The discussion revolves around the quantum suicide experiment and its implications for the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics. Participants critique the validity of using the experiment to draw conclusions about survival probabilities and the nature of consciousness in relation to MWI and other interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Participants express differing views on the implications of the quantum suicide experiment for MWI and the nature of consciousness. There is no consensus on whether the experiment can provide objective evidence for MWI or if it merely reflects biases in personal survival assessments.
Participants highlight limitations in the arguments presented, including assumptions about consciousness and the interpretation of probabilities in the context of MWI versus single-world interpretations. Some points remain unresolved, particularly regarding the implications of survival in the quantum suicide experiment.
Excellent point! But note that I have also presented two analogies in classical probability without many worlds. And your example also reinforces my central conclusion: Even if MWI is right, the suicide experiment cannot be used to prove it.Delta Kilo said:This whole topic is a red herring. You don't need MWI to show that. Imagine you have an army of volunteers. At your command they go into individual sound-proofed rooms and start shooting themselves. Those lucky few who survive may well consider themselves invincible. This is no different from multiple copies of the same person in MWI. So what?
I think the key difference is that, you cannot use an army of volunteers to test MWI, we all agree there. You can only test it yourself! And for that, you need no army at all, you just need one gun, and a few bullets. If you're still here after that, MWI is clearly right, and so is the QS interpretation of MWI that there is such a thing as "me" that forks along with the experimental outcomes. I don't recommend you try this, because I don't think you will make it. That's because I think MWI and QS cannot both be right-- they are having a little fight over the meaning of "me." MWI must reject the entire concept of "me", because I'm forking all the time, yet only perceive one of me, so the whole "me" concept is a kind of illusion in MWI (a weird kind of illusion that passes every test, which is not normally what we call an illusion). But QS invokes the same "me" concept that MWI just destructed, to argue that "I" will survive the suicide. So banking on not ending your existence is like betting that two different horses will win the same race.Delta Kilo said:This whole topic is a red herring. You don't need MWI to show that. Imagine you have an army of volunteers. At your command they go into individual sound-proofed rooms and start shooting themselves. Those lucky few who survive may well consider themselves invincible. This is no different from multiple copies of the same person in MWI. So what?
I don't see how is it going to prove anything at all except that I am one lucky son-of-a-gun.Ken G said:If you're still here after that, MWI is clearly right, and so is the QS interpretation of MWI that there is such a thing as "me" that forks along with the experimental outcomes.