline alone.

I can't see how you could come up with a good answer to (1) that
didn't explain (2) in the process. If the brain generates experience, and
it does so to enhance the organisms survival-value, that explains why
we have experience at all. Are you working from the epiphenomenal position
that consciousness doesn't do anything ?

I don't know how you can say there is no mystery when we all have subjective experience, but we don't know what it is.

We don't know what it is in the (1) sense -- how it relates the physical.
Before people got the idea that it needs to be related to the physical,
no-one worried about it.

Apart from subjectivity is reason. I say it is apart because one needn't think anything to exist subjectively, and no thinking machine produces subjectivity (not yet anyway). So while intertwined, they are existentially independent as well, and consequently each has different rules for realization. If we want to know the taste of pizza, can we realize that by reason? We might be able to figure out how to make a more stretchy dough, or if we should go to one pizzeria or another, but there is no possible way to realize the taste of pizza through reason.

Well, we can figure out "a colour half-way between red and yellow"
by reason.

The aleged ineffability of qualia is exagerated and fuzzy--
how easy they are to think and communicate depends on exactly how you are
thinking and communicating. The problem becomes most acute in
the mathematical language of physics and computer science; I think
that gives us a clue about the nature of qualia.

My overall point, then, is that the attempt to know the nature of qualia through reason employs the wrong method of realization. To realize the source of subjective experience, to really understand its nature, first one must learn to directly experience it (i.e., not reason about it sans that direct experience).

And does that go on to answer the questions ? Is experience a sufficient criterion, or only a necessary one. Understanding involves relating things
together; if you build a wall between subjectivity and objectivity, you will never understand either.