Can Oakland Survive a Disaster Without Federal Aid?

[Astronuc]

80% of New Orleans citizens were evacuated. That's a very large rate. FEMA was only predicting 60%.

That left 20% or about 80,000 - 100,000 people left. They needed to be evacuated. Where were the buses then. The City was waiting for FEMA, and FEMA was ?

The bus issue is a ruse.

I saw quite a few flooded buses in New Orleans, well away from the Superdome. So something wasn't right.

Several of my friends had evacuated by Saturday, and I believe most of the 80% had done so by Sunday morning. That left Sunday through that late afternoon to get out. Katrina's eye came over Plaquemines Parish at the mouth of the Mississippi about 0400 Monday. Certainly no one was going to leave then.

I would like to know what happened on Tuesday morning and thereafter.

 

[BobG]

It occurs to me that they could have had buses on standby in Lafayette and Baton Rouge.

All the available buses in New Orleans should have been brought to the Superdome, and parked on the overpasses nearby so as not to get flooded.

They had expected a Cat 4 storm, at high tide, so there was a chance that the levees would have been overtopped (the water would have flown over the levees and flooded the city).

Clearly the responsible authorites at the City and State level had not worked out contingencies, and that was not the fault of the federal government.

On the other hand, someone should have been watching the levees for signs of failure, or at least there should have been some monitoring system of the integrity. Was that strictly some entity in the federal government, such as the Army Corps of Engineers?

The city's buses should have been moved from low ground, but surely not parked on the overpasses. No telling where they'd be after the hurricane and bad news for anyone that has a bus landing on them. Their buses should have been stored on high ground in a protected parking deck - i.e. Money!

Actually, even if not permanently stored in a parking deck, the city could have commandeered a parking deck for the short term - during a mandatory evacuation, shouldn't most of the cars be gone from the parking deck? Or does the parking business actually pick up as people decide that's a good time to store their second or third cars?

 

[SOS2008]

The city's buses should have been moved from low ground, but surely not parked on the overpasses. No telling where they'd be after the hurricane and bad news for anyone that has a bus landing on them. Their buses should have been stored on high ground in a protected parking deck - i.e. Money!

Actually, even if not permanently stored in a parking deck, the city could have commandeered a parking deck for the short term - during a mandatory evacuation, shouldn't most of the cars be gone from the parking deck? Or does the parking business actually pick up as people decide that's a good time to store their second or third cars?

I heard the problem was getting bus drivers to drive the buses. Sen. Landrieu stated that Mayor Nagin had a hard time getting these people to work on a sunny day, let alone in the face of a hurricane. Ouch, that may be a little harsh--In all fairness bus drivers are not trained for crisis (even police who are trained "to protect and to serve" couldn't handle their jobs) and given a choice to evacuate as ordered, it wouldn't surprise me.

 

[TRCSF]

I heard the problem was getting bus drivers to drive the buses. Sen. Landrieu stated that Mayor Nagin had a hard time getting these people to work on a sunny day, let alone in the face of a hurricane. Ouch, that may be a little harsh--In all fairness bus drivers are not trained for crisis (even police who are trained "to protect and to serve" couldn't handle their jobs) and given a choice to evacuate as ordered, it wouldn't surprise me.

Actually, she was talking about any given mayor, not Nagin specificially. But yeah, the buses were being used up until the bus drivers had to evacuate themselves. It's not like bus drivers are first responders.

 

[2CentsWorth]

I just saw this and nearly soiled myself:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9324891/

Bush takes blame for flaws in Katrina response
President heading to Louisiana on Thursday for primetime speech

"Katrina exposed serious problems in our response capability at all levels of government," Bush said at joint White House news conference with the president of Iraq.

"To the extent the federal government didn't fully do its job right, I take responsibility," Bush said.

Though the excerpts quoted above are a bit parsed, I suspect they know what an investigation will find.

 

[pattylou]

My God. Has hell frozen over?

 

[pattylou]

Defending the heroes, not the process
As for blunders in the federal response, "I'm not going to defend the process going in," Bush said. "I am going to defend the people saving lives."

=smirk= I can't wait to see him defend Gore, in that case.

 

[TRCSF]

Heh. "To the extent..."

More bull.

 

[Astronuc]

But yeah, the buses were being used up until the bus drivers had to evacuate themselves. It's not like bus drivers are first responders.

And that is a problem with the city's emergency preparedness plan that the city and state should have addressed. When the only way to evacuate a population is by bus, then someone better be sure those buses are there!

The buses perhaps got people to the Superdome, but when that had to be evacuated, then what? What was the plan? That is where the city and state fell short.

FEMA should have been monitoring that, and when something went wrong, they should have been able to step in.

"Katrina exposed serious problems in our response capability at all levels of government," Bush said at joint White House news conference with the president of Iraq.

"To the extent the federal government didn't fully do its job right, I take responsibility," Bush said.

For once Bush has impressed me. I really hope he is sincere and follows through.

 

[TRCSF]

The buses perhaps got people to the Superdome, but when that had to be evacuated, then what? What was the plan? That is where the city and state fell short.

FEMA should have been monitoring that, and when something went wrong, they should have been able to step in.

After the storm New Orleans was essentially destroyed. It's completely unrealistic to think that the city government was in any position to get people out of town at that point.

That's exactly what FEMA is for.

 

[faust9]

It seems the paths of evacuation were frought with shotgun wielding sheriffs: http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/13/katrina.bridge/index.html

Make of it what you will.

 

[2CentsWorth]

It seems the paths of evacuation were frought with shotgun wielding sheriffs: http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/13/katrina.bridge/index.html

Make of it what you will.

To me it is definitely of a discriminatory nature. It sounds like there was fear that looting would spread, fair enough, but it was mostly women and children and some disabled folks (according to the person interviewed). I can't believe there wasn't a school or some place the people could have been allowed to go (with a water fountain or vending machines?).

 

[loseyourname]

It seems the paths of evacuation were frought with shotgun wielding sheriffs: http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/13/katrina.bridge/index.html

Make of it what you will.

Racism is probably part of this, but this is also bad communication between municipalities. A mayor shouldn't tell his people to evacuate to the next city over without first consulting that city's officials to make sure they'll be welcome.

 

[Astronuc]

After the storm New Orleans was essentially destroyed. It's completely unrealistic to think that the city government was in any position to get people out of town at that point.

Not quite - not until the levees started failing and the flooding began.

That's exactly what FEMA is for.

Perhaps. This is a grey area. FEMA is supposed to 'support' local and state efforts, and state governments (or their emergency preparedness programs/offices) are supposed to coordinate local efforts. At least that is what I have gleaned form other states' emergency plans - the states take the responsibility within their borders.

It looks like the emergency program failed in Louisiana and New Orleans.

However there is this (from http://www.vaemergency.com/library/plans/coveop/eopvol1/appendix3.pdf )

Basic Plan, Appendix 3
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN AND
THE (FEMA) REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN

A. Following Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognized the need for a more flexible and rapid federal response to supplement state and local efforts during a catastrophic disaster. Until then, the federal role following a disaster had been largely limited to financial assistance during the recovery period.

B. Recognizing that state and local governments are overwhelmed by a catastrophic disaster and that the Federal Government should be more proactive in such situations, FEMA developed and published the Federal Response Plan (FRP) in 1992. The plan describes how FEMA would coordinate with 27 federal departments and agencies (including the American
Red Cross) to assist state and local governments during the emergency response period. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) was updated in April 1999.

C. The Director of FEMA has the authority to activate part or all of the Federal Response Plan. After consultation with the Director of FEMA, the FEMA Regional Director may also activate part or all of the plan. A presidential disaster declaration will also, of course, permit implementation of the plan. Operations are to be carried out under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288, as
amended).

Virginia Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan Page 64 of 67

So, the question is, did Michael Brown have any clue about the Federal Response Plan and/or the Regional Response Plan?

Then - What about the regional FEMA director?

And - what about the Louisiana governor, Louisiana's director of emergency preparedness (or equivalent), and New Orleans mayor and its director of emergency preparedness.

All levels of government were involved here.

 

[Astronuc]

Racism is probably part of this, but this is also bad communication between municipalities. A mayor shouldn't tell his people to evacuate to the next city over without first consulting that city's officials to make sure they'll be welcome.

Mission statement:

The Office of Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the response and coordination of those actions needed to protect the lives and property of its citizens from natural or man-made disasters as well as emergency planning for the City of New Orleans.

Our primary responsibility is to advise the Mayor, the City Council and Chief Administrative Officer regarding emergency preparedness activities and operations.We coordinate all city departments and allied state and federal agencies which respond to city-wide disasters and emergencies through the development and constant updating of an integrated multi-hazard plan.

All requests for federal disaster assistance and federal funding subsequent to disaster declarations are also made through this office.

Our authority is defined by the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993, Chapter 6 Section 709, Paragraph B:

"Each Parish shall maintain a disaster agency which, except as otherwise provided under this act, has jurisdiction over and serves the entire parish."

from http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=46&tabid=9

Well, here is one guy we have not heard from - Major General Bennett C. Landreneau, who "is the Adjutant General for Louisiana. He is responsible for the deployment and coordination of programs, policies and plans affecting the more than 14,000 members of the Louisiana Army and Air National Guard. He is also the Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness." I wonder if he was in Iraq?

http://www.loep.state.la.us/agencyrelated/administratorsIndex.htm

Deputy Director
Emergency Preparedness
Colonel Michael L. Brown

Deputy Director
Homeland Security
Colonel (Retired) Jadwin V. Mayeaux, Jr.

I think I saw a picture of these guys with Mayor Nagin and the Governor trying deal with the flood and evacuation.

 

[Skyhunter]

Here is a link covering the ecological damage to the bayou.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/n...2b1bd67f9&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss

 

[Townsend]

Did anyone catch the OPRAH show?

This video shows dead bodies so be warned...

http://www.thevoiz.com/media/oprahkatrina.mov

 

[loseyourname]

Astronuc, I'm not sure how you're responding to me with that quote. I apologize if I'm being dense; I'm really tired.

 

[Astronuc]

Astronuc, I'm not sure how you're responding to me with that quote. I apologize if I'm being dense; I'm really tired.

I was agreeing with your points, particularly the point on communication between municipalities, and adding something from the plan. Somewhere, the immediate needs of New Orleans was not conveyed to other places like Baton Rouge, Alexandria, Lafayette, and FEMA.

The state of Lousiana should have been coordinating the evacuation with support from FEMA. Some states have developed compacts for mutual support in the face of a disaster like Katrina. I need to find an example.

Thousands of people were evacuated to Houston, but that seems to have been an afterthought. Prior to Katrina, I don't believe Houston had any interaction with New Orleans regarding the use of the Astrodome to warehouse displaced persons.

And it would appear that the New Orleans emergency plan did not assume that parts of the city would be uninhabitable for months.

 

[BobG]

It's probably not fair to focus in New Orleans pre-disaster planning without something to compare it to.

What's the plan for evacuating the Northwest coastal towns in the event of a tsunami warning? How about Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York City - do they have evacuation plans for certain disasters?

Or, probably more applicable considering the geographic proximity, how would Houston be evacuated if it were in the path of Cat 5 hurricane?

Chernobyl has shown that the effects of a nuclear disaster can linger for years. What's the plan for evacuating a city due to a disaster at a nuclear plant and do their plans account for the fact that their city will be uninhabitable for a prolonged period of time?

 

[Art]

What's the plan for evacuating the Northwest coastal towns in the event of a tsunami warning? How about Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York City - do they have evacuation plans for certain disasters?

If they don't already have an emergency evacuation plan then New York City should develop one quickly. There is an outcrop of rock measuring several square miles and weighing 500,000,000,000 tons hanging off an island in the Canaries (a highly volatile volcanic region) which, if it falls, experts believe will cause a tsunami 300 feet high to hit the east coast of America around 8 hours later.

But huge landslides and the mega-tsunami that they cause are extremely rare - the last one happened 4,000 years ago on the island of Réunion. The growing concern is that the ideal conditions for just such a landslide - and consequent mega-tsunami - now exist on the island of La Palma in the Canaries. In 1949 the southern volcano on the island erupted. During the eruption an enormous crack appeared across one side of the volcano, as the western half slipped a few metres towards the Atlantic before stopping in its tracks. Although the volcano presents no danger while it is quiescent, scientists believe the western flank will give way completely during some future eruption on the summit of the volcano.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/2000/mega_tsunami.shtml

 

[Astronuc]

It's probably not fair to focus in New Orleans pre-disaster planning without something to compare it to.

What's the plan for evacuating the Northwest coastal towns in the event of a tsunami warning? How about Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York City - do they have evacuation plans for certain disasters?

It's not fair to single out NO for criticism. I suspect all major cities are now reflecting upon their own emergency plans.

Or, probably more applicable considering the geographic proximity, how would Houston be evacuated if it were in the path of Cat 5 hurricane?

Apparently there have already been discussion in Houston about that - beginning a few days after Katrina. Had Katrina gone into Houston my parents, my sister's family and my sister-in-law's family would most likely have had to evacuate. But they have a place to go northwest of the city. Much of Houston would have flooded - again! They had some significant floods a few years ago. Cities east and southeast of Houston, e.g. Pasadena and Galveston, would have been pretty much wiped out.

The bullet got close to Houston, but it took out New Orleans instead.

Chernobyl has shown that the effects of a nuclear disaster can linger for years. What's the plan for evacuating a city due to a disaster at a nuclear plant and do their plans account for the fact that their city will be uninhabitable for a prolonged period of time?

Emergency planners near nuclear plants are supposed to have evacuation plans if the utility declares an emergency. They may or may not work well.

 

[BobG]

It's not fair to single out NO for criticism. I suspect all major cities are now reflecting upon their own emergency plans.
Apparently there have already been discussion in Houston about that - beginning a few days after Katrina. Had Katrina gone into Houston my parents, my sister's family and my sister-in-law's family would most likely have had to evacuate. But they have a place to go northwest of the city. Much of Houston would have flooded - again! They had some significant floods a few years ago. Cities east and southeast of Houston, e.g. Pasadena and Galveston, would have been pretty much wiped out.

The bullet got close to Houston, but it took out New Orleans instead.

Emergency planners near nuclear plants are supposed to have evacuation plans if the utility declares an emergency. They may or may not work well.

None of them get tested. The cost would be exhorbitant. Instead, officials run through tabletop exercises. These make sure officials are familiar with evacuation plans - they don't test whether the plan actually works. They don't always even reveal whether the officials believe the plan might work. "This plan can't possibly work!" - "You got a better one?" - silence.

Biggest evacuations in history:

300,000 soldiers were evacuated from Dunkirk in 10 days (this one's pretty famous)

600,000 were evacuated from a flood in China, with 40,000 evacuated in one day alone.

About 600,000 were evacuated from cities in Texas for Hurricane Carla. There wound up being about 46 deaths, but the hurricane also wounding up missing major cities. (Trivia: Hurricane Carla was Dan Rather's big debut, resulting in him moving from a local TV station to the CBS network).

145,000 evacuated for Three-Mile Island. This was very chaotic with a large number evacuating just because it was unclear to the public exactly who should be evacuating.

116,000 evacuated for Chernobyl with 220,000 eventually relocated permanently.

What's considered the most successful large scale evacuation in the US? The evacuation from Manhattan on 9/11/2001. About 300,000 to 1,000,000 were evacuated in somewhere between one to four days. The fact that no one can give an 'official' number and the estimates varied so widely show how organized a successful evacuation is. Most were evacuated by ferry.

3,000,000 people were evacuated from British cities in 4 days at the beginning of World War II. Virtually all of the evacuees were teachers and children. Great Britain was anticipating an intense bombing campaign from the Germans. This is the largest, most successful evacuation I've seen, but it was well planned in advance in anticipation of Germany going to war with Great Britain.

4,000,000 people evacuated the Southeast coast for Hurricane Floyd. Good thing Hurricane Floyd stalled, changed direction, and never reached land - thousands would have died in their cars as they sat in exposed in traffic. The poor unable to evacuate would have been the lucky ones.

Here's an article about evacuations: http://www.ieminc.com/Whats_New/Evacuations_reprint.pdf

 

[SOS2008]

Last night was a report on the problem of mold. After structures were exposed to toxic, standing water for such a long time, wood is rotted and mold is spreading rapidly on everything including furnishings and personal items. The cost to deal with this is very high--often more then the home is worth?

 

[Astronuc]

Last night was a report on the problem of mold. After structures were exposed to toxic, standing water for such a long time, wood is rotted and mold is spreading rapidly on everything including furnishings and personal items. The cost to deal with this is very high--often more then the home is worth?

If the mold is bad - the house becomes hazardous waste. I presume it gets demolished, and dumped in a hazardous waste landfill, although it probably should be incinerated.

BobG makes a good point with - Biggest evacuations in history.

But one also has to look at period over which evacuations were achieved and resources available.

Recently, I have heard a lot of emergency preparedness experts now looking at 72 hrs for holding on in face of a disaster, i.e. everyone should be prepared to survive for 72 hrs without outside assistance.

As for 9/11, many of those who evacuated Manhattan were simply people who normally commuted to Manhattan, and they simply left and went home. Others who lived there had to quickly get out, and there was transportation to do that, although it was a little disorganized at first.

 

[loseyourname]

What's the plan for evacuating the Northwest coastal towns in the event of a tsunami warning? How about Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York City - do they have evacuation plans for certain disasters?

I would imagine that any plans that might exist to evacuate cities with well over 3 million residents (actually, Chicago might be a little under; I'm not sure) would include the deaths of many. If an actual city-wide disaster hit one of these places, it would be incredibly difficult to move that many people in time. The entire LA basin is surrounded by mountains and desert, and New York is built on a series of islands.

One thing I know about Los Angeles at least is that every building over 14 stories is required to have a helipad at the top of it to enable airlift evacuations. One other thing protecting at least that city, and Houston, is their enormous geographic size. It would very difficult for any kind of disaster to affect the entire city. Another thing about Los Angeles is that a lot of civic duties are carried out at the county level, and the county itself includes most of the surrounding suburban region. In fact, a lot of the police and emergency duties are coordinated at the county level, which should help enable cooperation between units located in different cities, sort of how the Port Authority police was so helpful in the wake of 9/11.

The borough of Manhattan, though, is very small and densely populated, and is probably done if a citywide disaster hits. There is no way you are going to evacuate 1.5 million people through five bridges and three tunnels on any kind of short notice. They should be insulated from Art's tsunami, though, by the fact that the island is about 20 miles in from the initial strait into the outer harbor.

 

[edward]

Originally Posted by BobG
What's the plan for evacuating the Northwest coastal towns in the event of a tsunami warning?

The smaller coastal towns all have sirens that sound in the case of a tsunami. Evacuation routes are marked with signs. I don't know about Seattle.

 

[Astronuc]

Apparent personal experiences from New Orleans evacuation

I have no way to verify this, but this is the story of two evacuees from New Orleans. It indicates some significant problems in trying simply leave New Orleans - and the authorities actually prevent an evacuation!

Hurricane Katrina - Our Experiences
By Parmedics Larry Bradsahw and Lorrie Beth Slonsky
EMSNetwork News

Tuesday 06 September 2005

Two days after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, the Walgreen's store at the corner of Royal and Iberville streets remained locked. The dairy display case was clearly visible through the widows. It was now 48 hours without electricity, running water, plumbing. The milk, yogurt, and cheeses were beginning to spoil in the 90-degree heat. The owners and managers had locked up the food, water, pampers, and prescriptions and fled the City. Outside Walgreen's windows, residents and tourists grew increasingly thirsty and hungry.

The much-promised federal, state and local aid never materialized and the windows at Walgreen's gave way to the looters. There was an alternative. The cops could have broken one small window and distributed the nuts, fruit juices, and bottle water in an organized and systematic manner. But they did not. Instead they spent hours playing cat and mouse, temporarily chasing away the looters.

We were finally airlifted out of New Orleans two days ago and arrived home yesterday (Saturday). We have yet to see any of the TV coverage or look at a newspaper. We are willing to guess that there were no video images or front-page pictures of European or affluent white tourists looting the Walgreen's in the French Quarter.

We also suspect the media will have been inundated with "hero" images of the National Guard, the troops and the police struggling to help the "victims" of the Hurricane. What you will not see, but what we witnessed, were the real heroes and sheroes of the hurricane relief effort: the working class of New Orleans. The maintenance workers who used a fork lift to carry the sick and disabled. The engineers, who rigged, nurtured and kept the generators running. The electricians who improvised thick extension cords stretching over blocks to share the little electricity we had in order to free cars stuck on rooftop parking lots. Nurses who took over for mechanical ventilators and spent many hours on end manually forcing air into the lungs of unconscious patients to keep them alive. Doormen who rescued folks stuck in elevators. Refinery workers who broke into boat yards, "stealing" boats to rescue their neighbors clinging to their roofs in flood waters. Mechanics who helped hot-wire any car that could be found to ferry people out of the City. And the food service workers who scoured the commercial kitchens improvising communal meals for hundreds of those stranded.

Most of these workers had lost their homes, and had not heard from members of their families, yet they stayed and provided the only infrastructure for the 20% of New Orleans that was not under water.

On Day 2, there were approximately 500 of us left in the hotels in the French Quarter. We were a mix of foreign tourists, conference attendees like ourselves, and locals who had checked into hotels for safety and shelter from Katrina. Some of us had cell phone contact with family and friends outside of New Orleans. We were repeatedly told that all sorts of resources including the National Guard and scores of buses were pouring into the City. The buses and the other resources must have been invisible because none of us had seen them.

We decided we had to save ourselves. So we pooled our money and came up with $25,000 to have ten buses come and take us out of the City. Those who did not have the requisite $45.00 for a ticket were subsidized by those who did have extra money. We waited for 48 hours for the buses, spending the last 12 hours standing outside, sharing the limited water, food, and clothes we had. We created a priority boarding area for the sick, elderly and new born babies. We waited late into the night for the "imminent" arrival of the buses. The buses never arrived. We later learned that the minute they arrived to the City limits, they were commandeered by the military.

By day 4 our hotels had run out of fuel and water. Sanitation was dangerously abysmal. As the desperation and despair increased, street crime as well as water levels began to rise. The hotels turned us out and locked their doors, telling us that the "officials" told us to report to the convention center to wait for more buses. As we entered the center of the City, we finally encountered the National Guard. The Guards told us we would not be allowed into the Superdome as the City's primary shelter had descended into a humanitarian and health hellhole. The guards further told us that the City's only other shelter, the Convention Center, was also descending into chaos and squalor and that the police were not allowing anyone else in. Quite naturally, we asked, "If we can't go to the only 2 shelters in the City, what was our alternative?" The guards told us that that was our problem, and no they did not have extra water to give to us. This would be the start of our numerous encounters with callous and hostile "law enforcement".

We walked to the police command center at Harrah's on Canal Street and were told the same thing, that we were on our own, and no they did not have water to give us. We now numbered several hundred. We held a mass meeting to decide a course of action. We agreed to camp outside the police command post. We would be plainly visible to the media and would constitute a highly visible embarrassment to the City officials. The police told us that we could not stay. Regardless, we began to settle in and set up camp. In short order, the police commander came across the street to address our group. He told us he had a solution: we should walk to the Pontchartrain Expressway and cross the greater New Orleans Bridge where the police had buses lined up to take us out of the City. The crowed cheered and began to move. We called everyone back and explained to the commander that there had been lots of misinformation and wrong information and was he sure that there were buses waiting for us. The commander turned to the crowd and stated emphatically, "I swear to you that the buses are there."

We organized ourselves and the 200 of us set off for the bridge with great excitement and hope. As we marched pasted the convention center, many locals saw our determined and optimistic group and asked where we were headed. We told them about the great news. Families immediately grabbed their few belongings and quickly our numbers doubled and then doubled again. Babies in strollers now joined us, people using crutches, elderly clasping walkers and others people in wheelchairs. We marched the 2-3 miles to the freeway and up the steep incline to the Bridge. It now began to pour down rain, but it did not dampen our enthusiasm.

As we approached the bridge, armed Gretna sheriffs formed a line across the foot of the bridge. Before we were close enough to speak, they began firing their weapons over our heads. This sent the crowd fleeing in various directions. As the crowd scattered and dissipated, a few of us inched forward and managed to engage some of the sheriffs in conversation. We told them of our conversation with the police commander and of the commander's assurances. The sheriffs informed us there were no buses waiting. The commander had lied to us to get us to move.

We questioned why we couldn't cross the bridge anyway, especially as there was little traffic on the 6-lane highway. They responded that the West Bank was not going to become New Orleans and there would be no Superdomes in their City. These were code words for if you are poor and black, you are not crossing the Mississippi River and you were not
getting out of New Orleans.

Our small group retreated back down Highway 90 to seek shelter from the rain under an overpass. We debated our options and in the end decided to build an encampment in the middle of the Ponchartrain Expressway on the center divide, between the O'Keefe and Tchoupitoulas exits. We reasoned we would be visible to everyone, we would have some security being on an elevated freeway and we could wait and watch for the arrival of the yet to be seen buses.

All day long, we saw other families, individuals and groups make the same trip up the incline in an attempt to cross the bridge, only to be turned away. Some chased away with gunfire, others simply told no, others to be verbally berated and humiliated. Thousands of New Orleaners were prevented and prohibited from self-evacuating the City on foot. Meanwhile, the only two City shelters sank further into squalor and disrepair. The only way across the bridge was by vehicle. We saw workers stealing trucks, buses, moving vans, semi-trucks and any car that could be hotwired. All were packed with people trying to escape the misery New Orleans had become.

Our little encampment began to blossom. Someone stole a water delivery truck and brought it up to us. Let's hear it for looting! A mile or so down the freeway, an army truck lost a couple of pallets of C-rations on a tight turn. We ferried the food back to our camp in shopping carts. Now secure with the two necessities, food and water; cooperation, community, and creativity flowered. We organized a clean up and hung garbage bags from the rebar poles. We made beds from wood pallets and cardboard. We designated a storm drain as the bathroom and the kids built an elaborate enclosure for privacy out of plastic, broken umbrellas, and other scraps. We even organized a food recycling system where individuals could swap out parts of C-rations (applesauce for babies and candies for kids!).

This was a process we saw repeatedly in the aftermath of Katrina. When individuals had to fight to find food or water, it meant looking out for yourself only. You had to do whatever it took to find water for your kids or food for your parents. When these basic needs were met, people began to look out for each other, working together and constructing a community.

If the relief organizations had saturated the City with food and water in the first 2 or 3 days, the desperation, the frustration and the ugliness would not have set in.

Flush with the necessities, we offered food and water to passing families and individuals. Many decided to stay and join us. Our encampment grew to 80 or 90 people.

From a woman with a battery powered radio we learned that the media was talking about us. Up in full view on the freeway, every relief and news organizations saw us on their way into the City. Officials were being asked what they were going to do about all those families living up on the freeway? The officials responded they were going to take care of us. Some of us got a sinking feeling. "Taking care of us" had an ominous tone to it.

Unfortunately, our sinking feeling (along with the sinking City) was correct. Just as dusk set in, a Gretna Sheriff showed up, jumped out of his patrol vehicle, aimed his gun at our faces, screaming, "Get off the ****ing freeway". A helicopter arrived and used the wind from its blades to blow away our flimsy structures. As we retreated, the sheriff loaded up his truck with our food and water.

Once again, at gunpoint, we were forced off the freeway. All the law enforcement agencies appeared threatened when we congregated or congealed into groups of 20 or more. In every congregation of "victims" they saw "mob" or "riot". We felt safety in numbers. Our "we must stay together" was impossible because the agencies would force us into small atomized groups.

In the pandemonium of having our camp raided and destroyed, we scattered once again. Reduced to a small group of 8 people, in the dark, we sought refuge in an abandoned school bus, under the freeway on Cilo Street. We were hiding from possible criminal elements but equally and definitely, we were hiding from the police and sheriffs with their martial law, curfew and shoot-to-kill policies.

The next days, our group of 8 walked most of the day, made contact with New Orleans Fire Department and were eventually airlifted out by an urban search and rescue team. We were dropped off near the airport and managed to catch a ride with the National Guard. The two young guardsmen apologized for the limited response of the Louisiana guards. They explained that a large section of their unit was in Iraq and that meant they were shorthanded and were unable to complete all the tasks they were assigned.

We arrived at the airport on the day a massive airlift had begun. The airport had become another Superdome. We 8 were caught in a press of humanity as flights were delayed for several hours while George Bush landed briefly at the airport for a photo op. After being evacuated on a coast guard cargo plane, we arrived in San Antonio, Texas.

There the humiliation and dehumanization of the official relief effort continued. We were placed on buses and driven to a large field where we were forced to sit for hours and hours. Some of the buses did not have air-conditioners. In the dark, hundreds if us were forced to share two filthy overflowing porta-potties. Those who managed to make it out with any possessions (often a few belongings in tattered plastic bags) we were subjected to two different dog-sniffing searches.

Most of us had not eaten all day because our C-rations had been confiscated at the airport because the rations set off the metal detectors. Yet, no food had been provided to the men, women, children, elderly, disabled as they sat for hours waiting to be "medically screened" to make sure we were not carrying any communicable diseases.

This official treatment was in sharp contrast to the warm, heart-felt reception given to us by the ordinary Texans. We saw one airline worker give her shoes to someone who was barefoot. Strangers on the street offered us money and toiletries with words of welcome. Throughout, the official relief effort was callous, inept, and racist.

There was more suffering than need be.

Lives were lost that did not need to be lost.
Bradshaw and Slonsky are paramedics from California that were attending the EMS conference in New Orleans. Larry Bradshaw is the chief shop steward, Paramedic Chapter, SEIU Local 790; and Lorrie Beth Slonsky is steward, Paramedic Chapter, SEIU Local 790.

 

[Skyhunter]

In the Oakland Tribune today there was an http://www.insidebayarea.com/oaklandtribune/localnews/ci_3031159 about the City re-evaluating the disaster management plan. They have concluded that Oakland must be able to manage a disaster without Federal help.