Did our brains evolve to understand quantum mechanics?

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SUMMARY

The discussion centers on Lawrence Krauss's assertion that humans did not evolve to understand quantum mechanics (QM), as our evolutionary history primarily involved survival skills relevant to our environment. Participants agree that while our brains are not specifically adapted for QM, they have evolved to enhance our understanding of the world, which includes abstract concepts like QM. The conversation highlights the continuous nature of evolution and the potential for future adaptations in cognitive abilities related to complex theories such as QM.

PREREQUISITES
  • Understanding of evolutionary biology concepts, particularly natural selection.
  • Familiarity with quantum mechanics principles and terminology.
  • Knowledge of evolutionary psychology and its critiques.
  • Basic comprehension of cognitive development in humans and animals.
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  • Research the role of natural selection in cognitive evolution.
  • Explore the principles of quantum mechanics and their implications for human understanding.
  • Investigate the critiques of evolutionary psychology and its methodologies.
  • Study the relationship between brain complexity and problem-solving abilities in various species.
USEFUL FOR

This discussion is beneficial for evolutionary biologists, cognitive scientists, psychologists, and anyone interested in the intersection of evolution and complex theoretical concepts like quantum mechanics.

  • #31
Simon Bridge said:
But is the claim that is it supported by evidence? A particular person may have no doubt at all and still be wrong. We like to think that intelligence and the associated big brains are advantageous basically because we have them. Well, we have the latter and like to think we have the former.

The ability to solve puzzles need not be any particular net advantage so long as it is not a fatal disadvantage the traits supporting this can still get passed on.

There is support for sexual selection for big brains appearing in the literature.
i.e. http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0000062
... the authors suggest that monogamy, in particular, selects for larger brains by requiring more processing power to handle deceit - creating an arms race of sorts.

... it could be like elaborate plumage in some birds - which can actually be a hinderance to the individual - oversized brains could fit as an energy drain: conspicvuous consumption - look at me I'm healthy and have good genes because I'm successful enough to be able to carry this huge cool person of energy-guzzling meat around. But how to show it off?

But but butbutbutbut... shouldn;t we be hearing from OP by now?

There seems to be some pertinent discussion here

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20445094
Colloquium paper: the cognitive niche: coevolution of intelligence, sociality, and language.
Pinker S.
"Although Darwin insisted that human intelligence could be fully explained by the theory of evolution, the codiscoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace, claimed that abstract intelligence was of no use to ancestral humans and could only be explained by intelligent design. Wallace's apparent paradox can be dissolved with two hypotheses about human cognition. One is that intelligence is an adaptation to a knowledge-using, socially interdependent lifestyle, the "cognitive niche." This embraces the ability to overcome the evolutionary fixed defenses of plants and animals by applications of reasoning, including weapons, traps, coordinated driving of game, and detoxification of plants. Such reasoning exploits intuitive theories about different aspects of the world, such as objects, forces, paths, places, states, substances, and other people's beliefs and desires. The theory explains many zoologically unusual traits in Homo sapiens, including our complex toolkit, wide range of habitats and diets, extended childhoods and long lives, hypersociality, complex mating, division into cultures, and language (which multiplies the benefit of knowledge because know-how is useful not only for its practical benefits but as a trade good with others, enhancing the evolution of cooperation). The second hypothesis is that humans possesses an ability of metaphorical abstraction, which allows them to coopt faculties that originally evolved for physical problem-solving and social coordination, apply them to abstract subject matter, and combine them productively. These abilities can help explain the emergence of abstract cognition without supernatural or exotic evolutionary forces and are in principle testable by analyses of statistical signs of selection in the human genome."

The article by Spelke also seems interesting:
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/pdfs/DanaSpelke.pdf
"Geometric map-making is even more recent, and the formal unification of number and geometry is less than 400 years old (see Dehaene, 1997, for discussion). Thus, the human brain cannot have been shaped, by natural selection, to perform symbolic mathematics. When children learn mathematics, they harness brain systems that evolved for other purposes.

What are those systems and purposes?"
 
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  • #32
Pythagorean said:
Yes, evolution must have enabled us to attain the intelligence to understand QM. That can be said about any subject. But was the intuition to understand QM selected for? Of course not. It's easy to wiggle something like "puzzle-solving" into selection since it's a vague concept and I think it strays from the OP's topic anyway to talk about puzzle-solving in general.

The intuition we (and most mammals) start with allowed us to track prey and avoid predators, to know our bodies position in space, to predict trajectories, to judge depth so we don't walk off cliffs. We have great spatial intuition in the classical physics sense. These are readily available for throwing a rock or spear (I don't agree with finding a cave... that would be more of a Bayesian process for a caveman.. still not QM though).

But it's really not surprising... we framed classical physics in language and concepts that were intuitive to us from what we could observe. With better technology and advanced concepts, we were able to predict and observe things beyond what our senses could naturally observe and (still using abstractions like space) we formulated QM.

QM concepts like nonlocality, indistinguishability, superposition of states... intuition for such concepts wouldn't have had any usefulness in reproduction in the 99.9% of human history. So it's not surprising that humans don't readily grasp them.

I think that intuition is learned, and therefore it cannot be subject to selection. The reason why QM seems so counterintuitive yet classical mechanics does not is that in our everyday experience, we encounter objects that obey the laws of classical mechanics, but we do not commonly experience objects that behave quantum mechanically. Therefore, these experiences wire our brain to be able to process and predict the motion of objects subject to classical mechanics. This wiring, however, is not predetermined by genetics (which is what you seem to be arguing).

For example, if you were to take some kids (or even an adults) with no experience at ball sports, then tell them to go catch fly balls in the outfield of a baseball park, I would expect that nearly all would find the task difficult. There is no innate ability to judge the flight of the ball even though it's behavior is fairly predictable from classical mechanics. Only by watching others, learning from coaches, and practicing themselves do they develop the intuition needed to very easily position themselves perfectly to receive the fly ball.

I'm reminded here also of cultures that use relative directions (i.e. left/right, forward/back) versus those that do not and instead refer only to cardinal directions (i.e. north, west, south, east). To those who grew up in cultures using relative directions, referring only to cardinal directions for everyday tasks (raise your left arm versus raise your east arm) seems very counterintuitive. Yet to those who grew up in cultures that do not use relative directions can easily and naturally get by using only cardinal directions. Again, the lesson is clear; our brains and our initutions are wired in response to the environments we experience.

So, in a sense, Krauss and others in this thread are correct to say that our brains generally are not wired to understand quantum mechanics. However, this wiring is a result of learning, not something that is heritable. Furthermore, through practice thinking about abstract ideas like QM, we can rewire our brains to develop the necessary intuition to understand these concepts.
 
  • #33
atyy said:
What are those systems and purposes?"

Besides the obvious role of the occipital lobe in visual processing, I think the posterior parietal complex* has a lot do with it. It's essentially where we map our position in space from and infer positions of other objects through visual input[1][2]. And we observe that mathematicians generally have increased gray matter in the inferior parietal lobe [3].

*Though some research points at the temporal lobes.[4]

[1] http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7126325
[2] http://jn.physiology.org/content/80/5/2657.short
[3] http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17921236

[4]
"Unlike the monkey brain, spatial awareness in humans is a function largely confined to the right superior temporal cortex, a location topographically reminiscent of that for language on the left"
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v411/n6840/abs/411950a0.html
 
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  • #34
Ygggdrasil said:
I think that intuition is learned, and therefore it cannot be subject to selection. The reason why QM seems so counterintuitive yet classical mechanics does not is that in our everyday experience, we encounter objects that obey the laws of classical mechanics, but we do not commonly experience objects that behave quantum mechanically. Therefore, these experiences wire our brain to be able to process and predict the motion of objects subject to classical mechanics. This wiring, however, is not predetermined by genetics (which is what you seem to be arguing).

For example, if you were to take some kids (or even an adults) with no experience at ball sports, then tell them to go catch fly balls in the outfield of a baseball park, I would expect that nearly all would find the task difficult. There is no innate ability to judge the flight of the ball even though it's behavior is fairly predictable from classical mechanics. Only by watching others, learning from coaches, and practicing themselves do they develop the intuition needed to very easily position themselves perfectly to receive the fly ball.

I'm reminded here also of cultures that use relative directions (i.e. left/right, forward/back) versus those that do not and instead refer only to cardinal directions (i.e. north, west, south, east). To those who grew up in cultures using relative directions, referring only to cardinal directions for everyday tasks (raise your left arm versus raise your east arm) seems very counterintuitive. Yet to those who grew up in cultures that do not use relative directions can easily and naturally get by using only cardinal directions. Again, the lesson is clear; our brains and our initutions are wired in response to the environments we experience.

So, in a sense, Krauss and others in this thread are correct to say that our brains generally are not wired to understand quantum mechanics. However, this wiring is a result of learning, not something that is heritable. Furthermore, through practice thinking about abstract ideas like QM, we can rewire our brains to develop the necessary intuition to understand these concepts.

Specific things like throwing spears or catching fly balls wouldn't be what was selected for. Coordinate frames don't matter either... what the cultures, spear throwers, ball-players, etc, have in common is that they can construct an n-particle coordinate system in euclidian space, they all do it through the same part of brain (whether it's parietal or temporal. It seems to be parietal in monkey, temporal in humans according to reference 4 in my last post).

Is it an adaptation or a side-effect? I don't know, I will spend more time looking for sources when I have time; obviously I suspect it was an adaptation. Navigating and tracking seems indispensable in hunting for food and avoiding predators. Visuospatial navigations seems to have a clear advantage over chemotaxic navigation for large animals. Wouldn't it have been selected for a while ago in mammalian (or even vertebrate) evolutionary history as our olfactory system diminished and our visual system began to dominate?
 
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  • #35
It looks like most of the selection-based research is on temporal lobes (specifically the hippocampus) even in lower vertibrates. Admittedly, I've only read titles and abstracts here and my molecular and evolutionary background is lacking, but it seems in line with my thinking.

Spatial reasoning is selected for

"Natural selection, sexual selection and artificial selection have resulted in an increase in the size of the hippocampus in a remarkably diverse group of animals that rely on spatial abilities to solve ecologically important problems."

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016622369290080R

"Hippocampal size is known to correlate positively with [...] selective pressure for spatial memory among passerine bird species."

http://www.pnas.org/content/87/16/6349

"We analyze here recent data indicating a close functional similarity between spatial cognition mechanisms in different groups of vertebrates, mammals, birds, reptiles, and teleost fish, and we show in addition that they rely on homologous neural mechanisms."

http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/12937346/reload=0;jsessionid=wkOr9UZf7m88bA5u5O3H.4

" The hypothesis that gathering-specific spatial adaptations exist in the human mind is further supported by our finding that spatial memory is preferentially engaged for resources with higher nutritional quality (e.g. caloric density). "

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17711835

" in the avian telencephalon, there is a separation of visual motion and spatial-pattern perception as there is in the mammalian telencephalon. However, this separation of function is in the targets of the tectofugal pathway in pigeons rather than in the thalamofugal pathway as described in mammals."

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15163688spatial reasoning underlies abstract reasoning

This, I think, is why we so commonly use concept of space in the sciences, we even take non-spatial variables and plot them against each other and call it phase space in order to get better idea of what a system is doing. Every time we plot a variable, we're translating that variable to space. We assume all the properties of space for most classical variables (continuity, smoothness, deterministic trajectories in Euclidian space). Here's more research about using spatial reasoning for thinking about other things:

musical pitch:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027705000260

numbers:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135467996387552#.UrJAGPRDuMM

time:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01094.x/abstract;jsessionid=7867474264EC5E729B9863EF5DE600E8.f02t04

Conflict with QM

Spatial reasoning relies on continuity, smoothness, and locality. The unintuitive concepts in QM are exactly the ones that conflict with these: nonlocality, discretization, uncertainty. Particles can't have a precisely defined position and momentum, a particles can exist in a superposition of states.

Ode to learning

Obviously, without learning, none of this would be possible... learning is necessary, but (imo) insufficient to explain our readily available grasp of spatial reasoning. It's interesting that how we learn is influenced by spatial concepts, so in some sense, the adaptation of learning itself may be closely tied to spatial reasoning.
 
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  • #36
Pythagorean said:
Conflict with QM

Spatial reasoning relies on continuity, smoothness, and locality. The unintuitive concepts in QM are exactly the ones that conflict with these: nonlocality, discretization, uncertainty. Particles can't have a precisely defined position and momentum, a particles can exist in a superposition of states.

Ode to learning

Obviously, without learning, none of this would be possible... learning is necessary, but (imo) insufficient to explain our readily available grasp of spatial reasoning. It's interesting that how we learn is influenced by spatial concepts, so in some sense, the adaptation of learning itself may be closely tied to spatial reasoning.
So, was our ability to learn 'selected' for the advantage it gave us, or are you asserting it's neither here nor there in regards to our survival?
 
  • #37
When I say adaptation of learning, I refer to selection (that learning was selected for*), but that was only part of a side point. The main point was that learning classical physics (by interacting with the world) is only part of why it's so intuitive to us. The other part, I think, is due to selection.

Oh yeah, place cells. I forgot about those. We (mammals, at least) even have a neural encoding process dedicated to locality in Euclidean space. I've never heard of any other function for place cells beside navigation. The encoding process may be used elsewhere, but I've never heard of it. (They are also in the hippocampus).


*and I don't really know that, it's just an assumption that seemed self-evident to me.
 
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  • #38
Pythagorean said:
When I say adaptation of learning, I refer to selection (that learning was selected for*), but that was only part of a side point. The main point was that learning classical physics (by interacting with the world) is only part of why it's so intuitive to us.
Classical physics is not intuitive to us at all! Example: Galileo spent most of his life trying to explain things like, no, we won't be thrown off the Earth if it's revolving, which was the intuitive belief, and that a heavier object will not fall faster than a lighter one. It makes complete intuitive sense to suppose the heavier object will fall faster, and it was like pulling teeth for him to get people to believe otherwise. Mark Twain said something like, "Common sense is the ability to look around you and see with your own eyes the world is flat."All humanity started out intuiting the world was flat. Columbus had a hard time getting a crew because so many sailors believed that if you went too far out to sea you'd come to the edge of the world and fall off. Just about every bit of classical mechanics was shocking to people at first. How is it you don't know that, before Galileo, people didn't realize bodies in motion were brought to rest by outside forces? Aren't you aware of all the crackpot notions Aristotle propagated that held supremacy for 2000 years?

We've been solving excruciatingly counter-intuitive puzzles from day one, amigo: √2
 
  • #39
Pythagorean said:
Conflict with QM

Spatial reasoning relies on continuity, smoothness, and locality. The unintuitive concepts in QM are exactly the ones that conflict with these: nonlocality, discretization, uncertainty. Particles can't have a precisely defined position and momentum, a particles can exist in a superposition of states.

zoobyshoe said:
Classical physics is not intuitive to us at all! Example: Galileo spent most of his life trying to explain things like, no, we won't be thrown off the Earth if it's revolving, which was the intuitive belief, and that a heavier object will not fall faster than a lighter one. It makes complete intuitive sense to suppose the heavier object will fall faster, and it was like pulling teeth for him to get people to believe otherwise. Mark Twain said something like, "Common sense is the ability to look around you and see with your own eyes the world is flat."All humanity started out intuiting the world was flat. Columbus had a hard time getting a crew because so many sailors believed that if you went too far out to sea you'd come to the edge of the world and fall off. Just about every bit of classical mechanics was shocking to people at first. How is it you don't know that, before Galileo, people didn't realize bodies in motion were brought to rest by outside forces? Aren't you aware of all the crackpot notions Aristotle propagated that held supremacy for 2000 years?

We've been solving excruciatingly counter-intuitive puzzles from day one, amigo: √2

A question along the lines of zoobyshoe's thought: isn't Newtonian physics nonlocal?
 
  • #40
I agree not all of classical physics is intuitive. (Though being thrown off the Earth revolving indicates that someone is exercising their intuition about centripetal force).

What's intuitive about classical physics is the framework, whereas the framework of QM is not intuitive. Klauss isn't talking about doing advanced physics problems, either. Just how particles move through (and exist in) space and time. It's really quit simple to predict a thrown spear's motion because you can count on continuity and locality.

Anyway, even infants know many of the fundamental concepts of classical physics:

" The evidence supports the view that certain core principles
about these domains are present as early as we can test for them and the nature
of the underlying representation is best characterized as primitive initial concepts
that are elaborated and refined through learning and experience"
Physics for infants: characterizing the origins of knowledge about objects, substances, and number
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcs.157/pdf

@atty:

I refer to:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_nonlocality

specifically, I was thinking that you can simultaneously define the position and momentum of a classical particle (or a person), it is localized in space. Not so with a quantum particle. It exists as a probability distribution in space.

addendum:

I agree that the classically nonlocal concept electromagnetism is extremely unintuitive, too. Not so much gravity. Gravity serves as a constant asymmetry in our spatial coordinate system, and I wager you could find obvious adaptations involving it in all species in all kinds of different ways.
 
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  • #41
Pythagorean said:
Specific things like throwing spears or catching fly balls wouldn't be what was selected for. Coordinate frames don't matter either... what the cultures, spear throwers, ball-players, etc, have in common is that they can construct an n-particle coordinate system in euclidian space, they all do it through the same part of brain (whether it's parietal or temporal. It seems to be parietal in monkey, temporal in humans according to reference 4 in my last post).

Is it an adaptation or a side-effect? I don't know, I will spend more time looking for sources when I have time; obviously I suspect it was an adaptation. Navigating and tracking seems indispensable in hunting for food and avoiding predators. Visuospatial navigations seems to have a clear advantage over chemotaxic navigation for large animals. Wouldn't it have been selected for a while ago in mammalian (or even vertebrate) evolutionary history as our olfactory system diminished and our visual system began to dominate?

I agree with you here that it is probably true that evolution has led humans to develop greater capacities for visual and spatial reasoning. What I think is less clear is that there is a hereditary reason why spatial reasoning underlies abstract thinking. Again, I think that we learn to think about abstract notions spatially, and that such associations are not innate. For example, it was once thought that the concept of the number line (a clear example of using spatial reasoning to address abstract concepts) was something that was genetically programmed into the brain. New research suggests that this view is wrong:
Results suggest that cardinal number concepts can exist independently from number line representations. They also suggest that the number line mapping, although ubiquitous in the modern world, is not universally spontaneous, but rather seems to be learned through — and continually reinforced by — specific cultural practices.
(Núñez et al. 2012. Number Concepts without Number Lines in an Indigenous Group of Papua New Guinea. PLoS ONE 7: e35662. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035662)

Although you cite a number of studies pointing to spatial reasoning underlying other types of abstract thinking, it's worth noting that these types of psychological and behavioral studies have a very hard time distinguishing effects that are innate and effects that are learned. Indeed, many have criticized psychological studies for studying how people in the Western world think then claiming that these modes represent the entire human population (see for example Henrich et al. 2010. The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 61. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999152X). Indeed, the article singles out visual perception and spatial reasoning as areas in which the broader human population exhibits much greater variation than in modern societies:

Human societies vary in their linguistic tools for, and cultural practices associated with, representing and communicating directions in physical space, the color spectrum, and integer amounts. There is some evidence that each of these differences in cultural content may influence some aspects of nonlinguistic cognitive processes. Here we focus on spatial cognition, for which the evidence is most provocative. As above, it appears that industrialized societies are at the extreme end of the continuum in spatial cognition. Human populations show differences in how they think about spatial orientation and deal with directions, and these differences may be influenced by linguistically based spatial reference systems.

I think, when looking at research into human behavior, we must take great care in not mistaking the limitations of our culture for the limitations of our species.
 
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  • #42
Wow, k-means clustering is intuitive :p
 
  • #43
Pythagorean said:
What's intuitive about classical physics is the framework, whereas the framework of QM is not intuitive. Klauss isn't talking about doing advanced physics problems, either. Just how particles move through (and exist in) space and time. It's really quit simple to predict a thrown spear's motion because you can count on continuity and locality.
If you've never seen a boomerang before, you going to predict it's motion?
 
  • #44
Yggg, that's fair. I can appreciate the caution with psychology, but I feel your last quote is inline with my thinking (it actually sounds like the weak Sapir Whorf hypothesis). We all have a vestibular system. We may come up with different ways to describe the sensation imparted by physics onto our vestibular system but they're all consistent with continuity and locality.

That paper is interesting though, I love things like this:

Yggg's ref said:
Speakers of English and other Indo-European
languages favor the use of an egocentric (relative) system
to represent the location of objects – that is, relative to
the self (e.g., “the man is on the right side of the flagpole”).
In contrast, many if not most languages favor an allocentric
frame, which comes in two flavors. Some allocentric
languages such as Guugu Yimithirr (an Australian
language) and Tzeltal (a Mayan language) favor a geocentric
system in which absolute reference is based on
cardinal directions (“the man is west of the house”). The
other allocentric frame is an object-centered (intrinsic)
approach that locates objects in space, relative to some
coordinate system anchored to the object (“the man is
behind the house”). When languages possesses systems for
encoding all of these spatial reference frames, they often
privilege one at the expense of the others. However, the
fact that some languages lack one or more of the reference
systems suggests that the accretion of all three systems into
most contemporary languages may be a product of longterm
cumulative cultural evolution.

All that really changes here, though, is where the origin is defined in the coordinate system which is still completely in line with the classical framework. In fact, you could find the same kind of differences between the homework solution of two different physics students: one will choose the particle to be at the origin, one will choose an absolute origin.. and in different cases one will be easier to solve (less math) but both are perfectly valid.
 
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  • #45
Pythagorean said:
specifically, I was thinking that you can simultaneously define the position and momentum of a classical particle (or a person), it is localized in space. Not so with a quantum particle. It exists as a probability distribution in space.

But classical waves also do not have a definite position.

Pythagorean said:
I agree that the classically nonlocal concept electromagnetism is extremely unintuitive, too. Not so much gravity. Gravity serves as a constant asymmetry in our spatial coordinate system, and I wager you could find obvious adaptations involving it in all species in all kinds of different ways.

I was reminded of http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24077562 "neural correlates of an internal model that has been proposed to compensate for Einstein's equivalence principle" :)

Pythagorean said:
This, I think, is why we so commonly use concept of space in the sciences, we even take non-spatial variables and plot them against each other and call it phase space in order to get better idea of what a system is doing. Every time we plot a variable, we're translating that variable to space. We assume all the properties of space for most classical variables (continuity, smoothness, deterministic trajectories in Euclidian space). Here's more research about using spatial reasoning for thinking about other things:

musical pitch:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027705000260

numbers:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135467996387552#.UrJAGPRDuMM

time:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01094.x/abstract;jsessionid=7867474264EC5E729B9863EF5DE600E8.f02t04

Conflict with QM

Spatial reasoning relies on continuity, smoothness, and locality. The unintuitive concepts in QM are exactly the ones that conflict with these: nonlocality, discretization, uncertainty. Particles can't have a precisely defined position and momentum, a particles can exist in a superposition of states.

Ode to learning

Obviously, without learning, none of this would be possible... learning is necessary, but (imo) insufficient to explain our readily available grasp of spatial reasoning. It's interesting that how we learn is influenced by spatial concepts, so in some sense, the adaptation of learning itself may be closely tied to spatial reasoning.

As before, I'm not sure QM is more unintuitive than classical mechanics, especially after Bohm. Nonetheless, your comments reminded me also of

http://clm.utexas.edu/fietelab/Papers/WidloskiFiete_bookchapter_13.pdf
"In this chapter we have focused on exploring how the brain's navigational circuit solves the problems of map-building and self-localization in novel environments. Despite this focus, it bears emphasizing that the hippocampus does not likely exist solely or even primarily to serve this function. ... To understand the elevation of the spatial variable, we might build on the analogy. The full record kept by the librarian includes a title, author names, a summary, a publication date, a publisher, number of copies in the library, and importantly, a call number. The call number is a privileged indexing variable: one author can have multiple books and multiple books may share a title, etc., but each book has a unique call number, and this number further specifies where on the shelves to find the book. On the shelves, books placed near each other address related topics, and thus the call number conveys semantic meaning that goes beyond simply providing a unique identier. Similarly, whereas the full record of an episode consists of a place, a time, context, valence, reward contingency, and landmarks, the place or location index is privileged. It is an efficient locator of a memory, and, in general, records with similar spatial labels will tend to have important relationships to each other because of the spatiotemporal continuity of the world."
 
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  • #46
Pythagorean said:
What's intuitive about classical physics is the framework, whereas the framework of QM is not intuitive. Klauss isn't talking about doing advanced physics problems, either. Just how particles move through (and exist in) space and time. It's really quit simple to predict a thrown spear's motion because you can count on continuity and locality.

Anyway, even infants know many of the fundamental concepts of classical physics:

" The evidence supports the view that certain core principles
about these domains are present as early as we can test for them and the nature
of the underlying representation is best characterized as primitive initial concepts
that are elaborated and refined through learning and experience"
Physics for infants: characterizing the origins of knowledge about objects, substances, and number
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcs.157/pdf
Overall you're making a very logical case that classical physics should be more intuitive than QM. Your argument makes complete sense. The only flaw I can find in it is that it's wrong.

It's wrong because it bears no resemblance to the reality of the history of physics. Again, I refer you to the writings of Galileo and historical accounts of the difficulties he encountered getting people to accept ideas which you feel are intuitive. It's a good theory in that it's logical, but it isn't supported by the naturally occurring experiments that have taken place throughout history by which, we can see, it is tested.

Modern man has existed for something like 40,000 years, but in all that time, despite whatever "intuitive physics" infants develop, we simply did not grasp the first law of motion. It took 40,000 years for that to sink in. By contrast, QM, which started with Planck, was sketched out in 20-30 years. Yes, it's a completely different frame, but our experience in working out the classical frame, our long history of counter-intuitive puzzle solving, allowed for the adaption to the new kind of problem to happen quite fast. We got traction on it remarkably quickly compared to classical physics.

I agree not all of classical physics is intuitive. (Though being thrown off the Earth revolving indicates that someone is exercising their intuition about centripetal force).
Yeah, erroneously, which supports my case. The fact people automatically conflate motion and acceleration is a good example of the considerable limits of "intuitive" physics.

The fact classical physics has to be taught at all is an argument against the notion it's intuitive. How can we call that which has to be laboriously taught, intuitive?
 
  • #47
Pythagorean said:
Anyway, even infants know many of the fundamental concepts of classical physics:
Just to be clear, this was a whimsical remark, right?
 
  • #48
You seem to be thinking me (or Klauss?) is making an argument for all classical physics, which is not the case. The argument I'm making is that classical physics is more intuitive than QM (you said it yourself in #46) not that all of classical physics is intuitive (the strawman you also raised in #46, #43, etc).

Again, it's the framework that's intuitive, not the whole science (it makes learning the whole science easier though) and remember the context: it's in comparison to QM. Most importantly, continuity and locality in Euclidian space are what's intuitive in classical physics and their violations in QM are what's unintuitive about QM.

For examples (and this is one example from the infant study) we don't expect balls to go through walls. In QM, tunneling is possible (thanks to nonlocality) and that's weird to us (and to infants). The point isn't that you are born knowing how to find solutions to Navier Stokes, it's that your systems are tuned to a world with spatial continuity and particle locality because that's the world they developed in.

And, by the way, intuition for centripetal force is intuition for Newton's First law.
 
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  • #49
Also, here's opinions and summaries from the authors of the infant physics study in case you don't want to read the study:

In the MU Developmental Cognition Lab, we study infant knowledge of the world by measuring a child’s gaze when presented with different scenarios,” said Kristy vanMarle, an assistant professor in the Department of Psychological Sciences in the College of Arts and Science. “We believe that infants are born with expectations about the objects around them, even though that knowledge is a skill that’s never been taught. As the child develops, this knowledge is refined and eventually leads to the abilities we use as adults.”

In a review of related scientific literature from the past 30 years, vanMarle and Susan Hespos of Northwestern University found that the evidence for intuitive physics occurs in infants as young as two months – the earliest age at which testing can occur. At that age, infants show an understanding that unsupported objects will fall and that hidden objects do not cease to exist. Scientific testing also has shown that by five months, infants have an expectation that non-cohesive substances like sand or water are not solid. In a previous publication, vanMarle found that children as young as 10 months consistently choose larger amounts when presented with two different amounts of food substance.

“We believe that infants are born with the ability to form expectations and they use these expectations basically to predict the future,” vanMarle said. “Intuitive physics include skills that adults use all the time. For example, when a glass of milk falls off the table, a person might try to catch the cup, but they are not likely to try to catch the milk that spills out. The person doesn’t have to consciously think about what to do because the brain processes the information and the person simply reacts. The majority of an adult’s everyday interactions with the world are automatic, and we believe infants have the same ability to form expectations, predicting the behavior of objects and substances with which they interact.”

While the intuitive physics knowledge is believed to be present at birth, vanMarle believes parents can assist skill development through normal interaction, such as playing and talking with the child and encouraging him/her to interact with objects.

http://munews.missouri.edu/news-rel...uitive-physics”-knowledge-says-mu-researcher/
 
  • #51
No, it's always a possibility. In the context of the articles demonstrating selection for spatial reasoning, it's suggestive evidence. But it's not just a matter of learned or not, it's also a matter of how much the hardware facilitates the learning of.
 
  • #52
Ygggdrasil said:
What I think is less clear is that there is a hereditary reason why spatial reasoning underlies abstract thinking...

I meant to respond to this but I got distracted by other aspects of the discussion. I agree with this. In the post you refer to, I intentionally separated the discussion of selection from the discussion of abstract thought with the bold headers to make this point clear.
 
  • #53
Now the debate over whether CM or QM is more intuitive seems to be missing the point. I think the really interesting question at hand now is whether certain "physical intuitions" about the world, such as the expectations of solidity, continuity, cohesion and property changes that the Hespos and vanMarle article discusses, are genetically programmed or learned. The fact that these show up in two month old infants is a sign that they may be innate. However, two month olds still have considerable experience with the world and it is also possible that they have learned these expectations from observing the world around them. Of course, both nature and nurture could have some role in the process. These seem like very difficult questions to answer.
 
  • #54
Pythagorean said:
You seem to be thinking me (or Klauss?) is making an argument for all classical physics, which is not the case. The argument I'm making is that classical physics is more intuitive than QM (you said it yourself in #46) not that all of classical physics is intuitive (the strawman you also raised in #46, #43, etc).

Again, it's the framework that's intuitive, not the whole science (it makes learning the whole science easier though) and remember the context: it's in comparison to QM. Most importantly, continuity and locality in Euclidian space are what's intuitive in classical physics and their violations in QM are what's unintuitive about QM.

For examples (and this is one example from the infant study) we don't expect balls to go through walls. In QM, tunneling is possible (thanks to nonlocality) and that's weird to us (and to infants). The point isn't that you are born knowing how to find solutions to Navier Stokes, it's that your systems are tuned to a world with spatial continuity and particle locality because that's the world they developed in.
I'm not maintaining that classical physics is just as hard for a modern student to grasp as QM, I'm saying it was a lot harder to figure out in the first place. A bright person can be taught, and grasp, Newton's three laws, in, let's say, an hour. It's very, very easy to receive knowledge that someone else spent millennia figuring out from scratch, and to get the completely erroneous impression we, ourselves, could have figured it out from scratch quite quickly had we set our minds to it. Once someone else makes sense of something they can pass that understanding to another without all the false starts, errors, and red herrings that delayed the understanding.

If you re-watch the whole video, you'll see that Kraus agrees with me that we seem to have a penchant for tackling mysteries and puzzles and that we're usually surprised by the results (they're very often counter-intuitive). I think he's at cross purposes to himself by prefacing all that with the remark that "we didn't evolve to understand QM". He seems to be crediting our survival exclusively to the automatic fight or flight type of reactions, which are genetic. That's true in the very short term, but he's missing the equally important long term activities we engage in when we're not running from tigers, which are often tackling mysteries like QM. That is so all pervasive in human behavior that we've moved from hunter-gatherers to city builders and space explorers.

Tigers are still out there hunting people, when they can get to them, while we're sitting here debating over the internet by means of astonishingly complex technology. Tigers didn't evolve to understand QM. I think, in a very important sense, it's much more accurate to say we did evolve to understand QM than to say we didn't. If our puzzle solving penchants and abilities weren't selected for, whatever specific brain functions you wish to parse these abilities to, where did they come from?



And, by the way, intuition for centripetal force is intuition for Newton's First law.
If they had an intuitive grasp of Newton's First Law, why did they deny the Earth could be rotating, a situation they "intuited" would result in all things on the surface being thrown off into space?
 
  • #55
“We believe that infants are born with the ability to form expectations and they use these expectations basically to predict the future,” vanMarle said. “Intuitive physics include skills that adults use all the time. For example, when a glass of milk falls off the table, a person might try to catch the cup, but they are not likely to try to catch the milk that spills out. The person doesn’t have to consciously think about what to do because the brain processes the information and the person simply reacts. The majority of an adult’s everyday interactions with the world are automatic, and we believe infants have the same ability to form expectations, predicting the behavior of objects and substances with which they interact.”
You realize that birds, for example, are vastly better at this "intuitive physics" than people, right?
 
  • #56
More, less is beside the point. But like I said, it's a vertebrate adaptation. One of the papers I cited was about birds and the anatomical comparison of specialized systems for object tracking to visual systems for pattern recognition, though it also mentions the homologous system in humans and primates.

That the adaptation is conserved across species is even more evidence that it's selected for : )
 
  • #57
zoobyshoe said:
I'm not maintaining that classical physics is just as hard for a modern student to grasp as QM, I'm saying it was a lot harder to figure out in the first place. A bright person can be taught, and grasp, Newton's three laws, in, let's say, an hour. It's very, very easy to receive knowledge that someone else spent millennia figuring out from scratch, and to get the completely erroneous impression we, ourselves, could have figured it out from scratch quite quickly had we set our minds to it. Once someone else makes sense of something they can pass that understanding to another without all the false starts, errors, and red herrings that delayed the understanding.

If you re-watch the whole video, you'll see that Kraus agrees with me that we seem to have a penchant for tackling mysteries and puzzles and that we're usually surprised by the results (they're very often counter-intuitive). I think he's at cross purposes to himself by prefacing all that with the remark that "we didn't evolve to understand QM". He seems to be crediting our survival exclusively to the automatic fight or flight type of reactions, which are genetic. That's true in the very short term, but he's missing the equally important long term activities we engage in when we're not running from tigers, which are often tackling mysteries like QM. That is so all pervasive in human behavior that we've moved from hunter-gatherers to city builders and space explorers.

Tigers are still out there hunting people, when they can get to them, while we're sitting here debating over the internet by means of astonishingly complex technology. Tigers didn't evolve to understand QM. I think, in a very important sense, it's much more accurate to say we did evolve to understand QM than to say we didn't. If our puzzle solving penchants and abilities weren't selected for, whatever specific brain functions you wish to parse these abilities to, where did they come from?

If they had an intuitive grasp of Newton's First Law, why did they deny the Earth could be rotating, a situation they "intuited" would result in all things on the surface being thrown off into space?

You seem to be conflating intuition with knowledge and technical know-how. Intuition is the ability to acquire knowledge without inference or reasoning. It doesn't mean you get everything right. False starts, red herings, etc are not in contradiction with intution. You don't hire a central manager for a bank if all they have is intuition. You need experience and practice to be able to harness your intution. Furthermore, the claim is "there exists", not "for all".

Klauss doesn't contradict himself at all. He talks about that we like puzzle solving and the we're drawn to it, not that we're adapted to it (and that's not true across the human species, anyway, not everyone likes puzzles). Klauss doesn't say that it was selected for (i.e. that we evolved to solve puzzles).

Because via Newton's first law, if you're rotating (and there's the balancing force isn't strong enough) you will be "thrown off" the sphere (you will actually just be continuing on your path via Newton's First... it's gravity that keeps you on Earth). That's good intuition. They happen to be wrong about which force dominates (they assumed gravity was weaker) but they didn't have to be taught Newton's First Law to comprehend that consequences of it! That's (by definition) intuition for physics!

(Also.. if you want to explore the adaptation of "puzzle solving", that's on your to provide the literature and the arguments and how it links to QM and demonstrate that it's as pervasive as the intuition for classical properties. It seems like a long shot to me, but it's your time.)
 
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  • #58
Ygggdrasil said:
Now the debate over whether CM or QM is more intuitive seems to be missing the point. I think the really interesting question at hand now is whether certain "physical intuitions" about the world, such as the expectations of solidity, continuity, cohesion and property changes that the Hespos and vanMarle article discusses, are genetically programmed or learned. The fact that these show up in two month old infants is a sign that they may be innate. However, two month olds still have considerable experience with the world and it is also possible that they have learned these expectations from observing the world around them. Of course, both nature and nurture could have some role in the process. These seem like very difficult questions to answer.

Well, those "phsyical intutions" (solidity, continuity, cohesion) are all pervasive in classical physics and not in quantum physics, but I completely agree with you besides our semantic disagreement.

A third way to look at it is that the innate properties of the circuit facilitated the learning quickly (within two months of birth). Remember also that babies can't see that well or interpret what they see in the first month, so they wouldn't have really had the full two months to learn (well, not visually anyway, which is the system we think is responsible for detecting these physical properties).

There are some anatomically functional division that have been found in owls between innate neural circuits and neural circuits for learning (namely whether they use a disinhibition process vs. a silent-synapse process)[1]. Maybe if we investigated which was associated with the active networks in object tracking and expectation violation in infants, we could see which dominates (nature or nurture?) or if they are more-or-less equivalent. I would assume they are closer to equivalent because of the well-known blind-the-baby-kittens experiment which demonstrate a strong nurture effect in at least one sensory system.

[1]"Studies in barn owls have revealed that the additional learned circuits that had been assembled during a sensitive period in juvenile birds were turned on and off in the adult through mechanisms distinct from those that turn innate natural circuits on and off (disinhibition versus AMPA/NMDA ratios for the innate and learned circuits, respectively), suggesting that innate and acquired circuit arrangements can be distinguished functionally"

http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v13/n7/full/nrn3258.html
 
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  • #59
Because via Newton's first law, if you're rotating (and there's the balancing force isn't strong enough) you will be "thrown off" the sphere (you will actually just be continuing on your path via Newton's First... it's gravity that keeps you on Earth). That's good intuition. They happen to be wrong about which force dominates (they assumed gravity was weaker) but they didn't have to be taught Newton's First Law to comprehend that consequences of it! That's (by definition) intuition for physics!
I concede this point completely. The fact they thought we'd be thrown off the Earth were it rotating demonstrates an intuitive grasp of Newton's First Law. Their error was in not accounting for mitigating forces.

What did you mean here, then:

(Though being thrown off the Earth revolving indicates that someone is exercising their intuition about centripetal force)
?
Pythagorean said:
You seem to be conflating intuition with knowledge and technical know-how. Intuition is the ability to acquire knowledge without inference or reasoning. It doesn't mean you get everything right. False starts, red herings, etc are not in contradiction with intution. You don't hire a central manager for a bank if all they have is intuition. You need experience and practice to be able to harness your intution.
No. The whole point of the word is to describe insights that are in place without preliminary conscious trial and error, corrections, experiments to check theory against reality, etc.:

intuition:
1: quick and ready insight
2
a : immediate apprehension or cognition
b : knowledge or conviction gained by intuition
c : the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference

The learning that leads to intuition is effortless and unconscious, which is why an individual experiencing an intuition would have no rational explanation for why they knew what they knew. A person operating a slingshot could easily acquire intuition about Newton's First Law and suspect we would be thrown off the Earth if it were rotating, but they wouldn't be able to articulate why they worry that is the case. They wouldn't be able to consciously explain, "A body in rest or in uniform motion in a straight line will remain that way unless acted on by an outside force."

And, it has to be right. You can't call it "knowledge" if it's bunk. There's no point in using the word "intuition" if you're talking about a succession of random, incorrect confabulations.

Klauss
Krauss, actually. (It's OK, I've been calling him "Kraus".)

...doesn't contradict himself at all. He talks about that we like puzzle solving and the we're drawn to it, not that we're adapted to it (and that's not true across the human species, anyway, not everyone likes puzzles). Klauss doesn't say that it was selected for (i.e. that we evolved to solve puzzles).
I know he's not making the overt assertion we evolved for puzzle solving. But it's a property he attributes to us, mysteriously, after having listed our evolutionary endowments as limited to fight or flight responses. Here's my original remark:

Having watched it, I think Kraus is wrong to say we didn't evolve to understand QM, due to what he says later about us enjoying puzzle solving so much. Clearly there's been selection in favor of puzzle solvers, and QM is just another puzzle. Figuring things out is what we do, and it's not an activity limited to humans. A lot of animals are puzzle solvers, to the best of their ability.

Since he ascribes puzzle solving to us he would have, if confronted, to admit it must have been selected for. However, he opens by specifically only mentioning fight or flight, shelter seeking, and spear and rock throwing (which, in the context of the video, seems to be a reference to a 'fight' reaction to danger rather than an expression of tool-making).

So there is a contradiction between the limited list he gives of what was selected for at the start of the video and the ability he ascribes to us later on. If all that was selected for was rudimentary fight or flight responses, how is it he suddenly finds us solving puzzles and being amazed by the results? He doesn't address the cause or origin of puzzle solving, he brings it in without explanation, having specifically excluded the only thing he mentions that could be construed as a form of puzzle solving, understanding QM, from what was selected for.

Krauss believes we didn't evolve to understand QM because it's outside the scale we evolved in. Makes sense. It also makes sense to propose we did evolve to understand classical physics. Makes sense, but untrue. Every inch of our progress in Classical Physics was hard won through, collectively, millions and millions of hours of puzzle solving. Made possible by the fact we did evolve to solve puzzles (at least, we evolved the ability and drive to learn to solve them).

I think what you're failing to observe is that the ability to throw a spear accurately is a completely different kind of activity than intellectually sorting out and articulating the 3 Laws. Intuitively grasping that the harder you throw it, the further it will go into the mammoth, is a million miles away from being able to say F=ma. The latter requires sorting out the concept of force, the concept of mass, the concept of acceleration, and then that the magnitude of the force will be equal to the product of the mass and acceleration, and then finding suitable units for all. The former (spear throwing) isn't physics, the latter is. The former can be learned relatively quickly, the latter (specifically F=ma) took us 40,000 years to sort out, despite the fact we were living in the world of, on the scale of, spear throwing that whole time. Saying it is a completely different activity than doing it.

(Also.. if you want to explore the adaptation of "puzzle solving", that's on your to provide the literature and the arguments and how it links to QM and demonstrate that it's as pervasive as the intuition for classical properties. It seems like a long shot to me, but it's your time.)
I suppose I would, if I'd ever made such a claim.
 
  • #60
Pythagorean said:
(Also.. if you want to explore the adaptation of "puzzle solving", that's on your to provide the literature and the arguments and how it links to QM and demonstrate that it's as pervasive as the intuition for classical properties. It seems like a long shot to me, but it's your time.)

For the first point, there is the Pinker proposal I linked to earlier. http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/papers/PNAS-2010-Pinker-8993-9.pdf

Interesting related commentary
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2010/05/31/did-humans-evolve-to-fill-a-cognitive-niche/
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress...olutionary-psychology-mostly-by-steve-pinker/
"Second, “developmental plasticity†does not stand as a dichotomous alternative to “evolved features.†Our developmental plasticity is to a large extent the product of evolution: our ability to learn language, our tendency to defer to authorities when we’re children, our learned socialization—those are all features almost certainly instilled into our brains by natural selection as a way to promote behavioral flexibility in that most flexible of mammals."

The Bohmian interpretation makes QM as intuitive as classical statistical mechanics. And yes, classical mechanics is not intuitive - there was Aristotelian physics for a long time before that. I think this is in the spirit of what zoobyshoe has been saying.

"Aristotle’s physics bad reputation is undeserved, and leads to diffused ignorance: think for a moment, do you really believe that bodies of different weight fall at the same speed? Why don’t you just try: take a coin and piece of paper and let them fall. Do they fall at the same speed? Aristotle never claimed that bodies fall at different speed if we take away the air. He was interested in the speed of real bodies falling in our real world, where air is present. It is curious to read everywhere “Why didn’t Aristotle do the actual experiment?â€. I do not know if he did, but I know that if he did observation would have confirmed his theory." http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.4057
 
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