Does Neuroscience Challenge the Existence of Free Will?

[Pythagorean]

Oh I just misunderstood you then. To me mainstream is "the common current thought of the majority". I've just missed the part where this definition was otherwise. My bad, sorry.

Sarcasm is very productive. There's something Q_Goest and you are conflating here.

There's three things going on:

1. constituent reductionism
2. causal reductionism
3. philosophical reductionism

My point is that nonlinear dynamics conforms to 1. and 2. so it IS mainstream scientifically; there's no change of view necessary in a strictly fundamental, scientific manner. If you're a real neuroscientist, then you have got to understand this at least with the canonical Hodgkins Huxley model.

apeiron and Q_Goest are arguing about 2. I'm not part of that argument, I'm a causal reductionist (i.e. I agree with Q_Goest there). Nonlinear dynamics is in the same camp, strictly speaking (it says nothing about 3., human interpretation does).

I disagree with Q_Goest that he can jump from (1 and 2) to 3 as he did, suggesting that because there's compartmental models, 3. must be true too. Nonlinear dynamics is evidence to me, that 3. is wrong. This may not be a mainstream view in philosophy (I wouldn't know) but we were talking about science, weren't we? Which is why you flashed your alleged neuroscience credentials.

 

[apeiron]

So again you said that "effects on selective attention on neural receptive fields has been one of the hottest areas of research for the last 20 years.", and again this is wrong. I can just wonder how you came to pretend otherwise despite it's wrong even using the data you emphasized.

Yeah, easy tactic to pick out isolated statements rather than deal with the substance of a post.

Again, the context was Q Goest disbelief in global constraints, and my saying global constraints are mainstream in neuroscience since forever (like since Luria for example). He asked about neurons so I cited the specific receptive field research.

Now you want to make it about receptive fields rather than top-down causality. Well still the effects of selective attention on receptive fields was the biggest thing to happen in the field since Torsten/Wiesel. Fair to say Singer/Gray oscillations would have grabbed more headlines, of course.

Perhaps you were not around at the time so don't quite appreciate the impact the work had?

Obvious strawman building, given I never made this claim. I'm better not: this my line of research.

And now you can tell us exactly how the scanning revolution has changed our view of the brain perhaps. What do you consider a few of the things that have been revealed that we never expected?

If scanning is the new gold standard as you seem to want to suggest, where are the results to match animal studies? Name your hot 5 or 10 results when it comes to the cognitive architecture of the brain and let's see what is not essentially a confirmation of animal studies.

Or you could just answer the OP. What new light has imaging thrown on the subject of freewill (that had not already been foreshadowed by EEG studies or animal studies)?

I expect the usual silence on matters of any substance.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean,

Nascent mainstream is not self-contradictory. Nonlinear science is nascent to the mainstream, but it is mainstream (i.e. the work is published in well-known peer-reviewed journals). I don't know what you think my interpretation is; I responded to Q_Goest who (wrongly) put computational models and nonlinear science at odds.

You’ve misunderstood then. I previously tried to bring out what your views were on the topic of downward causation and you took offense. The reason I was asking was to figure out what kind of downward causation, if any, you were supporting. As I’d eluded to before, I’m not sure you understand what some of these folks are saying about how nonlinear systems allow for downward causation. I have no problem with the fact that most of reality is nonlinear. Reality really is nonlinear. I only have a problem with the concept of strong emergence and downward causation, and it seems there are those in the literature who attempt to use the concept of nonlinear systems to push these ideas. I’m not sure if you’re aware of those attempts or not, but it appears you aren’t.

 

[nismaratwork]

I would have to agree with Pythagorean here, or rather, his assessment. I don't think I'm knowledgeable enough yet to pick a camp beyond the default I thoughtlessly hold.

Put in terms of 123 however, and re-reading the thread, I have to say that either Lievo, you're not understanding Pythagorean's position, or you're uncharacterstically taunting him.

 

[Pythagorean]

Hi Pythagorean,

You’ve misunderstood then. I previously tried to bring out what your views were on the topic of downward causation and you took offense. The reason I was asking was to figure out what kind of downward causation, if any, you were supporting. As I’d eluded to before, I’m not sure you understand what some of these folks are saying about how nonlinear systems allow for downward causation. I have no problem with the fact that most of reality is nonlinear. Reality really is nonlinear. I only have a problem with the concept of strong emergence and downward causation, and it seems there are those in the literature who attempt to use the concept of nonlinear systems to push these ideas. I’m not sure if you’re aware of those attempts or not, but it appears you aren’t.

I clearly said weak emergence, and that I have no idea what downward causation means and that I'm not supporting it because I don't understand it. Then I was given definitions (for the fifth time) that don't help me to understand it. I'm not particularly concerned about understanding it, either.

I thought you were attacking nonlinear sciences (I do realize there are people that abuse it, just like they do with quantum mechanics, maybe my post above replying to lievo will clear up my disagreeance with you, if it exists; not sure anymore) post #211

 

[apeiron]

If reality is computational, then all global influence are inside a TM. It may or not be the case, but if you assume the global environnement is not inside a Turing machine, there is no surprise you will conclude it's not computationnal.

But reality is not computational.

*cough cough* I'm afraid it tells us you are not very familar with this engine. Brain + "receptive field" returns 88 700 hits. You see the trick?

You may notice that brain + MRI returns 1 130 000

Why would I search for MRI instead of fMRI? You want that I compare anatomy studies to functional ones? So yes I did see your trick .

But continue with your appeal to the authority of google searches in place of engaging in substantive arguments by all means. It is really making you look clever.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi apeiron,

Davies correctly says that global constraints are not some extra force. Force is a localised, atomised, action - efficient causality. Constraints are just constraints. They might sound "forceful" because they act downwards to constrain the local degrees of freedom (as I say, shape them to have some distinct identity). But they are a complementary form of causality. A constraining or limiting action, not a constructive or additive one.

If one defines global constraints as you say, I have no argument. It sounds more like "boundary conditions". Benard cells for example, are bounded top and bottom with heat flux on the bottom and heat removed at the top. Are these "global constraints"? Certainly Benard cells are not an example of downward causation. I think the quote I've provided by Davies states that position quite clearly.

 

[Q_Goest]

There's something Q_Goest and you are conflating here.

There's three things going on:

1. constituent reductionism
2. causal reductionism
3. philosophical reductionism

My point is that nonlinear dynamics conforms to 1. and 2. so it IS mainstream scientifically; there's no change of view necessary in a strictly fundamental, scientific manner. If you're a real neuroscientist, then you have got to understand this at least with the canonical Hodgkins Huxley model.

apeiron and Q_Goest are arguing about 2. I'm not part of that argument, I'm a causal reductionist (i.e. I agree with Q_Goest there). Nonlinear dynamics is in the same camp, strictly speaking (it says nothing about 3., human interpretation does).

I disagree with Q_Goest that he can jump from (1 and 2) to 3 as he did, suggesting that because there's compartmental models, 3. must be true too. Nonlinear dynamics is evidence to me, that 3. is wrong. This may not be a mainstream view in philosophy (I wouldn't know) but we were talking about science, weren't we? Which is why you flashed your alleged neuroscience credentials.

What do you mean by philosophical reductionism?

 

[Lievo]

Yeah, easy tactic to pick out isolated statements rather than deal with the substance of a post.

You could say "Ok I was wrong". That happens, you know. Even to those guys who talk to Chalmer.

the effects of selective attention on receptive fields (...)
Perhaps you were not around at the time so don't quite appreciate the impact the work had?

Or perhaps it had little impact.

And now you can tell us exactly how the scanning revolution has changed our view of the brain perhaps. What do you consider a few of the things that have been revealed that we never expected?

That we never expected... strawman but interesting: at a glance I would say default mode, cognition in cerebellum, consciousness in insula, modulation of cortical tickness, BCI with person supposely in coma.

 

[Pythagorean]

What do you mean by philosophical reductionism?

epistemological reductionism?

The idea that we can (deterministically) predict what will emerge just by knowing the constituents. That the behavior of the whole can be described by behavior of the constituents.

I found this: It's really tough to read but it outlines the difference between ontological and the epistemological reductionism:
http://www.zeww.uni-hannover.de/026_Hoyningen_Ep_Reduct_Biol.pdf

 

[Q_Goest]

Can you explain why separability should breaks down at this border, despite QM is perfectly computable?

Sorry. This is a great question, but I think our discussion of 'free will' has already gotten a bit far afield. Maybe another thread is in order?

 

[Lievo]

Sarcasm is very productive.

I would have to agree with Pythagorean here

I give you my word I was not sacastic here. Please read my post #209 as pure first degree, including apology. I've no idea why it appears otherwise.

 

[Pythagorean]

I give you my word I was not sacastic here. Please read my post #209 as pure first degree, including apology. I've no idea why it appears otherwise.

Not a big deal, no worries. I even made my statement sarcastic for fun. But there was also substance in that post.

 

[apeiron]

Hi apeiron,

If one defines global constraints as you say, I have no argument. It sounds more like "boundary conditions". Benard cells for example, are bounded top and bottom with heat flux on the bottom and heat removed at the top. Are these "global constraints"? Certainly Benard cells are not an example of downward causation. I think the quote I've provided by Davies states that position quite clearly.

OK, now go back to Pattee on the difference between holonomic and non-holonomic constraints.

Sorry about the jargon, but this is important. Remember that we are talking about the modelling of conscious freewill - and so the modelling of complex adaptive systems, or systems with life and mind.

So the claim is that these are systems with control over their global constraints/boundary conditions - in a way that non-living systems like Benard cells are not.

A dissipative structure like a Benard cell is about the self-organisation that occurs within certain fixed boundary conditions (the constraints are imposed from the outside - by an experimenter in this case). So there is a kind of downwards causality - the simplest possible kind. You could call it strong, or weak, or whatever. Holonomic is what some physicists would call it.

But life and mind are more complex. They have the memory mechanisms that can manipulate the constraints acting on dynamical systems. Genes know when to toss an enzyme into the mix to change the dynamics of a metabolic reaction. They can shift the global constraints.

The human mind - employing speech - does the same trick. Clear your mind as best you can (relax the constraints and so maximise the degrees of freedom). Now I will toss the word DONKEY at you. Your state of awareness will now be constrained selectively. You will be thinking about donkeys, what they look like, what they mean, etc. Now I will say ANGRY DONKEY, and your state of thought will become even more constrained, more selective, more highly specified.

So the point about complex systems is that they are also still just dissipative structures (all life and mind exists as order that accelerates the entropification of the universe). But they have these extra levels of control over the global contraints by which their dynamical processes are self-organising.

So now downwards causation starts to seem like something strong and distinctive. For example, I can of my own freewill decide to rest or run about. So even my rate of entropification is under some control (over a limited range of course).

You can see two things hopefully here. The first is that this view maintains a gradualism from the non-living system (like a Benard cell) to living ones. Yet it also defines the crucial difference. One is merely holonomic, the other is also non-holonomic.

And it seems fair enough to say both are examples of strong downward causation - one being of the strong holonomic variety, the other being of the strong non-holonomic one. But I am not going to die in the ditch over jargon.

The idea I am defending is that the causality of systems is based on a dichotomy of local construction and global constraint. This loosely translates to what people have meant by bottom-up and top-down causality. Or even initiating conditions and boundary conditions.

But the advantage of the jargon I prefer is that it is based on a logic of vagueness. It presumes the existence of local degrees of freedom (the indeterminate potential) and then the constraints that arise to organise them into a force that can actually construct.

 

[Lievo]

But reality is not computational.

How do you know?

Why would I search for MRI instead of fMRI? You want that I compare anatomy studies to functional ones?

C'mon. You have to search MRI because fMRI does not appears in functionnal MRI, echo-planar MRI, sparse sampling MRI, event-related MRI, block designed MRI, ... and yes also anatomical MRI. A lot to look at with this technics alone. Alternativley, search for brain imaging.

I also suggest you look at the pattern in time. I did not keep the data, but that's impressing.

 

[Q_Goest]

epistemological reductionism?

The idea that we can (deterministically) predict what will emerge just by knowing the constituents. That the behavior of the whole can be described by behavior of the constituents.

I found this: It's really tough to read but it outlines the difference between ontological and the epistemological reductionism:
http://www.zeww.uni-hannover.de/026_Hoyningen_Ep_Reduct_Biol.pdf

I'd say that, strictly speaking, we can't deterministically predict things, even in principal. The reason being that wave function collapse is not, in principal, deterministically predictable. But that doesn't mean that classical mechanics isn't deterministic. Yes, classical mechanics is a model that takes agregates of particles and sums them up and makes deterministic predictions which I don't see as being controversial at all. What I've tried to bring out is that the deviation from this deterministic prediction of the model is not important to providing for any kind of downward causation, mental causation, free will, etc... Just because our initial conditions may not be knowable down to the particle level in principal, doesn't mean that we now have wiggle room to allow for some kind of 'free will'.

 

[nismaratwork]

I give you my word I was not sacastic here. Please read my post #209 as pure first degree, including apology. I've no idea why it appears otherwise.

Well, I did say it would have been uncharacteristic for you... for me that's practically a compliment.

@apeiron: What does it say about someone who holds an image in their mind, ignoring everything including, (to keep the theme) 'ANGRY DONKEY'? Are they selectively bypassing this causation, or is it a matter of truly gathering your thoughts? Can you avoid the downward casuation by essentially swimming upstread to being with, or would you need to be utterly autistic for that to be meaningful?

Understand, I'm not trying to test your hypothetical, I just wonder how my speculative questions fit within its framework.

 

[nismaratwork]

I'd say that, strictly speaking, we can't deterministically predict things, even in principal. The reason being that wave function collapse is not, in principal, deterministically predictable. But that doesn't mean that classical mechanics isn't deterministic. Yes, classical mechanics is a model that takes agregates of particles and sums them up and makes deterministic predictions which I don't see as being controversial at all. What I've tried to bring out is that the deviation from this deterministic prediction of the model is not important to providing for any kind of downward causation, mental causation, free will, etc... Just because our initial conditions may not be knowable down to the particle level in principal, doesn't mean that we now have wiggle room to allow for some kind of 'free will'.

What does the (possible fiction) of collapse have to do with determinism? That just leads to circular reasoning dictated by the choice of Interpreation one chooses, unless it's dBB in which case there is no wavefunction collapse of any form in any way.

 

[Lievo]

Sorry. This is a great question, but I think our discussion of 'free will' has already gotten a bit far afield. Maybe another thread is in order?

No pb. I think this is the heart of what I don't get in your position, surely we will have to discuss it at one point.

 

[apeiron]

How do you know?

Quantum mechanics.

So how do you know its computational?

C'mon. You have to search MRI because fMRI does not appears in functionnal MRI, echo-planar MRI, sparse sampling MRI, event-related MRI, block designed MRI, ... and yes also anatomical MRI. A lot to look at with this technics alone. Alternativley, search for brain imaging.

I also suggest you look at the pattern in time. I did not keep the data, but that's impressing.

Argument by citation impact still? Hilarious.

OK, if we are comparing modalities, then google scholar brain + "single unit". Try comparing apples and apples a little bit.

You are obsessing about techniques, I was discussing concepts. Let me know anytime you feel up to discussing concepts.

 

[Ken G]

Sure it's logically sound. But could you think of a way to make a positive statement along this line?

Yes-- if we adopt a physicalist perspective, we are led to imagine that ultimately, all means of understanding the mind must be framed in physicalist language. If one merely sees physicalist language as the most objectively accessible correlates of the mind, one is led in a different direction, one that continues to allow validity to more psychological, as opposed to strictly neurological, approaches. That is the positive way to say it-- we are embarking on an inclusive study of mind, not an exclusive one. This also relates to what insights a systems approach can bring to the table-- I'm merely expanding the view that top-down physical approaches have value to saying that nonphysical approaches (introspection, psychology, behavioral studies, etc.) have value as well. I doubt we'll get a well-rounded view of what the mind is strictly with physicalist reductionism, and probably not even by extending that to include systems approaches, if doing so means turning away from all other modes of investigation. Doing so is essentially mistaking the meaning of language, and its role in human inquiry, which would be a particularly unfortunate mistake in regard to language about the mind.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'd say that, strictly speaking, we can't deterministically predict things, even in principal. The reason being that wave function collapse is not, in principal, deterministically predictable. But that doesn't mean that classical mechanics isn't deterministic. Yes, classical mechanics is a model that takes agregates of particles and sums them up and makes deterministic predictions which I don't see as being controversial at all. What I've tried to bring out is that the deviation from this deterministic prediction of the model is not important to providing for any kind of downward causation, mental causation, free will, etc... Just because our initial conditions may not be knowable down to the particle level in principal, doesn't mean that we now have wiggle room to allow for some kind of 'free will'.

And I agree with you. I've actually pointed out (somewhere around here) two independent experiments that don't look good for free will, where experimenters were able to predict people's behavior who thought they were making choices up to six seconds later. So six seconds after the deterministic system was already on it's way, the individual thought "hey, I'll choose this one" but the computer had already detected the system's (the brains) direction and beat the individual to the conclusion.

here's one of the two videos:

 

[apeiron]

@apeiron: What does it say about someone who holds an image in their mind, ignoring everything including, (to keep the theme) 'ANGRY DONKEY'? Are they selectively bypassing this causation, or is it a matter of truly gathering your thoughts? Can you avoid the downward casuation by essentially swimming upstread to being with, or would you need to be utterly autistic for that to be meaningful?

Understand, I'm not trying to test your hypothetical, I just wonder how my speculative questions fit within its framework.

That's why you have to clear your mind - clear away any existing imposed state of anticipation/intention.

I presume you already have some thoughts organising your mind at that moment - a prevailing top-down constrained view of what to expect. So you have to relax that to appreciate the power of the words alone.

 

[Q_Goest]

OK, now go back to Pattee on the difference between holonomic and non-holonomic constraints.

Sorry about the jargon, but this is important. Remember that we are talking about the modelling of conscious freewill - and so the modelling of complex adaptive systems, or systems with life and mind.

So the claim is that these are systems with control over their global constraints/boundary conditions - in a way that non-living systems like Benard cells are not.

A dissipative structure like a Benard cell is about the self-organisation that occurs within certain fixed boundary conditions (the constraints are imposed from the outside - by an experimenter in this case). So there is a kind of downwards causality - the simplest possible kind. You could call it strong, or weak, or whatever. Holonomic is what some physicists would call it.

But life and mind are more complex. They have the memory mechanisms that can manipulate the constraints acting on dynamical systems. Genes know when to toss an enzyme into the mix to change the dynamics of a metabolic reaction. They can shift the global constraints.
...

And it seems fair enough to say both are examples of strong downward causation - one being of the strong holonomic variety, the other being of the strong non-holonomic one. But I am not going to die in the ditch over jargon.

The idea I am defending is that the causality of systems is based on a dichotomy of local construction and global constraint. This loosely translates to what people have meant by bottom-up and top-down causality. Or even initiating conditions and boundary conditions.

But the advantage of the jargon I prefer is that it is based on a logic of vagueness. It presumes the existence of local degrees of freedom (the indeterminate potential) and then the constraints that arise to organise them into a force that can actually construct.

Ok, I guess we'll disagree on that. I think you're saying that genes and/or enzymes are causally influenced by the 'global state' of the brain. If that's what you're suggesting, then why allow one classical mechanical system to differ from another? By that I mean I see no reason to segragate 'living' systems that are described using classical mechanics from 'not alive' systems. That represents a paradox to me. We have 2 systems, both of which can be described to the degree necessary to make legitamate descriptions, modeled as classical, but the live one has genuine downward causation and the other non-living one doesn't. Is that what you mean?

 

[Pythagorean]

Ok, here's an argument, and it seems something along the lines of apeiron's argument.



I disagree with the assertion that we have choice over our environment. This video ignores the whole "did I really choose what I chose" question. Our choice of environment could easily be predetermined by the factors that he spoke of before drawing the final conclusion.

 

[apeiron]

Ok, I guess we'll disagree on that. I think you're saying that genes and/or enzymes are causally influenced by the 'global state' of the brain. If that's what you're suggesting, then why allow one classical mechanical system to differ from another? By that I mean I see no reason to segragate 'living' systems that are described using classical mechanics from 'not alive' systems. That represents a paradox to me. We have 2 systems, both of which can be described to the degree necessary to make legitamate descriptions, modeled as classical, but the live one has genuine downward causation and the other non-living one doesn't. Is that what you mean?

No, you completely misunderstand if you think I said brain states are controlling genes and enzymes. The example I gave was of enzymes controlling metabolic processes, and making a parallel with the way words control brain states.

And the symbol grounding problem is an example of why there is more to life than just rate dependent dynamics (classical physics).

Perhaps we have indeed reached the end of the road on this discussion. I would really recommend reading Pattee carefully as I have founded him the sharpest writer on this particular aspect of the systems approach.

 

[Pythagorean]

Here's the one I was talking about that predicted 6 seconds before the person consciously "made a decision" :

 

[Lievo]

Quantum mechanics.

So how do you know its computational?

That's you who pretend to know that. I personnaly don't know -altough it would be my guess.

What I know, is that if QM applies correctly describe reality, then reality is computationnal.

Argument by citation impact still? Hilarious.

Yep. An hilarious standard technics.

google scholar brain + "single unit"

Yep. For each paper mentionning single unit, 6 mention brain imaging. Again you're pointing data that show you're wrong, as if it was showing you right.

You are obsessing about techniques, I was discussing concepts.

Good for you. Just stop dig your heels in when you're so obviously wrong and we may switch faster to more interesting or at least fresh stuff. :zzz:

 

[Ken G]

OK, you have lost me there. I'm not even sure if you are making a satirical argument.

No satire-- just putting physicalism into a kind of operator formalism. When one does that, it exposes several hidden assumptions, in particular that P is invertible (so knowledge of a physical state of a mind is identical to knowledge of the mind) and that it commutes with E (so the evolution of a physical state is the same thing as evolution of mind). Those are actually different assertions, neither of which has any solid support.

For example, it is possible that the physical state of the mind is never going to suffice to tell us what is "in" that mind, and it is sheer assumption on our part that it ever could (and there I also echo your points about a reductionist "state" as being a kind of modelers fiction, indeed I extend that as well to the more potent coupling in the systems view). If knowing everything there is to know about the physical state of a mind is still not enough to know what is "in" that mind (imagine even trying to define the meaning of that phrase), then P is not invertible.

Also, one might imagine a situation where P actually is invertible, but does not commute with E. That is the case for invertible matrices, for example. Then if a mental state M evolves into E[M], and we look at its physical expression, we have P(E[M]). If we claim that P is invertible, we can say M = P^-1(Pr<-->Ps), where by Pr<-->Ps I just mean whatever physical interplay between top-down and bottom-up interactions one wishes to imagine. However, we could still only say E[M] = E[P^-1(Pr<-->Ps)], we could not say E[M] = P^-1(E[Pr<-->Ps]). In other words, if we start out with a state where M = P^-1(Pr<-->Ps) does hold, it does not necessarily continue to hold as it evolves, if P does not commute with E. This is the case, for example, in quantum mechanics, where states of known observables do not have to evolve into states of known observables, so even if we can initially invert the observable to obtain the state, we are not likely to be able to do that later on after evolving the observable correlates of the state.

M = Ps <--> Pr - I translate this as the mind contains two constrasting views of causality, that are formed mutually as a symmetry-breaking of ignorance. But I think still the set theoretic view is more accurate.

Indeed, I would say the actual equation must be P(M) = Ps<-->Pr, such that physical language we apply to the mind contains the two contrasting views you mention. The mind itself does not contain those contrasting views, because the mind is just the mind, and is not responsible for our language about it. This is usually a nitpick, but here it becomes centrally important-- we are trying to understand the limitations we impose when we use reductionism, so we should also understand the limitations we impose when we choose any type of language. The mind leading the mind, in effect-- and I'm going to claim that one! (neuroscience: the mind leading the mind.)

My claim on P (models of physical causality) is that Ps = Pl + Pg. So systems causality is local construction plus global constraints.

Yes, I see your point that Ps subsumes Pr, so my notation Ps<-->Pr does not embody that-- I wasn't too worried about the notation, only the issue that one may or may not take a systems approach, what I'm focusing on at the moment is the physicalist element of either.

However I then also claim that global constraints are still implied in Pr - they are just frozen and so can be left out of the modelling for simplicity's sake. Only the local construction has to be explicitly represented.

Yes, I agree here completely. I haven't heard it said from a systems perspective, but I always stress that all laws of physics are differential equations, so are never complete-- there is no "theory of boundary conditions", that is the dirty little secret of the manual elements of physics. It's the thaumaturgical element.

But you raise an interesting issue just about the need for a formal notation that captures the ideas of systems causality. There is an abundance of notation to represent reductionist constructive arguments, but not really an equivalent for the systems view.

That's an interesting point, and I agree that causality in the Ps and Pr domains is a very important aspect of physicalist thinking. What I'm saying, though, is that we also need a notation for lifting the physical language into a broader language of mind. Simply assuming that the mind is completely describable by its physical correlates strikes me as a good way to shoot ourselves in the foot down the road, and the notation involving P and E operations is intended to draw out the hidden (and unlikely) assumptions being made.

 

[Lievo]

Yes-- if we adopt a physicalist perspective, we are led to imagine that ultimately, all means of understanding the mind must be framed in physicalist language.

One precision please: here do you equate physicalist and mathematical language?