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(I wasn't sure whether to post this in general philosophy or in metaphysics - it raises metaphysical questions about the meaning of ultimate responsibility but the hard-determinist in me tells me that the topic itself is of a general nature - I'll let the moderators decide)
Introduction
In the perennial debate on free will and determinism it is important to understand where each camp lies in relation to the other, what the basic premises of each camp are, and where the battle-lines are drawn. This is an attempt to sketch-out a high-level map of that territory.
Definitions
I suggest basic definitions of free will and determinism as follows :
Determinism is the premise that “same past” entails “same future”; in other words that whatever happens today is determined precisely by antecedent states of the world; that given the past there is one and only one possible future in this world.
Free will is the premise that an agent with free will possesses ultimately responsibility for its actions. This notion of ultimate responsibility (UR) is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of free will, though in most explanations of free will the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) is also assumed.
Note : I will not go into a deeper examination of just what UR is supposed to mean at this point – since this will lead us into yet another debate on the coherency of UR. Suffice it to say that UR is supposed to mean that free will agents are the ultimate cause “of themselves” – UR is the modern terminology equivalent of causa sui (latin for “cause of itself”). To a libertarian UR is supposed to be a coherent notion, but to both hard determinists and compatibilists the notion of UR entails a contradiction or incoherency.
Discussion
Given the above definitions, we can ask whether free will is compatible with determinism. I believe that almost everyone would agree that (as defined above) free will and determinism are incompatible premises – if one is true then the other must be false. The thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism is called incompatibilism. There is one camp however, the compatibilists, who claim that free will and determinism are compatible premises. How do they achieve this compatibilism? Quite simply by redefining the meaning of either free will (the common approach) or determinism (the uncommon approach) such that these terms are then compatible.
I have tried to sketch the “family tree” of free will vs determinism beliefs in the attached figure (you will need to refer to it to make sense of the rest of this post).
The Incompatibilist Camp
Referring to the figure, the incompatibilists who embrace free will and reject determinism are the libertarians, whereas the incompatibilists who embrace determinism and reject free will are the hard-determinists. In the libertarian camp, both UR and PAP are held to be true premises, whereas in the hard-determinist camp both UR and PAP are held to be false.
Note : Here I am assuming that a hard-determinist does not necessarily believe that there are no indeterministic processes in the world – but she does believe that any such indeterministic processes do not have any bearing on the question of the truth or falsity of free will. In other words, the hard-determinist premise is that free will is false, and not necessarily that there are no indeterministic processes in the world. In other words, that indeterminism (if it exists) does not open the door to free will. I realize this idea that a hard-determinist does not necessarily reject the notion of indeterministic processes may sound contradictory, and will likely be a point for discussion.
The Compatibilist Camp
The compatibilist camp is also split. The ones who retain the above definition of determinism, and redefine free will such that it is compatible with determinism, I call true compatibilists (mainly because the vast bulk of compatibilists fall into this camp). To a true compatibilist, free will is nothing more nor less than being able (ie being physically unconstrained) to do what you want to do. PAP is not necessarily true, and UR is certainly not true, for a true compatibilist.
The compatibilists who retain the above definition of free will, and redefine determinism such that it is compatible with free will, I have shown by a broken line in the figure. There is only one champion of this view to my knowledge (professor Norman Swartz), and his approach I believe leads him back into the libertarian camp. In this camp, UR and PAP are held to be true.
Almost all of the above (I believe) is pretty much accepted in the free will vs determinism arena.
The Libertarian camp
Now we get to the contentious part.
I have further divided the libertarian camp into two sub-camps. There are the libertarians who believe that the concept of free will (ie how agents actually acquire UR) can be fully explained on a purely naturalistic basis (ie without invoking any mystical, magical or supernatural powers). In other words that there is a rational and logical explication for how UR can arise and can operate in the world which does not appeal to any unknown mystical forces. These I call naturalist libertarians. The naturalist libertarian believes that PAP can be satisfied via indeterminism, and that some suitable combination of indeterminism and determinism within an agent can somehow give rise to UR. The difficulty for the naturalist libertarian is in actually demonstrating (as opposed to assuming) that a particular combination of indeterminism and determinism gives rise to UR. I do not believe this has been successfully demonstrated, hence I label the naturalist libertarian camp in the figure as one which PAP can be satisfied, but in which UR is false. (Naturalist libertarians will no doubt argue that they assume UR is true – I do not dispute that – what I dispute is that the naturalist libertarian can show that UR is true in his model of libertarianism).
The other libertarian sub-camp is the camp of supernaturalist libertarians (I believe these comprise the vast majority of libertarians) who acknowledge that, though PAP can be satisfied by indeterminism alone, UR cannot. For these libertarians, the ultimate explanation of UR rests neither in determinism nor in indeterminism nor in any combination of the two, rather it lies outside of the natural world altogether in some mystical realm to which we have no access, in which it is supposed to be possible for an agent to be the cause of itself. This seems to be the only way that we can arrive at UR – by pushing the “explanation” for free will into the mystical realm where we ultimately end up with no rational explanation at all……. We simply say “and then a miracle happens”.
I would be interested in constructive comments from other members.
Have I interpreted the beliefs and premises of the various camps correctly? Am I misrepresenting or missing anything?
Best Regards
Introduction
In the perennial debate on free will and determinism it is important to understand where each camp lies in relation to the other, what the basic premises of each camp are, and where the battle-lines are drawn. This is an attempt to sketch-out a high-level map of that territory.
Definitions
I suggest basic definitions of free will and determinism as follows :
Determinism is the premise that “same past” entails “same future”; in other words that whatever happens today is determined precisely by antecedent states of the world; that given the past there is one and only one possible future in this world.
Free will is the premise that an agent with free will possesses ultimately responsibility for its actions. This notion of ultimate responsibility (UR) is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of free will, though in most explanations of free will the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) is also assumed.
Note : I will not go into a deeper examination of just what UR is supposed to mean at this point – since this will lead us into yet another debate on the coherency of UR. Suffice it to say that UR is supposed to mean that free will agents are the ultimate cause “of themselves” – UR is the modern terminology equivalent of causa sui (latin for “cause of itself”). To a libertarian UR is supposed to be a coherent notion, but to both hard determinists and compatibilists the notion of UR entails a contradiction or incoherency.
Discussion
Given the above definitions, we can ask whether free will is compatible with determinism. I believe that almost everyone would agree that (as defined above) free will and determinism are incompatible premises – if one is true then the other must be false. The thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism is called incompatibilism. There is one camp however, the compatibilists, who claim that free will and determinism are compatible premises. How do they achieve this compatibilism? Quite simply by redefining the meaning of either free will (the common approach) or determinism (the uncommon approach) such that these terms are then compatible.
I have tried to sketch the “family tree” of free will vs determinism beliefs in the attached figure (you will need to refer to it to make sense of the rest of this post).
The Incompatibilist Camp
Referring to the figure, the incompatibilists who embrace free will and reject determinism are the libertarians, whereas the incompatibilists who embrace determinism and reject free will are the hard-determinists. In the libertarian camp, both UR and PAP are held to be true premises, whereas in the hard-determinist camp both UR and PAP are held to be false.
Note : Here I am assuming that a hard-determinist does not necessarily believe that there are no indeterministic processes in the world – but she does believe that any such indeterministic processes do not have any bearing on the question of the truth or falsity of free will. In other words, the hard-determinist premise is that free will is false, and not necessarily that there are no indeterministic processes in the world. In other words, that indeterminism (if it exists) does not open the door to free will. I realize this idea that a hard-determinist does not necessarily reject the notion of indeterministic processes may sound contradictory, and will likely be a point for discussion.
The Compatibilist Camp
The compatibilist camp is also split. The ones who retain the above definition of determinism, and redefine free will such that it is compatible with determinism, I call true compatibilists (mainly because the vast bulk of compatibilists fall into this camp). To a true compatibilist, free will is nothing more nor less than being able (ie being physically unconstrained) to do what you want to do. PAP is not necessarily true, and UR is certainly not true, for a true compatibilist.
The compatibilists who retain the above definition of free will, and redefine determinism such that it is compatible with free will, I have shown by a broken line in the figure. There is only one champion of this view to my knowledge (professor Norman Swartz), and his approach I believe leads him back into the libertarian camp. In this camp, UR and PAP are held to be true.
Almost all of the above (I believe) is pretty much accepted in the free will vs determinism arena.
The Libertarian camp
Now we get to the contentious part.
I have further divided the libertarian camp into two sub-camps. There are the libertarians who believe that the concept of free will (ie how agents actually acquire UR) can be fully explained on a purely naturalistic basis (ie without invoking any mystical, magical or supernatural powers). In other words that there is a rational and logical explication for how UR can arise and can operate in the world which does not appeal to any unknown mystical forces. These I call naturalist libertarians. The naturalist libertarian believes that PAP can be satisfied via indeterminism, and that some suitable combination of indeterminism and determinism within an agent can somehow give rise to UR. The difficulty for the naturalist libertarian is in actually demonstrating (as opposed to assuming) that a particular combination of indeterminism and determinism gives rise to UR. I do not believe this has been successfully demonstrated, hence I label the naturalist libertarian camp in the figure as one which PAP can be satisfied, but in which UR is false. (Naturalist libertarians will no doubt argue that they assume UR is true – I do not dispute that – what I dispute is that the naturalist libertarian can show that UR is true in his model of libertarianism).
The other libertarian sub-camp is the camp of supernaturalist libertarians (I believe these comprise the vast majority of libertarians) who acknowledge that, though PAP can be satisfied by indeterminism alone, UR cannot. For these libertarians, the ultimate explanation of UR rests neither in determinism nor in indeterminism nor in any combination of the two, rather it lies outside of the natural world altogether in some mystical realm to which we have no access, in which it is supposed to be possible for an agent to be the cause of itself. This seems to be the only way that we can arrive at UR – by pushing the “explanation” for free will into the mystical realm where we ultimately end up with no rational explanation at all……. We simply say “and then a miracle happens”.
I would be interested in constructive comments from other members.
Have I interpreted the beliefs and premises of the various camps correctly? Am I misrepresenting or missing anything?
Best Regards
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