Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Tournesol]

Exactly what it is that red looks like is not related to its functional role, or at the very least, not exhaustively described by it.

Of course not. A functional (computational functionalism) role is just an abstract description, and as
such abstracts away the concrete properties of whatever system
implements it. The 'explanatory gap' is just a special case of not
being able to get back from the abstract to the concrete, because in
going from the concrete to the abstract a certain amount is left out.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Anyone see the irony in trying to rationally justify what by definition can only be experienced? One doesn't "think" the taste of a pizza, and one doesn't "feel" logic. So how is one going to prove or logically justify the existence of qualia?

 

[loseyourname]

One doesn't "think" the taste of a pizza, and one doesn't "feel" logic. So how is one going to prove or logically justify the existence of qualia?

That's fine, but experience alone doesn't lead us to the conclusion that what we experience is non-physical in nature. Experience only leads us to the conclusion that what we experience is yellow, or hot, or painful or whatever. It tells us nothing about the origin and/or nature of these experiences. Theory is required to make the leap to the definition that Status posted, which overtly stated that, in order to qualify as qualia, the content of an experience must not have any physical explanation. We can, of course, reason about our experiences and come to these conclusions in light of the theoretical framework that we develop. Most here think that they've reasoned to the conclusion that the contents of their experiences must be non-physical qualia. I think that their reasoning is not sound, and furthermore that there is absolutely nothing in my experience itself to lead me in either direction. I experience yellow, hot, and pain, not physical or non-physical.

 

[Canute]

Are you arguing that pain is physical? That doesn't make much sense to me. The causes of pain can be physical and can be invetigated by theorising, but how can the pain itself, without which any theory of its cause cannot get off the ground, be physical? If it is then I'd want to ask what you mean by 'physical'?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Theory is required to make the leap to the definition that Status posted, which overtly stated that, in order to qualify as qualia, the content of an experience must not have any physical explanation.

I believe he's correct, that's always how I've understood qualia.

We can, of course, reason about our experiences and come to these conclusions in light of the theoretical framework that we develop. Most here think that they've reasoned to the conclusion that the contents of their experiences must be non-physical qualia. I think that their reasoning is not sound, and furthermore that there is absolutely nothing in my experience itself to lead me in either direction. I experience yellow, hot, and pain, not physical or non-physical.

I understand the argument, I just don't agree that reason is going to provide the final answer on this question. Rather, it is through deepening one's experience of consciousness that one understands the mysterious character we're labeling "qualia." I say you will never get it by thinking because you are missing information about the nature of consciousness which you can only acquire through experience itself. And the irony is, the more one tries to figure it out, the further away from knowing anything about it one becomes.

 

[Billy T]

a third choice

I voted yes, not physical. Read the thread back to post 40 and was impressed by its quality. It may not be completely accurate, but in this and the question of consciousness etc. there seem to be two camps. The physicalists (mind is brain etc.) and the idealists (no it is not). Few non-religious idealists now days want to go as far as to claim the existence of a soul, thinking non-material matter (Descarte et al), but only that no machine/ computer could be conscious, have qualia, or for those of you familiar with the term, "intentionality."

Several of the posters here have participated in thread I started (What Price Free Will) but as some have not, I will attach here the "third way" - Namely in the physical brain, specifficly the parietal cortex, a real-time simulation of the physical world is running when we are awake or dreaming. In my view we are only information, nothing physical, in that simulation. We expereince only the things created in that simulation. Most of the things relate to (model) objects in the physical world, but not all. The often cited example of "red experience" being one. (If not familiar with Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" - Mary knows everything possible (factual) about red, but has never seen it, then does. - Is persuasive to me that qualia are something over and above facts / physical states.)

As I believe everything I experience is only non-physical information, I have no problem with qualia being non physical, but real. In fact, the things I experience are the only reason I can (perhaps erroneously, but I think not) infer there is a physical world. That is, for me, qualia, have a better claim to being "real" than the inferred physical world. I experience them directly, I do not infer their existence.

Read attachment, if you have not already done so, for more details, and three proofs that the current view of cognitive scientists about perception is wrong.

 

[Tournesol]

I believe he's correct, that's always how I've understood qualia. [as inherently nn-physical]

But the term was coined by C.I Lewis, and he does not require them to
be non-physical in his definition.

Rather, it is through deepening one's experience of consciousness that one understands the mysterious character we're labeling "qualia."

The only mystery about qualia is their relation to the physical , which is an
issue that arises with reason and must presumably be resolved by it. People
in ancient times never bothered about qualia becuase they just vaguely assumed that colours and so-on were just 'out there'. Qualia, as a concept,
arose in response to the scientific world-view.

 

[Les Sleeth]

But the term was coined by C.I Lewis, and he does not require them to be non-physical in his definition.

True. I suppose I meant what the term has come to stand for in two main divisions of the consciousness studies debate.

The only mystery about qualia is their relation to the physical , which is an issue that arises with reason and must presumably be resolved by it. People in ancient times never bothered about qualia becuase they just vaguely assumed that colours and so-on were just 'out there'. Qualia, as a concept, arose in response to the scientific world-view.

I see it as two different issues: 1) the relationship of consciousness to the physical, and 2) the fact that subjective experience exists at all. I agree the first issue is solvable by reason (most effectively, IMO, in the context of empirical research), but I don't believe the basis of subjective experience can be understood through reason or any objective discipline alone.

I don't know how you can say there is no mystery when we all have subjective experience, but we don't know what it is. How can that possibly be? It is a constant presence, the heart of consciousness, there is no "I" without it. It IS us, yet we are mystified as to how it came about or even what its nature is.

Apart from subjectivity is reason. I say it is apart because one needn't think anything to exist subjectively, and no thinking machine produces subjectivity (not yet anyway). So while intertwined, they are existentially independent as well, and consequently each has different rules for realization. If we want to know the taste of pizza, can we realize that by reason? We might be able to figure out how to make a more stretchy dough, or if we should go to one pizzeria or another, but there is no possible way to realize the taste of pizza through reason.

My overall point, then, is that the attempt to know the nature of qualia through reason employs the wrong method of realization. To realize the source of subjective experience, to really understand its nature, first one must learn to directly experience it (i.e., not reason about it sans that direct experience).

 

[Les Sleeth]

In fact, the things I experience are the only reason I can (perhaps erroneously, but I think not) infer there is a physical world. That is, for me, qualia, have a better claim to being "real" than the inferred physical world. I experience them directly, I do not infer their existence.

Good point.

 

[Tournesol]

True. I suppose I meant what the term has come to stand for in two main divisions of the consciousness studies debate.

I agree that is has acquired that implication, but I think it is very unfortunate -- it leads people to deny the obvious about their own
experience because they don't want consider anythign that smacks
of non-physicalism.

I see it as two different issues: 1) the relationship of consciousness to the physical, and 2) the fact that subjective experience exists at all. I agree the first issue is solvable by reason (most effectively, IMO, in the context of empirical research), but I don't believe the basis of subjective experience can be understood through reason or any objective discipline alone.

I can't see how you could come up with a good answer to (1) that
didn't explain (2) in the process. If the brain generates experience, and
it does so to enhance the organisms survival-value, that explains why
we have experience at all. Are you working from the epiphenomenal position
that consciousness doesn't do anything ?

I don't know how you can say there is no mystery when we all have subjective experience, but we don't know what it is.

We don't know what it is in the (1) sense -- how it relates the physical.
Before people got the idea that it needs to be related to the physical,
no-one worried about it.

Apart from subjectivity is reason. I say it is apart because one needn't think anything to exist subjectively, and no thinking machine produces subjectivity (not yet anyway). So while intertwined, they are existentially independent as well, and consequently each has different rules for realization. If we want to know the taste of pizza, can we realize that by reason? We might be able to figure out how to make a more stretchy dough, or if we should go to one pizzeria or another, but there is no possible way to realize the taste of pizza through reason.

Well, we can figure out "a colour half-way between red and yellow"
by reason.

The aleged ineffability of qualia is exagerated and fuzzy--
how easy they are to think and communicate depends on exactly how you are
thinking and communicating. The problem becomes most acute in
the mathematical language of physics and computer science; I think
that gives us a clue about the nature of qualia.

My overall point, then, is that the attempt to know the nature of qualia through reason employs the wrong method of realization. To realize the source of subjective experience, to really understand its nature, first one must learn to directly experience it (i.e., not reason about it sans that direct experience).

And does that go on to answer the questions ? Is experience a sufficient criterion, or only a necessary one. Understanding involves relating things
together; if you build a wall between subjectivity and objectivity, you will never understand either.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I can't see how you could come up with a good answer to (1) that didn't explain (2) in the process. If the brain generates experience, and it does so to enhance the organisms survival-value, that explains why we have experience at all. Are you working from the epiphenomenal position that consciousness doesn't do anything ?

I am not working from the epiphenomenal position at all, but having the brain “generate” experience isn’t the only alternative. For example, the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious that already exists universally, and in this way individuate it from that generality. So when you say there’s no good answer unless (1) explains (2), it seems you are assuming a fact that is still in dispute (that consciousness is physically spawned).

We don't know what it is in the (1) sense -- how it relates the physical.

Again, you are assuming the (1) sense will explain consciousness. I say it won’t. But if you can demonstrate something physical generating consciousness (such as AI), then you’ll have a stronger argument. As of now physicalist theory is nothing more than that, except they like to talk like theirs is the TRUTH even when they can’t yet make the case.

Before people got the idea that it needs to be related to the physical, no-one worried about it.

Who is “no one”? You mean, no Western thinkers? Plenty of people throughout history have sought to understand consciousness, not empirically or by rationalistic thought, but by deepening their ability to experience the self. You know, there is some logic in exploring subjectivity subjectively.

The West is only now getting to the problem, and since the approach is empirical they assume up front they are going to find the answers in the brain’s neuronal complex. Well, it just may not be found there.

Well, we can figure out "a colour half-way between red and yellow" by reason.

You missed the point. You can figure out concepts of color, you can’t figure out an experience of color. It’s interesting that thinking is experienced, but experience cannot be thought. Might that not indicate the primacy of experience in the proper functioning of consciousness (I’ll explain a bit more about what I mean at the end of this post)?

The alleged ineffability of qualia is exaggerated and fuzzy-- how easy they are to think and communicate depends on exactly how you are thinking and communicating. The problem becomes most acute in the mathematical language of physics and computer science; I think that gives us a clue about the nature of qualia.

One thing I’ve seen plenty of at this site is the dubious physicalist strategy of saying, “If we can’t explain it, we’ll dismiss it! It isn’t real! It’s an illusion!” Maybe the fuzzyness of qualia is due to trying to conceptualize something that can only be known by experience. Maybe the problem is the approach of the conceptualizers, and not with those who recognize there is something unique about subjective experience.

And does that go on to answer the questions? Is experience a sufficient criterion, or only a necessary one. Understanding involves relating things together; if you build a wall between subjectivity and objectivity, you will never understand either.

I’m not trying to build a wall between them, I am saying they are naturally different. I had nothing to do with making them that way, but I can recognize their distinctions and, with a little wisdom, understand how to make progress in each realm. If all you are trying to do it reduce everything to a concept, you’ll never get what I am saying.

What I see is people “living in their minds.” By that I mean they think so incessantly that it creates something like a perpetual mental semi-dream where they relate to their own concepts, beliefs, assumptions, aversions, desires, etc. more than they pay attention to reality. Who knows love better, the deeply loving person, or the brilliant philosopher who provides the perfect explanation? People confuse having great concepts with actually knowing, which is why we have so many geniuses running around advising everybody on what they really know little about experientially.

Give me the courageous experiencer any day of the week. I can trust him to speak and be what he knows instead of being a walking talking brain.

 

[Tournesol]

I am not working from the epiphenomenal position at all, but having the brain “generate” experience isn’t the only alternative. For example, the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious that already exists universally, and in this way individuate it from that generality. So when you say there’s no good answer unless (1) explains (2), it seems you are assuming a fact that is still in dispute (that consciousness is physically spawned).

But (1) was stated as "the relationship of consc. to the physical".
The idea that "the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious" is a conclusion about just that. If it correct,
it is the correct answer to (1) , it would also explain (2), the fact that we have subjective experience at all, in the process.

Again, you are assuming the (1) sense will explain consciousness. I say it won’t. But if you can demonstrate something physical generating consciousness (such as AI), then you’ll have a stronger argument. As of now physicalist theory is nothing more than that, except they like to talk like theirs is the TRUTH even when they can’t yet make the case.

Every known aspect of consc. can be affected by intervention in the physical
brain, and the idea that consc. is generated by the brain is the simplest
explanation for those facts.

Who is “no one”? You mean, no Western thinkers? Plenty of people throughout history have sought to understand consciousness, not empirically or by rationalistic thought, but by deepening their ability to experience the self. You know, there is some logic in exploring subjectivity subjectively.

I don't see much hope that that approach will solve the problem that
will address the particular concern of current Western society, the relationship between consc. and matter.

The West is only now getting to the problem, and since the approach is empirical they assume up front they are going to find the answers in the brain’s neuronal complex. Well, it just may not be found there.

If you are looking at neurons alone, you will not even be able to state
the HP.

You missed the point. You can figure out concepts of color, you can’t figure out an experience of color.

Well, I think you can to some extent. Beethoven could write music he
couldn't hear.

It’s interesting that thinking is experienced,

non-phenomenally

but

phenomenal

experience cannot be thought. Might that not indicate the primacy of experience in the proper functioning of consciousness (I’ll explain a bit more about what I mean at the end of this post)?

One thing I’ve seen plenty of at this site is the dubious physicalist strategy of saying, “If we can’t explain it, we’ll dismiss it! It isn’t real! It’s an illusion!” Maybe the fuzzyness of qualia is due to trying to conceptualize something that can only be known by experience.

I was not arguing against qualia, but against an experience-only
approach (the inverse of the physicalism you complain about)
If we stick to experience alone, we cannot even state the HP

What I see is people “living in their minds.” By that I mean they think so incessantly that it creates something like a perpetual mental semi-dream where they relate to their own concepts, beliefs, assumptions, aversions, desires, etc. more than they pay attention to reality. Who knows love better, the deeply loving person, or the brilliant philosopher who provides the perfect explanation?

know-that or know how ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

But (1) was stated as "the relationship of consc. to the physical". The idea that "the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious" is a conclusion about just that. If it correct,
it is the correct answer to (1) , it would also explain (2), the fact that we have subjective experience at all, in the process.

Not necessarily. I would say the physical intensifies subjective experience rather than creates it. But the neuronal advocates are trying to attribute the whole ball of wax to the physical . . . from start to finish. Isn't that where you stand?

Every known aspect of consc. can be affected by intervention in the physical brain, and the idea that consc. is generated by the brain is the simplest explanation for those facts.

But so what? Let's say your mind could be transported to another planet far, far away by a sophisticated robotic device. Once there, you can will the robot to walk around and do things; you can smell and taste through it; you can think with it and learn things. The one caveat is that to participate in this alien experience, you temporarily lose all memory of your life on Earth when you are drawn into the robot, and have to accept total dependence on the machine.

What that means is, if the AI circuitry of that device is messed with, your mind is messed with too because you are (temporarily) totally dependent on it to remain on that alien planet. Of course, if you walk your robot off a cliff and lose your connection, then you will return to your conscious life on Earth and remember everything.

When the "simplest explanation" is the one that merely benefits someone's belief system, I suspect that is not what William of Ockham was intending for his razor.

I don't see much hope that that approach will solve the problem that will address the particular concern of current Western society, the relationship between consc. and matter.

That's right, especially if Western society is clueless about what consciousness really is. What if a bunch of accountants decided to figure out what joy is by applying the most advance accounting methods known to humanity? Would they ever achieve insight? Just because rationality and empirical research works for lots of stuff doesn't mean it works for everything.

Well, I think you can to some extent. Beethoven could write music he couldn't hear.

True, and I can write a story about a place I've never been. Do you really believe that a concept of something is the same as the experience of it? If you were starving to death, could you feed yourself with the concept of food? It seems like you aren't properly differentiating between reality and the image of reality represented in your mind.

I was not arguing against qualia, but against an experience-only approach (the inverse of the physicalism you complain about)
If we stick to experience alone, we cannot even state the HP

The hard problem IS experience, yet you want to grasp it with the easy problem (demonstrated brain functionality)! If that were possible, then you could program a computer to solve the hard problem.

 

[Tournesol]

What that means is, if the AI circuitry of that device is messed with, your mind is messed with too because you are (temporarily) totally dependent on it to remain on that alien planet. Of course, if you walk your robot off a cliff and lose your connection, then you will return to your conscious life on Earth and remember everything.

I am well aware that other explanantions than the physicalist one are compatible with the facts; there are always an infinite number of explanantions to fit the facts. That's why we need occam's razor.

When the "simplest explanation" is the one that merely benefits someone's belief system, I suspect that is not what William of Ockham was intending for his razor.

Unless you can provide a specific reason to reject the physicalist solution,
that comment rebounds on you: you are rejecting physicalism, despite
its simplicity, because it doesn't fit your belief system.

Would they ever achieve insight? Just because rationality and empirical research works for lots of stuff doesn't mean it works for everything.

Again, I am arguing for a two-handed subjective+objective approach.

True, and I can write a story about a place I've never been. Do you really believe that a concept of something is the same as the experience of it?

The ability of Beethoven to perform an aesthetic activity such as composition without literally having the actual experiences indicates, to my mind, that
the quale/concept distinction is a fuzzy one.

It seems like you aren't properly differentiating between reality and the image of reality represented in your mind.

There is a difference between eating food and imagining you are eating food.

There isn't a difference between "realy" being in pain and "merely feeling" that you are in pain. That is one of the unique features of subjectivity.

The hard problem IS experience,

No. As defined by Chalmers, it is the relationship between experience and
the physical.

yet you want to grasp it with the easy problem (demonstrated brain functionality)!

No, I am noting that all the evidence points towards the idea that consc. being genrated by the brain. How this happens is another matter entirely.

 

[Canute]

I'm not aware of any evidence that brain causes consciousness, can you give some examples? Nor can I understand why you say that the simplest answer to the consciousness question is that it is physically caused. Why is this any simpler than Les's answer?

Beethoven could imagine that he hear in his mind what he was writing perfectly well when he was deaf by the way. A good musician can hear the orchestra playing just by looking at the score. If he had been deaf since birth that would be a different case, but as it is his deafness tells us nothing in general about qualia.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not aware of any evidence that brain causes consciousness, can you give some examples?

Where do I start ? The whole of psychology and neuroscience supports this
idea. Every identified aspect of consciousness can be affected by drugs, surger,
injusry to the brain etc. The only counterargument anyone has is the
'receiver' idea, the idea that the brain just picks up consciousness from somewhere
else, and physical interventions affect its ability to do so, not "consciousness itself"

Nor can I understand why you say that the simplest answer to the consciousness question is that it is physically caused. Why is this any simpler than Les's answer?

Because it has a simpler ontology. It doesn't require a Universal Consciousness Field that spends millions of years hanging around waiting for a nervous system to manifest in.

Beethoven could imagine that he hear in his mind what he was writing perfectly well when he was deaf by the way. A good musician can hear the orchestra playing just by looking at the score. If he had been deaf since birth that would be a different case, but as it is his deafness tells us nothing in general about qualia.

It tells us that the ineffability of qualia is not absolute; in some cases we
can make good guesses at them without being exposed to them.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am well aware that other explanantions than the physicalist one are compatible with the facts; there are always an infinite number of explanantions to fit the facts. That's why we need occam's razor.

Occam’s razor, as a methodology, is a bias toward simplicity that has proven useful to empirical research, which is exclusively physical. Therefore, when a physicalist claims this methodology necessitates getting rid of irrelevant components during a dispute over whether something is entirely physical or not, the call for Occam’s razor is a self-serving tactic.

The core of the debate is if physicalness is producing consciousness or not. So if you can’t find it through methods designed to reveal only the physical, how can you then say Occam’s razor demands we eliminate (from modeling discussions) the very thing physical research is going to miss?

Unless you can provide a specific reason to reject the physicalist solution, that comment rebounds on you: you are rejecting physicalism, despite its simplicity, because it doesn't fit your belief system.

I don’t have a belief system, I am waiting until there are more facts before drawing a final conclusion. I can say that I am looking at everything that has gone on/goes on in this world, and not just the physical factors. I haven't met any physcialsts modeling with that sort of scope, so it is hard for me to respect their on consciousness thinking since I see it as narrow.

Further, I don't think physicalists are objective . . . they have decided a priori the world is physical and are determined to model that way even if they have to ignore, dismiss, and razor out anything threatening to get in the way. As I’ve said in debates here before, debating physicalists over the last two plus years here has been no different that debating Biblical creationists who find ways to make their theories fit facts.

So yes, there are specific reasons to reject physicalism, if for no other grounds that it’s an “ism” and not impartial. It is committed to itself rather than the truth, and I’ll always fight that when I see it, especially when it’s done in the guise of dispassionate truth seeking.

No. As defined by Chalmers, it is the relationship between experience and the physical.

The hard problem is that physical principles cannot explain subjective experience, and therefore something more may be required to account for consciousness. The [physicalist] spin you put on the debate makes it sound like there’s nothing to the issue but figuring out how the brain does it.

No, I am noting that all the evidence points towards the idea that consc. being generated by the brain. How this happens is another matter entirely.

Some evidence points toward the brain’s involvement in consciousness, and other factors cannot yet be explained by brain physiology. I say, it is your a priori beliefs that make you jump to physicalist conclusions at every opportunity.

The ability of Beethoven to perform an aesthetic activity such as composition without literally having the actual experiences indicates, to my mind, that the quale/concept distinction is a fuzzy one.

That has nothing to do with the differences! He may have done it conceptually, from memory of sound, but that does not blur the distinction between the concept of music and the direct experience of music. Two completely different things.

There is a difference between eating food and imagining you are eating food. There isn't a difference between "really" being in pain and "merely feeling" that you are in pain. That is one of the unique features of subjectivity.

Again, you cannot seem to differentiate between mentality and raw experience. The experience of physical pain—whether it is stimulated by a smack over the head, one’s delusions, or an electrode hooked to the brain—is experience if pain is actually felt. If, on the other hand, a person is imagining pain and not actually feeling it anywhere, then that is mental.

Mentality is based on conceptualization, reason, logic, imagination; experience is based on sensitivity . . . two different things. We know this because we have clearly distinguished them for doing science. There is hypothesis and there is observation. They work together, but you cannot substitute one for the other and do science properly.

 

[Tournesol]

Occam’s razor, as a methodology, is a bias toward simplicity that has proven useful to empirical research, which is exclusively physical. Therefore, when a physicalist claims this methodology necessitates getting rid of irrelevant components during a dispute over whether something is entirely physical or not, the call for Occam’s razor is a self-serving tactic.

I disagree. The question of simpicity applies to all explanations. An explanation in terms of 1 disembodied spirit is better than an explantion
in termsof 23.

The core of the debate is if physicalness is producing consciousness or not. So if you can’t find it through methods designed to reveal only the physical, how can you then say Occam’s razor demands we eliminate (from modeling discussions) the very thing physical research is going to miss?

I never said we eliminate consciousness per se. I said the idea that
consciousness is separate from matter an universal is an unnecessary
complication, since you still have to explain how a person, as a material
being, cpatures (or receives or concentrates) it.

I don’t have a belief system,

You clearly have certain biases.

I am waiting until there are more facts before drawing a final conclusion. I can say that I am looking at everything that has gone on/goes on in this world, and not just the physical factors. I haven't met any physcialsts modeling with that sort of scope, so it is hard for me to respect their on consciousness thinking since I see it as narrow.

There is a difference between the kind of physicalist who
admits that consc. is at least closely connected to brain function,
and that kind that rejects everything that cannot be reduced
to the language of physics.

Further, I don't think physicalists are objective . . . they have decided a priori the world is physical and are determined to model that way even if they have to ignore, dismiss, and razor out anything threatening to get in the way.

Some physicists are a-priori dogatiasts, some are not.

So yes, there are specific reasons to reject physicalism, if for no other grounds that it’s an “ism” and not impartial.

Would you still reject a-poteriori physicalism ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I disagree. The question of simpicity applies to all explanations. An explanation in terms of 1 disembodied spirit is better than an explantion in terms of 23.

Well, we are going to have to disagree HUGELY here because I think the Occam concept has a narrow, specialized application that is very much limited to observable physical situations. It doesn't work well when applied to metaphysical questions, whether one's metaphysics is physicalism or spiritualism or . . . (name your poison).

It makes no sense to state that simplicity is universally preferable to complexity. Have you followed any of the debates here by people trying to over-simplify relativity? If something is complex, then it would be moronic to try to make it simple.

Occam's razor was never meant to be interpreted as asserting simplicity is automatically preferable to complexity. It is merely a way of stating that when you have everything you need to explain something, then get rid of all the excess baggage. It is NOT a formula for incessantly being simplistic, especially if that becomes a ploy for "dismissing" things that really aren't explained by one's pet theory.

When it comes to consciousness (specifically qualia/subjectivity), it is not explained by physicalness. I say, the only reason physcialists what to simplify in this case is so they can promote their dogma.

You clearly have certain biases.

And that would be . . .

I am uncommitted, but I am also not going to deny experiences with my own consciousness which do not conform to physicalist theory.

Would you still reject a-poteriori physicalism ?

I don't reject a posteriori physical theorizing. It is a practical and useful exercise to try to model that way. What I object to is individuals clearly committed to physicalism glossing over what is missing from physicalist theory, who won't admit that all they are looking at is physicalness and that is why they see nothing else, and who act like they already know the "truth" when really they are as in the dark as everybody else about certain things.

 

[learningphysics]

The question of "why does experience exist" is not a scientific problem, any more than the question of "why does gravity exist".

 

[Les Sleeth]

The question of "why does experience exist" is not a scientific problem, any more than the question of "why does gravity exist".

Yes, but we are debating in the philosophy area.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, we are going to have to disagree HUGELY here because I think the Occam concept has a narrow, specialized application that is very much limited to observable physical situations. It doesn't work well when applied to metaphysical questions, whether one's metaphysics is physicalism or spiritualism or . . . (name your poison).

You are portraying O's R as something which generates good theories in
certain fields. I think of it as something which constitutes good theories
in every field - something which is part of the definition of what a good
theory is , a criterion of theoretical excellence. So what, in your view, are the
criteria of goodness in metaphysics ? (AFAICS metaphsyicians care at lot about ontological parsimony. It is almost the sole motivation for idealism
and solipsism).

It makes no sense to state that simplicity is universally preferable to complexity. Have you followed any of the debates here by people trying to over-simplify relativity? If something is complex, then it would be moronic to try to make it simple.

Of course explanatory economy needs to be balanced against explanantory breadth. It is always acceptable to add an entity to a theory if you can explain more by doing so. However, in the particular case of non-physicalist
explanations of consciousness, I don't see the benefit. If you declare that
there is a Universal Consciousness Field, then there is still the Hard Problem of
how it interacts with the brain. Physicalism has its own Hard Problem and one less entity.

I am uncommitted, but I am also not going to deny experiences with my own consciousness which do not conform to physicalist theory.

I fail to see how experience alone can deliver a verdict of non-physiciallity.
Surely physicallity is conceptual, a way of thinking about the world. In which case,we have the option of thinking about the material world differently,
rather than heading straight for an appeal to the supernatural.

 

[Tournesol]

The hard problem is that physical principles cannot explain subjective experience, and therefore something more may be required to account for consciousness.

Physical description don't capture exprience. That doesn't mean the brain isn't generating experience, it just means physical descriptions aren't the whole story.

The [physicalist] spin you put on the debate makes it sound like there’s nothing to the issue but figuring out how the brain does it.

The choice seems to be between how the brain 'does it' (generates consc.) ...and how the brain 'does it' (receives or concentrates consc.)

Again, you cannot seem to differentiate between mentality and raw experience.

I am arguing that there is no sharp distinction in th efirst place.

The experience of physical pain—whether it is stimulated by a smack over the head, one’s delusions, or an electrode hooked to the brain—is experience if pain is actually felt. If, on the other hand, a person is imagining pain and not actually feeling it anywhere, then that is mental.

How can you 'imagine' pain without feeling it ? If I imagine a horse -- imageine,as in 'image', ie picture to my self -- surely I have an experience.

Mentality is based on conceptualization, reason, logic, imagination; experience is based on sensitivity . . . two different things. We know this because we have clearly distinguished them for doing science. There is hypothesis and there is observation. They work together, but you cannot substitute one for the other and do science properly.

It's been known for ages that observation is theory-laden.

 

[Tournesol]

The question of "why does experience exist" is not a scientific problem, any more than the question of "why does gravity exist".

Not only is the latter a scientific problem, it has a perfectly good solution,
in GR: gravity exists because acceleration does.

 

[Canute]

Where do I start ? The whole of psychology and neuroscience supports this idea. Every identified aspect of consciousness can be affected by drugs, surger, injusry to the brain etc.

Nobody denies that our states of consciousness are affected by brain events, any more than they deny that central processor states affect the display on computer monitors. But computers don't cause monitors, and there is no evidence that brains cause consciousness. This is the whole problem. If there were evidence then there would be no 'problem of consciousness'.

The only counterargument anyone has is the 'receiver' idea, the idea that the brain just picks up consciousness from somewhere else, and physical interventions affect its ability to do so, not "consciousness itself"

That is not the only counterargument, but it's one of them. I think people who put this argument, and arguments like it, generally say that ordinary human consciousness takes a form which is largely, perhaps almost entirely, determined by brain (or at least is correlated to brain states). But they argue that consciousness itself, in an ontological sense, is something more fundamental than brains. It is not just mystics and meditators who claim this. Colin McGinn, for instance, as 'analytical' a philosopher as one could wish for, suggests that consciousness originates 'prior' to the birth of the universe. Neurophysiologist Karl Pribram opines that "Searching for consciousness in the brain is like digging to the centre of the Earth in search of gravity".

Because it has a simpler ontology. It doesn't require a Universal Consciousness Field that spends millions of years hanging around waiting for a nervous system to manifest in.

I didn't notice anyone suggesting this. You are assuming that consciousness as manifest 'in' nervous systems is an advance on consciousness in a more fundamental state. Generally people who claim that consciousness is fundamental argue that it's the other way around.

If physicist John Wheeler is right then consciousness had to exist at the very birth of the universe. He doesn't find the idea ridiculous or in contravention of Occam's rule of thumb. The reason you find your hypothesis more simple is that you are thinking of just a small part of a much bigger problem. If you relate the problem of the origins of consciousness to the wider problem of the origins of the universe you find that making consciousness fundamental is the simplest solution.

It tells us that the ineffability of qualia is not absolute; in some cases we can make good guesses at them without being exposed to them.

Only if we have been exposed to something like them previously and can make a guess based on analogy. But, as you say, it is a guess. The fact that we can guess what a quale might be like to experience doesn't make qualia effable. Rather, the fact that we are forced to guess shows that they are not.

As solipsism is unfalsifiable then clearly we cannot show that qualia are less real than material objects. Descartes makes this point, that it is possible that material objects do not exist, but not possible that the experiencer of them, at some level, does not.

 

[Tournesol]

Nobody denies that our states of consciousness are affected by brain events, any more than they deny that central processor states affect the display on computer monitors. But computers don't cause monitors, and there is no evidence that brains cause consciousness. This is the whole problem. If there were evidence then there would be no 'problem of consciousness'.

As I stated first time around, you need to take the neurological evidence
in conjunction with Occam's Razor -- it is the simplest explanantion.
Now, the Occam's razor solution isn't necessarily correct . So when you
say "no evidence" what you presumbaly mean is "the evidence isn't conlcusive,
since the simplest explanation may not be the correct one". But it is not
as if anyone else has a conclusive explanation. Everyone else has reasons
that incline them towards one eplanation or another -- evidence, in other words.
And so do physicalists.

That is not the only counterargument, but it's one of them. I think people who put this argument, and arguments like it, generally say that ordinary human consciousness takes a form which is largely, perhaps almost entirely, determined by brain (or at least is correlated to brain states). But they argue that consciousness itself, in an ontological sense, is something more fundamental than brains. It is not just mystics and meditators who claim this. Colin McGinn, for instance, as 'analytical' a philosopher as one could wish for, suggests that consciousness originates 'prior' to the birth of the universe.

Where ? AFAICT he insists that consc. is a natural phenomenon and
rejects panexprientialism.

Neurophysiologist Karl Pribram opines that "Searching for consciousness in the brain is like digging to the centre of the Earth in search of gravity".

And one day I will hear someone give a reason for those ideas, not just a ready made conclusion.

If physicist John Wheeler is right then consciousness had to exist at the very birth of the universe.

He has a crazy idea, but no that one: he thinks consciousness existing now
affects the distant past.

He doesn't find the idea ridiculous or in contravention of Occam's rule of thumb. The reason you find your hypothesis more simple is that you are thinking of just a small part of a much bigger problem. If you relate the problem of the origins of consciousness to the wider problem of the origins of the universe you find that making consciousness fundamental is the simplest solution.

Hmmm...

 

[learningphysics]

Not only is the latter a scientific problem, it has a perfectly good solution,
in GR: gravity exists because acceleration does.

Well, ok. Since GR holds, and since acceleration exists, gravity does.

Now the question becomes:
"Why does GR hold, and why does acceleration exist?"

I think you see what I'm getting at. I can keep asking why.

Scientific laws regarding the nature of experience will have to say something like... "If so and so occurs..., experience will happen"...

Anything more than this... an ultimate explanation (which seems to me what people seeking solutions to the hard problem are looking for), is out of the realm of science.

 

[Tournesol]

I rather suspect explanations with *that* degree of ultimacy are beyond any realm.

 

[learningphysics]

I rather suspect explanations with *that* degree of ultimacy are beyond any realm.

Yes, perhaps. It seems that ultimate explanation is *possible* with regards to mathematics and logic.

 

[Canute]

As I stated first time around, you need to take the neurological evidence in conjunction with Occam's Razor -- it is the simplest explanantion. Now, the Occam's razor solution isn't necessarily correct . So when you say "no evidence" what you presumbaly mean is "the evidence isn't conlcusive,since the simplest explanation may not be the correct one". But it is not as if anyone else has a conclusive explanation. Everyone else has reasons that incline them towards one eplanation or another -- evidence, in other words. And so do physicalists.

When I said 'no evidence' I meant that there is no scientific evidence that brains cause consciousness. There is evidence of an association between brains and consciousness but it can be interpreted in more than one way so does not count as evidence in any particular direction.

Btw, I'm not unaware of current research, and follow the journals to keep an eye on what's new. But so far the evidence doesn't help resolve this issue. This is because evidence of a correlation between brain states and conscious states has no bearing on which causes which, or on whether they are both caused by something else. All three views are current, and the scientific evidence supports each of them equally. This was Descartes's problem, and has led some to even suggest that brain and mind are causally independent but synchronised (by God in some views, by consciousness in others). The issue is still a problem, or one of them.

Also, it is not quite true to say that nobody has an explanation. Rather, scientists do not accept the explanation given by those who study evidence derived from research into experience as opposed to evidence derived from research into other people's brain states, judging it to be 'too subjective' and therefore not 'scientific'. They therefore categorise this explanation as a non-explanation, dismissing it in principle rather than because they have researched into it. They therefore, generally speaking, end up thinking that nobody has yet put forward an explanation.

Where ? AFAICT he insists that consc. is a natural phenomenon and
rejects panexprientialism.

Try a search on 'mysterianism'. To suggest that consciousness is fundamental is not to suggest that it is not a natural phenomenon nor, I think, does it necessarily imply panexperientialism.

And one day I will hear someone give a reason for those ideas, not just a ready made conclusion.

The reasons are not hard to find, they're all over the Western scientific/philosophical literature on consciousness, and have been laid out a zillion times by Eastern philosophers. Are you quite sure that you're not hearing them, or just not listening?

He has a crazy idea, but no that one: he thinks consciousness existing now affects the distant past.

You may think that's crazy, but it's bang in line with what we know of quantum physics, in particular the time-symmetric nature of causation, and the common view in physics that space-time is some sort of illusion.

Hmmm...

Ha. Good response. The idea that consciousness is fundamental makes many people go hmmm, but it is not at all odd, or at least no more odd than the idea that matter is fundamental. However I can understand why you're sceptical. I used to be as well, and have argued at length that it was a ridiculous idea.

However, I wasn't trying to persuade you here that it's true, just pointing out that if it is true then on analysis it allows a very simple explanation of reality to be constructed. Because of this the idea cannot be dismissed by reference to Occam, only by reference to the evidence.

According to scientific experts that evidence is ambiguous. According to others, Les Sleeth for instance, and a couple of millenias worth of other people who have taken an introspective as well as an 'extrospective' approach to researching the nature of consciousness and reality, the evidence is perfectly clear, self-evident in fact, but takes a bit of time and practice to uncover. Whether true or false this is not a claim that can simply be dismissed out of hand, but only by reason or evidence.

 

[StatusX]

Here's a couple more ideas I had. First, if you don't believe in qualia, then reincarnation is a fundamentally incoherent idea to you. If you can imagine reincarnation being possible, then you see what we mean by qualia, that there is an inner experiencing being independent of the physical body. (call it a soul if you want, but it doesn't have to go to heaven, and I doubt it would exist in any form after death).

Second, imagine two universes. One "exists" in the same sense that our universe exists (don't worry if you think this is vauge, that will be my point). The second is just a hypothetical universe some scientist has thought up. Neither of these universes contain any experiencing beings. Is there any possible way in which the first can be considered more real than the second? Is existence a meaningful concept in the absence of experience? Are qualia just the manifestation of that extra posit in physics that "this is all real"? Interestingly (and unintentionally) this makes the wording of the title of this thread more significant: Is "real" just "experienced"?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Is existence a meaningful concept in the absence of experience? Are qualia just the manifestation of that extra posit in physics that "this is all real"? Interestingly (and unintentionally) this makes the wording of the title of this thread more significant: Is "real" just "experienced"?

Personally I don't think experience has anything to do with the existence of something else. Things/conditions exist whether anyone is conscious of them or not, but the only reason that is known is because experience also exists. So experience is about knowing existence, IMO.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am arguing that there is no sharp distinction in the first place . . . How can you 'imagine' pain without feeling it ? If I imagine a horse -- imagine,as in 'image', ie picture to my self -- surely I have an experience. . . . It's been known for ages that observation is theory-laden.

I don't have much hope we will ever agree mainly because of your above view, which seems to be that mentality and experience are the same thing (I've admitted mentality is an experience). I'll make one more attempt to argue they are entirely different.

It is true that when you imagine or think, you have an experience because not only is a thought or image present in your mind, you are also aware there is an image there. It's the "you" that makes it a conscious experience. If there was no internal "subject" to be aware the image -- like, say, the way a television has an image -- then it isn't conscious.

In your example of imagining a horse, the image is one thing and your internal awareness of it is another, but in any case, if there is no actual horse there to experience, then you are experiencing your imagination and not a horse. In the example of pain, if you imagine it then as long as you don't feel pain, then you are having an experience of imagination, not pain. Once you feel pain somewhere you are also experiencing pain. I say, it is the sensitivity of consciousness that allows experience, whether the input comes from thoughts, imaginings, the senses, etc., and the presence of a self

I have a little theory that one reason for the differences you and I are having is due to what kind of experience we each rely on most to know reality. If one relies primarily on the intellect, what is the primary source of one's experience? It is the intellect, which has been conditioned, can't stop thinking (i.e., and so is not under control), full of bias and opinion . . . In my view that person is not spending enough time viewing reality without the intellectual filters.

Another option for experience is to just be in the moment of reality, and to keep one's mind more quiet so one can experience reality as it is instead of how one's mind wants to present it.

So who is better set up to know reality? The person devoted to experiencing his own mind, or the person devoted to experiencing reality as it is and keeping mind out of the way?

 

[StatusX]

Personally I don't think experience has anything to do with the existence of something else. Things/conditions exist whether anyone is conscious of them or not, but the only reason that is known is because experience also exists. So experience is about knowing existence, IMO.

What about non-cognitive experience? If that exists, it isn't about knowing, it's purely about being. Also, this would make a consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation of QM more natural.

 

[learningphysics]

the being that is having experience

The real "irreducible" problem seems to me not that experience does happen... I believe we'll have better and better correlations between brain states and experience... states of matter and experience in the future. I'm willing to say that matter can create experience.

But I'm not willing to say that matter can create a being that is capable of having experience. For every experience there is the matter of the experience, and there is the subject. What is the nature of this subject? Is it matter? Is there a subject at all? I believe it exists, many would say no.

 

[Les Sleeth]

What about non-cognitive experience? If that exists, it isn't about knowing, it's purely about being. Also, this would make a consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation of QM more natural.

I've been following some of the discussion about that here, but I personally don't believe non-congitive experience makes sense. Without subjective awareness I wouldn't call it experience because then we've just messed up the meaning of experience. Maybe there are proto-experience conditions or parallels in reality, but I'd call them something else to preserve the definition of experience.

I also am not convinced it's consciousness that's causing the collapse, but rather some way we are physically intruding when we observe (I like the carrier wave theory myself). But even if it is consciousness that causes it, I don't see how that implies non-cognitive experience. It could simply mean that under certain condtions, experience can result in physical consequences.

 

[Tournesol]

Yes, perhaps. It seems that ultimate explanation is *possible* with regards to mathematics and logic.

I don't see how either maths or logic can explain the *real* existence
of anything, and I don't see how either can said to be ultimate when they depned on axioms.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The real "irreducible" problem seems to me not that experience does happen... I believe we'll have better and better correlations between brain states and experience... states of matter and experience in the future. I'm willing to say that matter can create experience.

But I'm not willing to say that matter can create a being that is capable of having experience. For every experience there is the matter of the experience, and there is the subject. What is the nature of this subject? Is it matter? Is there a subject at all? I believe it exists, many would say no.

That's an interesting way to outline the problem. I am not quite sure I understand what you mean by "matter can create experience." Do you mean avenues for stimulating experience, such as the senses, or physical data that is experienced?

See, I can't understand how there can be experience without the being. The being is what creates subjectivity, and subjective awareness is the definition of experience. Now, if you are talking about particular types of experience such as sound or sight, etc., rather than the actual state of "experiencing" then I agree matter generates experiences. I also don't think the brain is generating the experiencing being.

 

[Tournesol]

When I said 'no evidence' I meant that there is no scientific evidence that brains cause consciousness. There is evidence of an association between brains and consciousness but it can be interpreted in more than one way so does not count as evidence in any particular direction.

Yes it does in conjunction with Occam's razor. Of course nothing
counts as evidence for anything without some theoretical assumptions
in the backgorund.

Btw, I'm not unaware of current research, and follow the journals to keep an eye on what's new. But so far the evidence doesn't help resolve this issue. This is because evidence of a correlation between brain states and conscious states has no bearing on which causes which, or on whether they are both caused by something else.

Considerations of theoretical simplicity and consitency weigh strongly in favour
of mind states being identical with or caused by brain states. Do not confuse
the fact that a question is open with the idea that all options are equally likely.

All three views are current, and the scientific evidence supports each of them equally. This was Descartes's problem, and has led some to even suggest that brain and mind are causally independent but synchronised (by God in some views, by consciousness in others). The issue is still a problem, or one of them.

Also, it is not quite true to say that nobody has an explanation. Rather, scientists do not accept the explanation given by those who study evidence derived from research into experience as opposed to evidence derived from research into other people's brain states, judging it to be 'too subjective' and therefore not 'scientific'.

Can you point me to what they about how an immaterial consciousness ineteracts with a physical brain ?

They therefore, generally speaking, end up thinking that nobody has yet put forward an explanation.

I keep asking for explanations (as opposed to claims) and not getting them.

Try a search on 'mysterianism'.

McGinn's mysterianism is the claim that consciousness is natural but bwyond
our ability to understand.

The reasons are not hard to find, they're all over the Western scientific/philosophical literature on consciousness, and have been laid out a zillion times by Eastern philosophers. Are you quite sure that you're not hearing them, or just not listening?

I have read a many versions of dualism, idealism, panexperientialism, etc,
and obviously I don't find them convincing. If you can settle
on a version and put up a defence for it, fine.

You may think that's crazy, but it's bang in line with what we know of quantum physics,

We don't know what the correct interpretation of QM is, and the
idea that consciousness has somehting to do with it is based
on clearly identifiable errors.

in particular the time-symmetric nature of causation,

That is one theory. One of the better ones in my view, but Wheeler's
theory requires backwards causation AND miraculous consciousness.

and the common view in physics that space-time is some sort of illusion.

No, that is not a common view.

The idea that consciousness is fundamental makes many people go hmmm, but it is not at all odd, or at least no more odd than the idea that matter is fundamental.

it odder, because a) matter has clearly always been around and consc.
has not b) we know of oodles of things which are material but not
conscious, and have no clear evidence of anything that is consc. but not material.

However, I wasn't trying to persuade you here that it's true, just pointing out that if it is true then on analysis it allows a very simple explanation of reality to be constructed. Because of this the idea cannot be dismissed by reference to Occam, only by reference to the evidence.

Without Occam, the evidence supports an infinity of theories.

 

[learningphysics]

That's an interesting way to outline the problem. I am not quite sure I understand what you mean by "matter can create experience." Do you mean avenues for stimulating experience, such as the senses, or physical data that is experienced?

See, I can't understand how there can be experience without the being. The being is what creates subjectivity, and subjective awareness is the definition of experience. Now, if you are talking about particular types of experience such as sound or sight, etc., rather than the actual state of "experiencing" then I agree matter generates experiences. I also don't think the brain is generating the experiencing being.

I think we are in agreement. The Buddhist concept of "no-self" is mainly what I was thinking of when I mentioned people who'd say there was no being. Also Hume.

Their argument seems to be that within the content of experience there is no being that is seen, or at least nothing that can be called "self". If the self is not within sense-data then how do we know it exists? (This is not me asking, but the type of argument I've seen put forward).

It seems obvious to me that experience necessarily has a subject, because of the "nature" of experience. And it obviously cannot be within sense-data because it is what is experiencing the sense-data. There are things we can be certain of, even if they are not "sensed".

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think we are in agreement. The Buddhist concept of "no-self" is mainly what I was thinking of when I mentioned people who'd say there was no being. Also Hume.

Their argument seems to be that within the content of experience there is no being that is seen, or at least nothing that can be called "self". If the self is not within sense-data then how do we know it exists? (This is not me asking, but the type of argument I've seen put forward).

It seems obvious to me that experience necessarily has a subject, because of the "nature" of experience. And it obviously cannot be within sense-data because it is what is experiencing the sense-data. There are things we can be certain of, even if they are not "sensed".

Nicely reasoned. I'd add that those who ask the question "if the self is not within sense-data then how do we know it exists" do so because they've not explored the consciousness potential of inner experience. If they have success with that, then they will know that experience isn't dependent on the senses.

 

[StatusX]

Here's a test for those of you who don't believe in qualia, related to what I said before about reincarnation.

The most likely way a teleportation device would work would be to scan every atom in our body, destroy us, and create a physically identical body at another location. I, for one, would never use such a machine, and I doubt many would. But if you really believe we are nothing more than our physical bodies, then you should have no qualms about being destroyed and recreated. Where as I would be afraid that I'd no longer be "looking out through the eyes" of this new body (think about what would happen if the original body wasn't destroyed), such a fear would be absurd and meaningless to you. So, would you do it?

 

[learningphysics]

Here's a test for those of you who don't believe in qualia, related to what I said before about reincarnation.

The most likely way a teleportation device would work would be to scan every atom in our body, destroy us, and create a physically identical body at another location. I, for one, would never use such a machine, and I doubt many would. But if you really believe we are nothing more than our physical bodies, then you should have no qualms about being destroyed and recreated. Where as I would be afraid that I'd no longer be "looking out through the eyes" of this new body (think about what would happen if the original body wasn't destroyed), such a fear would be absurd and meaningless to you. So, would you do it?

Actually it seems that if you believe we are no more than our physical bodies, you'd be even more afraid of going into a transporter. Since it is definitely a new physical body, not the same one as before... then by definition (if we define a person as the physical body) the original person is destroyed (original physical body is destroyed) and a new one is created (new physical body with new atoms).

 

[StatusX]

Actually it seems that if you believe we are no more than our physical bodies, you'd be even more afraid of going into a transporter. Since it is definitely a new physical body, not the same one as before... then by definition (if we define a person as the physical body) the original person is destroyed (original physical body is destroyed) and a new one is created (new physical body with new atoms).

If an exact copy is created, nothing will have changed except your position. There is no meaningful physical difference between two identical atoms. What would they have to be afraid of, if they were guaranteed everything would go as planned? On the other hand, if you believed there was some non-physical essence that wasn't being transferred, you would be afraid to use it.

 

[learningphysics]

If an exact copy is created, nothing will have changed except your position. There is no meaningful physical difference between two identical atoms. What would they have to be afraid of, if they were guaranteed everything would go as planned? On the other hand, if you believed there was some non-physical essence that wasn't being transferred, you would be afraid to use it.

What if an exact copy was created and the original wasn't destroyed? If there is no non-physical essense, what happens?

 

[StatusX]

What if an exact copy was created and the original wasn't destroyed? If there is no non-physical essense, what happens?

I don't know, but how does this affect the question? The point is that if a person is no more than their physical body, then there is nothing wrong with destroying that body and then recreating it exactly as it was before. The person would not report any changes, except that they are now in a new location. Heterophenomenolgy would have to say this is the same person. A physicalist should have no problem using a teleporter.

 

[loseyourname]

Here's a test for those of you who don't believe in qualia, related to what I said before about reincarnation.

The most likely way a teleportation device would work would be to scan every atom in our body, destroy us, and create a physically identical body at another location. I, for one, would never use such a machine, and I doubt many would. But if you really believe we are nothing more than our physical bodies, then you should have no qualms about being destroyed and recreated. Where as I would be afraid that I'd no longer be "looking out through the eyes" of this new body (think about what would happen if the original body wasn't destroyed), such a fear would be absurd and meaningless to you. So, would you do it?

I wouldn't have any trouble doing it. Even if you believe, as you do, that consciousness is somehow linked to the intrinsic base of the physical, why should you have any qualms? Intrinsically, the physical stuff should still be the same as well, and hence you should continue to be the same experiencing subject, whether you are a physicalist or not. The only hypothesis that would have you as a potentially different person is the soul hypothesis, which you've never seemed to subscribe to. (Although it is worth pointing out that, even under the soul hypothesis, your soul can presumably find its way back to your physical body in the same manner it found its way there in the first place.)

 

[StatusX]

I wouldn't have any trouble doing it. Even if you believe, as you do, that consciousness is somehow linked to the intrinsic base of the physical, why should you have any qualms? Intrinsically, the physical stuff should still be the same as well, and hence you should continue to be the same experiencing subject, whether you are a physicalist or not. The only hypothesis that would have you as a potentially different person is the soul hypothesis, which you've never seemed to subscribe to. (Although it is worth pointing out that, even under the soul hypothesis, your soul can presumably find its way back to your physical body in the same manner it found its way there in the first place.)

The problem I have, as mentioned above, is what would happen if the original wasn't destroyed? There is no reason you would stop experiencing from the original body and switch over to the new one. So why should you switch when the original is destroyed. Of course, this presupposes the existence of an inner experiencing being. But it's interesting to note that the mind-body problem could actually have some practical applications. We'll want to know exactly how our experiences ground themselves in our physical brains before we hop in a teleporter.

 

[Tournesol]

I don't have much hope we will ever agree mainly because of your above view, which seems to be that mentality and experience are the same thing (I've admitted mentality is an experience). I'll make one more attempt to argue they are entirely different.

I am not arguing that phenomenallity and cognition and consciousness are
all identical; I am trying to urge against characterising qualia in terms of absolutes
(absolutely ineffeable, incorrigible, private, etc) since a) it's not true and b) it plays straight into
the hands of qulai-denyers like Dennett.

It is true that when you imagine or think, you have an experience because not only is a thought or image present in your mind, you are also aware there is an image there.

Or at least there is some awareness.

It's the "you" that makes it a conscious experience.

Or the experience itself.

If there was no internal "subject" to be aware the image -- like, say, the way a television has an image -- then it isn't conscious.

This 'homuncular' or 'Cartesian Theatre' image is also a) ill-supported and b) a gift
to consciousness-denyers.

I have a little theory that one reason for the differences you and I are having is due to what kind of experience we each rely on most to know reality. If one relies primarily on the intellect, what is the primary source of one's experience? It is the intellect, which has been conditioned, can't stop thinking (i.e., and so is not under control), full of bias and opinion . . . In my view that person is not spending enough time viewing reality without the intellectual filters.

Well, if the metaphysics of mind is such that thoughts and ideas are barriers
to awareness, and without them we become omniscient, then that might work.

OTOH, if the metaphysics of mind is such that thoughts and ideas are all we have to work with and without them we are as helpless as newborn infants, then it won't.

Another option for experience is to just be in the moment of reality, and to keep one's mind more quiet so one can experience reality as it is instead of how one's mind wants to present it.

And this allows one to experience reality as it is in itself...or is one just experiencing one's own experience.

So who is better set up to know reality? The person devoted to experiencing his own mind, or the person devoted to experiencing reality as it is and keeping mind out of the way?

Or the person experiencing whatever their limited, finites self is capable of experiencing, and making the bold, if unconsicous, assumption that they are in possesion of the complete picture.

 

[learningphysics]

I don't know, but how does this affect the question? The point is that if a person is no more than their physical body, then there is nothing wrong with destroying that body and then recreating it exactly as it was before. The person would not report any changes, except that they are now in a new location. Heterophenomenolgy would have to say this is the same person. A physicalist should have no problem using a teleporter.

Well, I'd think there were some physicalists who would hold that one atom "is" significantly different from another.

Anyway. It seems like there are a variety of positions. From the thread and off the top of my head:

A. No experiencing beings.
Impossible to create or destroy anyone. However, for me anyway, it contradicts my primal intuition of experience.

B. There is an experiencing being
1) The being is something physical.
a) The being is literally his atoms. Any change in the set of atoms
yields a new person. With this view, a transporter recreation would
be a new person. Copying yields no paradox. However, this view
implies that persons are continually destroyed and created as atoms
are replaced.
b) The person arises as a result of some physical process - an
epiphenomenon of some type. As long as the process remains, the
person remains. Transporter recreation would be the same person.
Copying yields a paradox.
2) The being is non-physical (soul), linked to the physical body. Here it is
unknown what will happen when you destroy and recreate the physical
body. If the link is reestablished, the person is resurrected in the new
physical body. Copying presumably creates a new person with the new
body linked to a different soul. Or maybe it is a physical process in the
body that creates the link. If two bodies have identical processes maybe
they share the same soul, like a time-sharing process in a computer
network.