Liability from Florida condo collapse: everyone will 'blame everybody else'
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/li...veryone-will-blame-everybody-else-2021-07-06/
Some good points on liability in Florida.
Morabito Consultants (MC) is being sued "for failing to warn residents of the danger of collapse."
The lawsuit blamed the Morabito engineering firm, which conducted the 2018 inspection, for allegedly failing to warn the condo association of the need to evacuate the building. The firm was retained again in 2020 and did not warn residents the damage it uncovered two years earlier had not been repaired, the lawsuit said.
I read the report and there was ample warning in item J,
"Abundant cracking and spalling of varying degrees was observed in the concrete columns,
beams, and walls. Several sizeable spalls were noted in both the topside of the entrance drive
ramp and underside of the pool/entrance drive/planter slabs, which included instances with
exposed, deteriorating rebar. Though some of this damage is minor, most of the concrete
deterioration needs to be repaired in a timely fashion. All cracking and spalling located in the
parking garage shall be repaired in accordance with the recommendations of ICRI."
Then under item K,
K. MC visual observations revealed that many of the previous garage concrete repairs are fail ing
resulting in additional concrete cracking, spalling and leaching of calcium carbonate deposits . At
the underside of Entrance/Pool deck where the slab had been epoxy-injected, new cracks were
radiating from the originally repaired cracks. The installed epoxy is not continuous as observed
from the bottom of the slab, which is evidence of poor workmanship performed by the
previous contractor. The injection ports were not removed, and the surfaces were not ground
smooth at the completion of the injection . Leaching of calcium carbonate deposits in numerous
areas has surely caused CTS to pay to repaint numerous cars. This leaching will continue to
increase until proper repairs are completed . MC is convinced that the previously installed epoxy
injection repairs were ineffective in properly repairing the existing cracked and spalled concrete slab.
MC could not predict that the building would collapse. It wasn't in imminent danger of collapse in 2018, and besides, MC warned, "The failed waterproofing is causing major structural damage to the concrete structural slab below these areas. Failure to replace the waterproofing in the near future will cause the extent of the concrete deterioration to expand exponentially." And that's exactly what happened since the condominium owners and board failed to take action in a timely fashion!
None of the owners contracted MC, but rather the CTS Condo Association contracted with MC, and a report was delivered. It was then the responsibility of the board to inform the owners, which they apparently did. But then the inspector for Surfside (Rosendo Prieto) apparently told an association/board meeting that the building was in "very good shape". The board should have followed up with MC regarding that representation, since it conflicted with the dire warning in the MC report.
It's not clear to me that MC was contracted for a structural integrity assessment, but MC certainly did point out potentially severe problems.
Incidentally, I recently read that Breiterman, Jurado & Associates, Consulting Engineers is a defunct corporation, i.e., it apparently ceased to exist.
June 26 -
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...09519a-d5de-11eb-a53a-3b5450fdca7a_story.html
Last year, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did a full replenishment of Surfside’s beaches, Salzhauer said. Much of the sand for that project was initially stored directly in front of Champlain Towers, she added.
This tells me the ocean was much closer to the building before the built up the beaches. I have seen this situation in Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, following one the hurricanes, where one building had the ocean right at the foundation, since the beach was completely washed away and new cut/channel through the barrier island had formed within meters of the building.
Edit/Update: Also from the Washington Post article,
Manuel Jurado said his side of Breiterman and Jurado handled the mechanical and electrical while Breiterman handled the structural side. (Sertio Breiterman died in the 1990s.) Jurado said he did not do anything with waterproofing or inspections. “To be honest with you, I don’t remember,” said Jurado, 92. “I don’t even remember this building in Surfside.”
Manuel Tapia-Ruano, a former vice president of the Friedman architectural firm, said the building’s design was handled by William Friedman, who died in 2018.
So this would confirm that Breiterman, Jurado & Associates dissolved after the death of Breiterman, especially if it was a partnership. I'm not aware of a successor. Similarly,
William M. Friedman & Associates Architects, Inc does not seem to exist either.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/miami-...ars-of-warnings-but-mixed-signals-11624994509 - also mentions Breiterman, Jurado & Associates as defunct.
https://www.enr.com/articles/52001-...r-champlain-towers-probable-collapse-sequence
There are at least three theories about the trigger of the progressive collapse, beyond the pool deck slab: column failure, slab failure due to punching shear or failure of the pile foundation system, perhaps under the pool deck. Kilsheimer, Bell and others speculate there may have been more than one contributing factor, as in a perfect storm.
Progressive failure is caused either by columns that fail axially due to axial over-stress or shear damage that progresses to axial failure or punching shear failure, says Moehle.
In punching shear, one or more of the building’s flat slabs develops a shear failure around the column and drops relative to the column.
If there is no continuous bottom reinforcement in the slab passing over the columns—a detail not required in 1981—then the slab can move downward relative to the column, redistributing load to adjacent slab-column connections, which in turn can fail. A slab that eventually lands on the floor below it overloads that floor system, and there is more punching shear, says Moehle, who has done extensive testing of concrete structures.
Also from the WP article of June 26
http://paduaresearch.cab.unipd.it/9896/1/Fiaschi_Simone_tesi.pdf - pages 65-66 in thesis (76-77 of 111 in pdf) - There is a figure that show subsidence rates on that barrier island, but not in Surfside. Nevertheless, the rates appear to be linear between 1993 and 2005, and possibly the continue to be linear even today, especially if water infiltrates the formation under Miami Beach and Surfside.
and
Kit Miyamoto, a veteran Los Angeles-based structural engineer who specializes in structural resilience, said that a pillar or column supporting the building appeared to have failed. Corrosion by the salty air or a “differential settlement,” meaning differences between how sides of the building were sitting on the land, could have caused a pillar to collapse, he said.
“This is truly a classic failure of a column,” said Miyamoto, chief executive of Miyamoto International, a global earthquake and structural engineering firm. “It was supporting many stories and that’s why it happened very suddenly.”
Miyamoto, who has studied building collapses around the world, added that it would be difficult to pinpoint the exact location of the degraded pillar because of the near-total destruction of the building. “It requires a forensic investigation, like peeling off the skin of an onion, one by one,” he said.