Defining Physicalness: Inviting Physicalists to Weigh In

[Bartholomew]

It eliminates _direct_ experience. Of course there is some direct experience within your own consciousness, but for things about the outside world, you can only get information indirectly--e.g. through reflected light or through nerve impulses from your skin.

I think that the existence of photons which were never matter refutes your argument.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think that the existence of photons which were never matter refutes your argument.

What are photons if not matter (or at least a constituent of matter)? That supposedly was the condition of things in the early stages; that is, there were "parts" which later joined. Not all electrons found a home with atoms, not all photons were incorporated into atoms.

But even if you wanted to get technical and say that radiation was never part of the fundamental unit of matter (an atom), I can't see how that undermines my proposed definition for physicalness. About three minutes after the Big Bang, the binding energy between protons and neutrons was strong enough to separate from the background radiation. Since then, what role has that radiation played in the physicalness of our universe? None that I know of.

Aren't we talking about what determines the physical laws right now? All I am saying is that physicalness right now (and for most of the last 15 billion years) is determined by matter, the effects of matter, and the offspring of matter.

 

[StatusX]

I saw it, I just don't what to say to someone who doesn't distinquish between experience-ability and conceptualness.

You could explain the difference to me, for one thing. And please do, because I must be missing something.

Energy is a measurement of a potential of matter. Two things that weigh the same on a scale does not make them intrinsically the same. Matter may possess energy, but that doesn't mean it is energy. A quick example. Cosmic background radiation loses energy as the universe expands. The radiation doesn't cease to exist, it just oscillates a bit slower. As far as we know, a photon will maintain it's character as a oscillating entity no matter how much energy it loses. So how can energy and a photon (which I am considering matter) be the same? I'll wait for more expertise to weigh in (e.g., selfAdjoint) before disputing you about this any further.

For one thing, photons are generally considered to be energy, as they have no rest mass. But as I've been saying, the distinction is unimportant. As you gain speed, you gain mass, and thus kinetic energy. As you get closer to a large mass, you lose potential energy, and thus mass. The curvature of spacetime which causes gravity is determined by the mass-energy density at each point. Feel free to bring in experts, I know enough to argue my side (which they'll agree with if they're legitimate experts).

I'm not sure if you think your opinions are authoritative, but just because you say it, doesn't make it so. Matter, its products, and its effects can be experienced, they can be measured, they can be predicted. If there is any anything more substantial than that, then I don't know what it is.

You experience your senses, nothing more, nothing less. In fact, most of your senses are only directly affected by the electromagnetic force. Photons hit your eyes, your eardrums and skin are repulsed when atoms get to close to them and push them around. Contrary to your intuiition, you have no direct experience with mass. However, it is such an important concept in our everyday lives that we have a deep, intuitive model of it in our minds. But just like time seems universally uniform, objects seem to have definite position and velocity, and the world seems to have three spatial dimensions, these are all (speculatively in the last case) not how the universe really is. Our brains are not flawless models of the universe, which is all I've been trying to say.

Well, I'm not seeing much willingness on your part to comprehend or address where I'm coming from. You are merely reframing everything I say in the context of your own belief system, good ol' physicalist dogma.

Again, please explain what you're looking for and I'll do my best to put aside my feelings and answer objectively.

EDIT:

Here's another way to think of the problem I see with your idea.

It is a historical accident that we have a concept for mass. It is entirely conceivable that an alien race would have a system for describing the world that has nothing akin to our notion of mass. Mass/energy equivalence is one way of seeing this; we came from two different angles on one concept and it wasn't until Einstein that we realized we were looking at the same thing. It is reasonable that some alien race could have started with a concept we could only call "mass-energy" and never needed an equation like E=mc². If you think this is far-fetched, look no farther than Lagrange's equations of motion. These are alternate formulations of Newton's laws that never once use the concept of a "force." Instead, Lagrange defined something called "action," and his one law is that systems take the path of least action. This is not radically different from Newton's method, but we're all human and so we all think in basically the same way. Another intelligent being might not have a concept for mass, charge, or even time.

 

[Rybo]

physical equals fermions and bosons minus gravity?

All I am saying is that physicalness right now (and for most of the last 15 billion years) is determined by matter, the effects of matter, and the offspring of matter.

I think this is correct as long as it includes fermions and bosons leaving gravity(gravitons) to the side for the moment.

Physical is energy as fermionic matter particles or bosonic force particles. That seems simple enough to me.

Metaphysical is energyless. Metaphysical laws and metaphyiscal space fo nothingness.
That seems simple to me.

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

You could explain the difference to me, for one thing. And please do, because I must be missing something. . . . Again, please explain what you're looking for and I'll do my best to put aside my feelings and answer objectively.

We're too far apart. In the past I've debated individuals with the perspective you are giving me, sometimes for months at a stretch, and still we both went away unconvinced. Every time we exchange ideas, my sense is that your assumptions about reality are so set in place you reinterpret everything I say into your belief system. On top of that, you may assume when I don't respond in a way that fits your worldview, I must not understand physicalness, so you need to explain it to me (like about how the senses work, or intuitiveness, or some other concept I understand perfectly). Maybe in the future there will be opportunities where I can explain where I'm coming from in different ways and you'll see it.

Right now I am swamped with another project and don't have time for a long side debate. Since that project involves a definition for "physical" I wanted to see how my ideas on it fly, which is why I started this thread.

 

[StatusX]

We're too far apart. In the past I've debated individuals with the perspective you are giving me, sometimes for months at a stretch, and still we both went away unconvinced. Every time we exchange ideas, my sense is that your assumptions about reality are so set in place you reinterpret everything I say into your belief system. On top of that, you may assume when I don't respond in a way that fits your worldview, I must not understand physicalness, so you need to explain it to me (like about how the senses work, or intuitiveness, or some other concept I understand perfectly). Maybe in the future there will be opportunities where I can explain where I'm coming from in different ways and you'll see it.

Right now I am swamped with another project and don't have time for a long side debate. Since that project involves a definition for "physical" I wanted to see how my ideas on it fly, which is why I started this thread.

Ok, then I win. Just kidding. If you want to cut this off here, that's fine, but I think I can be open-minded if you just spell out your side a little more clearly. But in any case, I suggest you briefly consider my edit above, if only as an opposing view that you might need to argue in whatever your project is.

 

[loseyourname]

Okay, here's what I was thinking:
If intelligent conception displays extrinsic relationships that can be mathematically modeled,

Okay, I'm going to stop you here. Intelligent conception itself is far too complex to model mathematically. The key is that intelligent conception be reducable to neuronal activity, which can be modeled mathematically. Inevitably, something will be lost in the reduction, but this is the case with any biological process. Whether or not intelligent conception itself would be considered physical under this definition is probably contentious, but the important thing is that intelligent conception have a physical basis.

The nuomenons that Bart was referring to do exist in a strict sense, but it isn't the kind of existence we're looking to here. The existence is solely an abstract existence. I probably shouldn't have even said that it should exist independent of intelligent conception, because it's difficult to say that mathematical objects only exist if someone is thinking about them. To be honest, I'm not sure exactly how to describe the existence of such things. The best way I can think of at this point to exclude them from my definition of "physical" is to say that they, in fact, cannot be mathematically modeled. Rather, they are mathematical models. Heck, I guess it gets a little sticky when you consider this kind of existence.

 

[loseyourname]

I agree with you on this. I don't see how mathematics defines what's physical. It describes the order and quanties present in physicalness, but that isn't all there is to physicalness. I also don't believe every aspect of physicalness can be represented mathematically. When Alexander was here we went through this issue of trying equate reality with the math that is merely a representation of it, and I thought we put it to rest.

It's not an identification. I'm not saying that physicalness is mathematical modelling. The math doesn't even matter. If we had no concept of math, we would still have physicalness. A good definition is just a set of properties that must be present in order to refer to object x using word y. The property I'm looking to is the property of having extrinsic relational attributes that behave with some degree of regularity. All of the objects of physics display this property whether or not they have mass or energy or momentum or any of the other derived quantities of mechanics. The real problem I have with your definition of physical as matter is twofold: First, it is an identity, rather than a definition. If that is all that physical means, then we already have the word "material" for that. "Physical" seems to mean something different, not synonymous with any other word. Second, it is not fundamental. The property of being matter is derived from other properties, as matter itself is defined as "anything that has mass and takes up space." Since mass itself is also a derived quanitity, it seems that you then have to turn to spatial extent. But of course we know that it is largely possible that some of the objects of physics do not have any spatial extent, yet they are still considered physical.

We must look to the intersection of the sets of properties of all things that are considered physical. What do these things all have in common? Some of them are material, some of them are not. Some of them have spatial extent, some do not. Some have mass, some do not. Some have energy, some do not. The only thing I can think of that all physical things have in common is the regularity of extrinsic behavior that they display. Why they display this regularity is another matter. This intrinsic ability to be causally efficacious in a somewhat predictable manner is the only intrinsic defining property of physical things. What this intrinsic physicalness is cannot be answered by any technique that we know of. Physics studies only relational attributes. It is the property of having these relational attributes - not the relational attributes themselves - that allow an object to come under the study of physics and thus make that object physical.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Here's another way to think of the problem I see with your idea.

It is a historical accident that we have a concept for mass. It is entirely conceivable that an alien race would have a system for describing the world that has nothing akin to our notion of mass. Mass/energy equivalence is one way of seeing this; we came from two different angles on one concept and it wasn't until Einstein that we realized we were looking at the same thing. It is reasonable that some alien race could have started with a concept we could only call "mass-energy" and never needed an equation like E=mc². If you think this is far-fetched, look no farther than Lagrange's equations of motion. These are alternate formulations of Newton's laws that never once use the concept of a "force." Instead, Lagrange defined something called "action," and his one law is that systems take the path of least action. This is not radically different from Newton's method, but we're all human and so we all think in basically the same way. Another intelligent being might not have a concept for mass, charge, or even time.

First of all, I switched from mass as the starting point to matter, which is essentually atoms. With that in mind, I cannot see the relevance of your point to my suggestion for a definition of physical. Are you saying you don't buy the generally accepted description of how things have proceeded since the Big Bang? I have tried to make it clear that a primary reason for placing matter at the start of the definition is because that appears to be how the universe relatively quickly unfolded (from a big foamy, soupy mess to atomic constituents), and still continues to unfold; that is, after a few minutes matter was set to go, and then for the next billions of years (minus the 300k years or so it took to separate from background radiation) it continued to go.

All the things we study in physics, whether it is QM or relativity or energy, are all in relation to the existence of matter, the effects of matter, or the products of matter. Since there would be no study of any of it without matter, what exactly would physics (i.e., physicalness) be about then?

 

[StatusX]

First of all, I switched from mass as the starting point to matter, which is essentually atoms. With that in mind, I cannot see the relevance of your point to my suggestion for a definition of physical. Are you saying you don't buy the generally accepted description of how things have proceeded since the Big Bang? I have tried to make it clear that a primary reason for placing matter at the start of the definition is because that appears to be how the universe relatively quickly unfolded (from a big foamy, soupy mess to atomic constituents), and still continues to unfold; that is, after a few minutes matter was set to go, and then for the next billions of years (minus the 300k years or so it took to separate from background radiation) it continued to go.

All the things we study in physics, whether it is QM or relativity or energy, are all in relation to the existence of matter, the effects of matter, or the products of matter. Since there would be no study of any of it without matter, what exactly would physics (i.e., physicalness) be about then?

Ok, matter is better than mass. But it still isn't precise what you mean by matter. If you mean all fermions and bosons as they appear in the standard model, then you're getting closer to something I can agree with. But the problem remains: Such a defintion would have been impossible a hundred years ago. So how do we know such a defintion will be applicable a hundred years from now? That is why I offered my orignal definition, that it depends on what we can explain with our current model of the universe. If you want something more concrete, come back in a hundred years (maybe more, maybe less) when we have a final theory of physics. This may just consist of the same particles the standard model does, but it is just as likely that there will be more. One likely possibility is the theoretically predicted supersymmetric partners of the current particles, such as selectrons and photinos. Another, more speculative possibility is some fundamental particle that explains consciousness. You and I would probably disagree as to whether this will be incorporated in the final theory of physics, but we really won't know until we get there.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Ok, matter is better than mass. But it still isn't precise what you mean by matter. If you mean all fermions and bosons as they appear in the standard model, then you're getting closer to something I can agree with. But the problem remains: Such a defintion would have been impossible a hundred years ago. So how do we know such a defintion will be applicable a hundred years from now? That is why I offered my orignal definition, that it depends on what we can explain with our current model of the universe. If you want something more concrete, come back in a hundred years (maybe more, maybe less) when we have a final theory of physics. This may just consist of the same particles the standard model does, but it is just as likely that there will be more. One likely possibility is the theoretically predicted supersymmetric partners of the current particles, such as selectrons and photinos. Another, more speculative possibility is some fundamental particle that explains consciousness. You and I would probably disagree as to whether this will be incorporated in the final theory of physics, but we really won't know until we get there.

Note my post way above, where I point out that the physicalism debate has outlasted many previous ideas of what constituted physical forces or matter. The only thing we can do today is to try to argue honestly in terms of what we "know" today. The basic point of any physicalist argument is that there shall be one standard of truth, not two, and the structured community activity of coordinating theory with experiment be the one left standing.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Ok, matter is better than mass. But it still isn't precise what you mean by matter. If you mean all fermions and bosons as they appear in the standard model, then you're getting closer to something I can agree with.

That's what I mean (when I originally said "mass," I thought everyone would think I meant the mass of atoms). But for the next part of my answer, keep in mind the entire definition of what I am suggesting.

But the problem remains: Such a defintion would have been impossible a hundred years ago. So how do we know such a defintion will be ( applicable a hundred years from now?

Not so. 300 hundred-plus years ago after defining the nature of mass, weight, force, inertia and acceleration, Newton might have said "Physicalness is matter, its effects, and its offspring.

That is why I offered my orignal definition, that it depends on what we can explain with our current model of the universe.

I still say our current model, as different as it is from Newton's, can be said to be the result of "matter, its effects, and its offspring."

If you want something more concrete, come back in a hundred years (maybe more, maybe less) when we have a final theory of physics. This may just consist of the same particles the standard model does, but it is just as likely that there will be more. One likely possibility is the theoretically predicted supersymmetric partners of the current particles, such as selectrons and photinos. Another, more speculative possibility is some fundamental particle that explains consciousness. You and I would probably disagree as to whether this will be incorporated in the final theory of physics, but we really won't know until we get there.

And don't forget the Higgs boson (a little mass joke). But see, none of those developments would undermine the definition of physical as " "matter, its effects, and its offspring." Do you see this, or am I really that off base? No matter what we discover, if it is derived from or caused by matter, then the definition holds. That's why I think it is a good one.

 

[Rybo]

Seems perfetly reasonable to me

And don't forget the Higgs boson (a little mass joke). But see, none of those developments would undermine the definition of physical as " "matter, its effects, and its offspring." Do you see this, or am I really that off base? No matter what we discover, if it is derived from or caused by matter, then the definition holds. That's why I think it is a good one.

Fermionic matter particles and bosonic force particles are in eternal complementation to the each other ergo one being the offspring/resultant of the other may be incorrect.

I say that 5-fold icosahedral gravity is a pulling-in force-- into as matter -- that results in all pushing-out radiational forces. Here too I may be incorrect in so stating it that way, however, the diffrrence is that without the the tensegral pulling-in force of gravity all forms of energy of all of physcial Unvierse would become totaly dissipated/dispersed and we would have the "heat death" sometimes theorized as one large very flat photon or set of photons and and infintiely expanding into an entropic nothingess of no energy at all, without hope of recollapse. Ugh!

Whose to say that isn't what fate awaits the Universe but I don't believe that will be the case. Call me optimsitic but really this is just derived from geometrical principles I've gleaned and extrapolated from Fullers Syn. 1 & 2.

This is why I believe gravity exists as a integral-set 5-fold icosahedral systemic-structures that I call the "the fabric of space" and that appears to us over time as the retarded, double-valenced(bonded) 4-fold octahedral leptons and the 4-fold qudra-valenced(bonded) tetrahedral hadrons.

Rybo

 

[StatusX]

Note my post way above, where I point out that the physicalism debate has outlasted many previous ideas of what constituted physical forces or matter. The only thing we can do today is to try to argue honestly in terms of what we "know" today. The basic point of any physicalist argument is that there shall be one standard of truth, not two, and the structured community activity of coordinating theory with experiment be the one left standing.

I agree, but the point of getting a defintion here is for the question "Can consciousness be explained as a physical property?" Obviously it cannot if we restrict ourselves to today's physics, but the more important question is whether physics will ever be able to explain it.

That's what I mean (when I originally said "mass," I thought everyone would think I meant the mass of atoms).

But see, none of those developments would undermine the definition of physical as " "matter, its effects, and its offspring." Do you see this, or am I really that off base? No matter what we discover, if it is derived from or caused by matter, then the definition holds. That's why I think it is a good one.

I don't mean any offense, but this misunderstanding might just be because you haven't studied that much of modern physics. Matter is a sort of ambiguous term, but I would say it generally refers to that which has mass. When you made the clarification in your last post that you had moved from "things that have mass" to "matter," I assumed you were using a different definition of matter, one that meant, as I guessed, the fermions and bosons in the standard model. Again, I don't know how much you know about this stuff, so I don't mean to be condescending if you already know this, but fermions are things like quarks, neutrinos, and electons. Things that probably (not certainly in the case of neutrinos) all have mass, and would generally all be considered matter. Bosons are photons and the other messenger particles that transmit the strong and weak (and maybe in a later theory, gravitational) forces. The bosons are more complicated, and can't be thought of simply as "resulting from things with mass." That is why a defintion of physical in terms of the traditional definition of matter is unsatisfactory.

My point was that even if you extend to the latter defintion of matter, the current fermions and bosons are just the contents of today's theory. Calling anything else that might crop up in tomorrow's theory "unphysical" is not justified. Getting back to the point I think you're really trying to make with this thread, it is not inconceivable that the final phyiscal model has fermions, bosons, maybe some other classes, and "qualions" that interact with these other particles in a quantifiable way and are responsible for conscious experience.

I don't know if this is going to happen. If it does, they probably wouldn't be particles in the traditional sense, since they probably wouldn't have specific positions in space. In fact, if you really insist on excluding such a thing from a defintion of physical, you might want change your defintion to something like "that which exists within space and time." But I would consider such a thing physical (because of the "quantifiable" part), and a disagreement on this would only be a matter of semantics.

There is a chance that your proposal will turn out to be identical to mine in the end. The reason I don't like it is a) it is inelegant, as it gives mass a priority it does not deserve, since it is just another number we assign to particles like charge and spin number, and b) it doesn't account for unforseeable discoveries in physics.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The reason I don't like it is a) it is inelegant, as it gives mass a priority it does not deserve, since it is just another number we assign to particles like charge and spin number, and b) it doesn't account for unforseeable discoveries in physics.

It is indeed inelegant. It is also simple (and to you probably simplistic) but seems safe and comprehesive enough to use (for now) when physicalists and nonphysicalists get into debates about what physical is and isn't. It terms of giving mass a priority, I don't know why you'd resist that since if the BB was the result of a singularity, then physicists already believe an occurance of infinite density was the first event of creation. I am simply pointing out that mass seems to be causing and the basis of a lot of physicalness.

 

[loseyourname]

It is indeed inelegant. It is also simple (and to you probably simplistic) but seems safe and comprehesive enough to use (for now) when physicalists and nonphysicalists get into debates about what physical is and isn't.

Well, it doesn't seem that safe to me, since you are still leaving open the possibility that physics will eventually be able to explain things that are not considered physical by your definition, whether they be Status' qualions or anything else that behaves in a predictable manner but is not derived from material substance.

Either way, as long as we each know what the other means when we use a certain word, isn't that what's important? Does it really make a difference whether different parties agree or not?

 

[Rybo]

Consciousness needs a particular particle or set of particles?

I agree, but the point of getting a defintion here is for the question "Can consciousness be explained as a physical property?" Obviously it cannot if we restrict ourselves to today's physics, but the more important question is whether physics will ever be able to explain it.
Calling anything else that might crop up in tomorrow's theory "unphysical" is not justified. Getting back to the point I think you're really trying to make with this thread, it is not inconceivable that the final phyiscal model has fermions, bosons, maybe some other classes, and "qualions" that interact with these other particles in a quantifiable way and are responsible for conscious experience.

Consciouness ergo awarness is explained by the relationships between all phyiscal particles that interact to create a conscious biologic and interact with that biologic as its sensoral experience ergo what I am phyiscally.

If you need a specific particle then perhaps it is the most elusive graviton or or some set of virtual particles or combinations of both and not neccessarily a new unknow particle.

Conscious awareness does not exist witout the physical. "I think about something(s)-- say my finger -- with somethings(s)-- neurons/brain -- ergo I am.

Rybo

 

[StatusX]

If you need a specific particle then perhaps it is the most elusive graviton or or some set of virtual particles or combinations of both and not neccessarily a new unknow particle.

Let me be more specific. I certainly don't think there is a particle in space that floats around and causes experience. So "qualions," with the particle suffix might have been misleading. I was only contrasting it with fermions and bosons in that it could be a new part of the theory, separate from these, but still related to them in a mathematically modellable way. (And I didn't mean it would have something like spin 3/4, if that's what anyone was thinking)

I should just point out the oxymoron in that word. "Qualia" was coined to describe how these experiences are qualitative things, where as particles are quantitative. A word like this is vulnerable to being used to demonstrate how physicalists like me don't really understand the problem. I agree there is an unquantifiable aspect to consciousness, but that will, as far as I can see, always remain a mystery. What a physical theory could do is categorize the experiences and predict if and when they will arise in certain systems. Most aspects of physics are relational, but they rest on a few qualitative ideas, like spacetime and the very concept of a "law." These aspects are probably beyond science to explain, and if consciousness can be modeled at all, its qualititative aspects will likely be elusive as well. But maybe science will go beyond this and, by incorporating consciousness, start to explain the intrinsic aspects of physics as well. Who knows? It's clear from past experience that we're not very good at guessing how science will evolve.

 

[hypnagogue]

Les, you insist that physicalness be defined in terms of some kind of intrinsic property (what it 'is'), but the key point (as has been mentioned) is that physical things are just not defined this way in the first place. In any physical theory, all you will find are quantities and rules that relate these quantities. In physical theory, there is nothing to mass (or any other quantity described in physics) other than the functional relationships it engages in. Mass is just the functional propensity to resist a force, or warp spacetime, or whatever. There is nothing to it beyond what it does.

You object that "Matter, its products, and its effects can be experienced, they can be measured, they can be predicted," but this is not going against the grain at all. That which can be measured is simply that which changes the measuring device in a systematic way by entering into some sort of functional relationship with it. That which can be predicted is just that which changes measuring devices in a reproducible pattern. That which can be experienced (in an objective sense) is that which can be detected by an organism's measuring device, the nervous system. We can account for measurability, predictability, and experience-ability (again, in an objective sense) just by appealing to extrinsic, relational properties. You are looking for some sort of essence (intrinsic propery) of the physical, but you shouldn't be frustrated not to find it, because essence simply has no place in physical theory.

 

[Les Sleeth]

That which can be measured is simply that which changes the measuring device in a systematic way by entering into some sort of functional relationship with it. That which can be predicted is just that which changes measuring devices in a reproducible pattern. That which can be experienced (in an objective sense) is that which can be detected by an organism's measuring device, the nervous system. We can account for measurability, predictability, and experience-ability (again, in an objective sense) just by appealing to extrinsic, relational properties.

That which changes the measuring devise has mass, and the measuring device itself has and relies on mass. Any predictable pattern you can cite has mass, came from mass, or was caused by mass. The nervous system is mass, it detects mass. All the "relational" properties you want to measure, predict, and experience (with physical senses) are, again, mass, products of mass, or effects of mass. How much of a common trait does physicalness have to have before we say something is universal to it?

You are looking for some sort of essence (intrinsic propery) of the physical, but you shouldn't be frustrated not to find it, because essence simply has no place in physical theory.

To the contrary. I am looking for the most basic structure, not the essence. I am attempting to argue it is manifested in mass. Personally I think essence and physicalness are incompatible concepts.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Well, it doesn't seem that safe to me, since you are still leaving open the possibility that physics will eventually be able to explain things that are not considered physical by your definition, whether they be Status' qualions or anything else that behaves in a predictable manner but is not derived from material substance.

Either way, as long as we each know what the other means when we use a certain word, isn't that what's important? Does it really make a difference whether different parties agree or not?

Let me see if I can be clear about why I see your definition leads to problems in a philosophical debate, for me anyway.

But first, I am confused about your concern. How have I left open the possibility that "physics will eventually be able to explain things that are not considered physical by [my] definition"? It seems to me you are the one, by wanting to base physicalness on the presence of any sort of order, who is leaving the door open. I will get back to this "order" point in a second.

However, the thing is, I actually do want to leave the door open for a physical explanation. That is what physicalists claim is the basis of life and consciousness, and so in a fair debate they should be able to use every relevant fact and argument to make their case. What I don't want to see is someone claiming something has come about through physical means, but which really didn't, by expanding the meaning of physical to include whatever we discover to be true.

If you review the physicalist side participating in this thread, you should be able to notice a certain approach. Look at, for example, selfAdjoint's definition of physical (and you'd probably agree his view represents the science perspective better than anyone else commenting in this thread). He said "Today physicality pretty much means consistence with the Standard Model of particle interactions or with General Relativity (locally GR looks like Special Relativity so that is included too). Those theories are accepted by physicists as 'effective,' matching all experiments we know how to do now, and there is enormous experimental support for their predictions at all energy scales likely to be relevant to the human body."

What's included there is a realm of laws that extends from particles and gravity right through biology. They represent the most important principles which support physicalist theory.

Now consider StatusX's statement, "All we know that is absolute is that there is a universe. . . . And time . . . is part of the universe. If you are moving or in a gravitational field, time slows down. It is taking intuition too far to assume time existed before the big bang. The big bang is where spacetime originated."

That too is classic physicalism. All that exists, all that came into being, did so with the advent of this universe.

I attempted to put things in perspective with my story of the first moments after the Big Bang. I said, "According to the commonly accepted theory, 10 -43 seconds after the Big Bang was the so-called GUT epoch . . . At 10 -20 seconds after inflation, most of what would be required to form matter existed; EM and weak forces separate, quarks form protons and neutrons. But a mere 3 minutes after the Big Bang the first nuclei were synthesized. Since expansion and cooling were going to continue, the rest of the matter of the universe was virtually guaranteed to develop."

Also I pointed out, ". . . if the BB was the result of a singularity, then physicists already believe an occurrence of infinite density was the first event of creation."

Okay, now let's consider that input together. We have a universe that is believed to have started with an event of infinite density. We have the basis of mass particles forming in well under a second, and actual nuclei within minutes. We have physicalists who believe all existence began with that event. Today we have science, whose primary principles (the Standard Model of particle interactions and General Relativity) "are accepted by physicists as 'effective,' matching all experiments we know how to do now, and there is enormous experimental support for their predictions at all energy scales likely to be relevant to the human body."

As I've pointed out, the universe's first significant act (the Big Bang) followed the high mass condition of a singularity, the Standard Model of particle interactions is the rules of matter (add: products and effects of matter to most of this list), relativity would not exist (or be observable) without mass, energy is derived from matter, energy is only detectable because it moves mass, our body is matter, our brains are matter, the electro-chemical aspects of the brain result from matter. What can we point to that science actually observes and studies which isn’t mass, mass derived, are an effect of mass?

Let’s get back to the issue of the physicalist versus nonphysicalist debate about consciousness. For the physicalist, the cause of consciousness is brain physiology. What is the basis of that physiology? It is 15 billion years of material change that took place in an “evolutive corridor” that stretches from the Big Bang to homo sapiens sapiens. One thing you are absolutely correct about is that the change in that evolutive corridor exhibits an incredible level of order. Also, consciousness itself has quite the organized/organizing nature.

Now here’s where I think we need to distinguish between order and physicalness. What is the origin of the universe’s order? Is it matter or physicalness itself? Or did consciousness develop before the physical universe, and provide the ordering aspect of creation? Did consciousness emerge from physicalness (i.e., Big Bang to now purely mechanical ordering), or did physicalness emerge from conscious ordering. Right now physicalist theory clearly has consciousness emerging from the organization of matter, which is why I am attempting to say physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

If conscious is independent of matter, then its fundamental existence has not come about in anyway from that physical development. However, I would agree it seems fairly apparent that brain physiology is helping to structure and organize aspects of human consciousness, plus I believe the brain helps to individuate consciousness.

Anyway, my main point is wanting to leave the issue of which developed first open to debate. What if part of the very nature of consciousness is order? Then we are attributing to physicalness something it is incapable of without the ordering principle consciousness provides.

 

[Locrian]

That which changes the measuring devise has mass

Not necessarily; just momentum. I find it strange this issue keeps coming up.

How are you defining mass?

 

[Locrian]

If you review the physicalist side participating in this thread, you should be able to notice a certain approach. Look at, for example, selfAdjoint's definition of physical (and you'd probably agree his view represents the science perspective better than anyone else commenting in this thread).

No, I wouldn't agree that his view represents the science perspective at all. It is both temporary and circular for reasons I've already given. I'm beginning to think you are hanging onto some of the definitions because they are easy to deconstruct, not because they are particularly useful.

 

[Rybo]

(And I didn't mean it would have something like spin 3/4, if that's what anyone was thinking)
I should just point out the oxymoron in that word. "Qualia" was coined to describe how these experiences are qualitative things, where as particles are quantitative. Who knows? It's clear from past experience that we're not very good at guessing how science will evolve.

SX, I think telepathy may be a rare phyiscal phenomena that we even more rarely consicously aware of and is incoprated via whole body-- or nearly whole body, brain whatever --physcial (EMR)/gravitational(qausi--physical) resonance between two or mor biologics.

If gravity is even a fraction faster than our accepterd speed-of-radiation then it would remain a mystery forever/eternally. Maybe slight less so as our current understanding of harnessing enough power to quantify any alledgged spin-2 graviton is perhaps millions of years beyond such feasible practical consideration now or later.

Many human planetary civilizations may have and will, ignorantly and unintentinally, kill themselves off, long before they even come close to ever harnesing a solar system size accelartor lab for such gravtionic experiements :) I dunno.

I think we need to always go back to the most generalized/comprehensive and complex and begin there in our subcatgaorization methods and conceptual de-evolution of Universe i.e. from complex to simple.

These following three are on same level as the first subcatgoriaztioon of Universe

1) Finite physical Universe ( all possible quantizisable particles, directly or indiectly, even if forever beyond the the scope of practical feasibility)

2) Metaphysical Universe ( qualitative, subjective, concepts, laws, energyuless, sizeless, tempertuareless etc...as mind or as the infnite nothingness outside of fintie physical Universe)

3) Quasi-physical gravity ( speculatived by me as the faster than of accepted speed-of-radiation, buffer-zone, between the physical and the metaphysical)

#1 Physical can be represented as that finite volumectric area inside of a polyhedron or multiple-dimensiona(hyper) concentric polyhedra curled inisde one polyhedron as the finite physical Universe.

#2 Metaphysical can be reprsented by inifnite nothing ouside of the finite polyhedron or polyhedra.

#3 Quasi-physical gravity is the itesy bitsy very thin/small surface structure area/edges/ of the polyhedron or polyhedra that sperates the physical Universe from the metaphyscial Universe.

My home page if interested.
http://home.usit.net/~rybo6/rybo/index.html

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

Not necessarily; just momentum. I find it strange this issue keeps coming up.

I think you are talking about rest mass.

 

[Locrian]

Not really; how are you defining mass? This is the third time I've asked that question. I am sincerely sorry if you did and I missed it, I really have been reading. Can you repeat yourself once more?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Not really; how are you defining mass? This is the third time I've asked that question. I am sincerely sorry if you did and I missed it, I really have been reading. Can you repeat yourself once more?

Anything with non-zero energy. Try this link

 

[Locrian]

Heh, well since energy is a construct humans have created for mathematically defining a system, and it is completely based on the concept of measuring the system and defining energy based on those measurements,

We might very well say your definition of physical that you proposed could be reworded to say something is physical if it can be mathematically conceptualized by those who measured it.

I wonder if that's what you are looking for? Something makes me doubt it.

Edit: By the way, that is absolutely not how I would define the word mass; however, I'm more than happy to use your definition. That's why I asked back on page...3 or so.

 

[StatusX]

What is the origin of the universe’s order? Is it matter or physicalness itself? Or did consciousness develop before the physical universe, and provide the ordering aspect of creation? Did consciousness emerge from physicalness (i.e., Big Bang to now purely mechanical ordering), or did physicalness emerge from conscious ordering. Right now physicalist theory clearly has consciousness emerging from the organization of matter, which is why I am attempting to say physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

Well then we've really been arguing over a meaningless difference in terms. I agree consciousness is separate from matter. And I see your point now, that there is an orginization in both consciousness and the material universe, and we need to determine which caused which.

I believe the rules are the rules, and we can never know where they came from. These rules allowed the formation of complex brains, and it is because of these brains that our experiences are so complex.

One other thing. If you insist on defining physical as "the effects of matter," consciousness still fits in. Obviously matter effects your experiences.

 

[loseyourname]

Heh, well since energy is a construct humans have created for mathematically defining a system, and it is completely based on the concept of measuring the system and defining energy based on those measurements,

We might very well say your definition of physical that you proposed could be reworded to say something is physical if it can be mathematically conceptualized by those who measured it.

I wonder if that's what you are looking for? Something makes me doubt it.

Edit: By the way, that is absolutely not how I would define the word mass; however, I'm more than happy to use your definition. That's why I asked back on page...3 or so.

So can we see yet how it is possible to reduce all physical descriptions to mathematical descriptions? Does that still not seem of significance to anyone but me? If all physical things have this in common, how can it not be a defining property?

Now here’s where I think we need to distinguish between order and physicalness. What is the origin of the universe’s order? Is it matter or physicalness itself? Or did consciousness develop before the physical universe, and provide the ordering aspect of creation? Did consciousness emerge from physicalness (i.e., Big Bang to now purely mechanical ordering), or did physicalness emerge from conscious ordering. Right now physicalist theory clearly has consciousness emerging from the organization of matter, which is why I am attempting to say physicalness is matter, the effects of matter, and the products of matter.

So basically you're fitting a definition to your conception of the consciousness debate. I'm trying to find a definition that stands alone, that has utility to all discussions and that identifies the one thing that all things must have to be studied physically. If this overturns your conception of the consciousness debate, so be it. You're making my case for me that you're attempting to derive a definition with the sole end in mind of excluding consciousness from physicalness.