PeterDonis said:
You can't prove any QM interpretation incorrect since they all make the same predictions for all experimental results.
The Penrose interpretation with gravitationally induced collapse or other spontaneous collapse interpretations like GRW do make different predictions for some experimental results, at least in theory. In practice, their parameters are adjusted appropriately such that it is very hard to disprove them by experiment. This is one of the things I had in mind when I wrote: "an interpretation that has been proven incorrect will ... slightly adapt itself such that it ... needs significant more effort to be proven incorrect".
However, I don't want to trivialize my suggestion that proving a particular interpretation incorrect would be interesting, and that often an interpretation proven incorrect "will probably just slightly adapt itself such that it is ... no longer incorrect". (Well, I am not sure what PeterDonis is getting at, so I also want to offer a less ironclad answer which offers more opportunities for being attacked.)
Let me give a non-trivial example by answering
a question based on an objection to Everett I found in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's Der Garten des Menschlichen (1977):
Of course Hume is right that justifying induction by its success in the past is circular. Of course Copenhagen is right that describing measurements in terms of unitary quantum mechanics is circular. Of course Poincaré is right that defining the natural numbers as finite strings of digits is circular. …
But this circularity is somehow trivial, it doesn’t really count. It does make sense to use induction, describing measurement in terms of unitary quantum mechanics does clarify things, and the natural numbers are really well defined. But why? Has anybody ever written a clear refutation explaining how to overcome those trivial circularities? …
To clarify:
Edward Teller tells a story about Bohr suggesting that he would have brought up Everett's idea and Bohr would have uttered some enigmatic words, which must be translated into von Weizsäcker's objection, and that accidentally von Weizsäcker happened to be there too. Who knows, but at least both Teller and von Weizsäcker are pupils of Heisenberg that consistently defend his version of the Copenhagen interpretation, and the objection is consistent with Heisenberg's philosophy.
The answer to the objection is that arguments using decoherence factor the Hilbert space into subsystems and the environment. This designation of an environment is a structure in addition to the Hilbert space and the Hamiltonian. Even more, this designation of an environment is typically based on the space-time structure of the world, and so implicitly brings the 3+1 dimensional structure (so important for our everyday experiences) back into Everett QM. As Jan-Markus Schwindt wrote in
Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation:
If we take QM in the EI, the mathematical structure is the state vector and its time evolution. This structure has actually turned out to be empty if it stands on its own. It becomes a nontrivial structure only in relation to an external observer, or through the interaction with an environment which is not part of the state vector already.
...
A structure is a structure only with respect to some observer or environment outside the structure who reads off the structure as a structure in a specific way.