Axiomatic Systems & Modern Physics

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the use of axiomatic systems in quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity (GR), particularly in relation to their consistency and applicability in describing physical phenomena. Participants explore whether different axiomatic frameworks are employed in non-classical physics and the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem on the completeness of physical theories.

Discussion Character

  • Exploratory
  • Debate/contested
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Technical explanation

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants question whether QM and GR can be based on the same axioms due to their inconsistencies.
  • There is a suggestion that physics should not be treated like mathematics, as physics is grounded in real-world observations.
  • One participant notes that while a theory can be mathematically consistent, its postulates arise from empirical observations.
  • Another participant raises the possibility of achieving a complete physical theory, questioning the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem.
  • Concerns are expressed about the inability to prove a theory correct until it is tested, suggesting that completeness may not equate to usefulness in describing reality.
  • It is mentioned that axiomatization in physics is rare, with classical electrodynamics lacking a formal axiomatic system.
  • One participant asserts that continuum mechanics has been axiomatized, but emphasizes that additional constitutive relations are necessary to fully describe physical behavior.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express differing views on the nature and role of axiomatic systems in physics, with no consensus on whether a complete axiomatic framework can be established for theories like QM and GR. The discussion remains unresolved regarding the implications of Gödel's theorem on physical theories.

Contextual Notes

Participants highlight limitations in the axiomatization of physical theories, noting that the purpose of any proposed axioms may differ significantly from those in mathematics. The discussion also reflects uncertainty regarding the sufficiency of existing axiomatic systems in capturing the complexities of physical phenomena.

Atran
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Hi, I'm not sure if this is the right place to post this.
Are other different axiomatic systems used for QM & GR?
I mean, as I'm currently a high school student, all theorems I've learned are proved by the same set of axioms.
I wonder if another applicable axiomatic system is used for non-classical physics.

Thanks for any valuable answer...
 
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QM and GR are inconsistent with each other, so presumably they couldn't start with the same axioms.

Bit of advice from a mathematician: Don't treat physics like mathematics. Ultimately physics depends on the real world, while mathematics comes from a consistent set of axioms.
 
Solid advice. A good theory will be mathematically consistent with itself, but its postulates still come from observation.
 
mathman said:
Bit of advice from a mathematician: Don't treat physics like mathematics. Ultimately physics depends on the real world, while mathematics comes from a consistent set of axioms.
K^2 said:
Solid advice. A good theory will be mathematically consistent with itself, but its postulates still come from observation.
I know that, for every axiomatic system, there is a logical framework.
We describe reality logically and therefore we are continuously seeking for an axiomatic system which with more accuracy applies to our reality.
If Gödel's incompleteness theorem is true, then is it possible to achieve a complete physics theory?
What if an observed phenomena could be explained by two different sets of axioms, and if so, which one would you recommend?
 
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Problem is that we can't tell that a theory fails to describe something until we try it. That means, no theory can ever be proven to be correct.

With that in mind, yes, it's possible to build a theory that's complete, but it will probably be useless. Something like 1=1 comes to mind. That's about as complete as you can make it, and in terms of mathematical absolutes, no better than any other theory we may develop. But it doesn't describe the real world very well. Or at all. From perspective of physics, that's a bit of a problem.
 
Atran said:
Are other different axiomatic systems used for QM & GR?
I mean, as I'm currently a high school student, all theorems I've learned are proved by the same set of axioms.
I wonder if another applicable axiomatic system is used for non-classical physics.

In general: it's very rare for a physics theory to be axiomatized.

For instance, there are no axioms for classical electrodynamics. (If I remember correctly someone tried, and came up with a system of 6 axioms or so. I don't know whether that was a sufficient system.)

In the few cases where there is a small set of "laws" the main purpose of those "axioms" is to be evocative. Compared to axioms in mathematics they really serve quite a different purpose.

As I said, the purpose of the "axioms" is to be evocative, to captivate, I don't think there is any mathematical rigor to it. It's about focussing attention on what is regarded as most fundamental in the theory.
 
mathman said:
Ultimately physics depends on the real world, while mathematics comes from a consistent set of axioms.

K^2 said:
Solid advice. A good theory will be mathematically consistent with itself, but its postulates still come from observation.

Cleonis said:
In general: it's very rare for a physics theory to be axiomatized.

For instance, there are no axioms for classical electrodynamics.

I'm not a mathematician, but I am fairly certain that continuum mechanics (which includes GR, electrodynamics and thermodynamics) has been fully axiomatized (AFAIK, by Truesdell and Noll), at least in the sense Hilbert meant.

However, it is true that the axioms of continuum mechanics alone do not completely specify the physical behavior of an arbitrary system: for that, *constitutive relations* must be specified (by oberservation or measurement).

But I'm not able to claim this is a fact as well as a real mathematician could.
 

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