- #31
Ernies
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moving finger said:
Tu quoque! 'Free'! You certainly are.
Ernies
Does moral responsibility entail libertarian free will?
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SUMMARY
The forum discussion centers on the relationship between moral responsibility and libertarian free will, with participants debating whether libertarian free will is essential for moral accountability. The concept of "Could Have Done Otherwise" (CHDO) is highlighted as a critical aspect of libertarian free will, while determinists argue that moral responsibility can exist without it, relying instead on causal determinism. Key arguments presented include the assertion that if actions are caused, moral responsibility is negated, and the counterpoint that moral responsibility requires a deterministic framework to be coherent. The discussion ultimately questions the validity of both perspectives and their implications for moral accountability.
PREREQUISITES- Understanding of moral philosophy concepts, particularly moral responsibility and libertarian free will.
- Familiarity with determinism and its implications on human agency.
- Knowledge of the "Could Have Done Otherwise" (CHDO) principle in free will discussions.
- Awareness of philosophical arguments, such as those presented by Norman Swartz, regarding moral responsibility.
- Research the implications of compatibilism in moral philosophy.
- Explore the arguments for and against determinism in the context of moral responsibility.
- Study the concept of "INNER responsibility" and its relevance to personal accountability.
- Investigate the judicial system's perspective on moral responsibility and free will.
Philosophers, ethicists, students of moral philosophy, and anyone interested in the intersection of free will and moral accountability will benefit from this discussion.
Tu quoque! 'Free'! You certainly are.
Ernies
- #32
Q_Goest
Science Advisor
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Hi MF,
I guess we'll have to simply agree to disagree on #3 above. "Choice" implies many things which don't apply here IMHO. In the case of a deterministic agent (an FSA or Touring machine) that "choice" can, in principal, be reduced to a single change in some entry on a table which is placed there by a read/write head where the action of the read/write head is ontically deterministic, regardless of whether it's knowable. I see no more reason to assign "moral responsibility" to the change in that particular entry than any other entry change. "Moral responsibility" also implies many things which can't be applied to the deterministic action of any FSA or Touring machine.
- #33
Ernies
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Please don't be offended: but I think you mean Turing machine, named after the famous Alan Turing, not "Touring machine".
- #34
moving finger
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Yes, we all are.Ernies said:
Deterministically free
(which to me means "the ability to choose, unconstrained by external forces")
Best Regards
- #35
moving finger
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Such as? Can you elaborate?moving finger said:
Do you deny that a deterministic machine can make choices?
(many seem to assume that “ability to choose” is inconsistent with determinism, but that is simply incorrect)
Such as? Can you elaborate?Q_Goest said:
What else do you think is needed before an agent can be deemed responsible for its actions?
(I suspect you are going to suggest that moral responsibility cannot arise from determinism alone, and must entail something called "free will"?)
But before you answer, consider the following :
Imagine, if you will, a thought experiment.
Let's say that you could have chosen to have either tea or coffee with your breakfast this morning.
Your choice was unconstrained by external factors, you were able to choose according to your will.
Let's say (for the sake of argument) that you chose coffee.
Suppose that now we could "rewind the clock", and set absolutely everything back to precisely the same way that it was just before your decision (including all your internal neurophysiological states etc). (I know this is impossible in practice - it's a thought experiment after all). Would your decision be the same again (would you again choose coffee) the "second time around"?
If you think it would not be the same, what explanation would you suggest for it being different to the first time (ie what rational or logical reason can you give for it being different)?
Suppose you could now repeat this thought experiment 100 times, so that you get 100 results. What do you think would be the outcome?
Would you choose "coffee" 100 times out of 100? (this would imply causal determinism)
Would you choose "tea" 50 times and "coffee" 50 times? (this would imply simple random behaviour).
Would you choose "tea" perhaps 20 times and "coffee" 80 times? (this would imply stochastic behaviour).
What empirical outcome would you expect from the above experiment if you really had "genuine free will", and why?
You may say "but I always had the option to choose tea!"
Yes, you had the option to choose tea. Nobody, and no force, external to you forced you to choose coffee “against your will”. You acted according to your will. And your will determined that you wanted coffee. And if you could reset the clock and take precisely the same decision all over again, it would still be the case that you could choose tea if you wanted to, but it would also still be the case that your “will” determines that you choose coffee. To suggest otherwise (to suggest that we would choose differently if we could repeat the choice) implies either that our will is NOT in control, or it implies that our will is acting randomly.
Who wants to believe that their willed decisions are random? How could random willed decisions be the basis for taking responsibility for our actions? The only way we can claim responsibility for our actions is if those actions are determined precisely by what we want to happen. And what we want to happen will be exactly the same if we rewind the clock and repeat the choice.
It’s not easy to give up the notion that we are not deterministic agents. But if you think carefully and logically about the issue, and try to avoid jumping to irrational emotional conclusions, you’ll see that it’s the only rational course to take.
Best Regards
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- #36
Ernies
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moving finger said:Yes, we all are.
Deterministically free
(which to me means "the ability to choose, unconstrained by external forces")
Best Regards
'Deterministically free' is the best example of oxymoron I have heard in years . ROFL. Your later explanation seems to me totally incompatible with the earlier words.
May you remain happy in your freely chosen illusion.
Ernies
p.s. look up the derivation of oxymoron.
- #37
moving finger
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Dear ErniesErnies said:
If you care to spend some time learning about the word "free" and its various meanings, instead of simply focussing on trying to be naively "clever", you would understand that there is nothing necessarily contradictory in the notions of determinism and freedom.
A deterministic machine is free (unconstrained by external forces) to make choices, but this does not imply that it possesses anything akin to the libertarian notion of free will.
We talk of objects being in "free fall" when unconstrained in a gravitational field, but we don't mean by this that they are not acting deterministically.
We talk in mechanics of "degrees of freedom" of physical systems, but we don't mean by this that they are not acting deterministically.
You perhaps assume one and only one meaning for the word "free", but in that case you live in a very blinkered world
Best Regards
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- #38
Ernies
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1.The primary meaning of 'free', in several dictionaries at least, is
"able to act at will; not under compulsion or restraint". It does not restrict it to 'external' constraint or deterministic external function.
2. All other uses are either a subset of this or mere analogies, which would of course include your 'external constraint', and things like 'free fall'.
3. Yet you insist that that 'free will', which is surely not external --to me, at least--- is 'illusion' which conceals determinism.
You are mistaken in thinking that I was not aware of the alternatives. Having spent several years being made mince-meat of by Herbert McCabe, this was impossible. I was concerned at the swapping between 'external' and 'internal' without notice.
(In case you don't know the name, McCabe was a Dominican who was also a genius. I was and am an agnostic, which of course meant fairly vigorous arguments every week. Being then young and inexperienced he usually made salami of me, but I did learn to detect those 'theories' which involved an un-announced change of connotation in reaching conclusions).
If you think I was merely trying to be 'clever', I am sorry to have given that impression. The remark about the derivation was meant as a joke. Perhaps I should have put the 'biggrin' symbol after it as you did.
Ernies.
"able to act at will; not under compulsion or restraint". It does not restrict it to 'external' constraint or deterministic external function.
2. All other uses are either a subset of this or mere analogies, which would of course include your 'external constraint', and things like 'free fall'.
3. Yet you insist that that 'free will', which is surely not external --to me, at least--- is 'illusion' which conceals determinism.
You are mistaken in thinking that I was not aware of the alternatives. Having spent several years being made mince-meat of by Herbert McCabe, this was impossible. I was concerned at the swapping between 'external' and 'internal' without notice.
(In case you don't know the name, McCabe was a Dominican who was also a genius. I was and am an agnostic, which of course meant fairly vigorous arguments every week. Being then young and inexperienced he usually made salami of me, but I did learn to detect those 'theories' which involved an un-announced change of connotation in reaching conclusions).
If you think I was merely trying to be 'clever', I am sorry to have given that impression. The remark about the derivation was meant as a joke. Perhaps I should have put the 'biggrin' symbol after it as you did.
Ernies.
- #39
Q_Goest
Science Advisor
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Hi MF, Regarding the tea/coffee choice experiment, I don't see any reason to apply moral responsibility to that choice. I might suggest this experiment instead:
Let's create a fictitious world where an almighty deity (let's call him Ogaud) decided he's very lonely as he alone exists. Nothing else exists. There is no white light nor even darkness because nothing else exists to create subjective experiences. Ogaud doesn't know what a noise sounds like nor what salsa tastes like because nothing exists.
So Ogaud decides to create something called a compter. This compter uses miss and mass to create things. When miss and mass bump into each other they do so in a very determinate way, just like billiard balls reflecting off each other on a pool table. An explanation of how it works could be derived perhaps, but it's very complex.
After playing with his compter a few times, Ogaud becomes enamored by the game. He decides to call it "Determinizm" and plays it every day. His day however equals 20 billion years to us. Still, he doesn't notice how quickly the time flies by when he plays this wonderful game.
Eventually though he gets bored with it. It seems, each time he plays with his compter something funny, albeit totally expected, happens. Each morning that he sets it into motion, the same events seem to unfold. He watches a tremendous explosion of things occur, and then takes note of a relatively tiny lump of miss/mass orbiting a large, hot lump. And on this tiny lump things start to appear, including a character named Movinger who questions the game of Determinizm and even morality itself. Each time Determinizm is played, Movinger arrives at the same conclusions. Each time the compter runs, it ends up creating all the same characters on this tiny lump of miss/mass which just happen to be the only characters in the entire game. And when the game ends after 20 billion of our years, each of the characters is perfectly reproduced each and every time. Each lump of miss/mass moves exactly the same way each time.
Ogaud doesn't like deja vu.
In fact, Ogaud hates it. Ogaud becomes so frustrated with the compter that eventually he sets down a rule that says "If any character makes all the same motions as he did in previous games, I shall reconstruct you with all your memories and place your miss/mass into a buring sea, and I shall call this new game niss/nass."
You see, the niss/nass is the nasty part of a new compter game that Ogaud has, one which can maintain all subjective phenomena of any emergent piece of miss/mass in the first game. The tiny bits of miss/mass will then undergo the subjective experience of excruciating agony for the remainder of the game.
Ogaud believes this will change the game of Determinizm somehow. Ogaud likes this rule and he calls it "moral responsibility".
Another morning arises and of course, Ogaud is eager to try out his new niss/nass compter game along with the miss/mass one. Much to his annoyance though, Determinizm continues down the same course it took each time he's played it. Each and every character does exactly the same thing they did last time, and Movinger continues to question morality.
When Movinger dies, he is thus recreated with all his memories and experiences and is cast into the lake of fire and experiences a burning sensation. At this point he begins to scream for mother and remains in excruciating pain for the rest of Ogaud's day.
~
Personally, I don't think Ogaud should sentence Movinger to the sea of misery just because Movinger couldn't change the outcome of Ogaud's game. I see no reason Movinger should be punished because he couldn't change Ogaud's game. Movinger had no choice. Movinger was aware of the consequences, but he truly could do nothing to change his actions. Nor could any of the characters in the miss/mass. Yet Ogaud decided there should be something called moral responsibility and he even knew ahead of time that each character would continue to do exactly what they did before. The terrible niss/nass game was in no way connected to the miss/mass game, and the game always played out exactly as they had before. There could be no difference in the outcome of the game. Ogaud simply wanted to send Movinger to the sea of torment so he could watch the little character scream helplessly for what seemed an eternity to the wretched blighter.
Similarly, I see no purpose in suggesting the concept of moral responsibility exists in a world where the concept of determinism also exists. Moral responsibility implies something else.
Let's create a fictitious world where an almighty deity (let's call him Ogaud) decided he's very lonely as he alone exists. Nothing else exists. There is no white light nor even darkness because nothing else exists to create subjective experiences. Ogaud doesn't know what a noise sounds like nor what salsa tastes like because nothing exists.
So Ogaud decides to create something called a compter. This compter uses miss and mass to create things. When miss and mass bump into each other they do so in a very determinate way, just like billiard balls reflecting off each other on a pool table. An explanation of how it works could be derived perhaps, but it's very complex.
After playing with his compter a few times, Ogaud becomes enamored by the game. He decides to call it "Determinizm" and plays it every day. His day however equals 20 billion years to us. Still, he doesn't notice how quickly the time flies by when he plays this wonderful game.
Eventually though he gets bored with it. It seems, each time he plays with his compter something funny, albeit totally expected, happens. Each morning that he sets it into motion, the same events seem to unfold. He watches a tremendous explosion of things occur, and then takes note of a relatively tiny lump of miss/mass orbiting a large, hot lump. And on this tiny lump things start to appear, including a character named Movinger who questions the game of Determinizm and even morality itself. Each time Determinizm is played, Movinger arrives at the same conclusions. Each time the compter runs, it ends up creating all the same characters on this tiny lump of miss/mass which just happen to be the only characters in the entire game. And when the game ends after 20 billion of our years, each of the characters is perfectly reproduced each and every time. Each lump of miss/mass moves exactly the same way each time.
Ogaud doesn't like deja vu.
In fact, Ogaud hates it. Ogaud becomes so frustrated with the compter that eventually he sets down a rule that says "If any character makes all the same motions as he did in previous games, I shall reconstruct you with all your memories and place your miss/mass into a buring sea, and I shall call this new game niss/nass."
You see, the niss/nass is the nasty part of a new compter game that Ogaud has, one which can maintain all subjective phenomena of any emergent piece of miss/mass in the first game. The tiny bits of miss/mass will then undergo the subjective experience of excruciating agony for the remainder of the game.
Ogaud believes this will change the game of Determinizm somehow. Ogaud likes this rule and he calls it "moral responsibility".
Another morning arises and of course, Ogaud is eager to try out his new niss/nass compter game along with the miss/mass one. Much to his annoyance though, Determinizm continues down the same course it took each time he's played it. Each and every character does exactly the same thing they did last time, and Movinger continues to question morality.
When Movinger dies, he is thus recreated with all his memories and experiences and is cast into the lake of fire and experiences a burning sensation. At this point he begins to scream for mother and remains in excruciating pain for the rest of Ogaud's day.
~
Personally, I don't think Ogaud should sentence Movinger to the sea of misery just because Movinger couldn't change the outcome of Ogaud's game. I see no reason Movinger should be punished because he couldn't change Ogaud's game. Movinger had no choice. Movinger was aware of the consequences, but he truly could do nothing to change his actions. Nor could any of the characters in the miss/mass. Yet Ogaud decided there should be something called moral responsibility and he even knew ahead of time that each character would continue to do exactly what they did before. The terrible niss/nass game was in no way connected to the miss/mass game, and the game always played out exactly as they had before. There could be no difference in the outcome of the game. Ogaud simply wanted to send Movinger to the sea of torment so he could watch the little character scream helplessly for what seemed an eternity to the wretched blighter.
Similarly, I see no purpose in suggesting the concept of moral responsibility exists in a world where the concept of determinism also exists. Moral responsibility implies something else.
I don't know, but it seems to me a deterministic set of world rules will also rule out what we understand as moral responsibility. Yes, it can be redefined, rephrased or re something. But the meaning of moral responsibility is lost IMHO when you place determinisitic constraints on all of the agents.