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Moral responsibility : When an agent performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's cell phone at least to call for help. To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to ascribe moral responsibility to them on the basis of what they have done or left undone.
Libertarian free will : The ability of an agent making a "free will" choice to have chosen otherwise (sometimes called Could Have Done Otherwise or CHDO) than what it actually did choose in a given set of circumstances, if the precise circumstances (immediately prior to the moment of choice) could be "replayed" exactly as before.
Many defenders of the concept of libertarian free will seem to believe that such free will is a necessary pre-requisite for moral responsibility. In other words, if we deny the existence of libertarian free will, we must also deny that any agent is morally responsible for its actions.
Many determinists, on the other hand, argue that moral responsibility can have meaning if and only if our actions are precisely determined by our detailed and prevailing motives, wishes, desires, volitions, values etc, etc, and (given that such factors will be identical if the situation is replayed under identical circumstances) the concept of CHDO is incoherent and certainly not a pre-requisite for moral responsibility.
The question, then is :
Is libertarian free will an essential pre-requisite for moral responsibility, and (whether you think yes or no) why?
I'm interested to know the views of forum members on this question.
MF
(ps I posted this in Metaphysics and Epistemology becuse the questions it raises, regarding the requirement or otherwise for the existence of libertarian free will, are metaphysical and epistemological)
Libertarian free will : The ability of an agent making a "free will" choice to have chosen otherwise (sometimes called Could Have Done Otherwise or CHDO) than what it actually did choose in a given set of circumstances, if the precise circumstances (immediately prior to the moment of choice) could be "replayed" exactly as before.
Many defenders of the concept of libertarian free will seem to believe that such free will is a necessary pre-requisite for moral responsibility. In other words, if we deny the existence of libertarian free will, we must also deny that any agent is morally responsible for its actions.
Many determinists, on the other hand, argue that moral responsibility can have meaning if and only if our actions are precisely determined by our detailed and prevailing motives, wishes, desires, volitions, values etc, etc, and (given that such factors will be identical if the situation is replayed under identical circumstances) the concept of CHDO is incoherent and certainly not a pre-requisite for moral responsibility.
The question, then is :
Is libertarian free will an essential pre-requisite for moral responsibility, and (whether you think yes or no) why?
I'm interested to know the views of forum members on this question.
MF
(ps I posted this in Metaphysics and Epistemology becuse the questions it raises, regarding the requirement or otherwise for the existence of libertarian free will, are metaphysical and epistemological)
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