Defining Physicalness: Inviting Physicalists to Weigh In

[StatusX]

There is another one of those statements which you assert as a truth, when really it is just your opinion. I believe we really do know lots about how the universe works. That is why we are able to produce so much great technology, for example . . . because we understand things about the universe.

I meant at an ontological level. What do the rules mean? What is real? That we don't know these answers is not just my opinion.

Is there a word "particle"? Is there a term "mass"? Do they represent something that exists in reality or not? This is not only a basic question of epistomology, it is fundamental to empiricism; that is, we attempt correspondence between concepts and reality, and believe that when sufficient facts are present we can get close for working purposes. Of course, one isn't supposed to confuse the conceptual representatons with what they are supposed to correspond to in reality.

Who's side are you arguing here? I agree with everything here, and thought that you didn't.

This is not a physics class. It is philosophy. So I am not bound by the same rules. We are, as you suggest in the next part of your post, debating ontology. This is what I mean about you trying to translate everything into your perspective. It will never work unless you debating someone who fully agrees with you. We are looking at reality with two different sets of metaphysical assumptions; I'm not abandoning mine to participate in nothing but physicalist metaphysics.

No one's asking you to. But when you make assumptions based a naive understanding of physics, you have to be open to corrections. Just as if someone made philosphical claims based on the notion of absolute time or Earth being the center of the universe.

This is just ridiculous. I have claimed no such thing. We are having a discussion. I am suggesting a basis for the ontology of physicalness which I am still waiting for someone to properly refute. That's how philosophical debates work. If you refute it, then I'll change my mind. So far the only person to directly speak to my proposal has been selfAdjoint. True, he didn't like it, but since then I've been trying to refine my idea so it fits.

You, however, keep talking like a textbook. If you could put that aside for awhile, maybe we might be able to toss this idea around and see what comes of it.

I have suggested a relativistic definition of mass so it fits all possible circumstances (I still think atomic mass is most influential in terms of effects and products). I have suggested that everything we have ever observed about the universe was due to the presence of mass, something derived from mass, or an effect of mass. Now tell me, do you know of anything that's been observed outside of that definition? Would you say gravity? No way. If it weren't for mass, you would never know gravity exists. Would you say c? No way, if it weren't for mass you'd never know. Would you say relativity, same deal. So what would you say?

As I explained in the last post, energy passes along causation. That is, something must be energetic to cause something we can observe. But the end of the line (consciousness, in my view), the beginning (who knows), any quantifiable processes that might be unobservable but still important in some way we can't foresee, and the possibility that this view of energy is not completely correct are left out of your defintion, and I don't want them out of mine, as long as they can be mathematically formulated. Who cares if we define the word differently? When you say physical from now on, I'll know you're talking about my definition of material, and you similarly would know what I mean. That's all that's important.

The difference is, you cannot observe "physics" or "math." Don't you see? Physics and math are 100% in your head. They are concepts, aspects of the intellect.

True, experience takes place inside us too, but science itself has made a clear distinction between the two. With concepts, we get to theorize, model, predict, calculate . . . but no matter how perfect theories, predictions, calculations, etc. seem, for them to be considered "true" science requires observation.

So what is observation? We assume it is a reflection of reality, and that our senses can be trusted to feed us a reasonably accurate reflection. This contrasts with mental reflections, which might make sense but may not reflect actual external reality.

The difference between our definitions, therefore, is important. I am trying to get physicalness out of the "mind" and treat it as something objective, with properties. You can't say I've been vague. I've stuck my neck out with a hardcore, concrete definition and offered to defend it. So far all I am hearing is how naive my notions about physics are. What I think is happening is that you don't like the "inelegance" of mass as the source of physicalness. It's so brilliant to do math or understand relativity. Well, yes it is, but that doesn't change the fact that those things are only possibe because mass is present. Without it, what would you have to calculate or observe?

I understand you. You believe there is a physical (aspect of the) world and then a non-physical one. They are concretely differentiated, not just in our heads, and so they each need a concrete definition. Do I have this right?

I, on the other hand, relate "physical" to the root word "physics", and define it as anything that can be explained by physics, ie, with math. Some words simply can't be defined concretely. For example, "mathematically describable" cannot be. You believe physical is not one of these words, I believe it is. As far as the topic of the thread, that's the end of it: we define the word differently.

A good way to refute my definition would be to cite an exception. And I still think uncertainty eliminates the math definition of physicalness (unless you want to admit uncertainty is the presence of God in matter ).

I'm not sure how to cite an example that refutes your defintion, since mine includes yours as a subset. But as for the uncertainty principle, this is a mathematically derived limitation on measurement, and it allows nature to exhibit certain intrinsic randomness. We have precise equations that govern how the wave function of a particle evolves over time. These allow us to get (theoretically) exact probabilities that certain values of position, velocity, etc will be measured when we decide to observe the particle. If we calculate, say, a 70% chance it will be here and a 30% chance it will be there, then whether it is here or there is just as random as if you picked a random number between 0 and 1 and determined if it was above or below 0.7. There is, as far as we know, nothing more behind this randomness, and if we were to perform the experiment again and again until the end of time, the outcomes would converge to exactly 70% here and 30% there. (and by the way, leptons are a subclass of fermions along with hadrons, and they are distinguished because hadrons interact strongly and leptons don't)

But the recurring point is that mass is an aspect of the current theory, and new theories may throw it out the window. (probably not completely, but maybe it is only an approximation to something deeper) Your definition is subject to change and mine isn't. Once again, if you want a "concrete" defintion in terms of words like "mass" (which, again, I don't consider concrete), then come back a little later when the final theory is done.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Wow how did I miss this thread? This is a big pet peeve of mine .

I've wondered where you've been! Your comments about physicalness "meaning nothing" were my inspiration for this thread.

Here is what I think is going on and you can tell me if I'm off base. I believe that you see a certain distinction in reality. You have chosen to label this distinction "physical" and "non-physical". Now you are tasked with having to provide a definition of physical and non-physical in words that everyone can understand and still points to the distinction you have in mind. So when someone uses these terms differently, it appears they are making statements about the distinction that you see that is untrue.

I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Not what we label it. This is arbitrary. We can call the distinctions whatever we want. So when someone suggests that something is physical when it can be described by math and logic, then that's what it means to them and as long as the people they are communicating with have the same definition, then there is nothing wrong with that. But this says absolutely nothing about reality or it's distinctions. This is why I always have such a hard time understanding why everyone is so invested in words. I couldn't care less whether consciousness is physical or non-physical. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.

I would easily agree with your liberal attitude for discussing reality with others if it weren't for one thing. This one thing is the only reason I am fighting for a definition. Here it is.

There is something called "physicalism." What does it mean? Back on page six of this thread I gave Loseyourname a long answer, and in it I did sort of a history of the universe from the Big Bang to the human body. The physicalist insists that consciousness has come about from the products of the Big Bang, not the least of which is the physicalness of matter tied up in biology. They say that is what creates consciousness.

In other words, the order of things is: first there was the BB, then there was matter, then there was abiogenesis from matter, then there was the evolution of matter, then there was the emergence of consciousness from matter. Consider this quote by noted biologists Lynn Margulis & Dorion Sagan from their book What is Life?, “Life is planetary exuberance, a solar phenomena. It is the astronomically local transmutation of Earth’s air, water, and sun into cells . . . it is matter gone wild, capable of choosing its own direction in order to forestall its own thermodynamic equilibrium . . . Life is moving, thinking matter."

Any physicalists care to take issue with my characterization of your position?

Assuming for now I've fairly stated the physicalist position, I want to be able to argue that consciousness (and, as you know, "livingness") has not come about solely from the products of the Big Bang. The Big Bang, I argue, provides the materials (mass/energy basically) but something else may provide the organization, "something more" which precedes the advent of our universe. I also want to be able to argue there is some sort of essential, existential "stuff" (substance monism), and that of existential "stuff" physicalness is the same existential "stuff" of consciousness.

The argument is which develped first in the primordial existential "stuff": consciousness or physicalness. I don't not believe consciousness is mass or has mass or derives from mass. It is fundamentally, essentially massless. Since physicalists believe, as Margulis and Sagan say, "Life is moving, thinking matter," then I think mass is a good way to distinguish between physical and non-physical. So far I think I've been defending my view that you can describe all of physics in terms of mass, the effects of mass, and the products of mass pretty well.

 

[Les Sleeth]

No one's asking you to. But when you make assumptions based a naive understanding of physics, you have to be open to corrections. Just as if someone made philosphical claims based on the notion of absolute time or Earth being the center of the universe.

Let's hear one of my naive assumptions backed up with facts, not just your opinion. You seem to think I am without science education and that isn't so. As far as we've gone into physics for this discussion, I am still quite comfortable. Not a single thing you or anyone has said is beyond what I already know. We'd get along better if you'd just make your case without the tired old tactic of trying to say "if you only knew better." That is entirely the reason for my expressed frustration while debating you.

But . . . any quantifiable processes that might be unobservable but still important in some way we can't foresee, and the possibility that this view of energy is not completely correct are left out of your defintion, and I don't want them out of mine. But who cares if we define the word differently? When you say physical from now on, I'll know you're talking about my definition of material, and you similarly would know what I mean. That's all that's important.

The issue only comes up when talking about life and consciousness. Outside of that I, at least, am perfectly content to let physicists define their own field. But when we start talking about what is creating life and consciousness, so far the physicalist view has been it is matter, effects of matter, and the products of matter.

I understand you. You believe there is a physical (aspect of the) world and then a non-physical one. They are concretely differentiated, not just in our heads, and so they each need a concrete definition. Do I have this right?

I would say they there are aspects of existence concretely differentiated by conditions. I personally think there is only one sort of absolute existence, some sort of existential "stuff" which takes different shapes depending on conditions. I've been saying the "physical condition" of the stuff is characterized by mass/energy. In this model, consciousness, though of the same stuff, has come about through different conditions than "physical."

I, on the other hand, relate "physical" to the root word "physics", and define it as anything that can be explained by physics, ie, with math.

We are just going to have to disagree about equating physics to math. In fact, I've seen working physicists debate mathmaticians here who vehemently resisted your definition. Math is one of the tools, but physics certainly can't be boiled down to that. If it could, then what need is there for the observational aspect of empiricism?

But as for the uncertainty principle, this is a mathematically derived limitation on measurement, and it allows nature to exhibit certain intrinsic randomness. We have precise equations that govern how the wave function of a particle evolves over time. These allow us to get (theoretically) exact probabilities that certain values of position, velocity, etc will be measured when we decide to observe the particle. If we calculate, say, a 70% chance it will be here and a 30% chance it will be there, then whether it is here or there is just as random as if you picked a random number between 0 and 1 and determined if it was above or below 0.7. There is, as far as we know, nothing more behind this randomness, and if we were to perform the experiment again and again until the end of time, the outcomes would converge to exactly 70% here and 30% there.

I understand calculating for probabilities. And that is why I know you can have perfect calculations for probability, but you cannot ever perfectly determine the position and momentum of a particle. It seems like you are trying to snowjob me. It doesn't matter what's behind the randomness, what matters is that you cannot achieve unlimited accuracy with mathematics, and that is why mathematics cannot define physicalness.

But the recurring point is that mass is an aspect of the current theory, and new theories may throw it out the window. (probably not completely, but maybe it is only an approximation to something deeper) Your definition is subject to change and mine isn't. Once again, if you want a "concrete" defintion in terms of words like "mass" (which, again, I don't consider concrete), then come back a little later when the final theory is done.

Well, I suppose if we agree that when discussing consciousness and life, physicalness means derived from matter then we will understand each other. However, in terms of your definition not being subject to change ("anything that can be explained. . . with math"), I can't see how it even covers all of physicalness now, so I don't see how it's going to in the future. Also, as I said before, I don't see why order, which math nicely models, can't be part of nonphysical conditions. So to say anything which we can model mathematically is physical doesn't do it for me.

 

[Rybo]

To me the words physical and non-physical are just manmade words.
I'd asks whether it is possible that maybe "physical" and non-physical" aren't the right words to point to that distinction? Remember, to me, there is nothing sacred in a word like "physical". What's important is the real distinction in reality itself that you believe exists. Because the meaning of this statement depends on what I mean by physical and non-physical. It is all semantics and says nothing about reality.
But I wouldn't call this non-physical. I would have called this x".

Flip, it is true words are human made contstructs. Their first subcatagorziation is mathmatical language and non-mathmatical languaage.

So we are using words, to define other words, which, "other words" are used to define our finite "real"(physical/senorally apprehended) environment and the metaphysical(abstract/concpetual) and subjective qualities as ascertaaine by metaphyiscal mind overlapping interplay with the physical senses resulting as consicouness.

Both are correct as you say because ther is eternal complemetaion between the physical and metaphysical.

Non-physical is metaphysical = beyond the physical = concept = intellect =energy less/

Physical = reality --i.e. to make real, what before, was only a metaphysical concept;

--e.g. as captian Picard of Enterprise says to his Number One officer, "make it so" "make it happen as reality" = energy(energetic) = frequency over time and in space = motion = feasibly/potentially any instrumentally detectable and meterable phenomena.

Word do say something about reality. The oral/spoken word is sensoral(physical).

Written word is pattern of bits(electrons, pixels etc)

Concept of a word(concept) or concept of physical is both metaphysical concept.

Rybo

 

[Fliption]

I've wondered where you've been! Your comments about physicalness "meaning nothing" were my inspiration for this thread.

I figured as much!

The argument is which develped first in the primordial existential "stuff": consciousness or physicalness.

Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalist believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I figured as much!


Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalists believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?

Yeaaaaaaaaa :!) (all signs of happiness). Somebody finally got it! (Not that I couldn't have been clearer. )

 

[Locrian]

In past debates I've pointed to an irony involved in the loss of energy from a system. For the most part, after energy departs a system and disperses beyond other systems, it is gone and is no longer available for work. E=mc^2 tells us the loss of energy is the loss of mass. So the mass of the universe (especially taking into account expansion) is clearly decreasing.

I cannot see what you could mean by this. There is no theory that suggests our universe is losing either mass nor energy (though there may be entirely untested hypothesis that do). Thermodynamics says the useable energy of a system declines, but that is not the same as saying the energy of a system declines. The useable energy in our universe is declining, but there is no reason to think that the mass or energy of our universe is declining.

 

[StatusX]

Let's hear one of my naive assumptions backed up with facts, not just your opinion. You seem to think I am without science education and that isn't so. As far as we've gone into physics for this discussion, I am still quite comfortable. Not a single thing you or anyone has said is beyond what I already know. We'd get along better if you'd just make your case without the tired old tactic of trying to say "if you only knew better." That is entirely the reason for my expressed frustration while debating you.

Ok, I guess you want some external sources. I did a little reading and I found that there are actually two major philosophies of science. Instrumentalism is the view that physics is a tool for studying nature, but it doesn't necessarily describe it as it really is. It just works. Scientific realism is the more common approach among scientists, that there really are things like electric fields and quarks.

Roughly speaking, I guess I'm an instrumentalist. But this is not to say I specifically believe scientific realism is wrong. I'm just a skeptic, and I'm willing to accept the possibliity that physics is just a useful approximation of reality. We can never really know which is correct. But I think a definition of "physical" should account for the possibility that scientific realism is wrong. Specifically, things are physical when they can be explained, regardless of what they actally are.

One interesting example of a theory that illustrates the problem with an intrinsic definition of physical is one you may have heard of by Max Tegmark. He claims http://www.theophys.kth.se/old/max/toe.html that mathematical existence and physical existence are the same thing, and we live in a particular mathematical structure that is complex enough to support the development of "self-aware substructures," which is what we are. (apparrently he believes this mathematical self-reference is enough to give rise to conscious experience, a topic of another mostly ignored recent thread of mine ) Anyway, you would be hard pressed to find an intrinsic defintion of anything here, and yet it seems to be a logically coherent possibility.

We are just going to have to disagree about equating physics to math. In fact, I've seen working physicists debate mathmaticians here who vehemently resisted your definition. Math is one of the tools, but physics certainly can't be boiled down to that. If it could, then what need is there for the observational aspect of empiricism?


I understand calculating for probabilities. And that is why I know you can have perfect calculations for probability, but you cannot ever perfectly determine the position and momentum of a particle. It seems like you are trying to snowjob me. It doesn't matter what's behind the randomness, what matters is that you cannot achieve unlimited accuracy with mathematics, and that is why mathematics cannot define physicalness.


Well, I suppose if we agree that when discussing consciousness and life, physicalness means derived from matter then we will understand each other. However, in terms of your definition not being subject to change ("anything that can be explained. . . with math"), I can't see how it even covers all of physicalness now, so I don't see how it's going to in the future. Also, as I said before, I don't see why order, which math nicely models, can't be part of nonphysical conditions. So to say anything which we can model mathematically is physical doesn't do it for me.

As for the place for mathematics in physics. Can you cite one example of a physical theory that isn't based on a mathematical model? Not quantum mechanics. This is completely mathematical, and very much abstract. The fact that there is uncertainty represents the fact that, as was briefly discussed in this thread, particles don't really have definite positions or velocities until we measure them. It's just one of those counter-intuitive properties of nature. If anything, it's actually evidence for the possibility that science is only approximating reality.

Ohhhhhhhhh. I had to read your post several times but I think I may know what you're trying to say. When you criticize the definitions that have been given in this thread, you are criticizing them because they are not consistent with the conclusions of physicalism. Namely, that consciousness emerges from matter. So, their definitions are wrong because they do not lead to the conclusions of physicalism. The definition that you proposed was your attempt to have a definition that is consistent with what a physicalists actually believes.

For example, Loseyourname's definition has to do with whether something can be described by math/logic. So according to this definition a person who believes that all things can be descibed this way is a physicalist. But how does this position lead one to believe that matter precedes consciousness? It doesn't as far as I can see and perhaps this is what leads you to criticize it. Having this definition doesn't exclude the possibility that consciousness came first so that can't be what physical means!

Once you can establish what it means to be physical based on the conclusions of physicalists you can show that consciousness doesn't fit that definition.

I hope I have understood you better this time. I think the first thing that needs to happen is for everyone to agree or disagree with you that a physicalists believes what you say they believe. Is it a defining characterization of a physicalist to believe that consciousness emerges from matter? Or is that just a byproduct of the bland personalities of most physicalists ?

Yeaaaaaaaaa (all signs of happiness). Somebody finally got it! (Not that I couldn't have been clearer. )

Well if that's what you meant, you certainly didn't make it clear. How was I supposed to know that you had some preconceived notion of what a physicalist is, and wanted a definition that fitted with that? I already explained where I think consciousness fits in. I don't find it particularly useful (or logical) to say that experience (like colors?) could give rise to the universe. That doesn't help answer any questions.



But just to be perfectly clear:

If a theory of the universe comes around in which consciousness came first, and it gave rise to matter in a mathematically describable way, then I would call that a physical theory, and if I believed it, I would consider myself a physicalist.

 

[hypnagogue]

If a theory of the universe comes around in which consciousness came first, and it gave rise to matter in a mathematically describable way, then I would call that a physical theory, and if I believed it, I would consider myself a physicalist.

StatusX, I understand 'physical' in largely the same way you and do, as referring to abstract relational properties. Apparently we diverge at some point, though, as I disagree with your above statement. I also find it strange that you are sympathetic to Chalmers' arguments about consciousness, but that you still consider yourself a physicalist.

I think I've isolated the difference in the way we think, which may come to bear on this argument. I consider 'physical' to refer only to those aspects of a phenomenon that are relational, whereas you consider 'physical' to refer to any phenomenon that has any relational aspects. For instance, suppose some phenomenon P has both relational and intrinsic aspects. I would say P as a whole is not physical because not all its aspects are relational, although it does have physical aspects. You would say P as a whole is physical, because it has at least some relational aspects. Is that correct?

 

[StatusX]

StatusX, I understand 'physical' in largely the same way you and do, as referring to abstract relational properties. Apparently we diverge at some point, though, as I disagree with your above statement. I also find it strange that you are sympathetic to Chalmers' arguments about consciousness, but that you still consider yourself a physicalist.

I think I've isolated the difference in the way we think, which may come to bear on this argument. I consider 'physical' to refer only to those aspects of a phenomenon that are relational, whereas you consider 'physical' to refer to any phenomenon that has any relational aspects. For instance, suppose some phenomenon P has both relational and intrinsic aspects. I would say P as a whole is not physical because not all its aspects are relational, although it does have physical aspects. You would say P as a whole is physical, because it has at least some relational aspects. Is that correct?

But you believe there are intrinsic aspects to, say, an electron, right? Where do you draw the line? I believe that because we are part of the universe, we can never know anything intrinsic about it. Science does relations and stops there. I agree with Chalmers that experience is something that may arise more generally than just in humans or animals. I don't know how he would feel about my other opinion, though, that the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal can be mathematically described. From what you're saying, it seems he would disagree, but when I read about how he believes information processing systems could be the link, I thought he was on my side.

 

[Rybo]

You might, for instance, start threads over time and introduce ideas a step at a time, in digestable chunks, rather than try to present everything at once.
If I remember correctly Fuller refers to metaphysics in the classic way, which the meta-systems operating behind what's manifest.
I agree that "nothingness" cannot produce anything. Every time I see someone post another thread about it I can't get myself to participate because the idea is so silly to me. So the mass of the universe (especially taking into account expansion) is clearly decreasing.
If we try to describe the properties of energy, we will be told it has no existential properties, that it is just a calculating concept. But how can the departure of "nothing" result in the loss of mass? Is mass made up of nothing? Or is energy, in reality (i.e., not in the practice of physics) actually related to some sort of existential property? And is mass the manifestation of this more basic "something"?
If that primordial stuff were, for instance, some sort of homogeneous vibrant luminosity, then its amassing to become matter is significant. And I also am interested to see if it could manifest as consciousness independently of matter.

Les, mostly in my responses so far I've been trying to differrentiate physical(physic/reality) from metaphysical(non-physical) as I see it beingr related to this thread.

Sure sometbody may not understand some or most of what I am saying but that happens, to some degree, quite often most of us. I see posts with all kinds of mathmatical euations formulas and contants etc... and it goes over my head.

Im using words in the dictionary but like all words in thedictianonary there can be definitions 1),...15).

Perhaps others do not understand my use of the word "prinicples" meaning "cosmic laws" of physics. However I've used many words to help help out. E.g. Cosmic law is eternal ergo inviolate.

No mass is not made of "nothing." As I sadi earlier I mostly agree with you.

Primordal stuff is gravity. When ever I here the phrase bending of space-time I always remark, "what is the fabric/medium of space, that is bending"

Metaphyscial( nothing ) does not bend.

Physical ( something ) does bend. Very simple. What is hard is that the two are in eternal complementation ergo there is always going to be difficulty in trying to differrentiate the two with words alone.

An numerically mathematical, intellectual concept of triangle is a metaphysical ergo is sizeless, energyless, temperatureless etc...

A physcial triangle has size, is energy, has a tempreature etc..

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

I found that there are actually two major philosophies of science. Instrumentalism is the view that physics is a tool for studying nature, but it doesn't necessarily describe it as it really is. It just works. Scientific realism is the more common approach among scientists, that there really are things like electric fields and quarks.

I don't see why the two views have to conflict. I have a high regard for instrumentalism. As the link you provided pointed out, it has similarities to pragmatism, one of my all-time favorite ideas. Scientific realism, to me, relates to the concept of correspondence and, as I mentioned earlier, is another concept I totally accept.

So why would I say they are not competitors?

Well, because they are two completely different intellectual practices dealing with two different elements of science. When practicing instrumentalism a person is employing a practical method for investigation; while practicing realism, he is trying make certain ideas accurately represent (correspond to) what has been discovered/observed or what is hypothesized. In the instrumentalist mode, you will rely on what has been discovered before, so you really need those concepts to correspond to reality; and a good theorist also wants model components to correspond in precise ways so they can be tested.

Roughly speaking, I guess I'm an instrumentalist. But this is not to say I specifically believe scientific realism is wrong. I'm just a skeptic, and I'm willing to accept the possibliity that physics is just a useful approximation of reality. We can never really know which is correct.

Well, I would say you are converging on your specialty. It's good that people specialize in areas of research or theorizing. But I don't think you have to be in competition with approaches you personally aren't that interested in.

But I think a definition of "physical" should account for the possibility that scientific realism is wrong. Specifically, things are physical when they can be explained, regardless of what they actally are.

You are being the specialist again. I would only say that when doing your job, that is a good thing. But in a philosophical discussion you have to recognize the value of all useful persectives. One very useful perspective, for example, has been the view that there actually exists a reality regardless of whether we understand it or not. This helps one to stay more objective (which should be a value for all scientists, don't you think?). Why? Because every way one can separate from one's own personal preferences, predilections, biases, etc. one becomes more neutral. If you say, "I prefer instrumentalism," that's okay. But if you say, "I am going to make it my entire world view, despite the fact other approaches to knowledge have been proven useful," then you've allowed your subjective condition to color your perspective.

As for the place for mathematics in physics. Can you cite one example of a physical theory that isn't based on a mathematical model? Not quantum mechanics. This is completely mathematical, and very much abstract. The fact that there is uncertainty represents the fact that, as was briefly discussed in this thread, particles don't really have definite positions or velocities until we measure them. It's just one of those counter-intuitive properties of nature. If anything, it's actually evidence for the possibility that science is only approximating reality.

Sure. And so can you. Sometimes things are modeled mathematically first, and other times observations establish something as true, and the math follows. Evolution is a physical theory that wasn't based on math. Later, after genetics were better understood, math helped to make predictions.

See, I don't deny there is a high degree of order in physicalness, and that math is an incredible tool for looking abstractly ahead or for analyzing things. But in science, nobody is going to say something is settled just on the basis of math alone! It gives researchers a clue of where to look for confirming experience, but math itself is never considered proof about some unobserved aspect of reality. Observation is the proof in science.

What I think is ironic is that you've expressed your scepticism about correspondance in scientific realism, yet your math perspective is exactly the same thing except instead of conceptual correspondence you believe in mathematical corresondance.

Well if that's what you meant, you certainly didn't make it clear. How was I supposed to know that you had some preconceived notion of what a physicalist is, and wanted a definition that fitted with that? I already explained where I think consciousness fits in. I don't find it particularly useful (or logical) to say that experience (like colors?) could give rise to the universe. That doesn't help answer any questions.

I did say it, several times. But this has been a long and sometimes emotional thread. Lots of things have been said and missed. I am probably more familiar with the physicalist-nonphysicalist debate than most, so I probably didn't lay out the basis of the dispute so everyone could understand it.

If a theory of the universe comes around in which consciousness came first, and it gave rise to matter in a mathematically describable way, then I would call that a physical theory, and if I believed it, I would consider myself a physicalist.

It's certainly your privilege to think what you please, but I say all that attitude does is confuse the debate. Like Loseyourname, you want to say the presence of order defines physicalness. Somehow you guys have it in your head that nonphysical must be utterly undefinable or without traits or pure chaos . . .

I have tried to argue that consciousness in this universe is observed intimately entwined in matter. Physicalists say matter is creating/causing consciousness. But if consciousness could develop straight out of primordial potentiality, without the benefit of matter, then it doesn't seem so blasphemous to say it isn't physical.

In other words, if consciousness is a product of matter (brain), it is physical. If consciousness arose somehow straight from the same primordial stuff the physical universe came from, then it is nonphysical. Simple! Then we can debate clearly if evolving matter needs "cosmic" consciousness (i.e., to organize into life and produce individual human consciousnesses), or if consciousness (and life) is dependent on "physical" potenitals alone to self organize in such a way they create consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I consider 'physical' to refer only to those aspects of a phenomenon that are relational, whereas you consider 'physical' to refer to any phenomenon that has any relational aspects. For instance, suppose some phenomenon P has both relational and intrinsic aspects. I would say P as a whole is not physical because not all its aspects are relational, although it does have physical aspects. You would say P as a whole is physical, because it has at least some relational aspects. Is that correct?

A quick question. When you say "relational," are you only referring to external cause and effect? If, for example, qualia experience could be subjectively probed and found to contain "components" strictly internal itself, all of which were necessary for experience to exist, would you then say experience is physical?

 

[StatusX]

You are being the specialist again. I would only say that when doing your job, that is a good thing. But in a philosophical discussion you have to recognize the value of all useful persectives. One very useful perspective, for example, has been the view that there actually exists a reality regardless of whether we understand it or not. This helps one to stay more objective (which should be a value for all scientists, don't you think?). Why? Because every way one can separate from one's own personal preferences, predilections, biases, etc. one becomes more neutral. If you say, "I prefer instrumentalism," that's okay. But if you say, "I am going to make it my entire world view, despite the fact other approaches to knowledge have been proven useful," then you've allowed your subjective condition to color your perspective.

The reason I brought these views up was to point out that there is some doubt as to whether mass corresponds to something real. As of right now, we only know for sure that it is a helpful mathematical concept in describing the world. It may well be more than this, but I just thought that a good definition should cover all bases if possible. I thought mine did.

Sure. And so can you. Sometimes things are modeled mathematically first, and other times observations establish something as true, and the math follows. Evolution is a physical theory that wasn't based on math. Later, after genetics were better understood, math helped to make predictions.

See, I don't deny there is a high degree of order in physicalness, and that math is an incredible tool for looking abstractly ahead or for analyzing things. But in science, nobody is going to say something is settled just on the basis of math alone! It gives researchers a clue of where to look for confirming experience, but math itself is never considered proof about some unobserved aspect of reality. Observation is the proof in science.

Math is a loose term. Topology, computer science, and even formal logic are, in my opinion, math. As I think Bertrand Russel said, math is any system free from contradiction. When I say any physical theory must be mathematical, it doesn't necessarily mean it has numbers. It is just a logically sound model with which you can make specific predictions. The vast majority of the time, this involves numbers because we use units to define dimensions and so we get things like 54 m/s. Evolution, as you cited, could be stated in a few key principles which are logically consistent, and used to make predictions, so I think it fits under my defintion of a physical theory. This might seem like a last stitch effort to preserve my beliefs, but let me emphasize this one more time: this is only my defintion of physical. If it turns out that no one else in the world shares it, then I guess I'm not really a physicalist, and I'll have to figure out what I am.

What I think is ironic is that you've expressed your scepticism about correspondance in scientific realism, yet your math perspective is exactly the same thing except instead of conceptual correspondence you believe in mathematical corresondance.

I'm not sure I understand you. Math could only be an approximation to reality as well. Is this what you mean?

It's certainly your privilege to think what you please, but I say all that attitude does is confuse the debate. Like Loseyourname, you want to say the presence of order defines physicalness. Somehow you guys have it in your head that nonphysical must be utterly undefinable or without traits or pure chaos . . .

Just beyond our understanding. This makes my position pretty arrogant, that "nothing is beyond our understanding." But like I said, intrinsicness and creation are beyond us to understand, so I guess they are non-physical, and if that makes me a non-physicalist, then so be it.

I have tried to argue that consciousness in this universe is observed intimately entwined in matter. Physicalists say matter is creating/causing consciousness. But if consciousness could develop straight out of primordial potentiality, without the benefit of matter, then it doesn't seem so blasphemous to say it isn't physical.

In other words, if consciousness is a product of matter (brain), it is physical. If consciousness arose somehow straight from the same primordial stuff the physical universe came from, then it is nonphysical. Simple! Then we can debate clearly if evolving matter needs "cosmic" consciousness (i.e., to organize into life and produce individual human consciousnesses), or if consciousness (and life) is dependent on "physical" potenitals alone to self organize in such a way they create consciousness.

If you're talking about God, and claiming it created matter and the laws of physics, you may be right. I am in no position to dispute this, and you are in no position to dispute a claim that tiny laughing purple fishes created them. Like I said, this is pure speculation. I mean, whatever it is, how could we possibly understand it? How can something cause itself to exist?

 

[Les Sleeth]

If you're talking about God, and claiming it created matter and the laws of physics, you may be right.

God is a religious concept, so I'd prefer to avoid the subject. But why must we imagine consciousness has to evolve like ours has? Why couldn't a consciousness, for example, be as big as the universe? One version of a theory called "panpsychism" suggests consciousness developed right along with the development of the physical universe and is part of the fabric of the everything. I wouldn't have such a consciousness "creating" matter, but rather participating in the organization of it, particularly in life and the central nervous system.

I am in no position to dispute this, and you are in no position to dispute a claim that tiny laughing purple fishes created them. Like I said, this is pure speculation. I mean, whatever it is, how could we possibly understand it?

I know you think all reports of some sort of greater consciousness must be nothing but speculation, but most people (particularly science types) haven't studied the subject very thoroughly (if at all). This isn't thread to discuss it so I'll just say there is more to it than what you see in religion (FYI, I'm not religious).

How can something cause itself to exist?

Well, how can the universe cause itself to exist? How did life cause itself to exist? Physicalists don't seem to mind that dilemma, but the idea of consciousness evolving out of same primordial potentiality the universe came from seems preposterous. Personally I think anthropomorphism creates that perspective in us.

 

[Rybo]

Fermions =mass(phyiscal) bosons=massless(?)

The reason I brought these views up was to point out that there is some doubt as to whether mass corresponds to something real. Math is a loose term. Topology, computer science, and even formal logic are, in my opinion, math.

Stat,

1) geometry is the mathematical science of pattern (Fuller approximatly) Geometry is sets of Euclidean aspects. "Sets" is one of the four main branches of mathematics.

2) Quarks(fractionated spins) are femerions but mesons(two quarks) with spin-0 are bosons. We now know that at least one neutrino has mass, so, what with mass in this reagards..

... Photons have no mass but they are energ(getic) boson and some say they are not attractive to ohter paticles via gravity for these reasons, but they follow something called "bent(warped) space.?

If space is bent, then space has to be a "physcial something" to be "bent'.

Please correct my logic/rational were needed.

Rybo

 

[StatusX]

Well, how can the universe cause itself to exist? How did life cause itself to exist? Physicalists don't seem to mind that dilemma, but the idea of consciousness evolving out of same primordial potentiality the universe came from seems preposterous. Personally I think anthropomorphism creates that perspective in us.

That was my point. Whatever was the cause of the universe, it was a part of the universe. (here I take the universe to mean "all that is") So it is beyond our understanding, and thus non-physical. If consciousness caused the material universe, that process may be physical if it can be modeled as I've discussed. But the problem of where the consciousness came from would remain unsolved and so would be non-physical.

As for life, I could similarly ask "How could a star cause itself to exist?" There is no "hard problem" here, because there is no problem of self-reference. It is perfectly possible that life arose from inorganic matter.

 

[Les Sleeth]

As for life . . . It is perfectly possible that life arose from inorganic matter.

Uh huh. Maybe " tiny laughing purple fishes created" it. That's about as close as anyone is to demostrating life can arise from the potentials of matter alone.

 

[Rader]

Would this then be, an adequate working definition of physical?
Physical is the experience between the experiencer and the experienced, that can be mathematically modeled and be experimentally confirmed to have a mass coordinate somewhere in relation to another experience.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Why drag math into it? Wasn't lightning just as physical to Benjamin Franklin as to James Clerk Maxwell, though the second man had math to describe it and the first one didn't? I think this illustrates pretty well my thesis that "physical" is a contingent concept that depends on our current understanding of how the world works. It is at least conceivable that a theory of everything, should we attain it, would explain consciousness and pixies and God. Or it might just explain the 19 unknown parameters of the standard model of particle physics. We don't know and shouldn't let our conclusions rest on guesses.

 

[Rader]

Why drag math into it?

If we use this definition.
Three reasons:
01-Everything physical can be described by math.
02-There were things we described with math first, that at the time we were not sure they could be physical and now are. SR
03-And so there are things described by mathematics, that we are not sure exist but have a pretty good chance of maybe they do. strings black wholes TOE.

So in that sense I agree with you but what Les is after as far as I see is what came first the chicken or the egg. If mass is essential to something being physical and once upon a time there was no mass, then nothing was experienced of what we know as physical. Yet we seem to know that there is things that seem to us to be not physical, whatever our way of researching this is. So in theory, something may have existed before physical things, since physics only explains how things exist not what might have caused them to.

 

[honestrosewater]

Why not name a physical (or nonphysical) object and use an induction step to define the set of all physical (or nonphysical) objects?

 

[hypnagogue]

But you believe there are intrinsic aspects to, say, an electron, right? Where do you draw the line?

I believe that there are intrinsic aspects to an electron, but that physics makes no reference to such aspects. So it really just turns on how we define 'electron.'

If we say an electron is nothing more than that set of properties that physics calls an electron, then an electron is physical. But if we believe in intrinsic properties, we could say that the physical picture doesn't tell the whole story, and add that these physical electrons are always associated with certain non-physical, intrinsic properties. (Note the parallel here with how we sometimes say physical brain activity is 'associated with' subjective experience.) We could call the physical electron plus its associated intrinsic properties something like a quelectron and say that physics only tells us part of the story about quelectrons.

On the other hand, we could consider the word 'electron' to mean the entire intrinsic/relational package (i.e. define electron to mean the same thing as 'quelectron' as used above). In this case, I would say that electrons are not physical, but that they do have physical aspects (those aspects that are studied by physics).

It doesn't really matter which way we go, as these scenarios differ only in terminology. I prefer the first scenario, though, as in this scenario we can say that physics tells us everything there is to know about electrons. (In the second scenario, we wind up having something like a Hard Problem of electrons!)

I believe that because we are part of the universe, we can never know anything intrinsic about it. Science does relations and stops there.

The only thing is that subjective experience appears to be a congolomeration of intrinsic properties. I would tend to agree that we can't know anything about the intrinsic properties of electrons, but one can make a compelling argument that each person does know something about one's own subjective experience, and that one's own subjective experience literally is a collection of intrinsic properties of at least certain parts/activities of one's own brain.

I agree with Chalmers that experience is something that may arise more generally than just in humans or animals. I don't know how he would feel about my other opinion, though, that the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal can be mathematically described. From what you're saying, it seems he would disagree, but when I read about how he believes information processing systems could be the link, I thought he was on my side.

I think Chalmers' position would most accurately be described as follows. He would say that there are psychophysical laws describing how experience co-varies with physical conditions, and the form of these laws might very well be mathematical/topographical/whatever. But phenomenal experience itself could not be completely captured by such a schema; even given exhaustive psychophysical laws, the only way to really know the phenomenal nature of a quale would be to directly experience it.

 

[loseyourname]

Math is a loose term. Topology, computer science, and even formal logic are, in my opinion, math. As I think Bertrand Russel said, math is any system free from contradiction. When I say any physical theory must be mathematical, it doesn't necessarily mean it has numbers. It is just a logically sound model with which you can make specific predictions. The vast majority of the time, this involves numbers because we use units to define dimensions and so we get things like 54 m/s. Evolution, as you cited, could be stated in a few key principles which are logically consistent, and used to make predictions, so I think it fits under my defintion of a physical theory. This might seem like a last stitch effort to preserve my beliefs, but let me emphasize this one more time: this is only my defintion of physical. If it turns out that no one else in the world shares it, then I guess I'm not really a physicalist, and I'll have to figure out what I am.

You're not alone in this definition. I use exactly the same definition. Hypnagogue seems to use about the same definition, as does the author of the book we are discussing, Gregg Rosenberg. There is another common thread between the three of us: none of us are physicalists. In fact, this is my very problem with Les' framing of this question based on his conception of consciousness. I don't hold a positive belief, but if I had to lean one way, I would lean toward a physical explanation of consciousness - yet I'm not a physicalist. I also think that he is wrong to say that physicalism must say consciousness arises from matter and antiphysicalism must say that matter arises from consciousness. In fact, the very man he often supports - David Chalmers - says that both are fundamental. Neither came first and neither arose from the other.

I don't like the characterization of the definition we give as false because it conflicts with popular hypothese of physicalists, either. Saying physical can't mean "mathematically modelable" because a possible explanation of consciousness might be inconsistent with the popular physical hypothesis that consciousness is a product of matter is silly. In the 18th century, the popular physicalist hypothesis was that light waves traveled through an ethereal medium. The fact that this proved to not be true didn't mean that light wasn't physical. Physicalist hypotheses can be wrong without physicalism itself being wrong.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The only thing is that subjective experience appears to be a congolomeration of intrinsic properties. I would tend to agree that we can't know anything about the intrinsic properties of electrons, but one can make a compelling argument that each person does know something about one's own subjective experience, and that one's own subjective experience literally is a collection of intrinsic properties of at least certain parts/activities of one's own brain.

Math is a loose term. Topology, computer science, and even formal logic are, in my opinion, math. As I think Bertrand Russel said, math is any system free from contradiction. When I say any physical theory must be mathematical, it doesn't necessarily mean it has numbers. It is just a logically sound model with which you can make specific predictions

You're not alone in this definition. I use exactly the same definition. Hypnagogue seems to use about the same definition, as does the author of the book we are discussing, Gregg Rosenberg. There is another common thread between the three of us: none of us are physicalists. . . . I also think that he is wrong to say that physicalism must say consciousness arises from matter and antiphysicalism must say that matter arises from consciousness. In fact, the very man he often supports - David Chalmers - says that both are fundamental. Neither came first and neither arose from the other.

The thing is, I don’t really support Chalmers, except to agree that subjectivity exists. Subjectivity is the one aspect of consciousness we can experience, and which cannot yet be attributed to physical properties. When it comes to me “believing” something, experienceability is the key. That’s why I posted a thread some time ago stating my objection to “consciousness studies,” saying that as far as I am concerned it is too rationalistic . . . tons of reason and logic, and very little experiential confirmation. The fact that all you agree means nothing since the field is mostly speculative.

Further, you say you all aren’t physicalists, but I am growing more and more convinced that consciousness studies is turning into a refined version of physicalism. I say that because of exactly how I’ve defined physical, and which you don’t want to admit as a definition. But it seems to me the theory of consciousness is basically becoming: consciousness is an emergent property of mass, or at least, an emergent property of the Big Bang (which I’m still convinced creating mass was the most significant thing, by far, it did).

Now, why should I disagree with the so-called “experts” of consciousness studies, or with functionalists for that matter? I do have a reason. To help me explain, and since you seem to agree with Rosenberg, let’s review something he said in another thread last week about trusting one’s personal observations. He said, “Perhaps the observations are wrong? It is possible, but the observation seems highly replicable across people, cultures and time. Even people who disagree with the premise (including Dennett himself!) often say that their own observation of their own consciousness seems to deliver similar observational evidence, but they choose to be skeptical of their own observations on theoretical grounds: it conflicts with what they think they know about the brain and they also think there is no other reasonable theoretical position. . . . I choose to respect the observational evidence, given its high degree of replicability.”

Isn’t that basis of consciousness studies? That is, isn’t the personal experience of subjectivity, and that it’s repeatedly reported “across people, cultures and time” just about all consciousness studies has in terms of evidence? Aren’t we encouraged to trust that experience?

Well, I agree we should trust it. But the question is, how much of our subjectiveness does ordinary, everyday consciousness reveal to us? I say it just reveals the surface, and that all the models you guys are proposing are based on surface experience of consciousness. My evidence? The same as Gregg’s, which all you’ve accepted as adequate. First let me explain what I mean by “surface experience of consciousness” using an analogy. I’ve used analogies similar to the following before, but I’ll expand it a bit to cover the way we’ve been talking about things here. If you can tolerate it once more, I’ll get to the supporting evidence right afterwards.

Imagine consciousness is an ocean of water. Unlike Earth’s oceans, this ocean is perfectly still overall. But in certain places little “points” of water are inside frozen water, water frozen into the shapes of brains. The frozen brains are organized to teach specific “points” of water on the ocean how to work and play with the surrounding water. For example, the point can cause the water immediately surrounding it to take the shape of waves of different size and frequency. Besides teaching it work and play with the surrounding water, containing the point in a frozen medium does something else. Before that point was contained, its experience was just that of being a general part of the ocean, but now that it is temporarily (its container will thaw eventually) singled out, it becomes aware as an individual point on the ocean (i.e., the frozenness helps individuate that “point” of water). All this is good and well, except for one thing. The point of water, while participating with the frozen brain, gets completely caught up in manipulating the surrounding water and other frozen things around it. All the wave shapes it learns to create become all it knows, and the constricted condition containment causes to the point is also what it knows. It doesn’t realize its nature is really that ocean, or how deep that ocean goes, or how far it extends. It is completely convinced it is just a condensed thing with lots of waves.

Okay, back to modeling consciousness. We are allowing subjectivity in as evidence because it is experienceable, and it universally reported. But do we know all there is to know about our subjectivity? I know for a fact there is more to it, the exact same way you know there is a subjective aspect at all.

What I know is that it is possible to stop the “waves” of the mind. I know that if one gets skilled enough at stilling the mind, the mind joins with something MUCH bigger than itself. I have practiced this “union” experience for over 30 years, and in the last 10 years have gotten so skilled at it I can achieve it nearly every time I attempt it (at dawn this morning, in fact, I experienced it again). Since I’ve practiced about an hour per day, that adds up to thousands of hours of personal experience.

I also have studied the history of this experience; it is my expertise. It has a 3000 year history, and among those who’ve specifically practiced “union” (i.e., not just any introspective practice) the experience is reported “across people, cultures and time.”

So what am I supposed to do with my experience when I hear you all basing your models on “waves” and “frozenness.” To me, your descriptions of consciousness are due to seeing no deeper than the waves of your thoughts. You cannot stop thinking (go ahead and try) and your senses only deliver information about “frozenness”; and since that’s all you know, your models reflect the relatively superficial realm of consciousness that the waves of thinking and sense data expose (as well as the lack of depth and breadth incessant thinking/sense experience obscures). I can see there is something more basic than what you guys are modeling with because I join with it every morning. That, I say, is the true intrinsicness, not all the pieces and parts you are pulling together. You will never get it by thinking this out, never. You have to experience it.

Most people don’t want to go to the trouble to learn the experience, so where does that leave us? Like Rosenberg, I “choose to respect the observational evidence, given its high degree of replicability.” I can’t transfer my experience into you, and I can’t expect you to accept my word on this . . . you need your own confirming experience. So we are at an impasse. As I’ve said before, since I can’t possibly ignore my experience (could you?) and therefore am unable to believe in the approach being taken for consciousness studies, I am content to argue from my position and hope maybe it will intrigue/interest somebody enough to check for themselves.

 

[loseyourname]

That's nice, but why should this experience of yours become the basis for a definition of what it and isn't physical? You seem to be differentiating between sensory experience and non-sensory experience, but why should "non-sensory" be synonymous with "non-physical?" I'd still prefer to differentiate between what can and cannot be studied by physics and, by extension, what can and cannot be modeled by a physical theory (which is simply a relational theory).

 

[StatusX]

Les,
Here's the reason I think a lot of (physicalist) people don't seriously consider your claims that there's more to consciousness than most of us know. Under the physicalist view, consciousness arieses from certain configurations of matter, as you have stated. Now, when you meditate, I don't doubt that you are in a different experiential state than most of us have ever been in. But I also believe that your brain is physically in a different state than usual (possibly one similar to that of a person having a seizure, as selfadjoint mentioned here ). So the only mysteries your experiences present to a physicalist are what exactly that state is and how you got into it. Now, if you have compelling evidence that this state is more than just an altered physical state of your brain (eg, you obtained some knowledge you couldn't have normally, like seeing a future or distant event that turned out to really happen), then we would take your proposal more seriously. But as of now, you aren't presenting any compelling reasons to leave the physicalist platform. And even if we decided to meditate ourselves, and even if doing so caused our beliefs to change, how would we know this isn't also due to a purely physical change in our brain? That may be one reason why physicalists don't try what you suggest.

 

[Rybo]

Phsycial consciousness is alway off-center

What I know is that it is possible to stop the “waves” of the mind. I know that if one gets skilled enough at stilling the mind, the mind joins with something MUCH bigger than itself.

Les, whatever "waves of the mind" may be, they are are not stopable accept possibly as clinically "brain dead" circumstances. I dunno.

You may feel that you have stopped "waves of the mind" but rather I think we can only reside near such perfect stillness.

The physical apsects of consciousness is inexactitude, off-center, tainted, disequlibrium etc...

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

That's nice, but why should this experience of yours become the basis for a definition of what it and isn't physical? You seem to be differentiating between sensory experience and non-sensory experience, but why should "non-sensory" be synonymous with "non-physical?" I'd still prefer to differentiate between what can and cannot be studied by physics and, by extension, what can and cannot be modeled by a physical theory (which is simply a relational theory).

I didn't say non-sensory defined nonphysical. YOU are saying I said that. I simply described another way to experience, and something else to experience.

What if you'd never used your eyes, only your ears, and then I told you about light, and that you had to start using your eyes to experience it? Does using your eyes define light? The existence of light is not dependent on the existence of eyes. Eyes are how consciousness finds out about light, and light is EM. Two different issues.

I think I made it clear that I am suggesting you are missing information, that you won't get it through normal perception, and that there is a long history of reports about the nonphysical realm and how to develop the consciousness skills to experience it (i.e., so it isn't just my little trip). That is the most substantial basis of nonphysical ideas in the history of humanity. This recent claim of expertise in "consciousness studies" is arrogant in my opinion because it doesn't acknowledge the centuries of hard work by people who sometimes risked everything to study consciousness experientially, rather than just sitting around theorizing about it like the intellectuals.

I know exactly what you are talking about, do you know what I am talking about? No. Do you want to know? No. It's impossible to debate anyone determined to translate everything into their own frame of reference. If you guys want to have your own harmonious discussion, all of you relying on the same class of information to decide what's physical and nonphysical , I think I'll drop out and let you enjoy your mutual self-affirmation club.

 

[StatusX]

I believe that there are intrinsic aspects to an electron, but that physics makes no reference to such aspects. So it really just turns on how we define 'electron.'

If we say an electron is nothing more than that set of properties that physics calls an electron, then an electron is physical. But if we believe in intrinsic properties, we could say that the physical picture doesn't tell the whole story, and add that these physical electrons are always associated with certain non-physical, intrinsic properties. (Note the parallel here with how we sometimes say physical brain activity is 'associated with' subjective experience.) We could call the physical electron plus its associated intrinsic properties something like a quelectron and say that physics only tells us part of the story about quelectrons.

On the other hand, we could consider the word 'electron' to mean the entire intrinsic/relational package (i.e. define electron to mean the same thing as 'quelectron' as used above). In this case, I would say that electrons are not physical, but that they do have physical aspects (those aspects that are studied by physics).

It doesn't really matter which way we go, as these scenarios differ only in terminology. I prefer the first scenario, though, as in this scenario we can say that physics tells us everything there is to know about electrons. (In the second scenario, we wind up having something like a Hard Problem of electrons!)

The only thing is that subjective experience appears to be a congolomeration of intrinsic properties. I would tend to agree that we can't know anything about the intrinsic properties of electrons, but one can make a compelling argument that each person does know something about one's own subjective experience, and that one's own subjective experience literally is a collection of intrinsic properties of at least certain parts/activities of one's own brain.

I don't think being a physicalist necessarily entails believing that there is nothing more to particles that their mathematical descriptions. But that being said, I think we need to look deeper into the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties.

Is there anything we know about the world that is intrinsic besides our experiences? If not, then we need to ask ourselves if it is really reasonable to expect anything else to have intrinsic properties, and if not, we could then identify "phenomenal" with "intrinsic." All we would then be saying is that the material world is in some sense distinct from the mental world, at least in our minds. But this is trivially true (in our minds). The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not logical, but psychological. So the problem just becomes why certain experiences accompany certain material processes. Once we've answered this, we have done all we logically can in the way of human discovery.

So to summarize: we are given the universe (the set of all that exists). We can break this down into smaller parts and define relationships between the parts, whether these parts are electrons, colors, or whatever. But as for why these parts and these relationships are what they are, we can never know. Here, every part that can be linked via logical relationships to the rest of the parts is physical, and a physicalist believes these are the only parts that exist.

I think Chalmers' position would most accurately be described as follows. He would say that there are psychophysical laws describing how experience co-varies with physical conditions, and the form of these laws might very well be mathematical/topographical/whatever. But phenomenal experience itself could not be completely captured by such a schema; even given exhaustive psychophysical laws, the only way to really know the phenomenal nature of a quale would be to directly experience it.

This is true from within our world. But is it logically possible that someone outside of our world could know? By outside of our world, I mean that it is conceivable this universe is some kind of computer program being run on a higher level. If this or some similar situation was true, could those beings conceivably know what our experiences are like? I think they could, and the reason we can't know each other's experiences is analgous to the reason someone living in flatland can't figure out how to escape a square: we don't have the right perspective.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les,
Here's the reason I think a lot of (physicalist) people don't seriously consider your claims that there's more to consciousness than most of us know. Under the physicalist view, consciousness arieses from certain configurations of matter, as you have stated. Now, when you meditate, I don't doubt that you are in a different experiential state than most of us have ever been in. But I also believe that your brain is physically in a different state than usual (possibly one similar to that of a person having a seizure, as selfadjoint mentioned

What difference does it make what a physicalist, or any "ist", believes when it is time to experience? My cousin hates any food that is green, even though he's never tasted it. So as a greenhaterist, his belief is . . . But if he just tasted, he'd know! Of course, when he tastes, he has his face all screwed up with preconceptions, so all he really tastes is his own conditioning, and not the taste itself.

You don't go into an investigation of something new already convinced of how it is, or even wondering about it. Talk about assuring you won't learn anything. No, you become 100% experience and decide later.

So the only mysteries your experiences present to a physicalist are what exactly that state is and how you got into it.

Bahhhh. Just do it and find out. Leave your concepts behind. You don't need to be any kind of "ist" to openly learn. All you are doing being a physicalist is maintaining a filter that makes certain you will only receive information that supports your a priori beliefs.

Now, if you have compelling evidence that this state is more than just an altered physical state of your brain (eg, you obtained some knowledge you couldn't have normally, like seeing a future or distant event that turned out to really happen), then we would take your proposal more seriously.

LOL! Compelling evidence? What evidence do you have you aren't a brain in a vat somewhere? And what does seeing a future event have to do with anything? Do you think I am talking about supernaturalism? I have described the extent of the experience . . . that one becomes conscious of something very large and more basic which individual consciousnesses seem derived from. Why are you trying to turn this into the twilight zone?

But as of now, you aren't presenting any compelling reasons to leave the physicalist platform. And even if we decided to meditate ourselves, and even if doing so caused our beliefs to change, how would we know this isn't also due to a purely physical change in our brain? That may be one reason why physicalists don't try what you suggest.

You don't get it. There is no compelling evidence of self except to experience your own. That is exactly what "consciousness studies" is based on isn't it? You cannot externalize it, you can only get at it internally. It's not my fault we are made that way. If you are going to acknowledge there is a subjective aspect, and that one's subjectivity is only accessible by oneself, all I've said is that it can be explored more deeply, there is a history of the practice, and that it reveals more information about subjectivity than everyday consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les, whatever "waves of the mind" may be, they are are not stopable accept possibly as clinically "brain dead" circumstances. I dunno.

You may feel that you have stopped "waves of the mind" but rather I think we can only reside near such perfect stillness.

Well, you admit you "dunno." You can accept my report or not, but I have said what I experience, and honestly stated there is a long history of such reports.

 

[StatusX]

What difference does it make what a physicalist, or any "ist", believes when it is time to experience? My cousin hates any food that is green, even though he's never tasted it. So as a greenhaterist, his belief is . . . But if he just tasted, he'd know! Of course, when he tastes, he has his face all screwed up with preconceptions, so all he really tastes is his own conditioning, and not the taste itself.

You don't go into an investigation of something new already convinced of how it is, or even wondering about it. Talk about assuring you won't learn anything. No, you become 100% experience and decide later.

Does your cousin have a rational reason for hating green food? He can't, as you say, because he's never tasted it, and taste is what is at issue. Now, does a physicalist have a rational reason for not accepting reports of an "illumination", or whatever essence you're describing? At first, the answer seems to be no, by the same logic as before. But there is an important distinction in the two cases. For your cousin, the only thing that is at issue is the specific subjective experience of the taste of green foods. To reason about a thing without any facts about it is absurd. But you are making claims about subjectivity itself. We aren't arguing about whether or not your heightened experience is, for example, pleasurable. Of course, I have no facts to base any arguments about that on. We are arguing about whether it has any philosophical significance.

If in 200 years when our understanding of the brain might actually be somewhat comprehensive, we might be able to reduce your meditations to some kind of different brain state. Now, if a TOE includes the relationship between brain states and experience, and it predicts this special state will be accompanied by your special experience, then that's that. Of course, there is also the possibility that your experience actually is touching on something deeper.

So how could we possibly distinguish between your view and the physicalist one? Not by experiencing it, as any experiences we have could conceivably fit into the physicalist framework. So how? I'm honestly asking, I don't know.

LOL! Compelling evidence? What evidence do you have you aren't a brain in a vat somewhere? And what does seeing a future event have to do with anything? Do you think I am talking about supernaturalism? I have described the extent of the experience . . . that one becomes conscious of something very large and more basic which individual consciousnesses seem derived from. Why are you trying to turn this into the twilight zone?

I apologize, but I couldn't think of another way of asking the question. I have tried to rephrase it above. Basically, is there any way we can agree on to determine whether these experiences are significant? And like I said, just having them is not enough.

 

[Rybo]

What we "think" we experienced

Well, you admit you "dunno." You can accept my report or not, but I have said what I experience, and honestly stated there is a long history of such reports.

Les, What I meant by "I dunno" is that I don't know what percentage of neural acitivity(EKG's) has ceased -- ergo"waves of the mind"--- have ceased in clinically "brain dead" condition.

Similarly animals having a neural/brains system, we may ask, how much "waves of the mind" a.k.a. "access to mind", does a worm have. None(stopped) or just very(nearly stopped).

I sat zazen and meditated for on a regular basis for neaerly 14 years. I never was able to stop my mind.

Are we cognizant of every quantum moment? No, there is jumps in conition just as the eyeball jumps position. In most circumstances the eye doe not seeing,

Rybo

 

[Les Sleeth]

But you are making claims about subjectivity itself. We aren't arguing about whether or not your heightened experience is, for example, pleasurable. Of course, I have no facts to base any arguments about that on. We are arguing about whether it has any philosophical significance.

If it were just me making personal claims, then I’d have to agree with you. But you are simply refusing to recognize there’s any possible significance to this consciousness report, a report that spans “across people, cultures and time.” We are debating in the philosophy of science area because I am dissatisfied with the approaches to consciousness studies.

My opinion is that everyone is pushing their agenda, with the philosophy department wanting it rationalistic, and science department wanting it physicalistic. Obviously there are areas or study that reason handles well, and other areas where empircism is the key. But there is a yet another approach to knowledge, ancient and well documented, I have been suggesting is pertinent to consciousness studies.

There is nothing else like “union” in the history conscious development. Why shouldn’t I be suspicious of anyone who claims they want to study consciousness, but doesn’t even give this phenomenon a wink? If it does open up a new realm of consciousness for an individual, it is not by rational or empirical means. It has its own approach which needs to be understood. That’s one thing I have to admire Carlos Castaneda for; the was willing to step out of his formal anthropology training and try to understand and experience within the context of his subject matter.

Now, does a physicalist have a rational reason for not accepting reports of an "illumination", or whatever essence you're describing? . . . So how could we possibly distinguish between your view and the physicalist one? Not by experiencing it, as any experiences we have could conceivably fit into the physicalist framework. So how? I'm honestly asking, I don't know.

It’s hopeless. If you only look at the physical, and avoid anything that can’t be hooked up to a machine and studied, then guess what you’ll see. I’ve not asked you to believe there is something more basic to consciousness. I’ve told you of reports that offer information and which should be of significance to anyone trying to understand the nature of consciousness. One has to investigate and experience for oneself.

But the biggest problem is being a “physicalist” instead of a seeker of truth, who would look wherever and however truths are found, and let the cards fall where they may. Why come to debates with filters in place and translaters at the ready, so that information is excluded and/or redefined to fit your a priori belief system as fast as I can offer it up? With that approach, there is no possible way everything you evaluate and study will look like anything but “physical.” That’s why I say it is hopeless, because when participants are so impossibly opinionated, one ends up talking to programming rather than to open minds.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les, What I meant by "I dunno" is that I don't know what percentage of neural acitivity(EKG's) has ceased -- ergo"waves of the mind"--- have ceased in clinically "brain dead" condition. Similarly animals having a neural/brains system, we may ask, how much "waves of the mind" a.k.a. "access to mind", does a worm have. None(stopped) or just very(nearly stopped).

The “waves” I was talking about was just an analogy. It doesn’t represent brain waves that much. I was talking about how when the surface of a body of water is incessantly subject to turbulence, it is impossible to see how deep the water is or (if the waves are high enough) how far the water extends. So if you are trying to model consciousness when it looks like that, then the model won’t include the deeper and more expansive aspects.

I sat zazen and meditated for on a regular basis for neaerly 14 years. I never was able to stop my mind.

A common report. You have to know where to find what is already perfectly still inside you, and then join with it. That joining stops the mind for you. Normally people are trying to stop the mind with the mind itself, which, since it is moving, cannot be done. I struggled that way myself for 20 years. Now that I understand how to do it, I can’t believe how simple it is. I enjoy that stillness every morning, first thing.

 

[StatusX]

If it were just me making personal claims, then I’d have to agree with you. But you are simply refusing to recognize there’s any possible significance to this consciousness report, a report that spans “across people, cultures and time.” We are debating in the philosophy of science area because I am dissatisfied with the approaches to consciousness studies.

I am nothing more than a skeptic. I'm not saying physicalism is proven true, I'm just asking how you could rationally decide between them. Not "Which one could be measured by experiment?" Not "Which one do you feel is true in your gut?" It's "Which one can be demonstrated to be true using logic and reason alone?" As for what you say here, the two possibilities again are a) these people are tapping into something greater, and in fact, it is the same universal thing being reached by all of them across history and cultures, or b) this feeling of being conncected to something deeper can be reductively explained in terms of human neurologic structure, and so it is not suprising that many people have experienced and perceived it as important, because our brains are all similarly structured. I'm not saying which of these I think is true. I'm asking (one more time, as you avoided the question last time) how can you rationally determine whether the (a) view or the (b) view is correct? And if there is no way, even in principle, then is there an important distinction at all?

It’s hopeless. If you only look at the physical, and avoid anything that can’t be hooked up to a machine and studied, then guess what you’ll see. I’ve not asked you to believe there is something more basic to consciousness. I’ve told you of reports that offer information and which should be of significance to anyone trying to understand the nature of consciousness. One has to investigate and experience for oneself.

But the biggest problem is being a “physicalist” instead of a seeker of truth, who would look wherever and however truths are found, and let the cards fall where they may. Why come to debates with filters in place and translaters at the ready, so that information is excluded and/or redefined to fit your a priori belief system as fast as I can offer it up? With that approach, there is no possible way everything you evaluate and study will look like anything but “physical.” That’s why I say it is hopeless, because when participants are so impossibly opinionated, one ends up talking to programming rather than to open minds.

Once again, I go on logic, not core beliefs. I believe physicalism is true because it is a simple explanatory method with immense power that has proven to be underestimated in the past. If a more logical theory comes along, I will accept that. I don't battle for physicalism, I battle for logic. And I'm asking you to do the same.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am nothing more than a skeptic. I'm not saying physicalism is proven true, I'm just asking how you could rationally decide between them. Not "Which one could be measured by experiment?" Not "Which one do you feel is true in your gut?" It's "Which one can be demonstrated to be true using logic and reason alone?" As for what you say here, the two possibilities again are a) these people are tapping into something greater, and in fact, it is the same universal thing being reached by all of them across history and cultures, or b) this feeling of being conncected to something deeper can be reductively explained in terms of human neurologic structure, and so it is not suprising that many people have experienced and perceived it as important, because our brains are all similarly structured. I'm not saying which of these I think is true. I'm asking (one more time, as you avoided the question last time) how can you rationally determine whether the (a) view or the (b) view is correct? And if there is no way, even in principle, then is there an important distinction at all?

You aren't even close to understanding my meaning. You believe everything must have a rational explanation to be true? Couldn't you just feel brotherly love (I'm trying to keep hormones out of things), for example, and let the feeling teach you what it is? Can you learn to ride a bike by feeling your way through it?

We have two sides to us, rational and sensitive. Each can teach us, and each teaches different aspects of reality, even about the same thing (like riding a bike). Those who have explored the innerness I've been talking about have had to feel their way through it to understand it. So this involves the deepening of the side of consciousness opposite of rationality.

Yet, don't think because it is "felt" means it doesn't make one smarter. It adds a new dimension to intelligence, it doesn't detract from it. Have I lost my ability to reason? Do I avoid learning about the physical side of things (whether or not I'm good at it)? But when I try to explain to you, you keep being that person who thinks the only useful tool is a hammer, and so goes around treating everything like a nail. Show me logic, show me math.

Once again, I go on logic, not core beliefs. I believe physicalism is true because it is a simple explanatory method with immense power that has proven to be underestimated in the past. If a more logical theory comes along, I will accept that.

Lol. Your core belief is that only logic can be trusted.

I don't battle for physicalism, I battle for logic. And I'm asking you to do the same.

Why should I battle for logic? Who's being illogical or advocating illogic? I am simply saying that logic only works with things that have "parts" and order. If something exists which is continuous and homogeneous, without borders or parts or anything to get your logical mind around, then you are going to miss it. Logic is good for what it is good for, and feeling is good for what it's good for. The two don't mix even if they work together to give one a more complete understanding and picture of reality.

 

[selfAdjoint]

(I'm trying to keep hormones out of things)

Why are you trying that?

 

[StatusX]

Lol. Your core belief is that only logic can be trusted.

If you are arguing that feelings should come before logic, we have come to a brick wall. If I could logically explain your feelings in terms of neurons and physics, and you still said that your feelings are real and the logic is wrong, we would just have to agree to disagree. But I think the vast majority of philosophers would be on my side, that logic is the basis of philosophy, and shouldn't be abandoned if it presents counterintuitive conclusions.

You vaguely described the limits of logic, but it wasn't clear. I don't see where these limits are, except for questions of how our universe came into existnce. Your idea of some unifying consciousness might not have parts itself, but its relationship to the rest of the world must follow some kind of logic if you can talk about it at all. But like I said, this is all moot if I can explain those feelings logically and reductively. That is, if they logically supervene on the laws of physics and the potential laws relating experience to matter in a quantifiable way, how can you claim there is something being missed?

If the only argument you have is "you just have to feel it", you are the one who's not being open-minded, because I have explained why feeling it is not enough to know it's true. I'm not denying you feel what you feel, because that is a necessary truth, just like knowing what the feeling of brotherly love is. I'm arguing against the further assertion that this feeling means something absolute, outside of what it is in and of itself. If you are claiming you are experiencing something unifying all consciousness, that others have also tapped into over the years, you are going beyond necessary truths and making claims that need to be backed up.

EDIT:
I just wanted to point out that I don't mean this as a direct assault on your core beliefs. I recognize that nothing I say will change these. I am just using this as an oppurtunity to solidify my understanding of my own physicalist view of the world, and this means making sure it can stand up to any challenges. Hopefully you'll take this the same way, and this will allow you to solidify your own views. But if you want to stop this argument before it degrades to insults and personal attacks, I would be more than willing to go along with that.

 

[loseyourname]

I know exactly what you are talking about, do you know what I am talking about? No. Do you want to know? No. It's impossible to debate anyone determined to translate everything into their own frame of reference. If you guys want to have your own harmonious discussion, all of you relying on the same class of information to decide what's physical and nonphysical , I think I'll drop out and let you enjoy your mutual self-affirmation club.

Okay, before you go off again with your grumpy smilies, consider what I am saying. You are differentiating between two kinds of experiences, or at least two kinds of things that can be experienced. I'm simply asking why one category of experiential phenomena should be considered physical and the other non-physical? Why are you defining the word using this criterion alone? I'm going to quote here from the Rosenberg book we are discussing:

Physicalism is basically the position you would expect to be called materialism, except without the historical commitment to the existence of a material substance. In place of Descartes's substances, physicalism just commits itself to the existence of the basic physical properties and events, whatever they turnout to be.

I think this pretty well sums up what Status and I have been trying to tell you. I won't speak for him or anyone else, but I have no qualms with your reports of union. My qualm is with your using this one experience to define the word physical, by differentiating between that which you experience with your senses and that which you experience through union. That isn't the way the theory is constructed. You are essentially defining physical as "that which can be experienced, except that which can be experienced through union alone." That isn't fair. The definition of the word should stand alone. I am not trying to bring your experiences under the veil of physicalism. I don't know whether or not you are experiencing anything of a physical nature. All I am saying is that if the nature of what you are experiencing falls under the definition of the word physical, then it is physical. You're saying beforehand that it is not physical, and then tailoring a definition of "physical" to exclude what you experience. I think we should be differentiating along the lines of what can or cannot be studied by physics. Why should we differentiate along the lines of what can or cannot be experienced through union?

I'll never understand your brisk responses to this suggestion. You can completely retain your entire ontological theory, with all of the details in place, except that a single word might be used to refer to things that it previously wasn't used to refer to. What's the big deal? The character of the theory remains exactly the same. You are free to use whatever words you want to use in whatever way you want to use them, but let those who study physical relationships define the word "physical" when they use it. If this leads to a disparity in the usage of this word between parties, so be it. It won't be the first time it's happened. Just look at the use of the word "existentialism" and all of the different things it has been taken to represent by different parties.

 

[metacristi]

define physical

I haven't read the other proposals, in my view the closest answer is 'the science of matter and energy and their interactions' since science and matter are alternative ways of talking of the same 'physical' referent (possible a 'deeper' form of matter/field). I'd add here that as 'physical' should be defined evertyhing which permanently interact, no matter how weak, with usual matter, energy. This has nothing to do with our epistemological knowledge, some physical entities could remain forever outside our reach.

How do we accept epistemologically 'something' as 'physical' is another thing, especially in the view of the problems of unobservables, underdetermination of theories and the problem of theory ladenness. Here is my proposal. Once we accept a 'weak' form of realism (there is justification to accord it a fallible epistemological privilege, nonwithstanding that enough weak) well I'd define first as deserving to be labeled physical all 'entities' we infer from direct observation (the model is accepted as corrigible) or only in an indirect manner, in crucial experiments (like Rutherford experiment in the case of atoms).

Further I think we should accept, provisionally at least, the existence of fecund, absolutely necessary, unobservables in very successful scientific theories which have no known anomalies, having many corroborated predictions/explanations (anyway way much more than the number of premises from which those predictions/explanations have been deduced). This in spite of the fact that they are not yet 'confirmed' in isolation/are untestable in isolation, from what we know at a certain moment.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Why are you trying that?

I don't know if you are joking or not, but I'll answer as though you aren't. I am trying to distinguish between what we can feel and what's accentuated by hormones. Mostly people associate the term "feeling" with emotions; personally I think emotions are a special variety of feeling, i.e., feelings accentuated by hormones, to get people to behave certain ways (such as mothering, fight or flight, etc.).

But beneath/behind the influence of hormones is a more neutral realm which in past threads I've labeled "base sensitivity." If you think about it, experience is very dependent on sensitivity . . . all the senses are basically feelers. But if consciousness couldn't itself "sense," then sense data once it arrives at the brain would go unnoticed. We appear to be able to "feel" vibratory information; we might even say consciousness is (among other things) a "field" of sensitivity. And what is the most responsive a field can be to vibratory information? When it is perfectly still.

I am intimately familiar with "base sensitivity" because it's what I rely on in my union practice. As I said to Rybo about stilling the mind, there is a place at the core of one's consciousness which is very still, and if one can find it and join with it, it creates the same stillness in consciousness overall.

Now, the "search" method for that still spot is interesting. Unlike Googling, one has to find it through feeling, or more accurately, through heightened sensitivity to the innermost aspect of consciousness. When "union" occurs (the integration of the "parts" of consciousness), one's entire consciousness brightens up, and one finds oneself much more strongly in the "feeling" mode (non-emotional) than before. Intellect is quieted until one needs it, which I have found to be a good thing for the intellect itself! Instead of incessantly going whether I want it to or not, it goes to work when I will it, and it goes more in the direction I will it instead of being altered by the momentum of non-stop past thinking.

In general, having my base sensitivity made more prevalent has made me more aware of myself, my surroundings, and especially of subtlety. In my complaints about consciousness studies, I am claiming that there is “something more” present in subtlety than is being modeled. Also, the difference between that subtle thing and physical reality appears (to me anyway) to be mass.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If you are arguing that feelings should come before logic, we have come to a brick wall. If I could logically explain your feelings in terms of neurons and physics, and you still said that your feelings are real and the logic is wrong, we would just have to agree to disagree. But I think the vast majority of philosophers would be on my side, that logic is the basis of philosophy, and shouldn't be abandoned if it presents counterintuitive conclusions.

(To understand what I mean by "feeling" you might read by last post to selfAdjoint).

This is the problem with someone over-relying on one mode of consciousness . . . too often one feels compelled to pit one aspect against another. How valuable do you think your logic would be if consciousness weren't sensitive? You'd have no information to think about or with. It's because you are sensitive to light, sound, etc. that you are aware of reality, not because you can think.

Think for a second what made scientific thinking leap miles ahead of the rest of philosophy. Instead of sitting around the fireplace contemplating reality strictly in their heads, some thinkers said, "let's go sense reality, and THEN think about it." That elevation of importance of sensitivity in consciousness for empiricism is exactly the reason for the resulting elevation in understanding of reality. So it's not a contest between feeling/sensitivity and thinking! I am simply talking about aspects of consciousness, how they work together, and potentials of those aspects.

Now in the West the thinking aspect of consciousness has been the emphasis, and we are the world's experts when it comes to that. But in the history of humankind, others have tried to discover just how far the sensitivty aspect can be taken. The phenomenon called "enlightenment," for example, which the Buddha first demonstrated could be achieved, is the result of such experimentation. That is a "study of consciousness" nobody around here seems to want to acknowledge as worthy of serious consideration as information about the nature of consciousness.

You vaguely described the limits of logic, but it wasn't clear. I don't see where these limits are, except for questions of how our universe came into existnce. Your idea of some unifying consciousness might not have parts itself, but its relationship to the rest of the world must follow some kind of logic if you can talk about it at all. But like I said, this is all moot if I can explain those feelings logically and reductively. That is, if they logically supervene on the laws of physics and the potential laws relating experience to matter in a quantifiable way, how can you claim there is something being missed?

That you believe this blows my mind (almost ). Let's see you use logic to taste a mango. You have to sense/feel the taste, but of course after you do you could logically think about how much like a peach it tastes. Yet, if you did that for no compelling reason, I'd be wondering why you'd traded emphasizing the experience of taste for the experience of intellect when you had such a delicious treat waiting for you.

The point is, one aspect of consciousness works through sensitivity, and another works through logic. Different but interdependent realms.

If the only argument you have is "you just have to feel it", you are the one who's not being open-minded, because I have explained why feeling it is not enough to know it's true. I'm not denying you feel what you feel, because that is a necessary truth, just like knowing what the feeling of brotherly love is. I'm arguing against the further assertion that this feeling means something absolute, outside of what it is in and of itself. If you are claiming you are experiencing something unifying all consciousness, that others have also tapped into over the years, you are going beyond necessary truths and making claims that need to be backed up.

Well, I say you don't know because you've not explored how deeply feeling can be taken. That's been my point. We just accept what's provided by default. What if we'd done that with thinking? We'd still be walking around stuck in trial and error. No, we developed it from the default condition, we are taught it from early in life, and we (some of us anyway) practice it as we mature. That's how good thinking skills are developed.

Same with feeling, except you and most people don't know much about those individuals who decided to find what they could detect if they developed their sensitivity. I am suggesting that just like a motion detector would detect more subtle motion if its sensitivity were improved, there might be "something more" to detect if one works to improve conscious sensitivity.

I just wanted to point out that I don't mean this as a direct assault on your core beliefs. I recognize that nothing I say will change these. I am just using this as an oppurtunity to solidify my understanding of my own physicalist view of the world, and this means making sure it can stand up to any challenges. Hopefully you'll take this the same way, and this will allow you to solidify your own views. But if you want to stop this argument before it degrades to insults and personal attacks, I would be more than willing to go along with that.

I was just having a rough day when I let my frustration show. But I admit it sometimes gets to me to debate people who have educated themselves so narrowly. All you guys study is what supports your position, and participate in discussions with filters, and concepts, and a priori beliefs . . . I really cannot understand that since it seems truth seekers would want to know anything and everything that might help them understand the nature of oneself and reality. I honestly don't give a rat's ass how reality is, whether there is God and physicalness, or just physicalness, or just God, or the Matrix, or . . . I just want to know.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Okay, before you go off again with your grumpy smilies, consider what I am saying. You are differentiating between two kinds of experiences, or at least two kinds of things that can be experienced. I'm simply asking why one category of experiential phenomena should be considered physical and the other non-physical? Why are you defining the word using this criterion alone? I'm going to quote here from the Rosenberg book we are discussing: "Physicalism is basically the position you would expect to be called materialism, except without the historical commitment to the existence of a material substance. In place of Descartes's substances, physicalism just commits itself to the existence of the basic physical properties and events, whatever they turnout to be."

I agree with Rosenberg there, I've never said one single thing contrary to that. Of course, that is "physicalism" and not what determines what physical is in the first place (which is the question of this thread). Since you seem unable or unwilling to address that issue, let's just go with physicalism and say if anything seems immune to known physical properties and laws, then it is not physical.

As for my grumpy face, it is because you keep misstating my meaning. You put words/ideas in my mouth I never said, and then you answer that. For example:

You are essentially defining physical as "that which can be experienced, except that which can be experienced through union alone." That isn't fair. The definition of the word should stand alone. I am not trying to bring your experiences under the veil of physicalism.

What I said was, that the nonphysical is experienced in union, not the physical. I am saying that everything you are experiencing with your senses is physical, and I went on to say that if you look at that, every bit of it is mass, the effects of mass, or the products of mass. I challenged you to present one single thing that wasn't covered by that. But let's drop that if you wish, since you don't like that definition.

However, why would I choose mass? It's because the union experience reveals the presence of something that seems massless, homogeneous, unified and omnipresent which holds steady and unaffected behind all the activity of the universe's physical "parts" (which I see as mostly particles and their effects and products). I also have been trying to say that the union experience is from where the most legitimate reports of nonphysical have come.

I think we should be differentiating along the lines of what can or cannot be studied by physics. Why should we differentiate along the lines of what can or cannot be experienced through union?

Again, I didn't say that (no grumpy face today). But physics is not the standard for determining nonphysical either! Senses will show you physical, another experience will show you nonphysical. The nonphysical is not simply defined as what physics isn't. It has a characteristics, a nature, potentials . . . just as physicalness does.

The thing is, most people, once they experience that background presence, come to feel that the physical has arisen from it. They usually say the physical is a "form" of the nonphysical substance. That's certainly my sense. And since it seems that the way this essential stuff takes "form" is primarily by massing up, that's where I've been coming from with my demarcation line between physical and nonphysical.

I'll never understand your brisk responses to this suggestion. You can completely retain your entire ontological theory, with all of the details in place, except that a single word might be used to refer to things that it previously wasn't used to refer to. What's the big deal? The character of the theory remains exactly the same.

The reason is because you are attributing aspects to consciousness from physicalness which my experience is telling me doesn't come from there. And because you don't even know where to draw the line between physical and nonphysical, you are mushing it all up (this I why I see "consciousness studies" slowly but surely turning physicalistic). As I've said, you are leaving out -- no, purposely ignoring -- an entire realm of influence in the consciousnes question, one that's been studied extensively, for millennia in fact, before anyone in the West ever decided they were going to model consciousness. I find such a commitment to remaining ignorant of relevant facts strange.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I haven't read the other proposals, in my view the closest answer is 'the science of matter and energy and their interactions' since science and matter are alternative ways of talking of the same 'physical' referent (possible a 'deeper' form of matter/field). I'd add here that as 'physical' should be defined evertyhing which permanently interact, no matter how weak, with usual matter, energy. This has nothing to do with our epistemological knowledge, some physical entities could remain forever outside our reach.

How do we accept epistemologically 'something' as 'physical' is another thing, especially in the view of the problems of unobservables, underdetermination of theories and the problem of theory ladenness. Here is my proposal. Once we accept a 'weak' form of realism (there is justification to accord it a fallible epistemological privilege, nonwithstanding that enough weak) well I'd define first as deserving to be labeled physical all 'entities' we infer from direct observation (the model is accepted as corrigible) or only in an indirect manner, in crucial experiments (like Rutherford experiment in the case of atoms).

Good to see you again metacristi, I like your analysis very much. That "'physical' should be defined everything which permanently interact, no matter how weak, with usual matter [and] energy" is pretty much what I've been arguing.

 

[loseyourname]

I agree with Rosenberg there, I've never said one single thing contrary to that. Of course, that is "physicalism" and not what determines what physical is in the first place (which is the question of this thread). Since you seem unable or unwilling to address that issue, let's just go with physicalism and say if anything seems immune to known physical properties and laws, then it is not physical.

That's actually close to exactly what I've been saying. You'll find, in Rosenberg's system, that all things have physical and non-physical aspects. The physical aspects are the relational attributes, whereas the non-physical aspects are the intrinsic attributes. This is exactly why it doesn't make any sense to me when you ask what physical things are. Physical things are the relational attributes, those attributes which are subject to mathematical modelling. The case he makes for this distinction is a very strong one. In fact, before reading his book, I actually held a view that was closer to yours on what "physical" meant.

The reason is because you are attributing aspects to consciousness from physicalness which my experience is telling me doesn't come from there.

I have one quick question about this that I've been wanting to ask for a while. How exactly does an experience tell you what it is? I know you don't hear a voice saying "I am not physical" when you experience union. I don't doubt that there is a qualitative difference between the union experience and normal experience, but presumably you already think that all experience is of a non-physical nature. What is it about the experience that tells you the cause of the experience is massless?

And because you don't even know where to draw the line between physical and nonphysical, you are mushing it all up (this I why I see "consciousness studies" slowly but surely turning physicalistic).

But why is it that you think I don't know where to draw the line? I know exactly where to line and I've explained in great detail where and how I draw that line. You're giving every indication yet again that you only prefer your distinction because it excludes your conception of consciousness. Why should you care if consciousness studies became physicalistic if it was possible for consciousness (even your conception of consciousness) to be physical? If the quality and character of the experience and the explanation remains exactly the same, but a single word that refers to a single aspect of it changes, why is that such a big deal to you?

As I've said, you are leaving out -- no, purposely ignoring -- an entire realm of influence in the consciousnes question, one that's been studied extensively, for millennia in fact, before anyone in the West ever decided they were going to model consciousness. I find such a commitment to remaining ignorant of relevant facts strange.

What exactly makes you think I am ignoring these aspects or even that I am actively engaged in consciousness studies? And exactly what does this have to do with how I define the word "physical?"

 

[Les Sleeth]

That's actually close to exactly what I've been saying.

I know, that's why I suggested it.

The physical aspects are the relational attributes, whereas the non-physical aspects are the intrinsic attributes. This is exactly why it doesn't make any sense to me when you ask what physical things are. Physical things are the relational attributes, those attributes which are subject to mathematical modelling. The case he makes for this distinction is a very strong one. In fact, before reading his book, I actually held a view that was closer to yours on what "physical" meant.

And I say "relationalness" is just how you recognize physical, not what it is. Mathematicalness is a calculating, modeling, predicting intellectual skill that is possible because of the order present in most physicalness (not all!). The senses are how we experience the physical. But none of that is what "physical" is.

Regarding relationalness determining it, let's say we lived back when no one understood the cause of electricity. When they would experience static electricity, they'd say it was not related to any physical cause, "it's magic!", when really it is physical. And then, when you get deeper, you find out electricity isn't intrinsic either, there are causes of that.

So my complaint is that what you call relational is superficial. Also, if you did see the deeper thing, because there is order to it, I think you'd want to tack "physical" onto that too. You won't admit it, but I think you are physicalist through and through.

I have one quick question about this that I've been wanting to ask for a while. How exactly does an experience tell you what it is? I know you don't hear a voice saying "I am not physical" when you experience union. I don't doubt that there is a qualitative difference between the union experience and normal experience, but presumably you already think that all experience is of a non-physical nature. What is it about the experience that tells you the cause of the experience is massless?

Let me become impressionistic for a minute. What it is about union that tells me "the cause of the experience is massless" is the presence of what I've called "illumination." It is homogeneous, thick, very present, no "parts." After the experience, when one looks about, it all looks unified, one.

Now let me get logical for a minute. Do you accept qualia experience as intrinsic? Do you accept subjectiveness as intrinsic? Are you dependent on everyone else agreeing with you for accepting that as real? What if you lived in a robot world without a single other human to reassure you. . . would you accept the robots' evaluation of consciousness as applicable to your own?

Well, what's made you accept qualia/subjectivity is the same sort of thing behind my reports to you about union experience. That and studies of past practitioners.

But why is it that you think I don't know where to draw the line? I know exactly where to line and I've explained in great detail where and how I draw that line.

Well, I wasn't trying to say you don't know where you want to draw the line. I said you are wrong about where you are drawing it. I see the line merely as lower down on the physical scale, not truly between physical and nonphysical.

You're giving every indication yet again that you only prefer your distinction because it excludes your conception of consciousness. Why should you care if consciousness studies became physicalistic if it was possible for consciousness (even your conception of consciousness) to be physical? If the quality and character of the experience and the explanation remains exactly the same, but a single word that refers to a single aspect of it changes, why is that such a big deal to you?

I don't care. What I care about is the missing parts in the consciousness studies models. The explanation definitely will not be the same without the missing parts.

 

[StatusX]

This is the problem with someone over-relying on one mode of consciousness . . . too often one feels compelled to pit one aspect against another. How valuable do you think your logic would be if consciousness weren't sensitive? You'd have no information to think about or with. It's because you are sensitive to light, sound, etc. that you are aware of reality, not because you can think.

Think for a second what made scientific thinking leap miles ahead of the rest of philosophy. Instead of sitting around the fireplace contemplating reality strictly in their heads, some thinkers said, "let's go sense reality, and THEN think about it." That elevation of importance of sensitivity in consciousness for empiricism is exactly the reason for the resulting elevation in understanding of reality. So it's not a contest between feeling/sensitivity and thinking! I am simply talking about aspects of consciousness, how they work together, and potentials of those aspects.

Now in the West the thinking aspect of consciousness has been the emphasis, and we are the world's experts when it comes to that. But in the history of humankind, others have tried to discover just how far the sensitivty aspect can be taken. The phenomenon called "enlightenment," for example, which the Buddha first demonstrated could be achieved, is the result of such experimentation. That is a "study of consciousness" nobody around here seems to want to acknowledge as worthy of serious consideration as information about the nature of consciousness.

First of all, let me first admit that I've been at least partly wrong. I naively assumed everything about consciousness could be discovered by making superficial correlations between brain states and reported experience.

Here's what I meant. We isolate the pattern of brain excitation that always corresponds to a red experience, a heat experience, etc. By collecting all this data, we would form a theory with which we could reductively explain experience. This doesn't mean explain why red looks the way it does, which I believe is impossible in principle. It means that given the pattern of excitations in a brain or computer, we could qualititatively describe what that system is experiencing. Of course, we would first need vastly superior language for describing experience than we have now, possibly a mathematical language, but I think it is possible.

I dismissed your method of deep introspection, but this was narrow-minded. It is perfectly possible that you really are experiencing the basic structure of experience, and by correlating this to the material brain, which we can bet is in a similarly basic state during the union, we might be able to build a theory from the ground up. So your methods would likely be useful, even to someone like me.

However, you claim you are going above and beyond normal, materially correlated experience. Allow me to try to roughly explain how I interpret your description of the union, and please correct me if I'm wrong. You think the brain is sort of the physical channel of consciousness. Consciousness exists in a non-physical realm and interacts with the physical world by mingling up with the brain in some way. When you have this union experience, you are leaving the brain and experiencing pure consciousness, with no physical ties whatsoever. Is this close to what you're saying?

If so, here's the problem I see with it: How do you know? I assume you can remember the experience whenever you want. So, in some way, it is tied to your physical brain in that you were able to store it in memory. You also reason about the experience, although you claim the experience itself transcends reason. Now, I doubt you are reasoning while having the experience, as that would go against all you have said. So you are reasoning based on the memory of it. Is this correct so far? Now, if reasoning and memory are governed by the physical brain, and not the pure sensitivity, they supervene of the laws of physics. This mean that in principle, they could be reductively explained in terms of neurons and physics. So how do you know your reasoning about the union is correct if it is governed by the very laws you have decided you've transcended?

That you believe this blows my mind (almost ). Let's see you use logic to taste a mango. You have to sense/feel the taste, but of course after you do you could logically think about how much like a peach it tastes. Yet, if you did that for no compelling reason, I'd be wondering why you'd traded emphasizing the experience of taste for the experience of intellect when you had such a delicious treat waiting for you.

The point is, one aspect of consciousness works through sensitivity, and another works through logic. Different but interdependent realms.

I've explained the difference before. In making subjective judgements about the subjective world, subjectivity is not just the best tool but it's the only tool. But with the union reports, you are using subjectivity to make judgements about the objective world. By objective, I don't mean material. I mean you are claiming the union exists independent of your personal experience of it. This further fact cannot be known a priori.

I was just having a rough day when I let my frustration show. But I admit it sometimes gets to me to debate people who have educated themselves so narrowly. All you guys study is what supports your position, and participate in discussions with filters, and concepts, and a priori beliefs . . . I really cannot understand that since it seems truth seekers would want to know anything and everything that might help them understand the nature of oneself and reality. I honestly don't give a rat's ass how reality is, whether there is God and physicalness, or just physicalness, or just God, or the Matrix, or . . . I just want to know.

I'm sure you wouldn't want me to say "Wow, you had an interesting experience. I'll have to change my framework now because it doesn't acount for it in the way you've described it." I need to be a skeptic, to not accept a potential explanatinon for a phenomenon until it has been shown beyond doubt to be the only reasonable one. If I can present an coherent alternative explanation for the union reports, I call that progress. It allows us to strip them both down and determine which is the truth, which I want to find as much as you.

 

[Les Sleeth]

First of all, let me first admit that I've been at least partly wrong. I naively assumed everything about consciousness could be discovered by making superficial correlations between brain states and reported experience.

Here's what I meant. We isolate the pattern of brain excitation that always corresponds to a red experience, a heat experience, etc. By collecting all this data, we would form a theory with which we could reductively explain experience. This doesn't mean explain why red looks the way it does, which I believe is impossible in principle. It means that given the pattern of excitations in a brain or computer, we could qualititatively describe what that system is experiencing. Of course, we would first need vastly superior language for describing experience than we have now, possibly a mathematical language, but I think it is possible.

I dismissed your method of deep introspection, but this was narrow-minded. It is perfectly possible that you really are experiencing the basic structure of experience, and by correlating this to the material brain, which we can bet is in a similarly basic state during the union, we might be able to build a theory from the ground up. So your methods would likely be useful, even to someone like me.

However, you claim you are going above and beyond normal, materially correlated experience. Allow me to try to roughly explain how I interpret your description of the union, and please correct me if I'm wrong. You think the brain is sort of the physical channel of consciousness. Consciousness exists in a non-physical realm and interacts with the physical world by mingling up with the brain in some way. When you have this union experience, you are leaving the brain and experiencing pure consciousness, with no physical ties whatsoever. Is this close to what you're saying?

If so, here's the problem I see with it: How do you know? I assume you can remember the experience whenever you want. So, in some way, it is tied to your physical brain in that you were able to store it in memory. You also reason about the experience, although you claim the experience itself transcends reason. Now, I doubt you are reasoning while having the experience, as that would go against all you have said. So you are reasoning based on the memory of it. Is this correct so far? Now, if reasoning and memory are governed by the physical brain, and not the pure sensitivity, they supervene of the laws of physics. This mean that in principle, they could be reductively explained in terms of neurons and physics. So how do you know your reasoning about the union is correct if it is governed by the very laws you have decided you've transcended?



I've explained the difference before. In making subjective judgements about the subjective world, subjectivity is not just the best tool but it's the only tool. But with the union reports, you are using subjectivity to make judgements about the objective world. By objective, I don't mean material. I mean you are claiming the union exists independent of your personal experience of it. This further fact cannot be known a priori.



I'm sure you wouldn't want me to say "Wow, you had an interesting experience. I'll have to change my framework now because it doesn't acount for it in the way you've described it." I need to be a skeptic, to not accept a potential explanatinon for a phenomenon until it has been shown beyond doubt to be the only reasonable one. If I can present an coherent alternative explanation for the union reports, I call that progress. It allows us to strip them both down and determine which is the truth, which I want to find as much as you.

Excellent post! Very thoughtful, and I appreciate your effort to understand where I am coming from. All your questions are good ones, but my brain is shot for today. I'll have to answer you tomorrow.

The only thing I want to say now is that I definitely do NOT want you to change your framework on my say so! I've only been trying to get you to understand my side of it so when you challenge what I say, it is really what I mean instead of how you've reinterpreted it. I am perfectly happy leaving you to your own beliefs and opinions if you will do that.