BobG said:
There's a functional fallacy to using profiled screening - mainly because the number of terrorists is so incredibly small.
There were 809 million airline passengers in 2008. (http://www.bts.gov/press_releases/2009/bts019_09/html/bts019_09.html ).
I can't find a statistic for the number of passengers denied boarding because of luggage or personal screening, I think it's safe to say that over 99.9% were screened unnecessarily regardless of their appearance (there's no way anywhere close to 809,000 passengers failed screening). If a certain ethnic group is twice as likely to be a terrorist as a different group (and the 99.9% were anywhere near accurate), then 99.8% of screenings for that group would be wasted, vs 99.9% for the less risky group.
Compared to all screenings, there's virtually no improvement in efficiency by limiting screenings to certain profile groups. And the number of terrorists is so small, there's almost no disadvantage to choosing terrorists that don't fit the traditional profile. This isn't traditional warfighting tactics where you need a high number of successes and a high success rate for the attacks to be successful. It's a tactic where a 99.999999% success rate by us is a total and humiliating failure (8 terrorists a year successfully boarding a plane).
Of course it is.
Suppose that the vast majority of terrorists are Inuits, that 1 in 10.000 Inuits perform acts of terrorism.
Suppose that for the population at large, there is only 1 in 10 million of non-Inuits who perform acts of terrorism.
By increasing the surveillance a thousandfold for Inuits, while keeping the surveillance/scan level constant at the other group, we will vastly increase our success rate at catching terrorists.
In this case, we will avoid attacks involving burning, rancid seal oil, and that would be a definite relief, at least olfactorially..
For finding a needle in a haystack, you need something that cuts across the board with as little inconvenience as possible. I think the full body scans will meet that objective at least as effectively as screening luggage (similar accuracy, similar time cost, personnel cost, etc). There's privacy issues, but I find it hard to consider full body scans to be as severe an invasion of privacy as random people in airports ogling attractive, fully clothed people in airports (in fact, the latter would probably cause more discomfirt than the full body scan where your "transparency" is known to you more intellectually than emotionally).
Again:
What is the necessary amount of screening time here in order to test ALL?
And what are the costs we need in order to keep delays within acceptable boundaries?
If there is a glitch somewhere in these calculations, that prevents full screening of all passengers, then, NECESSARILY, sampling procedures MUST be implemented.
And those ought to be as rational as possible, i.e, by singling out identifiable high-risk groups.