ZapperZ said:
Nowhere in there is there any implied scenario that it is the probability that is 'existing'. Rather, there is an explicit indication that (i) both properties are simultaneously present and (ii) they are the "object" itself.
To call the SQUID superposition an
object would be misleading as an object is tangible, within the grasp of the senses. And of course the experiment only observes one or other direction of the current. Which is why I presume you put object in quotes. But even then, the superposition does not seem object-like in the sense you appear to mean - a persistent ring of activity.
The situation is just the same as a twin slit superposition. A condition is created in which a current is made to take both paths, resulting in a measurable self-interference, just as the twin slit creates an interference pattern. But would we call the "thing" passing through the twin slit situation a single "object"?
Superposition is a state to which neither the terms exist, nor non-existent, really apply. Georg's problem is that he wants to divide the world into these two strict categories as they are the two options that are possible under realism.
Clearly, he says, something in superposition does not fully exist in the naive realistic sense. But then he jumps to the conclusion, well, superposition must be a state of non-existence.
The SQUID example, just as much as twin slit experiments, shows that superpositions have physically-measureable consequences. So they exist in some sense. They can occupy a place and a time, as they do for nano-seconds in a super-cooled SQUID ring. But new words would be needed to describe the status of a superposition.
I have already suggested vagueness (vagueness being that to which the law contradiction does not apply - Peirce). But regardless, both existence and non-existence are too strong as descriptions of superpositions.