Defining Physicalness: Inviting Physicalists to Weigh In

[honestrosewater]

I think the point of confusion is whether physicalness is either an object or a property of objects.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I think the point of confusion is whether physicalness is either an object or a property of objects.

Well, I don't think you can go to the museum to see an example of physicalness, up on its pedestal, so I suspect its a property; for Chalmers it seems to be the property of things that physical science is capable of studying and that consciousness (says Chalmers) transcends.

 

[Bartholomew]

How about an interaction between massless particles, generating new massless particles? Would you consider these new massless particles physical ("offspring of matter") or not? I am guessing that you would, but if you do then all you're saying is that the particles were at one time in the form of matter. At other times they were in the form of energy. So what?

Any way you look at it, you're singling out the property of being matter over other properties. The things in front of you seem most "real" to you because you can see them and pick them up and interact with them in other useful ways, but this has no cosmic meaning. Energy, too, is real. Why not say something like, "the physical world is energy, the effects of energy (e.g. gravity), the change/movement of energy (e.g. heat), and the offspring of energy (e.g. matter)"? Energy may seem "ethereal" to you but it is just more stuff which happens to have different properties.

 

[loseyourname]

You'll still trying to look for intrinsic characteristics of physicalness. I'm trying to tell you that physicalness is not defined by intrinsic properties. In fact, being massive and having inertia and all these others things are not even intrinsic properties besides. If you bought that Rosenberg book we're going to be discussing, perhaps you'll understand the way he explains it better than the way I do. As far as I can tell, physicalness is defined by having extrinsic properties that can be mathematically modeled. It makes absolutely no difference what the intrinsic properties of these physical things are. As hypnagogue has explained in other threads, there are two different conception of physicalness. One actually does include intrinsic properties, and is called object-physicalism. This brand of physicalism, however, is very rare and doesn't have many adherents. Most physicalists are theory-physicalists, who only hold that extrinsic properties are physical. To explain again why I only include objects with extrinsic properties that can be mathematically modeled, I'll again appeal to the study of physical things: physics. If a given phenomenon can be studied by physics (that is, it can be mathematically modeled), then it is physical.

This seems to do it for me. I've given all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be considered physical. If that isn't a definition, what is? Consider this: Any given word a refers to object b if object b has the set of properties {x₁,x₂, . . . x_n} that define word a. Is that not the proper form of a definition? Substitute "physical" for a and use "has extrinsic properties that can be modeled mathematically" for the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that define a.

 

[Bartholomew]

I don't think that mathematical modeling is a good way to approach it either. For example, there is a theoretical limit to computational power; a computer powerful enough to model everything that goes on in the universe would not fit in the universe. And random phenomena, if there are such things, can't be modeled mathematically either. In those two situations the best you can do is approximate, "halfway" modeling.

 

[StatusX]

I don't think you've addressed the issue at all. It isn't a matter of what one knows, the analogy wasn't about that. It was thinking what the abilities and limitations of human consciousness can or cannot perceive has anything to do with the existential qualities of matter.

I think one thing you need to realize is that there is only one universe. There is no natural division in it, where some of it belongs to one category(physical) and some to another (non-physical). The separation only arises when humans start trying to describe it. Even if you allow for a completely serparate spiritual realm that we can never observe, or a separate mental world where consciousness resides, they're all part of the one universe, and are only separated in the minds of human beings. So there is nothing wrong with defining how we split the world based on what humans can explain (with science) and what they can't.

Well, I'm not sure string-ness is physical. What if stringness existed before the Big Bang? Maybe that is part of the primordial condition I mentioned. The issue is, can consciousness arise out of primordial conditions, or must it have a Big Bang physical universe first to appear?

It is a contradiction, as I said, for anything to exist "before" the big bang. And if you intend on even allowing the possibility that strings (as in string theory strings) are non-physical, then there isn't a chance we'll agree on a definition. String theory, if successful, will be the grand unified theory of physics, applicable in all physical situations. If that isn't completely physical, I don't know what is.

Also, it seems like you're trying to ask another question about consciousness that doesn't necessarily pertain to how we individually define physical. If that's the case, maybe you should spell out what you're saying and precisely what you mean when you say physical so we can discuss what you're hinting at, either here or in another thread.

Physical time started with the Big Bang. The "space" between physical objects developed after the Big Bang. I once again reference you to my above objective for distinguishing between physcial and non-physical.

Time is time. Non-physical time doesn't make any sense to me.

 

[loseyourname]

I don't think that mathematical modeling is a good way to approach it either. For example, there is a theoretical limit to computational power; a computer powerful enough to model everything that goes on in the universe would not fit in the universe. And random phenomena, if there are such things, can't be modeled mathematically either. In those two situations the best you can do is approximate, "halfway" modeling.

I didn't say that all of the computations necessary to determine future states of systems are possible. That isn't the point. It's just that the relationships between objects can be modeled. We can write equations that describe them, even if we cannot always solve these equations when we plug in numbers, or even know all of the numbers to plug in.

 

[Loren Booda]

"physical": the property of interaction relating observers with their perceived structures.

 

[Bartholomew]

If you count things that can only be partially modeled as physical, then the only things you are excluding are those things about which nothing at all can be said. If anything can be said about something, then that something has a property which (perhaps with some work) may be partially described mathematically.

Also, are you including nuomenons such as ideal lines as physical? They can be modeled mathematically; mathematics is based on them. But they do not exist.

 

[loseyourname]

If you count things that can only be partially modeled as physical, then the only things you are excluding are those things about which nothing at all can be said. If anything can be said about something, then that something has a property which (perhaps with some work) may be partially described mathematically.

You can say things about intrinsic properties, but you cannot mathematically model them, because you can only model relationships. You can't model an object (I know you can model the shapes and geometric properties of geometric objects, but that isn't what I mean). I really don't see the problem as I'm basically just saying that anything is physical if it can be studied with physics.

Also, are you including nuomenons such as ideal lines as physical? They can be modeled mathematically; mathematics is based on them. But they do not exist.

You've got a point there. I should also stipulate that the object exist independently of intelligent conception to be considered physical.

 

[honestrosewater]

Well, I don't think you can go to the museum to see an example of physicalness, up on its pedestal, so I suspect its a property; for Chalmers it seems to be the property of things that physical science is capable of studying and that consciousness (says Chalmers) transcends.

Yes, that was my point. The definitions that Les didn't like were all defining physicalness as a property of objects. Les' definition of the atmosphere was defining the atmosphere as an object. I don't know how the two kinds of definitions (of properties of objects v. objects) are expected to be similar. Maybe someone else already said that, but, if so, I didn't catch it.

I should also stipulate that the object exist independently of intelligent conception to be considered physical.

The problem is distinguishing between physical objects and abstract objects, right? Since both definitions include X (something about extrinsic relationships), the definition of physicalness must include, at least, X and Y or the definition of abstractness must include, at least, X and Z.
If Y is "exists independently of intelligent conception", wouldn't it follow that intelligent conception is not physical? Perhaps there's something special about how you're using "conception", but I know intelligence occurs in nature. If intelligence occurs in nature, but is not physical, what does that mean for physicalism?

 

[loseyourname]

The problem is distinguishing between physical objects and abstract objects, right? Since both definitions include X (something about extrinsic relationships), the definition of physicalness must include, at least, X and Y or the definition of abstractness must include, at least, X and Z.

If Y is "exists independently of intelligent conception", wouldn't it follow that intelligent conception is not physical? Perhaps there's something special about how you're using "conception", but I know intelligence occurs in nature. If intelligence occurs in nature, but is not physical, what does that mean for physicalism?

Don't have a clue what you mean. The conceptions of an intelligent being do not have physical existence aside from the existence of the neuronal activity associated with that conception. I suppose that this technically is physical existence (this is, of course, assuming that all thinking is physical in nature), but such things as perfect lines also have this kind of physical existence. I don't think that was what Bart meant.

 

[honestrosewater]

Don't have a clue what you mean. The conceptions of an intelligent being do not have physical existence aside from the existence of the neuronal activity associated with that conception. I suppose that this technically is physical existence (this is, of course, assuming that all thinking is physical in nature), but such things as perfect lines also have this kind of physical existence. I don't think that was what Bart meant.

Okay, here's what I was thinking:
If intelligent conception displays extrinsic relationships that can be mathematically modeled,
(1) "I should also stipulate that intelligent conception exist independently of intelligent conception to be considered physical"
is an instance of
(2a) "I should also stipulate that the object exist independently of intelligent conception to be considered physical."
Unless something can exist independently of itself, the first "intelligent conception" in (1) is somehow different from the second "intelligent conception" in (1). Even with
(2b) "I should also stipulate that the object exist independently of intelligent conception of the object to be considered physical."
we get
(3) "I should also stipulate that intelligent conception exist independently of intelligent conception of intelligent conception to be considered physical."
I'm not sure what, if anything, is wrong with (3), but
(4) "I should also stipulate that awareness exist independently of intelligent conception of awareness to be considered physical."
or
(5) "I should also stipulate that self-awareness exist independently of intelligent conception of self-awareness to be considered physical."
seem(s) problematic.
Where I was concerned about physicalism was in trying to add possibility and actuality to (2a) or (2b).

 

[Locrian]

Back to the issue of defining physical. After taking into account selfAdjoint’s comments, I would say “physical” is the most fundamental universal conditions that the Big Bang has produced, and that has two aspects:
1. Matter.
2. The effects of matter.

You should not include the Big Bang in this definition. That (just as his standard model/relativity definition did) makes the definition circular because the Big Bang hypothesis is just a temporary construct we are using for predictive effects. Why not just say "fundamental universal conditions in our universe" instead?

By the way, how are you defining mass?

 

[FZ+]

Observationability is not a property of physicalness because physicalness doesn’t require human consciousness to exist!

Isn't that an unprovable assertion, especially since we don't know what perception and consciousness is? What's wrong with saying that physicalness is undefined without a point of view?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Isn't that an unprovable assertion, especially since we don't know what perception and consciousness is? What's wrong with saying that physicalness is undefined without a point of view?

I am perfectly content for my own purposes with always tagging the concept with the POV, but unless we can agree on some shared concept it will be very difficult to disuss. We risk always talking past each other, which I think you will agree is a besetting difficulty with these threads.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If you count things that can only be partially modeled as physical, then the only things you are excluding are those things about which nothing at all can be said. If anything can be said about something, then that something has a property which (perhaps with some work) may be partially described mathematically.

Also, are you including nuomenons such as ideal lines as physical? They can be modeled mathematically; mathematics is based on them. But they do not exist.

I agree with you on this. I don't see how mathematics defines what's physical. It describes the order and quanties present in physicalness, but that isn't all there is to physicalness. I also don't believe every aspect of physicalness can be represented mathematically. When Alexander was here we went through this issue of trying equate reality with the math that is merely a representation of it, and I thought we put it to rest.

 

[Rybo]

Physical-Metaphyiscal and quasi-physical

http://www.rwgrayprojects.com/synergetics/s03/p2600.html#326.40

See link above for Fullers separate catagories of physical and metahysical

1) Physical/energetic motion-- [i.e. energy as fermionic matter or bosonic forces ]--has the potential for meterability/detectability i.e. to move a needle directly, as in we detect photons by there affect on electrons energy value. Similarly but not quite the same we detet virtual particles by their affect on real particles. We have a finite physical Universe.

1a) Physical = real = reality = to make real = and action/motion.

2) Metaphysical/energyless abstract and most generalized e.g. cosmic laws/principles a.k.a physical laws. We have a finite set of these laws.

2a) Metaphysical infinite space outside and beyond the finite phyiscal Unvierse.

I think that 5-fold, icosahedral-gravity(spin-2 boson) is the quasi-physical buffer-zone between;
(1) the faster than speed-of-radiation(EMR)-- or less --finite physical Universe and
(2) the infinite nothingness space beyond the physical Unvierse.

If loop quantum gravtiy theory(LQG) is correct then gravity does quantisize at the Planck scale, or smaller, possibly making for temporary pockets of metaphysical nothingess-space within our finite physical Universe. I dunno.

The detection equipment to confim or deny LQG will be in launched in 2006 or 2007.

The physical "hand(energy as matter) moivng in mass (kinietic energy)e nergy" and the metaphysical "wave/pattern" of that hand are in eternal complemetation to each other.

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

How about an interaction between massless particles, generating new massless particles? Would you consider these new massless particles physical ("offspring of matter") or not? I am guessing that you would, but if you do then all you're saying is that the particles were at one time in the form of matter. At other times they were in the form of energy. So what?

It is the order of events from the first moments of creation that I am singling out, and the fact that things still proceed that way.

Any way you look at it, you're singling out the property of being matter over other properties. The things in front of you seem most "real" to you because you can see them and pick them up and interact with them in other useful ways, but this has no cosmic meaning. Energy, too, is real. Why not say something like, "the physical world is energy, the effects of energy (e.g. gravity), the change/movement of energy (e.g. heat), and the offspring of energy (e.g. matter)"? Energy may seem "ethereal" to you but it is just more stuff which happens to have different properties.

According to Tom, energy is NOT real, it is merely a calculating concept. Why don't you show me a little?

However, you are correct that I am singling out matter, but you are incorrect that it's because of something so silly as that it seems "most real" to me. Give me some credit!

Did you miss my little analysis of how the universe has unfolded from the Big Bang? Matter was getting set up in the first second of creation. And how does the universe yield the vast majority of its energy? For the most part matter is giving up its energy, and not the other way around. So my reason for prioritizing matter at the top, is because that's what is causing all the things we observe.

Where is energy coming from? What makes gravity appear? Where is radiation coming from? What is expanding in the expansion of the universe? What is QM all about? What about life?

Let's say we were two consciousnesses floating out in space, and we could see anything that happened, no matter how minute or subtle. Now let's get rid of all matter. What could we observe that would be termed "physical." Give me one, just one example.

So I still think given the course of creation, that the most encompassing definition of physicalness is: matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

 

[StatusX]

Like we've been saying, matter suffers the same "extrinsic" problem you say our defintions do. Yours basically comes down to "that which resists acceleration, or is affected by something that resists acceleration." And it is meaningless to say mass is more real than energy, since they are the same thing, just looked at two different ways. Mass is a property we assign objects, just like energy, but it is one we can directly interact with. This doesn't make it any more real than "color charge." Like I said, physicalness doesn't "have it's own is-ness." It's a human (social) construct, just like acceleration and mass.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think one thing you need to realize is that there is only one universe. There is no natural division in it, where some of it belongs to one category(physical) and some to another (non-physical).

Why should I "realize" that? That's what is in dispute.

Even if you allow for a completely separate spiritual realm that we can never observe, or a separate mental world where consciousness resides, they're all part of the one universe, and are only separated in the minds of human beings. So there is nothing wrong with defining how we split the world based on what humans can explain (with science) and what they can't.

For you it is just "in the mind." Not necessarily for me. It depends on what experiences you've had, and I have had.

So there is nothing wrong with defining how we split the world based on what humans can explain (with science) and what they can't.

I agree there is nothing wrong with a definition for that. I disagree that physicalness should be defined by anything but it's most fundamental properties.

It is a contradiction, as I said, for anything to exist "before" the big bang.

Your so-called "contradiction" is simply a reflection of your a priori belief that everything began with this universe, and this universe is all there is. There is no reason one has to assume that must be so, and I don't.

One reason not to assume it is because it doesn't make sense. Something had to exist prior to Big Bang, and that was the [u[potential[/u] for the Big Bang. No potential, no manifestation. Have you ever contemplated what that raw potentiality must be like to allow or cause a Big Bang? Have you ever wondered what other manifestations that potentiality might be capable of? For example, instead of bubbling up a universe, could it bubble up consciousness?

And if you intend on even allowing the possibility that strings (as in string theory strings) are non-physical, then there isn't a chance we'll agree on a definition. String theory, if successful, will be the grand unified theory of physics, applicable in all physical situations. If that isn't completely physical, I don't know what is.

Well, I've admitted to you in another post that I think there is some one unifying reality behind all the apparent differences. It would unify everything, physical and nonphysical. I personally believe vibratory-ness is part of the foundation of all existence, so that's why I am open to string theory having something to do with the ultimate unified thing.

Also, it seems like you're trying to ask another question about consciousness that doesn't necessarily pertain to how we individually define physical. If that's the case, maybe you should spell out what you're saying and precisely what you mean when you say physical so we can discuss what you're hinting at, either here or in another thread.

But I have spelled it out. I'm proposing physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter. That's what this universe created, and what most determines its character. If we see that matter was the first thing going (or nearly so) and most determining, then the question becomes: is consciousness a product of that matter (like everything else physical), or did consciousness develop from the same raw potentiality the physical universe did, and then find a way to emerge through the nervous systems that evolved here on Earth.

Non-physical time doesn't make any sense to me.

Of course it doesn't. That's because you associate time with physcialness! But there are those who have said, the Buddha for example, that there is a plane of existence that is uncreated. In this purely existential plane, time is eternal, and it is claimed to be possible for consciousness to join with it. Things might grow and change in that plane, but they don't deteriorate. There really is no term for that sort of situation in this culture, so I use the commonly understood term "time" to describe by saying it is "non-physical" time.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Isn't that an unprovable assertion, especially since we don't know what perception and consciousness is? What's wrong with saying that physicalness is undefined without a point of view?

I don't think it is hard to prove except for the radical skeptic, for whom nothing is provable. We can see people come and go and nothing changes about the consistancy of laws that determine physical reality. To some extent we can see the nature of the universe before there were observers, such as when light from a long-ago supernova reaches us, or background microwave radiation, or when we find fossils a couple of billion years old.

The thing about a POV is that it allows for subjectivity. I'd hoped we could come up with an objective meaning for physical. To me that means its fundamental properties and what most determines physical conditions. I claim it is matter that does that.

 

[Bartholomew]

According to Tom, energy is NOT real, it is merely a calculating concept. Why don't you show me a little?

My point is that everything physics--or for that matter, common sense--has come up with is merely a calculating concept, matter included.

Let's say we were two consciousnesses floating out in space, and we could see anything that happened, no matter how minute or subtle. Now let's get rid of all matter. What could we observe that would be termed "physical." Give me one, just one example.

A photon.

 

[Bartholomew]

And it is meaningless to say mass is more real than energy, since they are the same thing, just looked at two different ways.

Well said.

 

[Les Sleeth]

My point is that everything physics--or for that matter, common sense--has come up with is merely a calculating concept, matter included.

Nope. We can experience matter. You can't experience energy directly, only its effects on things. What determines validity in science is that experiential component. Matter is not merely a conceptual contrivance as math is.

A photon.

I meant if matter had never existed. The photon has been radiated by matter.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Well said.

Where's Tom when you need him. Energy is a concept, not anything known to have existential qualities. Whatever it is that does work cannot be observed. Think about this, if you want to create a little matter from energy, where do you think you get the energy? From other matter. When energy departs systems, can you get it back? No, it is gone. That's the "direction" of change for the universe -- entropic.

And that's really the point, the flow of the things in the universe. I am simply stating the order things are occurring in the universe when I put matter first. Matter and energy might be equivalent on paper, but it doesn't reflect how the universe is going. It is from matter to energy. It is from matter to the radiation of EM. It is from matter to the manifestation of gravity. It is not, overall in terms of flow, from energy to matter, radiation to matter, gravity and then the appearance of matter . . . and that's how it's been for nearly 15 billion years, and how it's likely to continue.

The physicalness which now prevails in our universe began after the development of matter. If that is what established the rules and influences, then why isn't it proper to say physicalness is matter, the products of matter, and the effects of matter? It seems a simple observation, I don't see why anyone would dispute it.

 

[StatusX]

Where's Tom when you need him. Energy is a concept, not anything known to be existential. Whatever it is that does work cannot be observed. Think about this, if you want to create a little matter from energy, where do you think you get the energy? From other matter. When energy departs systems, can you get it back? No, it is gone. That's the "direction" of change for the universe -- entropic.

And that's really the point. It's that energy comes from matter, and that is the flow of the things in the universe. I am simply stating the order things are occurring in the universe when I put matter first. Matter and energy might be equivalent on paper, but it doesn't reflect how the universe is going. It is from matter to energy. It is from matter to the radiation of EM. It is from matter to the manifestation of gravity. It is not, overall in terms of flow, from energy to matter, radiation to matter, gravity and then the appearance of matter . . . and that's how it's been for nearly 15 billion years, and how it's likely to continue.

Physicalness has developed from the development of matter, the products of matter, and the effects of matter. It's a simple observation, I don't even see why anyone would dispute it.

First of all, let me repost this since you seem to have skipped by it and it addresses all you say here and most of your reply to my other post:

Like we've been saying, matter suffers the same "extrinsic" problem you say our defintions do. Yours basically comes down to "that which resists acceleration, or is affected by something that resists acceleration." And it is meaningless to say mass is more real than energy, since they are the same thing, just looked at two different ways. Mass is a property we assign objects, just like energy, but it is one we can directly interact with. This doesn't make it any more real than "color charge." Like I said, physicalness doesn't "have it's own is-ness." It's a human (social) construct, just like acceleration and mass.

As far as the rest of your reply. All we know that is absolute is that there is a universe. Any further digging on our part is fundamentally determined by how we think, and has nothing to do with any natural divisions in the universe. And time (a concept invented by man) is part of the universe. If you are moving or in a gravitational field, time slows down. It is taking intuition too far to assume time existed before the big bang. The big bang is where spacetime originated. I don't disagree that, logically, something had to cause the big bang (as in it could have not happened, but it did), but it didn't come before it in time.

If you are talking about the experience of time, that is tied to our specific brain. This is easily demonstrated by taking certain drugs and seeing how they alter our perception of time. So the conscious experience of time probably arose pretty late in the history of experiences. (again, I'm taking a Chalmerist view)

 

[Bartholomew]

Nope. We can experience matter. You can't experience energy directly, only its effects on things. What determines validity in science is that experiential component. Matter is not merely a conceptual contrivance as math is.

You cannot experience matter directly either, only its effects on things.

I meant if matter had never existed. The photon has been radiated by matter.

Perhaps not. Aren't there photons which have been around since the big bang without ever being matter?

 

[Les Sleeth]

First of all, let me repost this since you seem to have skipped by it

I saw it, I just don't what to say to someone who doesn't distinquish between experience-ability and conceptualness.

And it is meaningless to say mass is more real than energy, since they are the same thing, just looked at two different ways. Mass is a property we assign objects, just like energy, but it is one we can directly interact with.

Energy is a measurement of a potential of matter. Two things that weigh the same on a scale does not make them intrinsically the same. Matter may possess energy, but that doesn't mean it is energy. A quick example. Cosmic background radiation loses energy as the universe expands. The radiation doesn't cease to exist, it just oscillates a bit slower. As far as we know, a photon will maintain it's character as a oscillating entity no matter how much energy it loses. So how can energy and a photon (which I am considering matter) be the same? I'll wait for more expertise to weigh in (e.g., selfAdjoint) before disputing you about this any further.

This doesn't make it any more real than "color charge." Like I said, physicalness doesn't "have it's own is-ness." It's a human (social) construct, just like acceleration and mass.

I'm not sure if you think your opinions are authoritative, but just because you say it, doesn't make it so. Matter, its products, and its effects can be experienced, they can be measured, they can be predicted. If there is any anything more substantial than that, then I don't know what it is.

As far as the rest of your reply. All we know that is absolute is that there is a universe. Any further digging on our part is fundamentally determined by how we think, and has nothing to do with any natural divisions in the universe.

It's all YOU know. What is "fundamentally determined" is how YOU think. The opinion about natural divisions is YOUR opinion, and not necessarily the "truth."

And time (a concept defined by man) is part of the universe. If you are moving or in a gravitational field, time slows down. It is taking intuition too far to assume time existed before the big bang. The big bang is where spacetime originated. I don't disagree that, logically, something had to cause the big bang (as in it could have not happened, but it did), but it didn't come before it in time.

If you are talking about the experience of time, that is tied to our specific brain. This is easily demonstrated by taking certain drugs and seeing how they alter our perception of time. So the conscious experience of time probably arose pretty late in the history of experiences.

Well, I'm not seeing much willingness on your part to comprehend or address where I'm coming from. You are merely reframing everything I say in the context of your own belief system, good ol' physicalist dogma.

 

[Les Sleeth]

You cannot experience matter directly either, only its effects on things.

But see, all that does is eliminate the concept of experience. If experience is to mean something, then it is that we are able to perceive information reflected from the existence of something.

Perhaps not. Aren't there photons which have been around since the big bang without ever being matter?

True, I don't understand how that radiation came about. I thought maybe it was associated with some of the proto-matter interactions; for example, if the electron-positron annihilation produced it in that first second after the Big Bang.