Defining Physicalness: Inviting Physicalists to Weigh In

[Les Sleeth]

So can we see yet how it is possible to reduce all physical descriptions to mathematical descriptions? Does that still not seem of significance to anyone but me? If all physical things have this in common, how can it not be a defining property?

But see, math is a not property; the order that math symbolizes is. Math is an invention of consciousness, and so represents a potential of consciousness, not matter. Yet even if you want to make order the most basic property, if you read my response to you then you should see why I don't think order alone defines physicalness (order doesn't describe raw mass, for example).

However, I think there is another problem. If we could find just one single instance of when math cannot exactly represent physicality, then wouldn't you admit math is the wrong bottom line? Well, uncertainty is such an example (and I don't think it is the only one . . . why, for example, would there even exist "chaos theory" if there weren't other examples of unpredictability?). Since the "particleness" that the most substantial aspects of the universe is based on cannot be precisely represented mathematically, how can we select order as the most defining feature of physicalness?

So basically you're fitting a definition to your conception of the consciousness debate. I'm trying to find a definition that stands alone, that has utility to all discussions and that identifies the one thing that all things must have to be studied physically. If this overturns your conception of the consciousness debate, so be it. You're making my case for me that you're attempting to derive a definition with the sole end in mind of excluding consciousness from physicalness.

Well, consciousness is the big dispute isn't it? I'm not sure what else we can actually observe in this universe we can label non-physical (though I include "livingness"). I've argued in detail to you why the debate about consciousness boils down to if it emerges from the properties of matter or if it might develop apart from matter. None of the major physicalist players in the consciousness debate cares one iota if it comes from order; even if we say it does, the issue once more becomes, "where does order come from?" Physicalists will say, in the case of consciousness, that order comes from matter (the brain).

But I argue that order could develop first, out of the same raw potentiality that we say matter came from (i.e., the cause of the Big Bang). So I want be able to assert that the development of order preceded the advent of the universe. Once you define the order in the universe as "physical," you've eliminated the distinction of what comes first.

That's the real problem for me. I do see order as (nearly) universal. The question is, however, is there anything more distinquishing about physicality. I say there is, and that is mass, the effects of mass, and the products of mass.

While putting mass first covers the order and lack of it in the universe (simply by saying "this is how mass behaves"), putting order first cannot account for all the properties of mass. Therefore, mass is a more defining quality.

 

[honestrosewater]

So can we see yet how it is possible to reduce all physical descriptions to mathematical descriptions? Does that still not seem of significance to anyone but me? If all physical things have this in common, how can it not be a defining property?

I may not be of much help yet, but I see that it's possible and significant. And I suspect qualia will be the next domino to fall.

 

[StatusX]

Yet even if you want to make order the most basic property, if you read my response to you then you should see why I don't think order alone defines physicalness (order doesn't describe raw mass, for example).

This has been said again and again, but you don't seem to be understanding it. Mass is not "raw" in any sense. The ratio of the (inertial) masses of two objects is defined as the ratio of their accelerations when they interact. The unit of mass is defined arbitrarily. This abstract mathematical defintion is all there is to mass, period.

However, I think there is another problem. If we could find just one single instance of when math cannot exactly represent physicality, then wouldn't you admit math is the wrong bottom line? Well, uncertainty is such an example (and I don't think it is the only one . . . why, for example, would there even exist "chaos theory" if there weren't other examples of unpredictability?). Since the "particleness" that the most substantial aspects of the universe is based on cannot be precisely represented mathematically, how can we select order as the most defining feature of physicalness?

Uncertainty is mathematically well-founded. According to QM, there is a way to determine the probability of certain events precisely, and then the particular alternative the system chooses is completely random within the constraints of the probabilities. Chaos is a result of computational limits, nothing intrinsic about the universe. Not to mention chaos theory is a branch of mathematics.

Math is not something we do for fun that happens to fit the universe. It was developed precisely becase it helps us describe it. (some might argue this, but it's at least the overarching motivation) As I'm sure you've heard, many physicists believe that math is "the language nature speaks." If there is a property of the universe that we find that can't be studied by anything resembling math (and consequently, anything resembling science), then I think we'd all agree it isn't physical.

 

[Rybo]

Metaphysical math is invented or discovered

But see, math is a not property; the order that math symbolizes is. Math is an invention of consciousness, and so represents a potential of consciousness, not matter. Yet even if you want to make order the most basic property, if you read my response to you then you should see why I don't think order alone defines physicalness (order doesn't describe raw mass, for example).
.

I agree with Les mostly here. Metaphysical math is the disovery of sets of relationships within the vast sets of dynamical interrelationships of phyiscal Univierse.

Mathematics is language that preceeded other languages because it is operationally the prime metaphysical complementation to the physcial Unvierse of events, interrelationships, etc...

Words are of the metaphysical mind ergo concepts reprsenting or definnng while also complemeting the dynamic over time and in space physical.

I.e. whole numerical and patterned sets, that complement the physical Universe, can be ascertained, as these physical things move over time and in space.

Hmmm, its getting late...mind is disintegrating...coherent concepts..
...dribbling off...
...into the abyss...
...of nothingness...
...furhter and further...
.... from reality of...
...physical Universe...

...Ry...bo.......

 

[Les Sleeth]

This has been said again and again, but you don't seem to be understanding it. Mass is not "raw" in any sense. The ratio of the (inertial) masses of two objects is defined as the ratio of their accelerations when they interact. The unit of mass is defined arbitrarily. This abstract mathematical defintion is all there is to mass, period.

I understand it. You just want to act like your opinion is authoritative instead of nothing more than an opinion.

Mass is: any nonzero (energy) entity. And I say, all that we have measured and detected empirically is either mass, a product of mass, or an effect of mass (as defined). Know of anything else?

"Raw" was used as a metaphor, it isn't my fault if you are so literal YOU don't get it.

"The ratio of the (inertial) masses of two objects is defined as the ratio of their accelerations when they interact" is how it is measured, it isn't what mass is.

The "unit" may be defined arbitrarily, but again that is a measurement issue, not the fact that there is something there to measure to begin with!

If mass is abstract math, then exactly what is that wall you run into?

You mental giants who want reality to be just in your head (math) are as bad as airy fairy idealists who think the same thing. Measurement and calculation and the ability to sense is not what makes something real. All that is what allows us to work with it, or predict it, or detect it in the first place. I am sorry to have to inform you that reality isn't dependent your understanding or detection of it.

Uncertainty is mathematically well-founded. According to QM, there is a way to determine the probability of certain events precisely, and then the particular alternative the system chooses is completely random within the constraints of the probabilities. Chaos is a result of computational limits, nothing intrinsic about the universe. Not to mention chaos theory is a branch of mathematics.

Pure crap. You can "determine . . . probability . . . precisely"? Give me a break!

"Chaos . . . nothing intrinsic about the universe," more opinion stated as fact. You have no idea if it reflects anything intrinsic or not. Why don't you stop talking like God and admit you don't know? I am sure you WISH the universe had no chaotic aspects, but if you know for certain, then please publish your paper proving it or stop acting like a know-it-all.

Math is not something we do for fun that happens to fit the universe. It was developed precisely becase it helps us describe it. (some might argue this, but is at least the overarching motivation) As I'm sure you've heard, many physicists believe that math is "the language nature speaks."

Math is the language that the orderly parts of nature speaks. Neither you nor anyone else can describe every bit of the universe mathematically and confirm your math model is correct.

If there are properties of the universe that we find that can't be studied by anything resembling math (and consequently, anything resembling science), then I think we'd all agree it isn't physical.

Sorry, but no. I've given my reasons. You assuming the stance of an all-knowing intellect doesn't change my mind.

 

[StatusX]

Les,
I had originally typed a long reply where I addressed each of your points in detail, but it got erased by POS internet explorer. But it's probably for the best, because all thoses words would have clouded my main point.

We are currently only in possession of a theory of the universe called physics. This theory defines terms such as mass, energy, length, etc, and then specifies mathematical relations among these terms. We encode our observations with these terms and then use the theory to make predictions, which we then interpret back into observables. I'm not trying to talk to you like a child (as I never have intended to do), I'm just making this crystal clear so our disagreements aren't the result of ambiguities.

We know nothing about how the universe really works. It is possible, as you seem to be suggesting, that there are actually particles of mass floating around in space, and that's that as far as intrinsicness. Another possibility is that there's nothing at the bottom, as I discussed here without any replies. Physics makes no claims in this area. But what you've done is taken terms from physics, taken their meanings farther than they were ever intended to be taken, and then claimed we're the ones making assumptions when we tell you that's not what they mean. You're claiming to have solved deep ontological problems which are probably impossible to solve in principle.

Now the central point pertaining to this discussion is this: It is true that everything we observe, directly or indirectly, has energy. This is due to the fact that energy is required to cause a physical event, and our senses are physical processes. You limit the physical to things with energy, things that can cause other physical events. I allow it to include anything that can be explained with physics (or equivalently, modeled mathematically). What's the difference? I believe consciousness is affected by energy, but cannot itself instantiate physical events. It does not affect energy, and so it is not itself energy. But I believe it can be mathematically modeled, and so I believe it is physical. I would equate your definiton of physical to mine of matter, and agree that conscisousness isn't material.

 

[Les Sleeth]

We are currently only in possession of a theory of the universe called physics. This theory defines terms such as mass, energy, length, etc, and then specifies mathematical relations among these terms. We encode our observations with these terms and then use the theory to make predictions, which we then interpret back into observables. I'm not trying to talk to you like a child (as I never have intended to do), I'm just making this crystal clear so our disagreements aren't the result of ambiguities.

But see, this is exactly why I didn't want to debate you. I've understood everything you have said. I didn't need instruction about bosons and fermions (or leptons either if you decided to include them). In the past I've endured lectures from Loseyourname too (and quite a few before him) about the facts of biology and other science issues. It seems like physicalists believe if you don't agree with them, then it is just because you don't understand how physical reality works.

I am not so deluded as to believe I have the physics expertise of a professional. I do my best to learn and keep abreast of things. But you aren't expert in my field either. How much effort have you made to understand things outside your beliefs?

In any case, we are left with trying to find a middle ground were we can trade concepts. It isn't going to work if you constantly translate everything I say into your frame of reference! From your responses, I haven't seen that you have grasped much of what I've been saying. So for me, this debate just becomes mostly your point of view.

I explain a little more as I answer the rest of your post.

We know nothing about how the universe really works.

There is another one of those statements which you assert as a truth, when really it is just your opinion. I believe we really do know lots about how the universe works. That is why we are able to produce so much great technology, for example . . . because we understand things about the universe.

It is possible, as you seem to be suggesting, that there are actually particles of mass floating around in space, and that's that as far as intrinsicness.

Is there a word "particle"? Is there a term "mass"? Do they represent something that exists in reality or not? This is not only a basic question of epistomology, it is fundamental to empiricism; that is, we attempt correspondence between concepts and reality, and believe that when sufficient facts are present we can get close for working purposes. Of course, one isn't supposed to confuse the conceptual representatons with what they are supposed to correspond to in reality.

But what you've done is taken terms from physics, taken their meanings farther than they were ever intended to be taken, and then claimed we're the ones making assumptions when we tell you that's not what they mean.

This is not a physics class. It is philosophy. So I am not bound by the same rules. We are, as you suggest in the next part of your post, debating ontology. This is what I mean about you trying to translate everything into your perspective. It will never work unless you debating someone who fully agrees with you. We are looking at reality with two different sets of metaphysical assumptions; I'm not abandoning mine to participate in nothing but physicalist metaphysics.

You're claiming to have solved deep ontological problems which are probably impossible to solve in principle.

This is just ridiculous. I have claimed no such thing. We are having a discussion. I am suggesting a basis for the ontology of physicalness which I am still waiting for someone to properly refute. That's how philosophical debates work. If you refute it, then I'll change my mind. So far the only person to directly speak to my proposal has been selfAdjoint. True, he didn't like it, but since then I've been trying to refine my idea so it fits.

You, however, keep talking like a textbook. If you could put that aside for awhile, maybe we might be able to toss this idea around and see what comes of it.

I have suggested a relativistic definition of mass so it fits all possible circumstances (I still think atomic mass is most influential in terms of effects and products). I have suggested that everything we have ever observed about the universe was due to the presence of mass, something derived from mass, or an effect of mass. Now tell me, do you know of anything that's been observed outside of that definition? Would you say gravity? No way. If it weren't for mass, you would never know gravity exists. Would you say c? No way, if it weren't for mass you'd never know. Would you say relativity, same deal. So what would you say?

You limit the physical to things with energy, things that can cause other physical events. . . . I allow it to include anything that can be explained with physics (or equivalently, modeled mathematically). What's the difference?

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

True, experience takes place inside us too, but science itself has made a clear distinction between the two. With concepts, we get to theorize, model, predict, calculate . . . but no matter how perfect theories, predictions, calculations, etc. seem, for them to be considered "true" science requires observation.

So what is observation? We assume it is a reflection of reality, and that our senses can be trusted to feed us a reasonably accurate reflection. This contrasts with mental reflections, which might make sense but may not reflect actual external reality.

The difference between our definitions, therefore, is important. I am trying to get physicalness out of the "mind" and treat it as something objective, with properties. You can't say I've been vague. I've stuck my neck out with a hardcore, concrete definition and offered to defend it. So far all I am hearing is how naive my notions about physics are. What I think is happening is that you don't like the "inelegance" of mass as the source of physicalness. It's so brilliant to do math or understand relativity. Well, yes it is, but that doesn't change the fact that those things are only possibe because mass is present. Without it, what would you have to calculate or observe?

A good way to refute my definition would be to cite an exception. And I still think uncertainty eliminates the math definition of physicalness (unless you want to admit uncertainty is the presence of God in matter ).

 

[Rybo]

interfering and non-interfering patterns operating in pure principle

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

Les, this what Fuller calls metaphysical.

"What we have is interfering and non-interfering patterns oeprating in pure principle" (Fuller)

I cannot accept the idea that there is nothingness(metaphysical) principles that interfer with each other to create somthingness(physical).

This is partly how I dveloped my theory/conjecture that there are multiple sets of partially overlapping, non-valenced, 5-fold-icosaheral, bosonic gravity, operatings at speeds of a fraction grater than our accepted "speed-of-radiation" and is the quasi-physical buffer-zone between the finite physical and infinite metaphysical.

I think that 5-fold gravity interferes with itself in specific, double, triple and quadra-valenced, 4-fold patterns operating at, speeds-of-radiation or less, and is what we observe as fermionic matter.

http://home.usit.net/~rybo6/rybo/id8.html

Rybo

 

[Fliption]

Wow how did I miss this thread? This is a big pet peeve of mine .

Les, I'm sure you've noticed that I've had a big problem with the word "physical". I'll try to explain why I have such a problem with it. Also, I think my explanation could also elude to the cause for some of the confusion in this thread.

To me the words physical and non-physical are just manmade words. Nothing more. We can draw the line of distinction between physical and nonphysical wherever we want because as human beings we invented the words physical and non-physical. Because these distinctions are drawn up by man based on what is most useful, there is no absolute wrong or right answer.

These words have come about it seems because in our past, many people have had beliefs about reality that science could not say anything about i.e. the soul, god etc. So the distinction of physical versus non-physical was useful to refer to these types of things.

I will admit that I haven't read every post in this thread but it seems as if you are comparing each suggested definition to some absolute idea of what it means to be physical and then pointing out when they fall short. Since I don't believe that definitions can ever be wrong they can only be inconsistent, this seems odd to me.

Here is what I think is going on and you can tell me if I'm off base. I believe that you see a certain distinction in reality. You have chosen to label this distinction "physical" and "non-physical". Now you are tasked with having to provide a definition of physical and non-physical in words that everyone can understand and still points to the distinction you have in mind. So when someone uses these terms differently, it appears they are making statements about the distinction that you see that is untrue.

I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Not what we label it. This is arbitrary. We can call the distinctions whatever we want. So when someone suggests that something is physical when it can be described by math and logic, then that's what it means to them and as long as the people they are communicating with have the same definition, then there is nothing wrong with that. But this says absolutely nothing about reality or it's distinctions. This is why I always have such a hard time understanding why everyone is so invested in words. I couldn't care less whether consciousness is physical or non-physical. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.

I keeping thinking of this scenario which illustrates the trickiness of semantics: Imagine that one of the participants in this thread who disagrees with your definitions actually wakes up one day and sees the distinction that you see. And they said "OHHHHH now I see what you mean. But I wouldn't call this non-physical. I would have called this x".

 

[Les Sleeth]

"What we have is interfering and non-interfering patterns operating in pure principle" (Fuller) . . . This is partly how I dveloped my theory/conjecture that there are multiple sets of partially overlapping, non-valenced, 5-fold-icosaheral, bosonic gravity, operatings at speeds of a fraction grater than our accepted "speed-of-radiation" and is the quasi-physical buffer-zone between the finite physical and infinite metaphysical.

I think that 5-fold gravity interferes with itself in specific, double, triple and quadra-valenced, 4-fold patterns operating at, speeds-of-radiation or less, and is what we observe as fermionic matter.

I read Synergetics back in the 1970s when it was published and enjoyed it very much, but I haven't thought about it too much since then. I think if you want to discuss Fuller's ideas here, and how yours are related to his, you will have to go slow because anyone not familiar with Bucky-speak and his concepts probably isn't going to follow you. You might, for instance, start threads over time and introduce ideas a step at a time, in digestable chunks, rather than try to present everything at once.

Les, this what Fuller calls metaphysical. . . . I cannot accept the idea that there is nothingness(metaphysical) principles that interfer with each other to create somthingness(physical).

What I was talking about when I said "Physics and math are 100% in your head" is how people confuse their images and concepts about reality with reality itself. I've argued that people do this with "time," for example, treating it as actual when it is, IMO, purely a mental construct. If I remember correctly Fuller refers to metaphysics in the classic way, which the meta-systems operating behind what's manifest.

I agree that "nothingness" cannot produce anything. Every time I see someone post another thread about it I can't get myself to participate because the idea is so silly to me. The reason I am commenting on it now is because of how much more significant (apparently) I see mass than my fellow debaters.

In past debates I've pointed to an irony involved in the loss of energy from a system. For the most part, after energy departs a system and disperses beyond other systems, it is gone and is no longer available for work. E=mc^2 tells us the loss of energy is the loss of mass. So the mass of the universe (especially taking into account expansion) is clearly decreasing.

If we try to describe the properties of energy, we will be told it has no existential properties, that it is just a calculating concept. But how can the departure of "nothing" result in the loss of mass? Is mass made up of nothing? Or is energy, in reality (i.e., not in the practice of physics) actually related to some sort of existential property? And is mass the manifestation of this more basic "something"?

This is not Fuller's theme of course, who was interested in geometric systems and their interactions. My interest is in modeling some sort of practical monism that would give us an essence or primordial potentiality that can manifest as all the things we see in reality. If that primordial stuff were, for instance, some sort of homogeneous vibrant luminosity, then its amassing to become matter is significant. And I also am interested to see if it could manifest as consciousness independently of matter.

 

[StatusX]

There is another one of those statements which you assert as a truth, when really it is just your opinion. I believe we really do know lots about how the universe works. That is why we are able to produce so much great technology, for example . . . because we understand things about the universe.

I meant at an ontological level. What do the rules mean? What is real? That we don't know these answers is not just my opinion.

Is there a word "particle"? Is there a term "mass"? Do they represent something that exists in reality or not? This is not only a basic question of epistomology, it is fundamental to empiricism; that is, we attempt correspondence between concepts and reality, and believe that when sufficient facts are present we can get close for working purposes. Of course, one isn't supposed to confuse the conceptual representatons with what they are supposed to correspond to in reality.

Who's side are you arguing here? I agree with everything here, and thought that you didn't.

This is not a physics class. It is philosophy. So I am not bound by the same rules. We are, as you suggest in the next part of your post, debating ontology. This is what I mean about you trying to translate everything into your perspective. It will never work unless you debating someone who fully agrees with you. We are looking at reality with two different sets of metaphysical assumptions; I'm not abandoning mine to participate in nothing but physicalist metaphysics.

No one's asking you to. But when you make assumptions based a naive understanding of physics, you have to be open to corrections. Just as if someone made philosphical claims based on the notion of absolute time or Earth being the center of the universe.

This is just ridiculous. I have claimed no such thing. We are having a discussion. I am suggesting a basis for the ontology of physicalness which I am still waiting for someone to properly refute. That's how philosophical debates work. If you refute it, then I'll change my mind. So far the only person to directly speak to my proposal has been selfAdjoint. True, he didn't like it, but since then I've been trying to refine my idea so it fits.

You, however, keep talking like a textbook. If you could put that aside for awhile, maybe we might be able to toss this idea around and see what comes of it.

I have suggested a relativistic definition of mass so it fits all possible circumstances (I still think atomic mass is most influential in terms of effects and products). I have suggested that everything we have ever observed about the universe was due to the presence of mass, something derived from mass, or an effect of mass. Now tell me, do you know of anything that's been observed outside of that definition? Would you say gravity? No way. If it weren't for mass, you would never know gravity exists. Would you say c? No way, if it weren't for mass you'd never know. Would you say relativity, same deal. So what would you say?

As I explained in the last post, energy passes along causation. That is, something must be energetic to cause something we can observe. But the end of the line (consciousness, in my view), the beginning (who knows), any quantifiable processes that might be unobservable but still important in some way we can't foresee, and the possibility that this view of energy is not completely correct are left out of your defintion, and I don't want them out of mine, as long as they can be mathematically formulated. Who cares if we define the word differently? When you say physical from now on, I'll know you're talking about my definition of material, and you similarly would know what I mean. That's all that's important.

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

True, experience takes place inside us too, but science itself has made a clear distinction between the two. With concepts, we get to theorize, model, predict, calculate . . . but no matter how perfect theories, predictions, calculations, etc. seem, for them to be considered "true" science requires observation.

So what is observation? We assume it is a reflection of reality, and that our senses can be trusted to feed us a reasonably accurate reflection. This contrasts with mental reflections, which might make sense but may not reflect actual external reality.

The difference between our definitions, therefore, is important. I am trying to get physicalness out of the "mind" and treat it as something objective, with properties. You can't say I've been vague. I've stuck my neck out with a hardcore, concrete definition and offered to defend it. So far all I am hearing is how naive my notions about physics are. What I think is happening is that you don't like the "inelegance" of mass as the source of physicalness. It's so brilliant to do math or understand relativity. Well, yes it is, but that doesn't change the fact that those things are only possibe because mass is present. Without it, what would you have to calculate or observe?

I understand you. You believe there is a physical (aspect of the) world and then a non-physical one. They are concretely differentiated, not just in our heads, and so they each need a concrete definition. Do I have this right?

I, on the other hand, relate "physical" to the root word "physics", and define it as anything that can be explained by physics, ie, with math. Some words simply can't be defined concretely. For example, "mathematically describable" cannot be. You believe physical is not one of these words, I believe it is. As far as the topic of the thread, that's the end of it: we define the word differently.

A good way to refute my definition would be to cite an exception. And I still think uncertainty eliminates the math definition of physicalness (unless you want to admit uncertainty is the presence of God in matter ).

I'm not sure how to cite an example that refutes your defintion, since mine includes yours as a subset. But as for the uncertainty principle, this is a mathematically derived limitation on measurement, and it allows nature to exhibit certain intrinsic randomness. We have precise equations that govern how the wave function of a particle evolves over time. These allow us to get (theoretically) exact probabilities that certain values of position, velocity, etc will be measured when we decide to observe the particle. If we calculate, say, a 70% chance it will be here and a 30% chance it will be there, then whether it is here or there is just as random as if you picked a random number between 0 and 1 and determined if it was above or below 0.7. There is, as far as we know, nothing more behind this randomness, and if we were to perform the experiment again and again until the end of time, the outcomes would converge to exactly 70% here and 30% there. (and by the way, leptons are a subclass of fermions along with hadrons, and they are distinguished because hadrons interact strongly and leptons don't)

But the recurring point is that mass is an aspect of the current theory, and new theories may throw it out the window. (probably not completely, but maybe it is only an approximation to something deeper) Your definition is subject to change and mine isn't. Once again, if you want a "concrete" defintion in terms of words like "mass" (which, again, I don't consider concrete), then come back a little later when the final theory is done.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Wow how did I miss this thread? This is a big pet peeve of mine .

I've wondered where you've been! Your comments about physicalness "meaning nothing" were my inspiration for this thread.

Here is what I think is going on and you can tell me if I'm off base. I believe that you see a certain distinction in reality. You have chosen to label this distinction "physical" and "non-physical". Now you are tasked with having to provide a definition of physical and non-physical in words that everyone can understand and still points to the distinction you have in mind. So when someone uses these terms differently, it appears they are making statements about the distinction that you see that is untrue.

I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Not what we label it. This is arbitrary. We can call the distinctions whatever we want. So when someone suggests that something is physical when it can be described by math and logic, then that's what it means to them and as long as the people they are communicating with have the same definition, then there is nothing wrong with that. But this says absolutely nothing about reality or it's distinctions. This is why I always have such a hard time understanding why everyone is so invested in words. I couldn't care less whether consciousness is physical or non-physical. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.

I would easily agree with your liberal attitude for discussing reality with others if it weren't for one thing. This one thing is the only reason I am fighting for a definition. Here it is.

There is something called "physicalism." What does it mean? Back on page six of this thread I gave Loseyourname a long answer, and in it I did sort of a history of the universe from the Big Bang to the human body. The physicalist insists that consciousness has come about from the products of the Big Bang, not the least of which is the physicalness of matter tied up in biology. They say that is what creates consciousness.

In other words, the order of things is: first there was the BB, then there was matter, then there was abiogenesis from matter, then there was the evolution of matter, then there was the emergence of consciousness from matter. Consider this quote by noted biologists Lynn Margulis & Dorion Sagan from their book What is Life?, “Life is planetary exuberance, a solar phenomena. It is the astronomically local transmutation of Earth’s air, water, and sun into cells . . . it is matter gone wild, capable of choosing its own direction in order to forestall its own thermodynamic equilibrium . . . Life is moving, thinking matter."

Any physicalists care to take issue with my characterization of your position?

Assuming for now I've fairly stated the physicalist position, I want to be able to argue that consciousness (and, as you know, "livingness") has not come about solely from the products of the Big Bang. The Big Bang, I argue, provides the materials (mass/energy basically) but something else may provide the organization, "something more" which precedes the advent of our universe. I also want to be able to argue there is some sort of essential, existential "stuff" (substance monism), and that of existential "stuff" physicalness is the same existential "stuff" of consciousness.

The argument is which develped first in the primordial existential "stuff": consciousness or physicalness. I don't not believe consciousness is mass or has mass or derives from mass. It is fundamentally, essentially massless. Since physicalists believe, as Margulis and Sagan say, "Life is moving, thinking matter," then I think mass is a good way to distinguish between physical and non-physical. So far I think I've been defending my view that you can describe all of physics in terms of mass, the effects of mass, and the products of mass pretty well.

 

[Les Sleeth]

No one's asking you to. But when you make assumptions based a naive understanding of physics, you have to be open to corrections. Just as if someone made philosphical claims based on the notion of absolute time or Earth being the center of the universe.

Let's hear one of my naive assumptions backed up with facts, not just your opinion. You seem to think I am without science education and that isn't so. As far as we've gone into physics for this discussion, I am still quite comfortable. Not a single thing you or anyone has said is beyond what I already know. We'd get along better if you'd just make your case without the tired old tactic of trying to say "if you only knew better." That is entirely the reason for my expressed frustration while debating you.

But . . . any quantifiable processes that might be unobservable but still important in some way we can't foresee, and the possibility that this view of energy is not completely correct are left out of your defintion, and I don't want them out of mine. But who cares if we define the word differently? When you say physical from now on, I'll know you're talking about my definition of material, and you similarly would know what I mean. That's all that's important.

The issue only comes up when talking about life and consciousness. Outside of that I, at least, am perfectly content to let physicists define their own field. But when we start talking about what is creating life and consciousness, so far the physicalist view has been it is matter, effects of matter, and the products of matter.

I understand you. You believe there is a physical (aspect of the) world and then a non-physical one. They are concretely differentiated, not just in our heads, and so they each need a concrete definition. Do I have this right?

I would say they there are aspects of existence concretely differentiated by conditions. I personally think there is only one sort of absolute existence, some sort of existential "stuff" which takes different shapes depending on conditions. I've been saying the "physical condition" of the stuff is characterized by mass/energy. In this model, consciousness, though of the same stuff, has come about through different conditions than "physical."

I, on the other hand, relate "physical" to the root word "physics", and define it as anything that can be explained by physics, ie, with math.

We are just going to have to disagree about equating physics to math. In fact, I've seen working physicists debate mathmaticians here who vehemently resisted your definition. Math is one of the tools, but physics certainly can't be boiled down to that. If it could, then what need is there for the observational aspect of empiricism?

But as for the uncertainty principle, this is a mathematically derived limitation on measurement, and it allows nature to exhibit certain intrinsic randomness. We have precise equations that govern how the wave function of a particle evolves over time. These allow us to get (theoretically) exact probabilities that certain values of position, velocity, etc will be measured when we decide to observe the particle. If we calculate, say, a 70% chance it will be here and a 30% chance it will be there, then whether it is here or there is just as random as if you picked a random number between 0 and 1 and determined if it was above or below 0.7. There is, as far as we know, nothing more behind this randomness, and if we were to perform the experiment again and again until the end of time, the outcomes would converge to exactly 70% here and 30% there.

I understand calculating for probabilities. And that is why I know you can have perfect calculations for probability, but you cannot ever perfectly determine the position and momentum of a particle. It seems like you are trying to snowjob me. It doesn't matter what's behind the randomness, what matters is that you cannot achieve unlimited accuracy with mathematics, and that is why mathematics cannot define physicalness.

But the recurring point is that mass is an aspect of the current theory, and new theories may throw it out the window. (probably not completely, but maybe it is only an approximation to something deeper) Your definition is subject to change and mine isn't. Once again, if you want a "concrete" defintion in terms of words like "mass" (which, again, I don't consider concrete), then come back a little later when the final theory is done.

Well, I suppose if we agree that when discussing consciousness and life, physicalness means derived from matter then we will understand each other. However, in terms of your definition not being subject to change ("anything that can be explained. . . with math"), I can't see how it even covers all of physicalness now, so I don't see how it's going to in the future. Also, as I said before, I don't see why order, which math nicely models, can't be part of nonphysical conditions. So to say anything which we can model mathematically is physical doesn't do it for me.

 

[Rybo]

To me the words physical and non-physical are just manmade words.
I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.
But I wouldn't call this non-physical. I would have called this x".

Flip, it is true words are human made contstructs. Their first subcatagorziation is mathmatical language and non-mathmatical languaage.

So we are using words, to define other words, which, "other words" are used to define our finite "real"(physical/senorally apprehended) environment and the metaphysical(abstract/concpetual) and subjective qualities as ascertaaine by metaphyiscal mind overlapping interplay with the physical senses resulting as consicouness.

Both are correct as you say because ther is eternal complemetaion between the physical and metaphysical.

Non-physical is metaphysical = beyond the physical = concept = intellect =energy less/

Physical = reality --i.e. to make real, what before, was only a metaphysical concept;

--e.g. as captian Picard of Enterprise says to his Number One officer, "make it so" "make it happen as reality" = energy(energetic) = frequency over time and in space = motion = feasibly/potentially any instrumentally detectable and meterable phenomena.

Word do say something about reality. The oral/spoken word is sensoral(physical).

Written word is pattern of bits(electrons, pixels etc)

Concept of a word(concept) or concept of physical is both metaphysical concept.

Rybo

 

[Fliption]

I've wondered where you've been! Your comments about physicalness "meaning nothing" were my inspiration for this thread.

I figured as much!

The argument is which develped first in the primordial existential "stuff": consciousness or physicalness.

Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalist believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I figured as much!


Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalists believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?

Yeaaaaaaaaa :!) (all signs of happiness). Somebody finally got it! (Not that I couldn't have been clearer. )

 

[Locrian]

In past debates I've pointed to an irony involved in the loss of energy from a system. For the most part, after energy departs a system and disperses beyond other systems, it is gone and is no longer available for work. E=mc^2 tells us the loss of energy is the loss of mass. So the mass of the universe (especially taking into account expansion) is clearly decreasing.

I cannot see what you could mean by this. There is no theory that suggests our universe is losing either mass nor energy (though there may be entirely untested hypothesis that do). Thermodynamics says the useable energy of a system declines, but that is not the same as saying the energy of a system declines. The useable energy in our universe is declining, but there is no reason to think that the mass or energy of our universe is declining.

 

[StatusX]

Let's hear one of my naive assumptions backed up with facts, not just your opinion. You seem to think I am without science education and that isn't so. As far as we've gone into physics for this discussion, I am still quite comfortable. Not a single thing you or anyone has said is beyond what I already know. We'd get along better if you'd just make your case without the tired old tactic of trying to say "if you only knew better." That is entirely the reason for my expressed frustration while debating you.

Ok, I guess you want some external sources. I did a little reading and I found that there are actually two major philosophies of science. Instrumentalism is the view that physics is a tool for studying nature, but it doesn't necessarily describe it as it really is. It just works. Scientific realism is the more common approach among scientists, that there really are things like electric fields and quarks.

Roughly speaking, I guess I'm an instrumentalist. But this is not to say I specifically believe scientific realism is wrong. I'm just a skeptic, and I'm willing to accept the possibliity that physics is just a useful approximation of reality. We can never really know which is correct. But I think a definition of "physical" should account for the possibility that scientific realism is wrong. Specifically, things are physical when they can be explained, regardless of what they actally are.

One interesting example of a theory that illustrates the problem with an intrinsic definition of physical is one you may have heard of by Max Tegmark. He claims http://www.theophys.kth.se/old/max/toe.html that mathematical existence and physical existence are the same thing, and we live in a particular mathematical structure that is complex enough to support the development of "self-aware substructures," which is what we are. (apparrently he believes this mathematical self-reference is enough to give rise to conscious experience, a topic of another mostly ignored recent thread of mine ) Anyway, you would be hard pressed to find an intrinsic defintion of anything here, and yet it seems to be a logically coherent possibility.

We are just going to have to disagree about equating physics to math. In fact, I've seen working physicists debate mathmaticians here who vehemently resisted your definition. Math is one of the tools, but physics certainly can't be boiled down to that. If it could, then what need is there for the observational aspect of empiricism?


I understand calculating for probabilities. And that is why I know you can have perfect calculations for probability, but you cannot ever perfectly determine the position and momentum of a particle. It seems like you are trying to snowjob me. It doesn't matter what's behind the randomness, what matters is that you cannot achieve unlimited accuracy with mathematics, and that is why mathematics cannot define physicalness.


Well, I suppose if we agree that when discussing consciousness and life, physicalness means derived from matter then we will understand each other. However, in terms of your definition not being subject to change ("anything that can be explained. . . with math"), I can't see how it even covers all of physicalness now, so I don't see how it's going to in the future. Also, as I said before, I don't see why order, which math nicely models, can't be part of nonphysical conditions. So to say anything which we can model mathematically is physical doesn't do it for me.

As for the place for mathematics in physics. Can you cite one example of a physical theory that isn't based on a mathematical model? Not quantum mechanics. This is completely mathematical, and very much abstract. The fact that there is uncertainty represents the fact that, as was briefly discussed in this thread, particles don't really have definite positions or velocities until we measure them. It's just one of those counter-intuitive properties of nature. If anything, it's actually evidence for the possibility that science is only approximating reality.

Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalists believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?

Yeaaaaaaaaa (all signs of happiness). Somebody finally got it! (Not that I couldn't have been clearer. )

Well if that's what you meant, you certainly didn't make it clear. How was I supposed to know that you had some preconceived notion of what a physicalist is, and wanted a definition that fitted with that? I already explained where I think consciousness fits in. I don't find it particularly useful (or logical) to say that experience (like colors?) could give rise to the universe. That doesn't help answer any questions.



But just to be perfectly clear:

If a theory of the universe comes around in which consciousness came first, and it gave rise to matter in a mathematically describable way, then I would call that a physical theory, and if I believed it, I would consider myself a physicalist.

 

[hypnagogue]

If a theory of the universe comes around in which consciousness came first, and it gave rise to matter in a mathematically describable way, then I would call that a physical theory, and if I believed it, I would consider myself a physicalist.

StatusX, I understand 'physical' in largely the same way you and do, as referring to abstract relational properties. Apparently we diverge at some point, though, as I disagree with your above statement. I also find it strange that you are sympathetic to Chalmers' arguments about consciousness, but that you still consider yourself a physicalist.

I think I've isolated the difference in the way we think, which may come to bear on this argument. I consider 'physical' to refer only to those aspects of a phenomenon that are relational, whereas you consider 'physical' to refer to any phenomenon that has any relational aspects. For instance, suppose some phenomenon P has both relational and intrinsic aspects. I would say P as a whole is not physical because not all its aspects are relational, although it does have physical aspects. You would say P as a whole is physical, because it has at least some relational aspects. Is that correct?

 

[StatusX]

StatusX, I understand 'physical' in largely the same way you and do, as referring to abstract relational properties. Apparently we diverge at some point, though, as I disagree with your above statement. I also find it strange that you are sympathetic to Chalmers' arguments about consciousness, but that you still consider yourself a physicalist.

I think I've isolated the difference in the way we think, which may come to bear on this argument. I consider 'physical' to refer only to those aspects of a phenomenon that are relational, whereas you consider 'physical' to refer to any phenomenon that has any relational aspects. For instance, suppose some phenomenon P has both relational and intrinsic aspects. I would say P as a whole is not physical because not all its aspects are relational, although it does have physical aspects. You would say P as a whole is physical, because it has at least some relational aspects. Is that correct?

But you believe there are intrinsic aspects to, say, an electron, right? Where do you draw the line? I believe that because we are part of the universe, we can never know anything intrinsic about it. Science does relations and stops there. I agree with Chalmers that experience is something that may arise more generally than just in humans or animals. I don't know how he would feel about my other opinion, though, that the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal can be mathematically described. From what you're saying, it seems he would disagree, but when I read about how he believes information processing systems could be the link, I thought he was on my side.

 

[Rybo]

You might, for instance, start threads over time and introduce ideas a step at a time, in digestable chunks, rather than try to present everything at once.
If I remember correctly Fuller refers to metaphysics in the classic way, which the meta-systems operating behind what's manifest.
I agree that "nothingness" cannot produce anything. Every time I see someone post another thread about it I can't get myself to participate because the idea is so silly to me. So the mass of the universe (especially taking into account expansion) is clearly decreasing.
If we try to describe the properties of energy, we will be told it has no existential properties, that it is just a calculating concept. But how can the departure of "nothing" result in the loss of mass? Is mass made up of nothing? Or is energy, in reality (i.e., not in the practice of physics) actually related to some sort of existential property? And is mass the manifestation of this more basic "something"?
If that primordial stuff were, for instance, some sort of homogeneous vibrant luminosity, then its amassing to become matter is significant. And I also am interested to see if it could manifest as consciousness independently of matter.

Les, mostly in my responses so far I've been trying to differrentiate physical(physic/reality) from metaphysical(non-physical) as I see it beingr related to this thread.

Sure sometbody may not understand some or most of what I am saying but that happens, to some degree, quite often most of us. I see posts with all kinds of mathmatical euations formulas and contants etc... and it goes over my head.

Im using words in the dictionary but like all words in thedictianonary there can be definitions 1),...15).

Perhaps others do not understand my use of the word "prinicples" meaning "cosmic laws" of physics. However I've used many words to help help out. E.g. Cosmic law is eternal ergo inviolate.

No mass is not made of "nothing." As I sadi earlier I mostly agree with you.

Primordal stuff is gravity. When ever I here the phrase bending of space-time I always remark, "what is the fabric/medium of space, that is bending"

Metaphyscial( nothing ) does not bend.

Physical ( something ) does bend. Very simple. What is hard is that the two are in eternal complementation ergo there is always going to be difficulty in trying to differrentiate the two with words alone.

An numerically mathematical, intellectual concept of triangle is a metaphysical ergo is sizeless, energyless, temperatureless etc...

A physcial triangle has size, is energy, has a tempreature etc..

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

I found that there are actually two major philosophies of science. Instrumentalism is the view that physics is a tool for studying nature, but it doesn't necessarily describe it as it really is. It just works. Scientific realism is the more common approach among scientists, that there really are things like electric fields and quarks.

I don't see why the two views have to conflict. I have a high regard for instrumentalism. As the link you provided pointed out, it has similarities to pragmatism, one of my all-time favorite ideas. Scientific realism, to me, relates to the concept of correspondence and, as I mentioned earlier, is another concept I totally accept.

So why would I say they are not competitors?

Well, because they are two completely different intellectual practices dealing with two different elements of science. When practicing instrumentalism a person is employing a practical method for investigation; while practicing realism, he is trying make certain ideas accurately represent (correspond to) what has been discovered/observed or what is hypothesized. In the instrumentalist mode, you will rely on what has been discovered before, so you really need those concepts to correspond to reality; and a good theorist also wants model components to correspond in precise ways so they can be tested.

Roughly speaking, I guess I'm an instrumentalist. But this is not to say I specifically believe scientific realism is wrong. I'm just a skeptic, and I'm willing to accept the possibliity that physics is just a useful approximation of reality. We can never really know which is correct.

Well, I would say you are converging on your specialty. It's good that people specialize in areas of research or theorizing. But I don't think you have to be in competition with approaches you personally aren't that interested in.

But I think a definition of "physical" should account for the possibility that scientific realism is wrong. Specifically, things are physical when they can be explained, regardless of what they actally are.

You are being the specialist again. I would only say that when doing your job, that is a good thing. But in a philosophical discussion you have to recognize the value of all useful persectives. One very useful perspective, for example, has been the view that there actually exists a reality regardless of whether we understand it or not. This helps one to stay more objective (which should be a value for all scientists, don't you think?). Why? Because every way one can separate from one's own personal preferences, predilections, biases, etc. one becomes more neutral. If you say, "I prefer instrumentalism," that's okay. But if you say, "I am going to make it my entire world view, despite the fact other approaches to knowledge have been proven useful," then you've allowed your subjective condition to color your perspective.

As for the place for mathematics in physics. Can you cite one example of a physical theory that isn't based on a mathematical model? Not quantum mechanics. This is completely mathematical, and very much abstract. The fact that there is uncertainty represents the fact that, as was briefly discussed in this thread, particles don't really have definite positions or velocities until we measure them. It's just one of those counter-intuitive properties of nature. If anything, it's actually evidence for the possibility that science is only approximating reality.

Sure. And so can you. Sometimes things are modeled mathematically first, and other times observations establish something as true, and the math follows. Evolution is a physical theory that wasn't based on math. Later, after genetics were better understood, math helped to make predictions.

See, I don't deny there is a high degree of order in physicalness, and that math is an incredible tool for looking abstractly ahead or for analyzing things. But in science, nobody is going to say something is settled just on the basis of math alone! It gives researchers a clue of where to look for confirming experience, but math itself is never considered proof about some unobserved aspect of reality. Observation is the proof in science.

What I think is ironic is that you've expressed your scepticism about correspondance in scientific realism, yet your math perspective is exactly the same thing except instead of conceptual correspondence you believe in mathematical corresondance.

Well if that's what you meant, you certainly didn't make it clear. How was I supposed to know that you had some preconceived notion of what a physicalist is, and wanted a definition that fitted with that? I already explained where I think consciousness fits in. I don't find it particularly useful (or logical) to say that experience (like colors?) could give rise to the universe. That doesn't help answer any questions.

I did say it, several times. But this has been a long and sometimes emotional thread. Lots of things have been said and missed. I am probably more familiar with the physicalist-nonphysicalist debate than most, so I probably didn't lay out the basis of the dispute so everyone could understand it.

If a theory of the universe comes around in which consciousness came first, and it gave rise to matter in a mathematically describable way, then I would call that a physical theory, and if I believed it, I would consider myself a physicalist.

It's certainly your privilege to think what you please, but I say all that attitude does is confuse the debate. Like Loseyourname, you want to say the presence of order defines physicalness. Somehow you guys have it in your head that nonphysical must be utterly undefinable or without traits or pure chaos . . .

I have tried to argue that consciousness in this universe is observed intimately entwined in matter. Physicalists say matter is creating/causing consciousness. But if consciousness could develop straight out of primordial potentiality, without the benefit of matter, then it doesn't seem so blasphemous to say it isn't physical.

In other words, if consciousness is a product of matter (brain), it is physical. If consciousness arose somehow straight from the same primordial stuff the physical universe came from, then it is nonphysical. Simple! Then we can debate clearly if evolving matter needs "cosmic" consciousness (i.e., to organize into life and produce individual human consciousnesses), or if consciousness (and life) is dependent on "physical" potenitals alone to self organize in such a way they create consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I consider 'physical' to refer only to those aspects of a phenomenon that are relational, whereas you consider 'physical' to refer to any phenomenon that has any relational aspects. For instance, suppose some phenomenon P has both relational and intrinsic aspects. I would say P as a whole is not physical because not all its aspects are relational, although it does have physical aspects. You would say P as a whole is physical, because it has at least some relational aspects. Is that correct?

A quick question. When you say "relational," are you only referring to external cause and effect? If, for example, qualia experience could be subjectively probed and found to contain "components" strictly internal itself, all of which were necessary for experience to exist, would you then say experience is physical?

 

[StatusX]

You are being the specialist again. I would only say that when doing your job, that is a good thing. But in a philosophical discussion you have to recognize the value of all useful persectives. One very useful perspective, for example, has been the view that there actually exists a reality regardless of whether we understand it or not. This helps one to stay more objective (which should be a value for all scientists, don't you think?). Why? Because every way one can separate from one's own personal preferences, predilections, biases, etc. one becomes more neutral. If you say, "I prefer instrumentalism," that's okay. But if you say, "I am going to make it my entire world view, despite the fact other approaches to knowledge have been proven useful," then you've allowed your subjective condition to color your perspective.

The reason I brought these views up was to point out that there is some doubt as to whether mass corresponds to something real. As of right now, we only know for sure that it is a helpful mathematical concept in describing the world. It may well be more than this, but I just thought that a good definition should cover all bases if possible. I thought mine did.

Sure. And so can you. Sometimes things are modeled mathematically first, and other times observations establish something as true, and the math follows. Evolution is a physical theory that wasn't based on math. Later, after genetics were better understood, math helped to make predictions.

See, I don't deny there is a high degree of order in physicalness, and that math is an incredible tool for looking abstractly ahead or for analyzing things. But in science, nobody is going to say something is settled just on the basis of math alone! It gives researchers a clue of where to look for confirming experience, but math itself is never considered proof about some unobserved aspect of reality. Observation is the proof in science.

Math is a loose term. Topology, computer science, and even formal logic are, in my opinion, math. As I think Bertrand Russel said, math is any system free from contradiction. When I say any physical theory must be mathematical, it doesn't necessarily mean it has numbers. It is just a logically sound model with which you can make specific predictions. The vast majority of the time, this involves numbers because we use units to define dimensions and so we get things like 54 m/s. Evolution, as you cited, could be stated in a few key principles which are logically consistent, and used to make predictions, so I think it fits under my defintion of a physical theory. This might seem like a last stitch effort to preserve my beliefs, but let me emphasize this one more time: this is only my defintion of physical. If it turns out that no one else in the world shares it, then I guess I'm not really a physicalist, and I'll have to figure out what I am.

What I think is ironic is that you've expressed your scepticism about correspondance in scientific realism, yet your math perspective is exactly the same thing except instead of conceptual correspondence you believe in mathematical corresondance.

I'm not sure I understand you. Math could only be an approximation to reality as well. Is this what you mean?

It's certainly your privilege to think what you please, but I say all that attitude does is confuse the debate. Like Loseyourname, you want to say the presence of order defines physicalness. Somehow you guys have it in your head that nonphysical must be utterly undefinable or without traits or pure chaos . . .

Just beyond our understanding. This makes my position pretty arrogant, that "nothing is beyond our understanding." But like I said, intrinsicness and creation are beyond us to understand, so I guess they are non-physical, and if that makes me a non-physicalist, then so be it.

I have tried to argue that consciousness in this universe is observed intimately entwined in matter. Physicalists say matter is creating/causing consciousness. But if consciousness could develop straight out of primordial potentiality, without the benefit of matter, then it doesn't seem so blasphemous to say it isn't physical.

In other words, if consciousness is a product of matter (brain), it is physical. If consciousness arose somehow straight from the same primordial stuff the physical universe came from, then it is nonphysical. Simple! Then we can debate clearly if evolving matter needs "cosmic" consciousness (i.e., to organize into life and produce individual human consciousnesses), or if consciousness (and life) is dependent on "physical" potenitals alone to self organize in such a way they create consciousness.

If you're talking about God, and claiming it created matter and the laws of physics, you may be right. I am in no position to dispute this, and you are in no position to dispute a claim that tiny laughing purple fishes created them. Like I said, this is pure speculation. I mean, whatever it is, how could we possibly understand it? How can something cause itself to exist?

 

[Les Sleeth]

If you're talking about God, and claiming it created matter and the laws of physics, you may be right.

God is a religious concept, so I'd prefer to avoid the subject. But why must we imagine consciousness has to evolve like ours has? Why couldn't a consciousness, for example, be as big as the universe? One version of a theory called "panpsychism" suggests consciousness developed right along with the development of the physical universe and is part of the fabric of the everything. I wouldn't have such a consciousness "creating" matter, but rather participating in the organization of it, particularly in life and the central nervous system.

I am in no position to dispute this, and you are in no position to dispute a claim that tiny laughing purple fishes created them. Like I said, this is pure speculation. I mean, whatever it is, how could we possibly understand it?

I know you think all reports of some sort of greater consciousness must be nothing but speculation, but most people (particularly science types) haven't studied the subject very thoroughly (if at all). This isn't thread to discuss it so I'll just say there is more to it than what you see in religion (FYI, I'm not religious).

How can something cause itself to exist?

Well, how can the universe cause itself to exist? How did life cause itself to exist? Physicalists don't seem to mind that dilemma, but the idea of consciousness evolving out of same primordial potentiality the universe came from seems preposterous. Personally I think anthropomorphism creates that perspective in us.

 

[Rybo]

Fermions =mass(phyiscal) bosons=massless(?)

The reason I brought these views up was to point out that there is some doubt as to whether mass corresponds to something real. Math is a loose term. Topology, computer science, and even formal logic are, in my opinion, math.

Stat,

1) geometry is the mathematical science of pattern (Fuller approximatly) Geometry is sets of Euclidean aspects. "Sets" is one of the four main branches of mathematics.

2) Quarks(fractionated spins) are femerions but mesons(two quarks) with spin-0 are bosons. We now know that at least one neutrino has mass, so, what with mass in this reagards..

... Photons have no mass but they are energ(getic) boson and some say they are not attractive to ohter paticles via gravity for these reasons, but they follow something called "bent(warped) space.?

If space is bent, then space has to be a "physcial something" to be "bent'.

Please correct my logic/rational were needed.

Rybo

 

[StatusX]

Well, how can the universe cause itself to exist? How did life cause itself to exist? Physicalists don't seem to mind that dilemma, but the idea of consciousness evolving out of same primordial potentiality the universe came from seems preposterous. Personally I think anthropomorphism creates that perspective in us.

That was my point. Whatever was the cause of the universe, it was a part of the universe. (here I take the universe to mean "all that is") So it is beyond our understanding, and thus non-physical. If consciousness caused the material universe, that process may be physical if it can be modeled as I've discussed. But the problem of where the consciousness came from would remain unsolved and so would be non-physical.

As for life, I could similarly ask "How could a star cause itself to exist?" There is no "hard problem" here, because there is no problem of self-reference. It is perfectly possible that life arose from inorganic matter.

 

[Les Sleeth]

As for life . . . It is perfectly possible that life arose from inorganic matter.

Uh huh. Maybe " tiny laughing purple fishes created" it. That's about as close as anyone is to demostrating life can arise from the potentials of matter alone.

 

[Rader]

Would this then be, an adequate working definition of physical?
Physical is the experience between the experiencer and the experienced, that can be mathematically modeled and be experimentally confirmed to have a mass coordinate somewhere in relation to another experience.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Why drag math into it? Wasn't lightning just as physical to Benjamin Franklin as to James Clerk Maxwell, though the second man had math to describe it and the first one didn't? I think this illustrates pretty well my thesis that "physical" is a contingent concept that depends on our current understanding of how the world works. It is at least conceivable that a theory of everything, should we attain it, would explain consciousness and pixies and God. Or it might just explain the 19 unknown parameters of the standard model of particle physics. We don't know and shouldn't let our conclusions rest on guesses.