Does Neuroscience Challenge the Existence of Free Will?

[Lievo]

So Lievo, what exactly are your credentials then...as a neuroscientist?

Your usual line when you got it wrong, isn't it?

 

[nismaratwork]

In humans there is also a socially constructed dimension to our chosing and willing. So social evolution develops constraints that we then internalise and apply to our thinking. And these are indeed constraints evolving at a higher level and so more global in their scope.

We have more choice as a result of this extra degree of constraint of our individual psychologies. For example, we can choose to defy what we percieve as the social conventions. (That is, we are aware there is an alternative path even if we rarely go very far down it).

And even this level of freewill is a recent social innovation. You can trace the idea of the free-thinking human back to Socrates and Athenian democracy. But it remained a priviledged view of the few for a long time before becoming the mainstream view in modern Western society following first the Enlightenment, then the Romantic reversal that followed - the switch from Hobbes to Rousseau philosophically.

So that is the current irony. We believe we are independent of society in the choices we can make. But this is just our most recent state of social evolution. It is a particular brand of social organisation that teaches this belief.

In the short-term, it has been a belief with a strong competitive advantage. By relaxing the global social constraints (such as views on religion, morality, conformity, etc), a greater local creativity, diversity and experimentation is permitted.

In the longer term, well, history will judge. As has been argued, it is all about a balance between attention and habit, plasticity and stability, novelty and custom. And there could be various views about what is the most adaptive balance for a global-scale society (one that incorporates all the people of the planet).

Then what to make of psychopaths?... They lack even a sense of those constraints, and are ruled by impulse. That impulse is subject to their environment, but for all their 'sameness', they do manage to show a shocking degree of going down multiple paths.

 

[nismaratwork]

Your usual line when you got it wrong, isn't it?

Given what you've said and cited, and claimed as personal knowledge, it's actually quite a reasonable question.

 

[apeiron]

Then what to make of psychopaths?... They lack even a sense of those constraints, and are ruled by impulse. That impulse is subject to their environment, but for all their 'sameness', they do manage to show a shocking degree of going down multiple paths.

That is why psychopaths are presumed to be suffering from a brain dysfunction. So the exceptions that prove the rule.

Of course, we could also agree that there is genetic variety and that is part of the evolutionary learning story. Evolution supplies a global constraint, but the very systems logic that I have been employing explains why constraint is simply the constraint of local degrees of freedom. So genetics has that irreduciable random element that means the global genome does not freeze and lose the capacity to adaptively learn. There has to be Ashby's "requisite variety".

Thus we should expect some gaussian distribution of empathy or whatever trait you believe psychopaths to be lacking. And we would also expect to find the pathologically empathetic at the other extreme (if empathy were a simple trait).

The audience for chick flicks must come from some part of the human gene pool!

 

[apeiron]

Your usual line when you got it wrong, isn't it?

It is you who has been simply relying on your personal standing rather than making arguments backed by references (and undermining that standing by dishonest behaviour like editing posts).

Frankly your behaviour does not add up. It is very flaky. So if you claim to be a neuroscience researcher with a personal knowledge of the areas under discussion, then sources please!

 

[nismaratwork]

That is why psychopaths are presumed to be suffering from a brain dysfunction. So the exceptions that prove the rule.

Of course, we could also agree that there is genetic variety and that is part of the evolutionary learning story. Evolution supplies a global constraint, but the very systems logic that I have been employing explains why constraint is simply the constraint of local degrees of freedom. So genetics has that irreduciable random element that means the global genome does not freeze and lose the capacity to adaptively learn. There has to be Ashby's "requisite variety".

Thus we should expect some gaussian distribution of empathy or whatever trait you believe psychopaths to be lacking. And we would also expect to find the pathologically empathetic at the other extreme (if empathy were a simple trait).

The audience for chick flicks must come from some part of the human gene pool!

Heh... there is that...

I certainly believe that ASPD is primarily a neurological dysfunction, specifically in executive functions. What's interesting is that while most end in a spiral of behavior they seem unable to analyze or reconcile with society, quite a few manage to enter society to one degree or another. These people are not dysfunctional in a way that is anything like another known disorder... practically a different species for all intents and purposes.

Still, while exceptions in the general population, there is ample evidence they've been a pretty steady percentage for as long as we have records. Maybe it's a persistent flaw in the old genome, but I wonder that it seems to be so steady and universal. Schizophrenia is another, but let's put that aside for the moment, in favor of the less clearly disturbed sociopath.

In the absence of social order, a sociopath would fail to meet specific criteria for ASPD, only NPD and probably severe ADD, and other issues. So sociopaths are broken people by our standards, and probably any standard humans could apply, but exception or not they may be a window into our own experience.

I wonder how much of relatively high functioning sociopath's thinking is influenced by others' words, as emotions and many social cues would either be lost on them or ignored. Contrast that with a 'normal' person (i.e. non-psychopath) and it's the basis for that dichotomy you mention. Still, it exists with the sociopath, but to what degree?... they seem to be creatures of action and impulse without much if any restraint. That argues for the reductionist view, with social cues and evolution being almost entirely lost on this group.

I would dismiss it as disordered thinking, but ASPD is unique. Schizophrenia I think, is another view into human consciousness, and therefore freewill. You have a steady %'age of the population across gender, race, nationalities with this mental illness, yes? It's far more complex than sociopathy, and its often debilitating nature mixed with constant prevalence argues for it being some kind of inescapable result of human genetics or the brain... a kind of "risk of being conscious".

When I compare the sociopath-average-schizophrenic trio, I feel as though I'm looking at very different elements of the 'average' thought process. The person suffering from Schizophrenia thinks differently, not just in terms of hallucinations and other frank symptoms; they are often HIGHLY driven by surroundings, and can range from hysterical to catatonic.

There is something in that continuum from impulsive internally driven behavior, somewhat random and pattern-seeking (and failing) behavior, that mixed seems to be the 'norm'. I'd argue that the former and latter lack a degree of freewill that could be argued for a 'healthy' individual (i.e. not a sociopath, nor schizophrenic). If we consign these to "abnormalities", then it's just as you say, points on the bell curve, but if we consider these to be inevitably linked not to our genome alone, but consciousness and sentience... do you see where I'm going? Ignore psychotic symptoms for a moment and consider the high functioning sociopath and schizophrenic, both of which are predictable percentages of humanity and seem to always have been so.

For a random genetic variety issue, or evolutionary 'experiment' it's terribly constant and has been for a long time. Remember, you can have profoundly emotionally stunted people, lacking empathy who are not sociopaths. You can have people with a range of schizoid/schizophreniform disorders who are in the end, very little like Schizophrenics; when properly treated the former are "normal", the latter are not. I hate to say normal, but for the sake of brevity I am... anyway... what is it that makes those two disorders so constant, so persistant, and so unlike other mental illness?

Perhaps they are examples of the constraints top-down, or bottom-up failing in some profound way, and if so, it implies a combination of the two in a "normal" person. Depresed, anxious, manic, schizoid, psychotic... you don't find the same persistance of thought disorder that is a CONSTANT once the acute issue is dealt with. I find that more than a little fascinating, and why I wonder if the approach you outline is sufficient, in that it seeks an answer, rather than a gray area between reductionism and your view.

 

[apeiron]

For a random genetic variety issue, or evolutionary 'experiment' it's terribly constant and has been for a long time. Remember, you can have profoundly emotionally stunted people, lacking empathy who are not sociopaths. You can have people with a range of schizoid/schizophreniform disorders who are in the end, very little like Schizophrenics; when properly treated the former are "normal", the latter are not. I hate to say normal, but for the sake of brevity I am... anyway... what is it that makes those two disorders so constant, so persistant, and so unlike other mental illness?

I think you are seeking too simple a view of dysfunction. I would say the normal brain is more like a minestrone soup and there are a lot of ingredients that could be under-represented or over-represented and so unbalance the flavour.

But there is a very simple model of why "faulty" genes persist stabily in gene pools - the standard sickle cell anaemia model. So a little bit of "dysfunction" may be part of the essential variety. We could ask how genes produce gay brains too. That seems even more of a challenge to simple minded genetics.

Dyslexia, discalculia. People who are unco. Who actually ends up representing normal?

Brain development would in fact to seem to have an alarming number of degrees of freedom. So it is probably a good thing that our physical and social worlds enforce such strong constraints on our actions. Between them, they create much greater actual conformity than would otherwise exist.

A lot of the things you describe are really modern mental diseases. What was just borderline odd in the highly constrained life of previous ages can flower into full glorious psychopathy given the freedoms of the modern era.

 

[Lievo]

It is you who has been simply relying on your personal standing rather than making arguments backed by references (and undermining that standing by dishonest behaviour like editing posts).

No it's you who self-promoted yourself, and in a ridiculous way (I've talk to Chalmer!). Don't count I will do the same.

You also insulted me several times, and others too, and you're again insulting me by pretending it was dishonest to edit my poost, even though I let an explicit note of what I had change.

That's enough. You win. Place as much bull **** as you want, I won't correct you anymore.

 

[apeiron]

No it's you who self-promoted yourself, and in a ridiculous way (I've talk to Chalmer!). Don't count I will do the same..

Poor Lievo! You asked me if I had talked to Chalmers. I just replied honestly to your out-of-the-blue enquiry. And you shut up rather quickly after that.

You also insulted me several times, and others too, and you're again insulting me by pretending it was dishonest to edit my poost, even though I let an explicit note of what I had change.

Whereas you have always been the model of politeness and integrity.

Your edit came after my reply pointing out your failure. Honesty would have been correcting it via a reply in turn.

Honesty would also have involved telling me how it was an MRI breakthrough rather than an animal one (hint: if you had said http://www.pnas.org/content/97/8/4398, then maybe I could have agreed with you).

Honesty would have further involved answering how fMRI has anything to do with the BCI coma work.

You have had the chance to come clean on so many things so often it could have its own thread.

That's enough. You win. Place as much bull **** as you want, I won't correct you anymore.

So you will be forever that "mysterious neuroscientist"? The one who could never substantiate his claims to a greater expertise than the people he had to deal with.

Again, that would not matter if you could simply make a coherent case for your beliefs, supported by relevant references. But your choice.

 

[Ferris_bg]

Offtopic: Guys, what's your age, really? How can you continue to argue through multiple threads about things not related with the thread subject? Really there should be some rules about that, because flooding the thread in a way like that have not a single positive side. Apeiron, no offense, I really enjoy reading your posts, but you don't see how flawed sometimes your position is and what is more important, you take for granted that your position is the absolute truth. Please let us know if you are from the future, because ignoring other comments and refusing to even consider other positions is not at all philosophy.

Edit: @nismaratwork: I completely agree with you, offtopic posts should not be tolerated!

 

[nismaratwork]

I think you are seeking too simple a view of dysfunction. I would say the normal brain is more like a minestrone soup and there are a lot of ingredients that could be under-represented or over-represented and so unbalance the flavour.

But there is a very simple model of why "faulty" genes persist stabily in gene pools - the standard sickle cell anaemia model. So a little bit of "dysfunction" may be part of the essential variety. We could ask how genes produce gay brains too. That seems even more of a challenge to simple minded genetics.

Dyslexia, discalculia. People who are unco. Who actually ends up representing normal?

Brain development would in fact to seem to have an alarming number of degrees of freedom. So it is probably a good thing that our physical and social worlds enforce such strong constraints on our actions. Between them, they create much greater actual conformity than would otherwise exist.

A lot of the things you describe are really modern mental diseases. What was just borderline odd in the highly constrained life of previous ages can flower into full glorious psychopathy given the freedoms of the modern era.

Psychopaths, sure, but that's at least in part why I mentioned that in a less socially organized group "sociopath" is reduced to a collection of other disorders, at least in diagnosis. Schizophrenia however is no advantage in a more primative society... far from it... yet it also persists, not growing in numbers, not shrinking, not bound by gender or race or region.

I don't claim to find a "normal", which is why I define it simply as "not having ASPD or Schizophrenia" for the sake of this discussion. Sociopaths are also, much to the dismay of popular views, not necessarily built for a harsher world... poor impulse control and a lack of planning, mixed with no empathy is not great for survival in a group. It MAY be useful in passing along genetics for a time, but with its roots in Conduct Disorder, you'd expect such people to be killed by even a small group.

A few would certainly become the Genghis Kahns of history, and the Vlad Tepes', but that is the exception to the sociopathic rule. It is true that I'm simplifying dysfunction here, but this is philosophy not neurology and I'm trying to adopt only a stance that survive in the former. I'm not finding as easy as I'd hoped... or easy at all, but then, I am learning.

What I'd point out in the case of a sociopath is that social constraints which we both agree are so valuable, don't even register most of the time. Schizophrenia I'd be willing to cede as a 'late onset' illness that allows for reproduction, but then you'd expect more variation in the overall occurance.

@Ferris_bg: Arguably, as much as Lievo an Apeiron are snarling at each other, yours is the only post that would certainly be worth a warning at least.

 

[apeiron]

Apeiron, no offense, I really enjoy reading your posts, but you don't see how flawed sometimes your position is and what is more important, you take for granted that your position is the absolute truth. Please let us know if you are from the future, because ignoring other comments and refusing to even consider other positions is not at all philosophy.

If there are flaws in my position, perhaps you should highlight them. All I have done is argue things through by stating a position, providing sources, and replying to points made in reply. The complaint with Leivo is that he just says I'm wrong with nothing to back it up.

And what other positions am I not considering? Like reductionism? If I am arguing against anything then of course I am in the middle of considering it.

Perhaps it is just the friction you object to? If so, I apologise. If Leivo had played polite and fair, then that is certainly what he would have got in return.

 

[Ferris_bg]

And what other positions am I not considering?

The position that the non-reductive physicalism theories imply epiphenomenalism (I tried to explain that as best as I can https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3182518&postcount=141".

 

[apeiron]

Given the way supervenience has been conflated with weak emergentism in this discussion, it is worth reminding that there are other views.

There is nothing inherent in supervenience that requires higher level
states to be epiphenomenal, incapable of bringing anything about in their own
right. In some cases, it might be the higher-level states, and not the lower-level ones, which are causally responsible – there might, that is, be downward causation, even though there is determination from the bottom up. Which higher-level states a thing has will be determined by the lower-level states it has. But the causal powers of the lower-level states themselves are not sufficient to explain the result. In this sense, the higher-level states have genuinely new, emergent causal powers that are not reducible to the lower-level ones, even though they supervene upon them. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emergentists such as John Stuart Mill and C. Lloyd Morgan argued that this was in fact the way that chemistry was related to physics

This is from a nice paper discussing Aristotle's approach to the mind.

http://ancphil.lsa.umich.edu/-/downloads/faculty/caston/aristotles-psychology.pdf

 

[apeiron]

The position that the non-reductive physicalism theories imply epiphenomenalism (I tried to explain that as best as I can https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3182518&postcount=141".

Your lake analogy does not represent what I mean by a system where global constraints are in interaction with local constructive action.

You would have to be saying something more along the lines that throwing balls create the lake, and the existence of the lack comes to constrain your throwing of the ball so that it creates a still more definite lake.

You are starting off by imagining disconnected things (throwing and lakes) and thus you wire in a dualism. I argue the opposite - interaction from the start, which begins vaguely organised and develops to be a crisply systemic state of affairs.

I don't think Kim's arguments are at all solid or conclusive.

But I would agree that freewill or any notion of downward causality is a problem for materialistic ontologies. ie: reductionist ones.

What I have argued repeatedly is that systems causality is a physicalist ontology which recognises both material and formal cause, both effective and final cause.

So it is "dualistic" in the sense that substance and form are take as equally fundamental, but then not dualistic as it is an interactive ontology, where each is causing the other, and likewise a process or developmental ontology, as the whole develops (everything emerges, because local degrees of freedom and global organising constraints are each developing each other).

 

[Ferris_bg]

Most of the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Non-reductive_physicalism" for example claim the mental does not exist, but that's not logically consistent).

I don't think Kim's arguments are at all solid or conclusive.

Why so? What's wrong with his argument?

 

[apeiron]

What I'd point out in the case of a sociopath is that social constraints which we both agree are so valuable, don't even register most of the time. Schizophrenia I'd be willing to cede as a 'late onset' illness that allows for reproduction, but then you'd expect more variation in the overall occurance.

I'm not sure where you are going with this line of thought.

If it is why genes for certain brain disorders are maintained at a steady level in the gene pool, that is a murky topic. Worth its own thread, but not relevant to the OP nor really a question of philosophy (just perhaps with some implications for philosophy).

So far as neural correlates of freewill go, my point was that freewill is largely a socially constructucted notion that serves the purpose of creating a layer of self-regulating constraint at the level of individual psychology. Animals just act autonomously, directly. We learn to have consciences and to act as a constant social guardian over our "selfish" urges.

As society has evolved, the demand for individual self-regulation has only increased. (This is the "paradox" of systems causality - downward constraint sharpens local identity...it actually achieves something, produces something that was not there before so crisply).

So given natural brain variability (which we evolved for a hunter-gather lifestyle), more and more people might be expected to fall outside what has become an ever narrower norm in terms of self-regulation. Take hyperactivity as a classic example.

And our treatment of those falling outside the norm reveals the fact of top down constraint. We are individually all as free as can be in the Western liberal laisser faire postmodern life. Completely free to be what we want to be, act like we want to act. Until the point where suddenly we are not. And get sectioned under the mental health act, committed to the dementia ward, doped up with strong drugs, etc.

If we can't constrain ourselves within narrow bounds (cynically you would describe that as being productive consumers in a consumer society), then we discover the second kind of more forcible constraints that society has in store.

 

[apeiron]

Why so? What's wrong with his argument?

It fails to address the systems model of causality.

(Edit: Well, I should add that what Kim actually argues, and what people think he argues, can be two different things...and even he has shifted his position over time. So I prefer to begin with thinkers like Pattee and Rosen who I agree clearly with, rather than have to spend time disentangling bits where Kim is pretty much right, and where he rather obscures what matters.)

 

[apeiron]

Most of the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Non-reductive_physicalism" for example claim the mental does not exist, but that's not logically consistent).

But you can see from that wiki definition that I am not claiming a non-reductive physicalism. Instead, the systems approach could be called doubly reductionist I guess. Which is why it seems vaguely dualistic (it is in fact triadic).

So local causation (events, efficient causes, locales, atoms, etc) reduce upwards to global contraints. They are what they are because of global constraints. And equally, global constraints (laws, forms, boundary conditions) reduce to local causes.

The whole is reducible to its parts, and the parts are also reducible to the whole.

Now if you can show me where Kim addresses this notion, then fine. Otherwise I will stick to the sources that do discuss it.

 

[nismaratwork]

I'm not sure where you are going with this line of thought.

If it is why genes for certain brain disorders are maintained at a steady level in the gene pool, that is a murky topic. Worth its own thread, but not relevant to the OP nor really a question of philosophy (just perhaps with some implications for philosophy).

This is more where I'm going... maybe I should make a thread. Sorry for the inadvertant hiijack, but it seemed to be a possible window into the issues you've raised. In and of itself, as you say, it's murky enough that I'm not sure how I'd START such a thread.

So far as neural correlates of freewill go, my point was that freewill is largely a socially constructucted notion that serves the purpose of creating a layer of self-regulating constraint at the level of individual psychology. Animals just act autonomously, directly. We learn to have consciences and to act as a constant social guardian over our "selfish" urges.

Here's where I'm hooked again... a psychopath is still human, but they have no guardian for their selfish urges. Are they less free, more free, or is it totally irrelevant? I think that it's less freewill inherent in a lack of contraints from our evolved and social conscionce, and I find that interesting.

As society has evolved, the demand for individual self-regulation has only increased. (This is the "paradox" of systems causality - downward constraint sharpens local identity...it actually achieves something, produces something that was not there before so crisply).

So given natural brain variability (which we evolved for a hunter-gather lifestyle), more and more people might be expected to fall outside what has become an ever narrower norm in terms of self-regulation. Take hyperactivity as a classic example.

So far I'm with you, and the existing body of knowledge in psychology would tend to agree AFAIK.

And our treatment of those falling outside the norm reveals the fact of top down constraint. We are individually all as free as can be in the Western liberal laisser faire postmodern life. Completely free to be what we want to be, act like we want to act. Until the point where suddenly we are not. And get sectioned under the mental health act, committed to the dementia ward, doped up with strong drugs, etc.

If we can't constrain ourselves within narrow bounds (cynically you would describe that as being productive consumers in a consumer society), then we discover the second kind of more forcible constraints that society has in store.

This is why I chose two mental illnesses which are absolutely unique, and universal, but I'm not sure how to properly apply it as a lens into the issues raised here. Unfortunately, I'm more familiar with the physical and medical impliations... the philosophical formalism is something I'm learning here on the fly. In fact, much of what I've learned beyond the basics has been from links in this forum. If I seem to wander, it's not intentional, and I welcome the correction from you or anyone else.

 

[Ferris_bg]

http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/109/218". And if you ask these guys, do people have free will, they will surely say "yes". The problem is, the frog stays a frog, no matter how many times you kiss it. Unless of course it's not in your imagination, but that's another story.

 

[apeiron]

http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/109/218". And if you ask these guys, do people have free will, they will surely say "yes". The problem is, the frog stays a frog, no matter how many times you kiss it. Unless of course it's not in your imagination, but that's another story.

I didn't really follow anything you said there - even whether you are generally expressing agreement or disagreement with the papers you linked to. Can you explain the nature of your objections, if it is objections you are making?

Anyway, the first paper does give a reasonable account of the social history of a systems approach to biology...

Overwhelmingly, theoretical biologists are anti-reductionists. In one way or another they all argue that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and that it is necessary to overcome the assumptions of traditional science to make sense of life. However, such work is marginal to mainstream biology which has been far more influenced by the reductionism of the molecular biologists and socio-biologists (Francis Crick, James Watson, Jacques Monod, W.D. Hamilton and Richard Dawkins) and those who have modeled cognition on artificial intelligence. As Rosen noted: ‘The question “What is life?” is not often asked in biology, precisely because the machine metaphor already answers it: “Life is a machine.” Indeed, to suggest otherwise is regarded as unscientific and viewed with the greatest hostility as an attempt to take biology back to metaphysics."

And the second has a more explicit statement on freewill than you seem to be suggesting...

The tendency over the last several hundred years, perhaps since Newton, is to try to capture all of the world, the external world, everything that science pertains to, in one principle-one way of grasping reality. And that leads directly to the concept we call the "machine". So nature is a big machine, an organism is a machine, mechanism is the goal and the end of science, and mechanism itself can be embodied in one principle or one set of principles. They're the principles of Newton, the principles of Descartes, or they're principles of mathematics... There are many attractive features, which flow from the idea of the machine. One of them is the idea of objectivity. You want to explain nature in a way in which individual consciousness, or "will", has no part. That's what it means to say that nature is "objective". If you ask most people what they understand by objectivity, that's what they will tell you. Consciousness, or will, or volition, all of the things which are characteristically human, play no part. As I say, that has been attractive and that has set up the ideal. And that is partly why the Cartesian ideal of the machine was so nice; because it's inherently objective. If something can be done by a machine, then it clearly doesn't involve will, doesn't involve subjectivity or consciousness or anything like that. And that has animated most of epistemology for the last 300 years. Part of the attractiveness of mathematics was that it embodies this kind of objectivity, even though mathematics exists only in the mind. Well, anyway, complex systems are not like that. If you try to compress a complex system into that kind of mold, you'll miss it completely.

 

[nismaratwork]

http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/109/218". And if you ask these guys, do people have free will, they will surely say "yes". The problem is, the frog stays a frog, no matter how many times you kiss it. Unless of course it's not in your imagination, but that's another story.

If bio-naturalism is the same thing as bio-materialism, then I think it's little more than an aesthetic view of how you'd like to view these issues, with the assumption of more evidence than exists. Beyond that, your argument is... I don't know what the heck it is, but it's not agreeing with bio-materialism which assumes a much more unified view of consciousness than currently exists.

How can you form an aesthetic preference about an as-yet unverified property of something that hasn't been formulated?

 

[Ferris_bg]

Can you explain the nature of your objections, if it is objections you are making?

Now if you can show me where Kim addresses this notion, then fine. Otherwise I will stick to the sources that do discuss it.

Kim's argument is exactly pointed at such kind of theories like those of Rosen and Pattee (non-reductive physicalism theories). And my frog metaphor was pointed at the way one describes something. No matter what different kind of words you use, it's still the same old story.

I accept if you think Kim's argument is not sound. There is no way for me to change your views. You should know that once one take a side, one is not objective about it anymore (his position is under the referent power of the side he has taken). So even if I created some kind of doubt in you, I am happy about it. I myself would prefer functionalism over reductionism if I should be forced with such kind of choice, but that doesn't change my judgment about the illusion of free will in both theories.

 

[nismaratwork]

Kim's argument is exactly pointed at such kind of theories like those of Rosen and Pattee (non-reductive physicalism theories). And my frog metaphor was pointed at the way one describes something. No matter what different kind of words you use, it's still the same old story.

I accept if you think Kim's argument is not sound. There is no way for me to change your views. You should know that once one take a side, one is not objective about it anymore (his position is under the referent power of the side he has taken). So even if I created some kind of doubt in you, I am happy about it. I myself would prefer functionalism over reductionism if I should be forced with such kind of choice, but that doesn't change my judgment about the illusion of free will in both theories.

The conclusion that free will is an illusion is so clearly premature that I'd have to ask you support it with more than you have so far.

 

[Ferris_bg]

The conclusion that free will is an illusion is so clearly premature that I'd have to ask you support it with more than you have so far.

I have already done that in my previous comments in this thread, if you checked them out and read the given sources and still something doesn't sound clear, I would try to explain it. Please comment the parts that sound unclear.

Biological naturalism: Consciousness is a higher level function of the human brain's physical capabilities. More http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism" .

 

[nismaratwork]

I have already done that in my previous comments in this thread, if you checked them out and read the given sources and still something doesn't sound clear, I would try to explain it. Please comment the parts that sound unclear.

Biological naturalism: Consciousness is a higher level function of the human brain's physical capabilities. More http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism" .

This entails that the brain has the right causal powers to produce intentionality. However, Searle's biological naturalism does not entail that brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point out that while it appears to be the case that certain brain functions are sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that they are necessary for producing consciousness. In his own words:

"The fact that brain processes cause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be conscious. The brain is a biological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that was conscious; just as the heart is a machine, and we have built artificial hearts. Because we do not know exactly how the brain does it we are not yet in a position to know how to do it artificially." (Biological Naturalism, 2004)

I don't find this helpful at all... it seems to be the Penrose Hypothesis without even the flimsy foundation of microtubules. I'm not seeing support for your statements in articles that fail even to meet the standards of Wikipedia.

I'm sorry, protests aside, this sounds like messy dualism.

 

[Ferris_bg]

I'm not seeing support for your statements in articles that fail even to meet the standards of Wikipedia.

I haven't posted this link to support my statement, I have posted it because you asked what that mean. And I think the article can give you some basic info.

If you address future posts or questions to me about my previous posts, I'll edit this post with the answers, so be sure to check it out.

 

[apeiron]

Kim's argument is exactly pointed at such kind of theories like those of Rosen and Pattee (non-reductive physicalism theories).

But Kim's argument against emergentism does not cover the systems approach as taken by Pattee, Rosen, Salthe and others. Or at least I have never seen that anywhere. So if you can provide a reference.

Kim's whole analysis is flawed once you reject the idea of "mental states" as a meaningful ontological construct. You can talk about consciousness being a single thing with a moment to moment state in a loose way, but this does not bear up under analysis.

Consciousness is a spatiotemporally complex process (the standard process philosophy position as well as standard psychophysics). So the notion of instantaneous states is just wrong on this view.

And yes, there is a limit to a physicalist account when it comes to "qualia" like the redness of red. But this is a common garden variety of epistemic failure I would argue. For a model to be able to predict something, it must also be able to predict what it is not. To take a path, there must be represented some alternative paths. And when it gets down to the level of explaining red, we just run out of imaginable alternatives (like fubble, or blech).

So consciousness is irreduciable to a succession of states because it is spatiotemporally complex - organised across space and time. And qualia are irreducible in the limit because they become explanatory singularities. Models explain alternative fates and chop fine enough, you reach a pragmatic limit to prediction and measurement. But is this a failure of modelling, or a failure of subjectivity - you cannot imagine alternatives to the primary colours you see, the distinct scents you smell?

So there is that general failure of Kim's approach. Systems thinking is not even dealing in states that map. That is the way reductionism works. The systems approach deals in hierarchical spatiotemporal scale where fleeting local events are constrained within longrun global contexts.

A second issue is that the systems logic is interactive. So - using Kim's terminology for sake of argument - the P facts may determine the M facts, but the M facts are also determining the P facts. The local events may construct the global longrun state of constraint. But that global longrun state of constraint is equally shaping the identity of those local events.

This is why I urged a consideration of selective attention and neural receptive fields. A global state of memory and expectation acts as the context that acts downwards to shape up the kinds of things that local neurons can even say at that moment. Their repertoire of responses, their degrees of freedom, become constrained and so sharpened.

So Kim is dealing with "non-reductive physicalism" which claims that P => M. But the systems view is that P <=> M. And M cannot be consider a state at the same scale as P. So it is more like (P1, P2, P3...) <=> M. And then M is not "mental" as the mental state would be the emergent property of all of the system. So it would be (P <=> M) ---> Mind.

The general template for the systems view would thus be L <=> G, of whole systems emerge due to the interaction of local and global causality.

Then we can get into the more particular models of systems advanced by Pattee and Rosen.

So Pattee says D <=> S, or rate dependent dynamics is in interaction with rate independent semiotics. And D <=> S ---> Bios, or this is a general systems description of living and mindful systems, dissipative structures with non-holonomic constraints.

So three issues that Kim needs to tackle to be talking about the systems view.
1) The validity of mental "states" as a construct.
2) An interactive causality where "mental facts" also determine the "physical facts".
3) The claim that mind emerges "at the top" rather than the mind emerging "as a whole".

 

[Ken G]

Thanks for explaining further. It seems an interesting line of thought. I'm not familiar with operator formalism. Is it the same as bra-ket and complex number magic?

That's the flavor used in quantum mechanics, I don't mean anything so intricate or specific. Just the generic idea that the process of analyzing anything is a process of "operating", or mapping. It's the basis of the "map is not the territory" thinking, the need to distinguish the image space of our thoughts from the inverse-image space we are attempting to analyze with those thoughts.

And then your argument about the evolution operator connected to how passing light through two polarising filters "resets" the indeterminancy each time rather than constraining it additively as a reductionist thinker might expect?

Yes, the important thing about distinguishing an image space from the inverse-image space is that the evolution seen in the image space does not have to map backward onto the evolution in the inverse-image space. The algebra that maps forward onto its image can have mysterious elements, like imaginary wave functions and superposition states, that have no corresponding appearance in the image space. The projection is fundamentally non-invertible, so our contact with the inverse-image is tenuous, not "crisp". The emergence of crispness is not a mapping from the physical world into itself, it is a mapping from something else into how we think about the physical world.

Kind of like Einstein's unopenable watch, except that it's more than we just can't see what's in the watch, it's that we can't even assert the watch is made of components that we can understand separately from a watch. What is a wave function when it isn't being used in quantum mechanics? What is a mind when it isn't forming perceptions? These are not components we can analyze independently, and wonder how they are interacting inside the watch-- they are the models that meet some set of goals, and they only do what they do within some regime of global contraints that partly defines them.

Another way to express this is, saying "the whole is not the sum of its parts" may not go far enough, it may need to be extended to saying "the inverse-image of the image space where our analysis lives is not everything that is creating the reality we are analyzing." The inversion isn't crisp, so what is "really there" might not be either-- crispness is an output of reality, not an input to reality.