Hetero phenomenology definition in philosophy

[RageSk8]

Agree with heterophenomology qua taking subject's reports seriously, or agree with heterophenomology as amounting to an a priori dismissal of qualia ?

The first. Heterophenomenology is a dismissal of qualia - I just wouldn't call it an a priori dismissal.

 

[Tournesol]

So heterophenomenlogists have to ignore reports like "I am having a red quale" ?

 

[loseyourname]

The first. Heterophenomenology is a dismissal of qualia - I just wouldn't call it an a priori dismissal.

Haven't I made it clear that heterophenomenology is just a methodology? It is not a theory. It makes no claim on whether or not qualia exist, either a priori or a posteriori. It just so happens that the most prominent heterophenomenological theory out there, Dennett's, does dismiss the existence of qualia. It is not necessary for a heterophenomenological theory to do so.

 

[Doctordick]

What is to stop me saying that "gravity" is just a label for the tendency of things to fall when you let go of them ?

In what way does that not also qualify as an "explanation" of "gravity". Just because it doesn't give very elaborate details on what it "explains" doesn't make it not an explanation (it at least tells you to expect things to fall). It is just a rather poor, useless explanation in comparison to the accepted scientific explanation. As a matter of fact it is almost exactly my grandmother's explanation of gravity.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Aren't things like space, time and matter unexplainable primitives ?

That depends; are you talking about "unexplainable primitives" such as lines, circles or squares. In which case I would agree with you. Or are you holding that they are primitive in the sense that they exist without reason? In which case I would disagree with you. English is horribly vague.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Scientific reasoning is not the only kind, mathematical language is not the only kind.

No they aren't; but they are the best understood. What they are capable of communicating they do a pretty good job of obtaining universal agreement, a central requirement of clear communication.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[RageSk8]

So heterophenomenlogists have to ignore reports like "I am having a red quale" ?

No, but they would have to treat that report in the same way as "I see red" or "it is red."

 

[RageSk8]

Haven't I made it clear that heterophenomenology is just a methodology? It is not a theory. It makes no claim on whether or not qualia exist, either a priori or a posteriori. It just so happens that the most prominent heterophenomenological theory out there, Dennett's, does dismiss the existence of qualia. It is not necessary for a heterophenomenological theory to do so.

Do you honestly believe that methodologies are theory neutral? Methodologies have theoretic consequences. Heterophenomenology does not explicitly deny qualia, but it does, it has to, ignore the problem of qualia (if qualia is thought to be ineffable, non-relational, or completely subjective).

 

[loseyourname]

Do you honestly believe that methodologies are theory neutral? Methodologies have theoretic consequences.

I don't believe that all methodologies have no theoretic consequences. I do believe that heterophenomenology does not have any necessary consequences on whether or not we are to except qualia as an explanandum.

Heterophenomenology does not explicitly deny qualia, but it does, it has to, ignore the problem of qualia (if qualia is thought to be ineffable, non-relational, or completely subjective).

You can continue to say this, but the literature does not back you up. Despite his eventual dismissal of the term 'qualia' as having any relevance to consciousness, Dennett does not ignore the problem presented. He simply approaches it the way he approaches any other problem. Rather than attempting to determine whether or not qualia exist in the way your conception says they would, he attempts to determine why someone who believes they do holds that belief. That is hardly willful ignorance. I generally don't claim to be completely certain about very many things, but this one I am. I have had personal discourse with Dennett in which he has confirmed the claims I've made here. You may think it is a logical consequence of the structure of heterophenomenological enquiry that it cannot possibly even consider the problem of qualia, but Dennett does not agree with you, and given that he was the first to clearly formulate what heterophenomenology is, I'll take his word for it.

 

[Tournesol]

No, but they would have to treat that report in the same way as "I see red" or "it is red."

Why ? Presumably there is a reason why the subject chose to phrase it
the way they did, a reason that would reveal something about their psychology, one way or another.

 

[Tournesol]

Do you honestly believe that methodologies are theory neutral? Methodologies have theoretic consequences. Heterophenomenology does not explicitly deny qualia, but it does, it has to, ignore the problem of qualia (if qualia is thought to be ineffable, non-relational, or completely subjective).

I don't see why. I thought it was based on taking subjective reports at face value as far as possible. Obviously one would not be able to procede if
everything someone said is somehow ineffable or incomprehensible, but that is not the situation. If someone says "I am having an ineffable experience",
that is itself a comprehensible statement. It's not as if we had any a priori
reason to suppose that everybody can communicate everything that is going
on inside our heads -- in fact, if you make an engineering guestimate
of the amount of neural processing compared with the bandwidth of speech,
it turns out we couldn't possible do so.

 

[RageSk8]

Why ? Presumably there is a reason why the subject chose to phrase it
the way they did, a reason that would reveal something about their psychology, one way or another.

I agree. I guess this is semantic misunderstanding - of which I take fault for. More or less I believe that heterophenomenology's neutrality on the existence of qualia does not represent a neutral framework for enquiry between people like Dennett and people like Nagel. Now I realize that not all, in fact not most, qualists are New Mysterians. But New Mysterians are qualists in the strongest sense of the word. Anyways... I hope my (upcoming) reply to looseyourname will clarify my position.