News Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

[mathwonk]

I am glad to see this discussion. What puzzles me somewhat is how there could still be any room for doubt on this. Anyone who watched television during the run up to bush's war must recall hans blick patiently explaining there were no weapons of mass destruction, asking for more time to prove this conclusively, and the right wing attack journalists denouncing him as an easily deceived fool who could not find his rear end with both hands.

When I see the chaos, the death, the hatred mounting daily, the increase in terror recruits, I feel guilty at not doing more to stop this government from its near insane level of damage.

When i was a college student I demonstrated (peacefully) for years against rascism and the related vietnam war, and was clubbed and beaten by police, and spent time in jail until I could not take it any more.

I do not know what methods are best, but at least I hope everyone will discuss these issues, and ultimately go to the polls, to turn these self seeking profiteers out of office. it is the future of your generation that is being mortgaged to the hilt, not just in money but in good will abroad.

Has it ocurred to you why terrorists are throwing bombs? They see that we sit by and let these madmen kill and maim their families and destroy their countries, and they are trying to get our attention.

Maybe their leaders are as cynical as ours, maybe even more insane, but their young recruits believe this is a fight for their religion and sovereignty. And the bombs are falling primarily on their lands.

We cannot abandon our own democratic methods, even in the face of terror, but we must at least use them. We must organize, contribute, and vote. i sent a reluctant political contribution yesterday where I hoped it would do the most good. You get at best what you pay for, and big oil is willing to pay a lot for access to the resources of people throughout the world, including here.

If you like to travel in the US wilderness, do you make your voice heard when bush sells off access rights to public land and public resources for a song?

I apologize if this may offend someone who disagrees, as everyone must act on his/her own conclusions and conscience in our society, but I feel partly responsible for the innocent deaths that are being paid for by my taxes and encouraged by my silence.

good luck to you.

 

[pcorbett]

Unprepared for an insurgency. Prehaps you should have read all of my posts. This is NOT a topic of debate, it is a *fact.* Read the transcripts.

The word "preparation" is implicitly judgemental. You cannot honestly claim that it is fact. For one, you have to articulate some sort of metric for preparedness. Since you haven't, I assumed you meant universal preparedness--this is obviously not the case as the force was clearly prepared to mobilize to theater.

And, in fact, your claim is apparently based entirely on reading Ricks' citing one Maj. Isaiah Wilson, Army historian and planning officer while ignoring Ricks' citing one Capt. Chris Karns and Gen. Tommy Franks--two persons intimately involved in USCENTCOM's end of the JOPES pipeline. So tell me, is your definition of "fact" based principally on reporting only those second hand judgements that support your assertion?

If you do not wish to take the time to read the thread, then please leave.

If you don't wish to lay out even an overview of your case (read, Ricks' case) for unpreparedness, then why even carry on a discussion?

 

[Cyrus]

TOM RICKS: Yes. I was struck when I was out there, that General Casey had started up a counterinsurgency academy. The Coin Academy.

CHARLIE ROSE: I read that, yes.

TOM RICKS: In Taji. But think of that for a moment. The fact that the commander out there says the officers you`re sending out here are inadequately prepared. These are people who have been in the Army for 10 or 15 years. And he said, you can`t command in Iraq until you go to my counterinsurgency academy, a week-long course.

CHARLIE ROSE: Basically saying, they haven`t taught you what you need to know to fight this war.

TOM RICKS: That`s right. And so, here`s the tool kit. That`s a condemning fact, I think, that the commander in Iraq felt that the troops, the officers coming out were not adequately prepared by their institution.

For the last time, if you don't read what I write, then don't post. That is what is called a fact, and we are NOT going to debate facts.

 

[pcorbett]

For the last time, if you don't read what I write, then don't post.

I do read what you post, from the moment I stepped into the thread. You need not discuss anything with me, but don't complain when posters raise objections to your points. It's unseemly.

That is what is called a fact, and we are NOT going to debate facts.

Apparantly we are going to debate facts; in fact, I'm starting to default to skepticism whenever you present something as fact. What you have there, at best, is Ricks surmising Casey's intent in reinstituting COIN school as force recovery rather than optimization. The phrase "I think" should've been a dead giveaway. That's what we call a judgement, my friend.

Oh. Here's something for you to chew on. If there are no officers and enlisted prepared for the counterinsurgency mission, where do COIN instructors come from?

 

[Cyrus]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/20/AR2006022001303.html

Back then, U.S. forces rounded up tens of thousands of Iraqis, mixing innocent people in detention with hard-core Islamic extremists. Commanders permitted troops to shoot at anything mildly threatening. And they failed to give their troops the basic conceptual and cultural tools needed to operate in the complex environment of Iraq, from how to deal with a sheik to understanding why killing insurgents usually is the least desirable outcome in dealing with them. (It is more effective, they are now taught, to persuade them either to desert or to join the political process.)

Again and again, the intense immersion course, which 30 to 50 officers attend at a time, emphasizes that the right answer is probably the counterintuitive one, rather than something that the Army has taught officers in their 10 or 20 years of service. The school's textbook, a huge binder, offers the example of a mission that busts into a house and captures someone who mortared a U.S. base

The major criticism offered by students is that it would have been better to have the education six months earlier, when they were training their troops to deploy to Iraq, not after the units have arrived. Short had a tart response: It's not a bad idea, he said, but the Army back home wasn't stepping up to the job. "They didn't do it for three years" -- the length of the war so far, he noted. "That's why the boss said, 'Screw it, I'm doing it here.' "

Facts.

 

[pcorbett]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/20/AR2006022001303.html

Facts.

Says who? Why aren't the excerpts you provided better characterized as analysis? I'm quite sure you find Ricks' judgements entirely credible. You should make that case for the rest of us, and to do so you might start with introducing supporting evidence other than single source testimony.

Also, why haven't you answered my question? It's a simple one. Where are the instructors for the COIN school coming from?

 

[Cyrus]

Is that the best response you have? "Says who?" You are questioning what has been said by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq.

Good god. Please leave this thread, you refuse to listen to what experts are saying.

 

[pcorbett]

Is that the best response you have? "Says who?" You are questioning what has been said by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq.

I haven't questioned anything General Casey has said. I've questioned what Ricks argues and more importantly I question both the accuracy of your presentation of Ricks judgements and your categorical characterization of them as facts.

Good god. Please leave this thread, you refuse to listen to what experts are saying.

That's hilarious. How about an answer to my question? Where are the COIN instructors coming from? In a show of good faith, you should be able to find the answer covered briefly in the article you've posted.

 

[Cyrus]

That's hilarious. How about an answer to my question? Where are the COIN instructors coming from? In a show of good faith, you should be able to find the answer covered briefly in the article you've posted.

Yes, the COIN academy is taught by people in the Military. So what? Because there are a few people in the military that has this training does not mean the entire military sent to Iraq was given the proper training. Was this supposed to be a "good" question?

Did you bother to read what I posted?

The major criticism offered by students is that it would have been better to have the education six months earlier, when they were training their troops to deploy to Iraq, not after the units have arrived. Short had a tart response: It's not a bad idea, he said, but the Army back home wasn't stepping up to the job. "They didn't do it for three years" -- the length of the war so far, he noted. "That's why the boss said, 'Screw it, I'm doing it here.' "

I haven't questioned anything General Casey has said. I've questioned what Ricks argues and more importantly I question both the accuracy of your presentation of Ricks judgements and your categorical characterization of them as facts.

Well, the COIN institute is a FACT. What Casey has said about lack of proper training is a FACT.

Now, this is the LAST time I am going to defend a fact.

 

[pcorbett]

Yes, the COIN academy is taught by people in the Military. So what? Because there are a few people in the military that has this training does not mean the entire military sent to Iraq was given the proper training.

Now we're getting somewhere. Now pop quiz. What segment of the force (let's make it easy and stick with the US Army) consistently receives coinsurgency training). And while you're at it, consider the pros and cons of providing counterinsurgency to the remaining (combat) force. Finally, ask yourself how much of the force actually requires this training to complete not just any counterinsurgency mission, but the one in Iraq. Then, my friend, you can arrive at a judgement.

Was this supposed to be a "good" question?

Yes, actually.

Do you actually read anything I post?

Of course I do, which is why I'm glad you've backed away from your previously uninformed claim that the force was without qualification unprepared to take on the counterinsurgency mission. Now this discussion can proceed along the serious lines you aspired to in the beginning of the thread.

Well, the COIN institute is a FACT. What Casey has said about lack of proper training is a FACT.

The Center (there is no COIN institute) does exist, yes. So is the Small War Center for Excellence (which has been around for decades), as well as various other schools addressing stressing different areas of warfighting competence in all the services and occasionally in the unified commands. And I happen to agree with Casey's judgement that the US Army is not optimally structured to conduct a counterinsurgency mission. I do not agree with your judgement, a judgement you share with Ricks, that the US Army is unprepared to do the job. Neither does Casey in his assessment of the situation before he stoop up COIN Center of Excellence: "I'm convinced that with our support, the Iraqis and the Iraqi people will prevail in this struggle." [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050930-secdef4002.html]

Now, this is the LAST time I am going to defend a fact.

I think you and I should review the definition of fact before moving forward. Trust me, it'd really help you make at least as strong and serious a case as Ricks is making.

 

[Cyrus]

Of course I do, which is why I'm glad you've backed away from your previously uninformed claim that the force was without qualification unprepared to take on the counterinsurgency mission.

I did not back away from my previous statement that the military force was unprepared for an insurgency.The fact that COIN academy exists supports my claim. So again, what's your point?

 

[pcorbett]

I did not back away from my previous statement that the military force was unprepared for an insurgency.

As I said, "without qualification." You've already made those qualifications, twice.

The fact that COIN academy exists supports my claim. So again, what's your point?

How does the fact that the COIN school exists (and I'm glad we at least agree on this fact) uniquely support a claim that the force was unprepared rather than one that merely claims that force could afford to do better? Especially when General Casey claimed US forces could do the job before USCENTCOM got into the COIN education game?

 

[pcorbett]

Another thing to consider is that COIN is but one third of the military mission in Iraq. There's also Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and Small Scale Contingency readiness (essentially, the ability to regroup and reform for larger combat operations for action in the field...say against Syria or Iran)

 

[Cyrus]

How does the fact that the COIN school exists (and I'm glad we at least agree on this fact) uniquely support a claim that the force was unprepared rather than one that merely claims that force could afford to do better?

That is a great spin "afford to do better" for being, unprepared for an insurgency.

Side: Sorry, I have been rather belligerent with you. I apologize

Dammit, I need a vacation!

 

[pcorbett]

That is a great spin "afford to do better" for being, unprepared for an insurgency.

One good turn deserves another. I congratulate you on your spin as well.

Side: Sorry, I have been rather belligerent with you. I apologize

Same here.

Dammit, I need a vacation!

That's what the weekend's for.

 

[Gokul43201]

And, in fact, your claim is apparently based entirely on reading Ricks' citing one Maj. Isaiah Wilson, Army historian and planning officer while ignoring Ricks' citing one Capt. Chris Karns and Gen. Tommy Franks--two persons intimately involved in USCENTCOM's end of the JOPES pipeline. So tell me, is your definition of "fact" based principally on reporting only those second hand judgements that support your assertion?

Corbett, have you read what Gen. Bernard Trainor had to say about the planning, in Cobra II? That too supports the assertion that the military was unusually unprepared for the follow up to the capture of Baghdad.

 

[Skyhunter]

Corbett, look at the testimony before the Senate armed forces committee last week. They still don't know what is going on or what to do about it. We are in deep **** over there and the civilian branch of the military is incompetent.

 

[edward]

This video link to the Rose /Ricks interview still works and is free compliments of H/P. It is about 50 minutes long, but contains a wealth of information about the Iraq invasion plans, or lack thereof.

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-4926293608118312619&q=Thomas+Ricks

Rumsfeld in this weeks Senate hearings kept insisting that the war in Iraq is a continuation of the war on terrorism. Odd, there were no terrorist in Iraq when we invaded. Crying terrorism at every available chance is the only way the Bush administration can keep any sense of ligitimacy regarding iraq.

 

[Schrodinger's Dog]

I'm not sure it's of interest, but leaked memos between the commander of UK forces and Tony Blair at the end of the war itself showed me more than any news coverage that the US had badly underemphasised post war planning in the conflict. They were less diplomatic than me they also forsaw grave problems if the incompetence wasn't resolved. To say the least this has been coming since the end of the so called military phase. Just reading Hillary Clintons bash of Rumsfield in The Times, anyone got a more meaty story about this.

Cornflakes and politics, what better way to start your day?

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2300646,00.html"

The Sunday Times - World

The Sunday Times August 06, 2006

Rebels 'smell blood' in lawless Baghdad
Sarah Baxter, Washington
Americans lose faith in war
IT IS rare that Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, is lost for words. Yet last week he was subjected to a tirade of criticism for his conduct of the war in Iraq from Senator Hillary Clinton, the Democrat favourite for president in 2008.

“Yes we hear a lot of happy talk and rosy scenarios, but because of the administration’s strategic incompetence and record of blunders and, frankly, the record of incompetence in executing, you are presiding over a failed policy,” Clinton charged at a hearing of the Senate armed services committee. “Given your track record . . . why should we believe your assurances now?”

Rumsfeld, who had not wanted to appear before the committee at all, reeled. “My goodness,” he said, before embarking on an explanation of “the unfortunate and tragic thing that’s taking place”.

The defence secretary could not bring himself to say the phrase, civil war, but his top commanders did it for him. Their assessment was almost as blunt as that of William Patey, Britain’s envoy to Iraq, who warned in a parting letter to London that the country was in a “low intensity civil war” with diminishing prospects of achieving a stable democracy.

 

[pcorbett]

Corbett, have you read what Gen. Bernard Trainor had to say about the planning, in Cobra II? That too supports the assertion that the military was unusually unprepared for the follow up to the capture of Baghdad.

So now we have a dispute between officers. The question is which side do you fall on, if any? The only thing we can say for certain at any general level is that not everybody was happy with the planning process leading up to war. Trainor's verifiable criticisms center on the shift in objectives after May 2003, when the United States made the decision that the lack of a political follow on to Hussein's regime meant Coalition forces could not immediately transfer power to a native Iraqi government and end the occupation. We cannot say whether the planning was inadequate--there's been no exhaustive review of the cycle to determine what irregularities occurred and how, if they even did, contribute to mistakes in execution or failures to anticipate contingencies. Moreover, we have even less information to evaluate the contingency planning process from May 2003 onward--that's what really counts here. Right now, we have a handful of Army and Marine retired general officers chopped to USCENTCOM mostly after the invasion with retired and active officers who were at MacDill or in Washington polishing off the OPLAN in a political environment where the American public's support for operations has waned considerably.

 

[Cyrus]

So now we have a dispute between officers. The question is which side do you fall on, if any? The only thing we can say for certain at any general level is that not everybody was happy with the planning process leading up to war. Trainor's verifiable criticisms center on the shift in objectives after May 2003, when the United States made the decision that the lack of a political follow on to Hussein's regime meant Coalition forces could not immediately transfer power to a native Iraqi government and end the occupation. We cannot say whether the planning was inadequate--there's been no exhaustive review of the cycle to determine what irregularities occurred and how, if they even did, contribute to mistakes in execution or failures to anticipate contingencies. Moreover, we have even less information to evaluate the contingency planning process from May 2003 onward--that's what really counts here. Right now, we have a handful of Army and Marine retired general officers chopped to USCENTCOM mostly after the invasion with retired and active officers who were at MacDill or in Washington polishing off the OPLAN in a political environment where the American public's support for operations has waned considerably.

The General of the COIN academy I provided is not retired, he is in Iraq.

 

[Gokul43201]

So now we have a dispute between officers. The question is which side do you fall on, if any?

i. The side that needs to keep saying positive things about the planning in order to hold its job is already at a huge credibility deficit from that alone. Tommy Franks was the person in charge of figuring out the number of troops required for OIF. He was the one that came up with a number of over 200,000 and passed this number on to higher ups (at the time). When that number was rejected by Rummy (in essence), Franks said nothing to anyone; Shinseki didn't.

ii. There's tons of anecdotal evidence from the other side. I wish I'd stored up names and incidents as I heard them on the radio, but I haven't.

iii. We are not talking about opinions here, but facts relating to the planning. You must either believe that X is lying when he recalls/relates incidents that support the assertion here or you must believe that such incidents do not support the assertion (X is poor at logic).

 

[pcorbett]

The General of the COIN academy I provided is not retired, he is in Iraq.

Yes, and we've already established he says nothing which supports your case.

i. The side that needs to keep saying positive things about the planning in order to hold its job is already at a huge credibility deficit from that alone. Tommy Franks was the person in charge of figuring out the number of troops required for OIF. He was the one that came up with a number of over 200,000 and passed this number on to higher ups (at the time). When that number was rejected by Rummy (in essence), Franks said nothing to anyone; Shinseki didn't.

Explain what you mean by "[General Franks] came up with a number of over 200,000 and passed this number on to the higher ups (at the time)." And explain why "General Franks came up with a number of approximately 150,000 and pass this number on to the higher ups (at the time)" isn't an equally accurate statement.

To put it in other words, General Franks job was to provide the contingency planning for the Iraq OPLAN and, through JOPES, coordinate with OSD. He was the unified commander, responsible for execution and providing guidance to national command authority. There is no evidence to date that the only two people senior to him--the Secretary of Defense and the President--overruled his ultimate determination of the necessary amount of force and force flow necessary to carry out the mission, nor is there any evidence that he disagreed with plans laid down on the eve of war.

ii. There's tons of anecdotal evidence from the other side. I wish I'd stored up names and incidents as I heard them on the radio, but I haven't.

Anecdotal evidence is anecdotal, and no evidence at all. It's surreptitious speculation dubiously linking an insufficient scatter of dots into whatever conspiracy you want to fashion.

iii. We are not talking about opinions here, but facts relating to the planning. You must either believe that X is lying when he recalls/relates incidents that support the assertion here or you must believe that such incidents do not support the assertion (X is poor at logic).

Actually, no. All I need do is separate out what is commentary from fact. I have no doubt that Trainor holds his far more limited judgement than yours as earnestly as you do. I also have no doubt that his judgement is informed by far greater relevant experience--career and first-hand--than yours. I also have no doubt the same holds true for Generals Peter Pace, Richard Myers, Tommy Franks, George Casey and John Abizaid. And I have no doubt that each side holds passion. I have no reason to suspect that anyone on either side has any impure reason for criticizing the other. So I arrive at my own judgement, without appealing to authority, and I find General Abizaid's the more credible point of view on the matter. We have a Sunni insurgency that by most accounts measures roughly twenty thousand fighters--mostly lightly armed. Looking at Iraq's pre-March 2003 Order of Battle, I have to wonder why more of over four hundred thousand shooters in the Iraqi Army haven't signed up. Then I have to recognize that the two major Sunni groups responsible for the majority of insurgent significant actions in Iraq operate akin to the Special Republican Guard and the Fedayeen Saddam. After that, I ask you and other Administration critics, how irresponsible was Paul Bremer for disbanding the Iraqi Army?

 

[Cyrus]

Yes, and we've already established he says nothing which supports your case.

No you have not.

nor is there any evidence that he disagreed with plans laid down on the eve of war.

Did you even bother to read about what I posted on what happens to people who did not agree with what the administration wanted to hear? They were not invited back.

From your posts, I take it you still have not read or watched the transcripts, have you?

After that, I ask you and other Administration critics, how irresponsible was Paul Bremer for disbanding the Iraqi Army?

I cannot anwser that, and neither can you. Someone like Ricks et al. can, and you know that. So don't ask the question.

 

[pcorbett]

No you have not.

Um, yes I have. To borrow a favorite phrase of yours, "read the thread."

Did you even bother to read about what I posted on what happens to people who did not agree with what the administration wanted to hear? They were not invited back.

So now you've gone from posting judgements as facts to simply making things up?

From your posts, I take it you still have not read or watched the transcripts, have you?

I'm amazed you can come to that conclusion, when with each post I've demonstrated far greater familiarity with material than yourself.

I cannot anwser that, and neither can you. Someone like Ricks et al. can, and you know that. So don't ask the question.

Oh, I can answer the question. In fact I'm pretty sure I can do a better job at answering it than Ricks. But I do agree with you that you can't. So I'ma ask away, my friend.

 

[Gokul43201]

Explain what you mean by "[General Franks] came up with a number of over 200,000 and passed this number on to the higher ups (at the time)." And explain why "General Franks came up with a number of approximately 150,000 and pass this number on to the higher ups (at the time)" isn't an equally accurate statement.

I'll have to do some digging for this, so it will take some time. This was from an interview that I heard maybe a year or two ago. The number that Franks came up with was the number quoted by Shinseki during the Sen. Armed Services Cmte (I think that's what it was) hearing. This number was in excess of 200,000 (it may have been closer to 300,000, but my memory is very foggy).

Anecdotal evidence is anecdotal, and no evidence at all. It's surreptitious speculation dubiously linking an insufficient scatter of dots into whatever conspiracy you want to fashion.

Ummm...if I'm asserting that a 300 mile long pipe is broken, all I need to support my assertion is a single sighting of a break. You can show my a thousand spots where the pipe ain't broke, but that amounts to squat. Anecdotal evidence is still evidence - there's situations where's it's completely useless and some where it's not.

If Rummy admitted to you that the postwar planning was completely screwed up, you'd dismiss that as anecdotal evidence?

I have no doubt that Trainor holds his far more limited judgement than yours as earnestly as you do. I also have no doubt that his judgement is informed by far greater relevant experience--career and first-hand--than yours.

Really, you claim to know what my judgement is and what it is based upon? And what if my judgement were nothing more than his is, as communicated by him?

 

[Astronuc]

The End of Iraq
How American Incompetence Created a War Without End

http://www.simonsays.com/content/book.cfm?tab=3&pid=517687

The United States invaded Iraq with grand ambitions to bring it democracy and thereby transform the Middle East. Instead, Iraq has disintegrated into three constituent components: a pro-western Kurdistan in the north, an Iran-dominated Shiite entity in the south, and a chaotic Sunni Arab region in the center. The country is plagued by insurgency and is in the opening phases of a potentially catastrophic civil war.

George W. Bush broke up Iraq when he ordered its invasion in 2003. The United States not only removed Saddam Hussein, it also smashed and later dissolved the institutions by which Iraq's Sunni Arab minority ruled the country: its army, its security services, and the Baath Party. With these institutions gone and irreplaceable, the basis of an Iraqi state has disappeared.

Also -
http://bowman.typepad.com/cubowman/iraq/index.html

From - http://www.tomhull.com/blog/archives/236-Cobra-Poisoning.html

How much manpower that might have actually taken had never been more than a wild guess in previous war plans -- I suspect that Zinni's 380,000 figure was better tuned to dissuading his hot-headed political bosses from doing something stupid than it was a careful estimate of the all the ways invasion of Iraq could go wrong.

Well, they didn't listen - and they did something stupid.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some interesting background material.

http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=202921


http://mediamatters.org/items/200506280010
Wallace failed to challenge Rumsfeld's false claims about troop levels in Iraq, which Hume later echoed, in which one will find:

In fact, substantial evidence suggests that in developing the war plan Rumsfeld rejected the advice of top military commanders who warned that more troops would be necessary to secure postwar Iraq. And even after the end of "major combat operations," Rumsfeld reportedly squelched requests from military commanders -- as well as L. Paul Bremer III, who headed the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority until the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004 -- for more troops.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/17349.pdf

This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the
U.S. Central Command commander who first briefed it to the President and White
House Staff calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. Reportedly, this option
would involve 250,000 troops, and would combine an air offensive with up to four
armored, mechanized, and/or Marine divisions.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23191.pdf
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25375.pdf

This report seems to get revised often (the following are ostensibly the same).
http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL31701
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/41127.pdf (RL31701)
http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL31701.pdf

http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/failedtransition/

http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Occupation_forces_in_Iraq (some bad links)
On November 26, 2003, retired U.S. Army General Jay Garner admitted in a radio interview that the U.S. Made Postwar Iraq Mistakes (bad link).

 

[Cyrus]

Um, yes I have. To borrow a favorite phrase of yours, "read the thread."

I read what you posted, it does not go against what I stated.

So now you've gone from posting judgements as facts to simply making things up?

What judgement. They were not invited back to the table if they dessented. That is a fact.

I'm amazed you can come to that conclusion, when with each post I've demonstrated far greater familiarity with material than yourself.

You think you know everything, apparently.

Oh, I can answer the question. In fact I'm pretty sure I can do a better job at answering it than Ricks. But I do agree with you that you can't. So I'ma ask away, my friend.

Really, do you have 17+ years working with the middle east policy with important players?


You really think you know everything, don't you. I will ask you to leave this thread unless you change your tone.

 

[pcorbett]

I'll have to do some digging for this, so it will take some time. This was from an interview that I heard maybe a year or two ago. The number that Franks came up with was the number quoted by Shinseki during the Sen. Armed Services Cmte (I think that's what it was) hearing. This number was in excess of 200,000 (it may have been closer to 300,000, but my memory is very foggy).

A few points. General Shinseki did not quote a number in March 2003 Senate Armed Services Committee. He said "several hundred thousand." He also said for specific numbers he'd have to rely on the unified commander's estimate. General Franks JOPES'd a plan calibrated for 200,000 troops. During review this was revised to slightly under that.

Ummm...if I'm asserting that a 300 mile long pipe is broken, all I need to support my assertion is a single sighting of a break. You can show my a thousand spots where the pipe ain't broke, but that amounts to squat. Anecdotal evidence is still evidence - there's situations where's it's completely useless and some where it's not.

If you're asserting that a 300 mile long pipe is broken and provide evidence to the fact, it wouldn't be anecdotal. If your evidence didn't verifiably demonstrate the damage, it would be anecdotal. Anecdotal evidence is no evidence at all. It's utility is a different matter all together, but you can safely say it's going to be useless on me.

If Rummy admitted to you that the postwar planning was completely screwed up, you'd dismiss that as anecdotal evidence?

Hypotheticals are useless on me, too.

Really, you claim to know what my judgement is and what it is based upon? And what if my judgement were nothing more than his is, as communicated by him?

From you: "[Trainor and Gordon] the assertion that the military was unusually unprepared for the follow up to the capture of Baghdad" (emphasis added)."

The view you attribute to Trainor is not at all expressed in the book. In fact, Cobra II's thesis is that the present difficulty is the result of five significant errors that occurred in preparation--it does not argue that a lack of preparation is responsible. Therefore, why shouldn't I consider this you're personal opinion based on--from what I can tell--absolutely no evidence whatsoever?

 

[pcorbett]

I read what you posted, it does not go against what I stated.

Then you haven't read it at all. There are others with your point of view who can respond productively. Good bye.