Hetero phenomenology definition in philosophy

[loseyourname]

I have to admit I'm a little confused as to your where you stand, loseyourname. You don't really seem to be claiming qualia aren't real, or that they're within the scope of heterophenomenology. You're just saying that heterophenomenology will do as well as any other method in explaining them.

You'll have to be clearer on what you mean by "qualia" as it can be a rather loaded term. I don't think I really have a stance on this in a way that would please you. I think that the argument's I've seen from you claiming to demonstrate that a heterophenomenological method cannot, in principle, account for these qualia fail. I'm not going to make the opposite claim, though. What I will claim is that, from what I've seen, I have every reason to believe that if a heterophenomenological method won't answer your questions, neither will any other method. It might just be one of those "inert facts" that Dennett talks about, like the gold in his teeth. No amount of historical or chemical research can ever tell us whether or not this gold was every owned by Julius Caesar, but nobody considers this a failing of history or chemistry. Sometimes there are simply factual question, meaningful factual questions that do have answers, that nonetheless cannot be answered.

There is no primary data for animism, but there is for qualia. And I don't quite understand how anything can be proven about qualia, such as inverted qualia being impossible.

The point is that there is absolute no evidence, no primary datum, to suggest that inverted qualia is possible, despite the fact that a theory inclusive of such a phenomenon would lead to no contradictions. Sure, it is logically possible to have inverted qualia, but for the purpose of which you seem to want to use that fact, it makes no difference.

I'm just taking your argument form and substituting in different instantiations of the statement variables to make it clear that it is not a valid argument form. I suppose I could construct a truth table, but I don't know how easy that would be using the LaTex tags we have available. Keep in mind that I'm not saying that I think all of your arguments are invalid in this way. I just don't understand why it is that people seem to think it's okay to claim one hypothesis must be incorrect simply because it is logically possible for that to be the case, or it is logically possible for a competing hypothesis to be true. The simple fact is, no theory of consciousness needs to account for things like zombies and inverted qualia any more than evolutionary biology needs to account for the sequential divine creation of individual species.

The reason is that we can verbalize structural and functional differences. But how could you ever verify that you see red the same way I do?

I still don't see why you are singling out colors. Think about Michelle once again, if you will, but this time granting her geometric knowledge. Every time she sees looks at a circle, she sees an ellipse. But because of the way she has always experienced this sight, she refers to the shape as being "round" and as having the equation of a circle. She says that it is equal in width and height, even though it is not. She just misunderstands these terms! How would you be able to tell the difference here? It's the same as the example with colors. Every time Michael looks at the color red, he sees green. He calls it "red," however, and describes it as a warm color with a long wavelength of light. I honestly can't tell the difference between these two situations! What the heck is the fascination with color?

This is a pretty deep issue. It seems to me that what we know is exactly what we experience. We know facts because we experience the thoughts about those facts. (note that I'm talking about what the experiencer knows at a given instant of time) Since what we experience can be correlated to what our neurons are doing, you might think we are restricted to the knowledge "in" our neurons, ie, that which could be extracted in a detailed scan of our brain. But we also "know" what the experiences are like. We know what it feels like to know a fact or see a color.

This may not be the traditional defintion of knowledge, but I think on a little reflection you'll see it's accurate. You can't justifiably claim that what we know is what is in our neurons. How do we have access to those neurons? This might seem like a ridiculous question to an eliminativist, who would simply say we are those neurons. But there really is a seperation. If we were just our neurons, why don't we know what all our neurons are doing, or for that matter, what our stomach cells are doing? How do we even know for certain that we are made of neurons and not chinese people? This might be getting pretty far from the original topic, but these are all important issues to the overarching mind problem.

First off, I don't think the question of whether or not our minds are built up of Chinese people is one that needs to be taken seriously by philosophers of mind. The rest of this I began to address with my response to Tournesol. I'll see what the two of you have to say before elaborating. I think that this dual usage of the verb "to know" is involved in Paul Churchland's refutation of the Mary argument. Perhaps I will look into that.

 

[StatusX]

First of all, I'm not arguing for the actual, metaphysical possibility of inverted qualia in normal people. I'm saying that it is possible that two colors could fill the exact same functional role for some very simplistic human, or machine. If inverted qualia are impossible, it is because of some inherent structural difference between red and green, like maybe that there are more shades of green than red, or red is closer to orange than green. But if they really could fill identical functional and structural roles (which might require some change to the thought experiment to further restrict what Michael is allowed to see and do), there is clearly no reason the experiences couldn't be switched. (I'm suprised you're still not seeing why this can't be true with shapes. "Longer" and "distance" are non-subjective, unambiguous terms. How could she misunderstand width and height in some amazingly contrived way that would allow her to see circles as ellipses, but still function normally in the rest of her life?) It is possible Michael doesn't see red and green the same way we do, but if he sees them as anything, then heterophenomenology is predicting a symmetry that isn't really there.

Which is connected to what I was saying about knowledge. If Michael knows red and green are different, he must have distinct accompanying experiences of them, because our experiences are all we can know. Undoubtedly, neurons can explain why he reports they are different. But we're talking about the inner experiencing being. And whether this kind of knowledge is the standard one or not, it is a natural phenomenon and thus something that needs to be explained.

One more thing. The analogy to inert historical facts is one of the most absurd things I've ever heard. Clearly the problem there is either that it would require an unreasonable amount of calculation, or that we're limited by uncertainty. But there is no hard problem of inert historical facts, and scientific methods aren't inherently incapable of answering those questions. And even more importantly, those are trivial, specific facts, where as experience is arguably one of the most fundamental phenomena of the the universe.

EDIT: Can you explain how Michelle would see the shape in the attached picture?

 

[Tournesol]

First off, I was trying to say that you can't write an equation to describe the experience of seeing an ellipse or a circle.

That isn't quite the question. The question is about what things look
like. A circle will look like a circle or an ellipse -- either way what-it-looks-like is describable mathematically.

That's the argument with colors, right? Because certainly you can write an equation that describes the physical underpinning that causes that experience. I fail to see a difference between the two categories of experience.

Meaning neither is describable, or both are describable ?

Yeah, I know. We were just talking about this in a class I'm taking on why humans have such a propensity for war. What I was saying is that I don't think what you are talking about is factual knowledge. It is more of a personal acquaintance. I'm not going to go so far as to say it's a misusage of the verb "to know," simply because it is so commonly used, but clearly there is a distinction.

It isn't supposed to be objective knowledge -- that is kind of the point.
What are you implying? That subjective knowledge isn't proper knwoledge ?

I'm reminded of an argument against the omniscient of God. It is said that God does not know what it is like to ride a bike. He has no legs or body, and even if you are Christian and believe that God took human form 200 years ago, there were no bikes. Since God doesn't know what it's like to ride a bike, God doesn't know everything and so cannot be omniscient. The theist responds by saying that this is nonsense; having the experience of riding a bike is not in the category of factual knowledge.

I think the theist could reply that God could know this miraculously.

It seems compelling to conclude, in light of these and other cases, that there are really two different things meant by the verb "to know."

Well yyyeeeesss. Qualiaphiles aren't saying subjective knowledge overrides
objective knowledge -- they are just saying that the two are different.

 

[Tournesol]

You'll have to be clearer on what you mean by "qualia" as it can be a rather loaded term.

C.I Lewis's original definition of qualia:-

"There *are* recognizable qualitative characters of the
given, which may be repeated in different experiences,
and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia."
But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being
recognized from one to another experience, they must
be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion
of these two is characteristic of many historical
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories.
The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the
subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."

The point is that there is absolute no evidence, no primary datum, to suggest that inverted qualia is possible,

surely you mean indetectable inverted qualia. Things like colour blindness are not too far from real inverted qualia.

I still don't see why you are singling out colors. Think about Michelle once again, if you will, but this time granting her geometric knowledge. Every time she sees looks at a circle, she sees an ellipse. But because of the way she has always experienced this sight, she refers to the shape as being "round" and as having the equation of a circle. She says that it is equal in width and height, even though it is not. She just misunderstands these terms! How would you be able to tell the difference here?

I think it would be very easy to spot someone who systematically misunderstands the word "equal". This isn't even a logical possibility.

First off, I don't think the question of whether or not our minds are built up of Chinese people is one that needs to be taken seriously by philosophers of mind.

Errmm..it's a reductio ad absurdum...it's supposed to be silly.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Things like colour blindness are not too far from real inverted qualia.

Color blindness is completely explained by physical factors. How can it be "qualia" which by the definition you gave ("purely subjective") are not?

 

[loseyourname]

First of all, I'm not arguing for the actual, metaphysical possibility of inverted qualia in normal people. I'm saying that it is possible that two colors could fill the exact same functional role for some very simplistic human, or machine. If inverted qualia are impossible, it is because of some inherent structural difference between red and green, like maybe that there are more shades of green than red, or red is closer to orange than green.

The structural difference is pretty clear. They are caused by different wavelengths of light. Higher frequency photons have more energy and react with our retinae in a different way than lower frequency photons. Because they are different reactions, our brain perceives them differently. Any difference in perception from person to person would have to be a difference in the way their brain processes information - a difference that should be detectable empirically.

"Longer" and "distance" are non-subjective, unambiguous terms. How could she misunderstand width and height in some amazingly contrived way that would allow her to see circles as ellipses, but still function normally in the rest of her life?)

They are no less subjective or ambiguous than the terms we use to describe color. Hue and richness and warmth are every bit as measurable as length and distance. She wouldn't understand these terms in any contrived way. Her misperception would need to be fairly systematic, but I see no contradictions arising, which is all that "logically possible" means. This situation, no matter how impossible, could occur without a paradox arising.

It is possible Michael doesn't see red and green the same way we do, but if he sees them as anything, then heterophenomenology is predicting a symmetry that isn't really there.

No clue what you mean here. I wasn't aware that heterophenomenology predicted anything other than that some of our beliefs about our experiences are incorrect.

Which is connected to what I was saying about knowledge. If Michael knows red and green are different, he must have distinct accompanying experiences of them, because our experiences are all we can know. Undoubtedly, neurons can explain why he reports they are different. But we're talking about the inner experiencing being. And whether this kind of knowledge is the standard one or not, it is a natural phenomenon and thus something that needs to be explained.

I agree. Why humans see colors in the way they see them is indeed something that any science of consciousness should have to explain.

One more thing. The analogy to inert historical facts is one of the most absurd things I've ever heard.

Why? One is something that clearly does not need to be explained, simply because it cannot be. The other is yet another thing that may not be explainable. If that is the case, they are analagous.

Clearly the problem there is either that it would require an unreasonable amount of calculation, or that we're limited by uncertainty. But there is no hard problem of inert historical facts, and scientific methods aren't inherently incapable of answering those questions. And even more importantly, those are trivial, specific facts, where as experience is arguably one of the most fundamental phenomena of the the universe.

Two situations needn't be congruent to be analagous. Don't try to put words in my mouth. All I said was that they had the one similarity I've noted above.

EDIT: Can you explain how Michelle would see the shape in the attached picture?

I suppose she would see one circle. That's a good point. Perhaps I should change her misperception to mistaking triangles for quadrangles. How would Michael see sub-green wavelengths of light? As infrared?

 

[StatusX]

The structural difference is pretty clear. They are caused by different wavelengths of light. Higher frequency photons have more energy and react with our retinae in a different way than lower frequency photons. Because they are different reactions, our brain perceives them differently. Any difference in perception from person to person would have to be a difference in the way their brain processes information - a difference that should be detectable empirically.

But we're not talking about photons, were talking about his experience. We can have visual experiences in the absence of photons, so they are not necessary prerequisites. And I'm saying Michael processes them identically. All he can do is distinguish them.

Imagine a simple circuit that can detect radio waves of a certain frequency. Two of these are built, one that outputs a pulse if a low frequency (lf) wave hits the antenna, and the other outputs a pulse if a high frequency (hf) wave hits it. Attatched to these two circuits is a simple digital processor. Now, two waves are sent in succession. As they are received, the appropriate detector circuit passes on a signal. The digital processor's job is to determine if both signals came from the same detector, that is, if the two waves were the same or not. That's all it can do. This system is symmetric in hf and lf waves, in that if you switched all the instances of hf waves for lf waves and lf for hf, it would respond the same.

Clearly, the output of the system, and the digital circuit which creates that output is symmetric. But the detectors themselves are not. When you switch the instances of the colors, you are switching which detector is activated when. Now assume this system has a subjective world. (since this is just a simpler model of Michael's brain). I've been saying a heterophenomenologist shouldn't care about this difference, because it has no bearing on the system's behavior.

Now, maybe I'm wrong, and they would claim the subjective world is different because of this change. But here's my main point: Since the difference has no functional effect, the heterophenomenologist would have to be admitting that there are aspects of the subjective world that aren't acounted for by the subject's behavior. They'd be saying that changing the way a subject is internally constructed could affect this abstract notion of subjectivity, even if every interaction the subject has with its environment is unaffected. From what I've read, I don't think that they would call such a change significant.

In fact, a method very similar to heterophenomenolgy (differing mainly in interpretation) could use this thought experiment to claim that the machine's experience of hf and lf waves arises in the detector circuits, not the digital circuit, because switching hf for lf would obviously switch experiences, but only the detector circuits would be different. Bringing this back to human beings, it means that our experience of colors arises somewhere between the retinas and the place where judgements about colors are made.

They are no less subjective or ambiguous than the terms we use to describe color. Hue and richness and warmth are every bit as measurable as length and distance. She wouldn't understand these terms in any contrived way. Her misperception would need to be fairly systematic, but I see no contradictions arising, which is all that "logically possible" means. This situation, no matter how impossible, could occur without a paradox arising.

Perhaps I should change her misperception to mistaking triangles for quadrangles. How would Michael see sub-green wavelengths of light? As infrared?

Again, I'm talking about experience. Maybe Michael would experience subgreen wavelengths the same way some birds experience infrared wavelengths. How would we ever know? And clearly the triangle/quadrangle confusion would not be possible, as is the case with any shapes. It would mean she'd have to confuse the numbers three and four, which you could straightforwardly derive a paradox from. (eg, ask her to take away three apples from a pile of four).

If my thought experiment fails, it is because I'm incorrectly assuming heterophenomenology would ignore the non-behavioral change caused by the switch, as I described above. If this is the case, then I don't really have a problem with the method, although I would take it as a starting point (ie, axiom) that qualia really do exist. But it does not fail because you could replace arbitrary objects for "red experience" and "green experience" and reach an absurdity. The only things you could switch in are things that have no functional or structural properties, ie, intrinsic experiences.

 

[Tournesol]

Color blindness is completely explained by physical factors. How can it be "qualia" which by the definition you gave ("purely subjective") are not?

Colour blindness is only "completely explained" in terms of antomical differences and funcitonal competencies. If you are awkward enough to want to know
how things look to someone with red-green colour blindness, the explanation
is not going to tell you.

 

[Mentat]

Colour blindness is only "completely explained" in terms of antomical differences and funcitonal competencies. If you are awkward enough to want to know
how things look to someone with red-green colour blindness, the explanation
is not going to tell you.

How do things "look" to someone who isn't color blind?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Colour blindness is only "completely explained" in terms of antomical differences and funcitonal competencies. If you are awkward enough to want to know
how things look to someone with red-green colour blindness, the explanation
is not going to tell you.

This is just petitio principli, aka begging the question. You assume the explanation is incomplete because of qualia, but qualia and their existence was the point of the excercise. I don't accept qualia, so I believe the explanation is complete.

 

[loseyourname]

Clearly, the output of the system, and the digital circuit which creates that output is symmetric. But the detectors themselves are not. When you switch the instances of the colors, you are switching which detector is activated when. Now assume this system has a subjective world. (since this is just a simpler model of Michael's brain). I've been saying a heterophenomenologist shouldn't care about this difference, because it has no bearing on the system's behavior.

Now, maybe I'm wrong, and they would claim the subjective world is different because of this change. But here's my main point: Since the difference has no functional effect, the heterophenomenologist would have to be admitting that there are aspects of the subjective world that aren't acounted for by the subject's behavior.

I think you've just misunderstood heterophenomenology, which is what I've been suspecting all along. There really are a lot of misconception about it out there, mostly due, I would suspect, to the fact a given person disagrees with Dennett generally, so they just assume that they disagree with this as well. Heterophenomenology is equipped to deal with the situation you just described. Switching the individual detectors, though the system itself might never know the difference, is something that can be detected. A heterophenomenologist does not only take into account a subject's behavior - that is behaviorism, not heterophenomenology. Also taken into account is any detectable change in neural architecture - the analog of the change made to your radio detector's input circuits.

 

[Tournesol]

How do things "look" to someone who isn't color blind?

If you are not colour blind, you already know the answer.

 

[Tournesol]

This is just petitio principli, aka begging the question. You assume the explanation is incomplete because of qualia, but qualia and their existence was the point of the excercise. I don't accept qualia, so I believe the explanation is complete.

Which is question-begging too. This kind of two-way QB is quite common in philosophy.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Which is question-begging too. This kind of two-way QB is quite common in philosophy.

In which case, philosophy is futile, that part of it anyway. I think of philosophy as an art form. This isn't to deny that it has "truth", but Picasso has "truth" too.

 

[Mentat]

If you are not colour blind, you already know the answer.

So your entire premise is based on "aw, you know what I mean" reasoning? Sounds like Chalmers to me .

 

[StatusX]

I think you've just misunderstood heterophenomenology, which is what I've been suspecting all along. There really are a lot of misconception about it out there, mostly due, I would suspect, to the fact a given person disagrees with Dennett generally, so they just assume that they disagree with this as well. Heterophenomenology is equipped to deal with the situation you just described. Switching the individual detectors, though the system itself might never know the difference, is something that can be detected. A heterophenomenologist does not only take into account a subject's behavior - that is behaviorism, not heterophenomenology. Also taken into account is any detectable change in neural architecture - the analog of the change made to your radio detector's input circuits.

Maybe so, but then I'm a little confused about what exactly the difference is between heterophenomenology and behaviorism? In what sense are the specific neural impulses part of that set of subjective data, alongside things like "A likes chocolate" and "A believes he experiences"? I'm not denying they should be included, but if you deny qualia (that is, for the heterophenomenologists who deny it, like Dennett), how could the specific neural structure be significant?

 

[loseyourname]

I'm not sure what you're asking, but I'll give you my own understanding of heterophenomenology (which Dennett has told me himself is accurate). It's rather simple. The only dictate is that, as a researcher, you must not assume that your subject's beliefs about his own experience are either correct or incorrect until some corroborating evidence is provided. Any kind of evidence can be considered as long as it doesn't stand alone.

I realize that for many common experiences, it seems obvious that they are correct. For instance, if I believe that I saw Marilyn Monroe, I'm probaby correct, even if I was hallucinating. More mundanely, if I am fed an orange and I say that it tastes like an orange, the heterophenomenologist is not likely to consider this a contentious claim. But there are claims made by experiencing subjects that are contentious. Heck, consider Sleeth. He claims that through direct experience, he knows that consciousness is the fundamental substance in the universe from which matter and energy are derived and which is the driving force behind the emergence of life. Don't you think it is a good idea for a researcher to not assume that he is correct and then explain the claim? Isn't it a better idea to simply seek to explain why exactly he believes that? We shouldn't just assume from the outset that he believes it because his claim is true.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I've been rereading Dennett's CE. I fiind that he seems to apply heterophenomenology to first person experience, although I can't find anywhere where he says so explicitly. But in discussing the phi experiment and Libet's 400 ms gap, he emphasizes that you should take your beliefs seriously, but not embrace them, since his understanding of our beliefs of our recent experience are constructions (either "stalinist" substitutions before the fact or "orwellian" editing of impressions after they have been recorded) which coming from separate independent process and never fully conflated, give us a usable but not strictly accurate idea of reality.

 

[Tournesol]

In which case, philosophy is futile

No, other considerations can be broguht to bear

 

[Tournesol]

So your entire premise is based on "aw, you know what I mean" reasoning? Sounds like Chalmers to me .

So you are saying things don't seem like anything at all to you..no colours scents or sounds...poor you.

 

[selfAdjoint]

So you are saying things don't seem like anything at all to you..no colours scents or sounds...poor you.

Oh for goodness sake Tournesol, haven't we gotten beyond these cheap shots? My internal life is very rich, but I am a nominalist on "what it is like". It's not a thing that requires an explanation, it's just a name for what is going on.

 

[StatusX]

I'm not sure what you're asking, but I'll give you my own understanding of heterophenomenology (which Dennett has told me himself is accurate). It's rather simple. The only dictate is that, as a researcher, you must not assume that your subject's beliefs about his own experience are either correct or incorrect until some corroborating evidence is provided. Any kind of evidence can be considered as long as it doesn't stand alone.

So are you saying that heterophenomenolgy leaves the question of whether qualia exist open? If so, then I have no problem with the method, and as I mentioned earlier, the existence or non-existence of qualia may just be an interpretational issue.

 

[selfAdjoint]

So are you saying that heterophenomenolgy leaves the question of whether qualia exist open? If so, then I have no problem with the method, and as I mentioned earlier, the existence or non-existence of qualia may just be an interpretational issue.

From Consciousness Explained, page 73.

The heterophenomenological method neither challenges nor accepts as entirely true the assertions of subjects, but rather maintains a constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in the hopes of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the subjects.

Note that he applies this approach to researchers studying the reports of subjects in the course of an experiment or anthropological investigation. In other word there is a great asymmetry between the humans involved, the trained researcher versus the subject, who is assumed to be an expert on his/her own internal beliefs, but innocent of other relevant expertise.

I don't see how this specialized approach can be applied to a philosophical give and take between equals.

 

[Tournesol]

Oh for goodness sake Tournesol, haven't we gotten beyond these cheap shots? My internal life is very rich, but I am a nominalist on "what it is like". It's not a thing that requires an explanation, it's just a name for what is going on.

What are the criteria for deciding whether or not something needs explanantion ?
What is to stop me saying that "gravity" is just a label for the tendency of things to fall when you let go of them ?

 

[selfAdjoint]

The criterion is that the phenomenon must be communicable and found to be the same for all, by social intercommunication. Then we can all search for an explanation. But some philosophers, searching for a way to stave off mechanism, have hit on the uncommunicable "way it seems to me", which they miscall "what it is" and erected it into an unexplainable primitive for ontology.

 

[Tournesol]

The criterion is that the phenomenon must be communicable and found to be the same for all, by social intercommunication.

That is not a criterion for whether something needs an explanation,
that is a criterion for whether the scientific method can supply one.#

"If we can't explain it we shouldn't explain it" -- "I am the master of this college, what I don't know isn't knowledge"

Then we can all search for an explanation. But some philosophers, searching for a way to stave off mechanism,

One could equally say that qualiaphobia is nothing but a way of shoring up physicalism.

have hit on the uncommunicable "way it seems to me",.

Well, you can't say it in maths very well, but just try communicating the Thory of Relaivity in a symphony or a painting.

which they miscall "what it is" and erected it into an unexplainable primitive for ontology.

Aren't things like space, time and matter unexplainable primitives ?

 

[Mentat]

That is not a criterion for whether something needs an explanation,
that is a criterion for whether the scientific method can supply one.

What would "explanation" of something you can't define, point out, or even communicate mean? What would it be to "explain" something without communicating?

"If we can't explain it we shouldn't explain it"

If one can't explain something -- it is impossible in principle to explain it -- then one shouldn't try.

That seems rather obvious to me.

One could equally say that qualiaphobia is nothing but a way of shoring up physicalism.

Pseudoscience predates science by millenia.

Well, you can't say it in maths very well, but just try communicating the Thory of Relaivity in a symphony or a painting.

Try communicating qualia (the incommunicable) in a symphony or a painting. I've seen many paintings, and I have listened to many symphonies, but I have never once had any reason to believe in qualia.

Besides, he wasn't saying you should be able to communicate it in maths, he was saying you should be able to communicate it. Period.

That "what it is like to me" is incommunicable in principle is what makes it seem a dead-end in scientific reasoning.

Aren't things like space, time and matter unexplainable primitives ?

Who said there was something wrong with unexplainable primitives? What was wrong was erecting one in a desparate attempt to save a world-view.

 

[Tournesol]

If one can't explain something -- it is impossible in principle to explain it -- then one shouldn't try.

And there is one, sweeping all-encompassing mode of explanation...or a variety of language games ? SelfAdjoint's original claim was that
we need not explain qualia. He then said (in effect) that we cannot e
explain qualia scientifically. Note how scientific explanation is surreptitiously taken to be the only relevant kind. Note also how
the "cannot means need not" manoeuvre is needed to prevent anyone
drawing awkward conclusions -- including non-physicalist ones -- from
the possible failure of scientific explanation.

Besides, he wasn't saying you should be able to communicate it in maths, he was saying you should be able to communicate it. Period.

He was saying that, but he shouldn't have been. The communication
issue depends on how you are communicating, just as the explanation
issue depends on how you are explaining.

That "what it is like to me" is incommunicable in principle is what makes it seem a dead-end in scientific reasoning.

Scientific reasoning is not the only kind, mathematical language is not the only kind.

 

[RageSk8]

"Telling Nagel that he may be become able to, thanks to mastering Dennett's theory, to describe what he had previously been unable to describe, is like telling Kant that he may become able, after mastering someone elses theory (Hegel perhaps, or Sellars')to describe what he previously claimed was the indescribable thing-in-itself." - Richard Rorty, Holism, Intrinsicality, Transcendence found in Dennett and his Critics, p. 187.

I agree with heterophenomenolgy, but I I know of no direct argument for it that would work on Tournesol, StatusX, etc. I also doubt that Rorty's strategy, taking the debate together with many other philosophical disputes to a metaphilosophical level, would do much good... This debate is an incredibly hard one to declare a winner on based solely on argumentation. We aren't just working with different assumptions - we are working from different gestalts (thus Rorty's strategy).

 

[Tournesol]

Agree with heterophenomology qua taking subject's reports seriously, or agree with heterophenomology as amounting to an a priori dismissal of qualia ?