Is Consciousness an Emergent Property of a Master Algorithm?

[Mentat]

Sorry it's been so long. This thread was probably long forgotten by now. My access to the internet became almost non-existent for quite a while.

The word 'consciousness' picks out many different concepts. To facilitate precise, meaningful discussion, it is useful to pick out and refer to some of these distinguishable concepts that all exist underneath the greater hood of the word 'consciousness.'

The most general bifurcation we can make is between P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and A-consciousness (access consciousness). We've already discussed P-consciousness to death. Here's http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/foldop/foldoc.cgi?access+consciousness of access consciousness:

access consciousness
<philosophy of mind> Also known as a-consciousness, is a kind of direct control. A representation is access-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting and action.

So, "access consciousness" is a kind of direct control...what exactly does that mean? Your definition states that a representation is access-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action.

Well, reasoning and reporting are actions, so the definition is basically saying that a representation is access-conscious if it acts so as to appear to be conscious (or, rather, so as to appear to be "p-conscious"). Now, if we take all such things as reasoning, reporting, categorization, and computation to be "actions" (of the computer in question -- in this case, the brain), then these processes would all serve as naught but indications of something else: p-consciousness. Is that right?

That is a pretty accurate description. In everyday life, we use the information made available from the A-consciousness of others to make inferences about their P-consciousnesses. Of course, a given A-conscious behavior only gives the appearance as if there is a certain P-conscious experience underlying it, an appearance that may be misleading or outright false.

So one may perform all the processes mentioned above (all the "actions"), which indicate consciousness, while never actually being conscious? Is there an action that is missing from such a case, which would leave this "zombie" falling short of p-consciousness? Or is it something else entirely? After all, if p-consciousness were an action, then it would fall under a-consciousness. But, if it's not an action, then what is it? And why do we assume it's existence, when any action that we observe to indicate it could be misleading?

I know this covers a lot of points that we'd already covered before, but I need to reprocess exactly how this point is expounded, before I can comment on it. I don't want to just repeat old arguments. Instead, I want to try and see your point without bias (if that's possible), while at the same time remembering everything I'd read, and have read since the last time we discussed this.

We need the A-consciousness of others to make judgments about their P-consciousness, so epistemically the two are deeply related. A-consciousness is our means of expressing and knowing about P-consciousness. But you are correct to note that the definition of A-consciousness does not directly refer to P-consciousness at all, and this is a key point I have been trying to establish. Your strategy to deny P thus far has been to equate P with A at the outset, but now perhaps you see that there is a bit of a conceptual wedge we can drive between the two.

Only if we assume that they both exist. I still don't get why we, a priori, accept the existence of p-consciousness, and then immediately shroud it in mystery, by stating that all the actions that indicate it can be fabricated.

It's not as simple as this, as I indicated in that thread. The conceivability argument (with zombies and such) is intimately related with the explanatory argument and the knowledge argument, such that you can't really fully grasp or fully deny anyone of them without fully grasping / denying the others. The explanatory argument appears to be particularly relevant. Very briefly, it goes

(2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness; so

Is not your middle premise somewhat axiomatic...why should we assume that it is true? After all, if consciousness were, itself, a function of certain computers, then saying that an explanation of function does not suffice to explain it would be clearly inaccurate.

By way of analogy, suppose I claim that it is impossible to derive an imaginary number from the set of real numbers using only the operations of addition and multiplication. In a sense, my initial intuition here is weakly conceived, as I cannot possibly imagine every single case of adding / multiplying every permutation of numbers. But I don't need to imagine all the details. I can see underlying principles which makes my intuition true for all cases.

Deduction rather than induction. Your analogy is accurate, but not necessarily analogous. First, one must know why we assume the existence of an imaginary number in the first place. Since it is invaluable in most areas of mathematics, this is already established. But, is this the case with P-consciousness? In what fields is it so necessary that we have assumed it's existence?

As I used to mention quite frequently, there is almost always something wrong with assuming the existence of "something", and then -- only after accepting that this "something" exists -- attempting to define it and show it's relation with other things that are better understood.

It appears that the existence of something that lacks form and structure, but which is related to the thinking process, would be a very important point for neurologists (and all other such scientists of the mind), and yet it doesn't ever seem to come up. The reason for this, it seems to me, is something that you used to say quite often: You cannot discover p-consciousness through even the most in-depth study of the actions of the brain.

This either means that there is no such thing, or it means that there is such a thing, but that it has no effect on the brain or body whatsoever.

There have been other mysterious things in science's past. Dark Matter/Dark Energy is one example that comes to mind. We still don't really know what makes it up (at least, not since the last time I checked, which has been a little while now :shy:). Yet, it is completely different from p-consciousness in that the effects of its presence were noticed before its existence was postulated.

A better example would probably quarks and leptons; the fundamental particles (hopefully ). You've said before that p-consciousness should be assumed to be something fundamental, and thus not built up from anything else, but independently existent. Yet, the other things that have been assumed to be fundamental (the elementary particles) were discovered by first noticing effects, and then postulating causes. P-consciousness, OTOH, seems to be first postulated and then justified (or so some hope) by observing some effects.

Forgive me for going on as I have, but it's been a while...I just wanted to make sure I was coherent.

 

[hypnagogue]

I still think you're coming at the problem slightly askew via your insistence on stating that P-consciousness is assumed. P-consciousness is certainly routinely assumed in the third person case; I readily assume you are P-conscious, despite my lack of direct evidence of your phenomenal perceptions, on the basis of indirect evidence in the form of your A-conscious actions, your status as a fellow human being, etc. (Direct evidence of your phenomenal experiences could only be constituted, I believe, if I were to myself experience your experiences, which is impossible as far as anyone knows.)

However, the 3rd person case is not the only ontologically relevant perspective to consider, even if limiting ourselves to an idealized attempt at purely 3rd person investigation has proved to be epistemically fruitful in science. In the 1st person case, P-consciousness is not an assumption; in fact, it couldn't be anything farther from an assumption. To deny that I experience certain phenomenal qualities when I look at a soda can is no better than denying that there exists a site on the internet called Physics Forums with a member who calls himself Mentat. With no means of objectively demonstrating such phenomenal qualities, we are left with a tension between solving a puzzle whose pieces don't seem to fit or simply throwing out one of the pieces. To construct a truly honest and comprehensive picture of reality, we must not throw away any of the pieces nature gives to us, regardless of how daunting or strange the consequences may be.

One fact well worth noting is that, from the 1st person perspective of a human, P-consciousness and A-consciousness appear to be deeply intertwined. If I appreciate the beauty of the sky and make the A-conscious utterance "the sky is beautiful today," I take it straightforwardly that what has moved me to say this is the sky's rich blueness, perhaps the shapes of the clouds, and so on: my P-conscious experience of it. You were correct to point out the inherent difficulty here-- if we say that P straightforwardly led to A, then in accordance with the definitions we should redefine P as A, seemingly leaving no more room for P.

I think the problem here is our tendency to treat P as if it must fit in a chain of events, somehow reifying it by classifying it along the same lines as we are accustomed to so expertly classifying and analyzing physical phenomena. But all philosophical investigation points to the suggestion that P is something entirely distinct from a physical phenomenon, and thus we should not fall into the trap of conceptualizing it as if it were just that.

I believe the most promising approach is to regard P not as a piece of the pattern in the tapestry of reality, but rather to regard it as the very material from which the tapestry is fashioned (the intrinsic), which supports the existence of abstract patterns of relationships (the extrinsic-- physical phenomena). On this view, P-consciousness (or at least some very primitive, alien form of it) is that elusive something sought by Hawking that breathes fire into the (extrinsic) equations described by physics. Gregg Rosenberg advances a very sophisticated and promising (and of course, much more thorough) version of this thesis in his upcoming book "A Place for Consciousness," set to be released this fall. (He has a preliminary version online located at http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html -- I believe the final version will be edited significantly, but if you're curious this will probably be enough to give you a good idea of the basic points.)

 

[Mentat]

I still think you're coming at the problem slightly askew via your insistence on stating that P-consciousness is assumed. P-consciousness is certainly routinely assumed in the third person case; I readily assume you are P-conscious, despite my lack of direct evidence of your phenomenal perceptions, on the basis of indirect evidence in the form of your A-conscious actions, your status as a fellow human being, etc. (Direct evidence of your phenomenal experiences could only be constituted, I believe, if I were to myself experience your experiences, which is impossible as far as anyone knows.)

However, the 3rd person case is not the only ontologically relevant perspective to consider, even if limiting ourselves to an idealized attempt at purely 3rd person investigation has proved to be epistemically fruitful in science. In the 1st person case, P-consciousness is not an assumption; in fact, it couldn't be anything farther from an assumption. To deny that I experience certain phenomenal qualities when I look at a soda can is no better than denying that there exists a site on the internet called Physics Forums with a member who calls himself Mentat. With no means of objectively demonstrating such phenomenal qualities, we are left with a tension between solving a puzzle whose pieces don't seem to fit or simply throwing out one of the pieces. To construct a truly honest and comprehensive picture of reality, we must not throw away any of the pieces nature gives to us, regardless of how daunting or strange the consequences may be.

But what is this "piece"? Is it something that we experience from a 1st-person PoV, or is it the 1st-person PoV itself? If it is merely the ability for conscious awareness of the world from a 1st-person vantage point, then I don't see what the big issue is...honestly, from what other reference point could a being actually percieve the world? To be sure, there is a bit more involved in having a 1st-person perspective, like self-consciousness (awareness of the fact that you exist as an entity separate from other entities). But this is really just another action, which occurs in some of the most primitive of beings on Earth (e.g. a lobster will seek out food, but will never eat itself...this gives it a sort of "special" place in its world, relative to other things, and is clearly a form of self-consciousness (albeit, a primitive one)). From an evolutionary stand-point, it is a quite logical step, that more advanced beings should be able to process their own existence (via introspection) to a much greater degree than lower beings. From a creationist stand-point the point is even easier to make. It just doesn't seem like there should be an issue at all, if it's merely about having 1st-person experience of the world with which you interact.

Now, if it is indeed something more than just the 1st-person experience itself, then it must be something experienced, in which case it itself is an objective phenomenon, processed right along with the rest of the objective phenomena in the world, by sentient beings. But, if it is an objective phenomenon, then there should be no logical problem with the idea that we will eventually reduce it in terms of function and form, just as we can with every other objective phenomenon (at least, ideally).

One fact well worth noting is that, from the 1st person perspective of a human, P-consciousness and A-consciousness appear to be deeply intertwined. If I appreciate the beauty of the sky and make the A-conscious utterance "the sky is beautiful today," I take it straightforwardly that what has moved me to say this is the sky's rich blueness, perhaps the shapes of the clouds, and so on: my P-conscious experience of it.

So the blueness of the sky is part of P-consciousness, and not A-? Is not distinguishing that the sky is one shade of blue and not some other color a categorizational activity of the brain? It is as much an action that you percieve "blueness" as that you remarked on it, is it not?

You were correct to point out the inherent difficulty here-- if we say that P straightforwardly led to A, then in accordance with the definitions we should redefine P as A, seemingly leaving no more room for P.

Perhaps it's the wording, but there appears to be something wrong with this point. If "P" leads to "A" then "P" is a distinct process from "A". To speak of one as leading to the other is to differentiate them, eliminating the opportunity for redefining "P" as "A".

On the other hand, if what we'd assumed to be something qualitatively different from an "A" function, was in fact just another "A" function, then we could indeed redefine "P" as "A", since there would have been no "P", merely complicated "A"s.

I hope that didn't seem too irrelevant, it seemed noteworthy to me.

I think the problem here is our tendency to treat P as if it must fit in a chain of events, somehow reifying it by classifying it along the same lines as we are accustomed to so expertly classifying and analyzing physical phenomena. But all philosophical investigation points to the suggestion that P is something entirely distinct from a physical phenomenon, and thus we should not fall into the trap of conceptualizing it as if it were just that.

I believe the most promising approach is to regard P not as a piece of the pattern in the tapestry of reality, but rather to regard it as the very material from which the tapestry is fashioned (the intrinsic), which supports the existence of abstract patterns of relationships (the extrinsic-- physical phenomena). On this view, P-consciousness (or at least some very primitive, alien form of it) is that elusive something sought by Hawking that breathes fire into the (extrinsic) equations described by physics. Gregg Rosenberg advances a very sophisticated and promising (and of course, much more thorough) version of this thesis in his upcoming book "A Place for Consciousness," set to be released this fall. (He has a preliminary version online located at http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html -- I believe the final version will be edited significantly, but if you're curious this will probably be enough to give you a good idea of the basic points.)

I shall probably look at it today, but for now my question becomes (as it has in the past), if "P-consciousness" were something aside from the physical, how could it interact with the physical? Indeed, it is a point at which I had hinted earlier (however unintentionally), by mentioning the fact that neurologists never seem to run into this "P-consciousness" phenomenon; it never seems to effect anything in the brain. And yet you always define it as intrinsically related to A-consciousness, which is exactly that which these scientists are studying.

btw, It will not be necessary, on this particular occasion, to worry about what does and does not constitue "physicality" (thank God), because the postulate "P is not physical" is being taken for granted (meaning that there is such a thing as physical reality, that P is not a part of that realm, but that it still interacts with it (this last premise being based upon the definitive qualities of P)).

 

[hypnagogue]

But what is this "piece"? Is it something that we experience from a 1st-person PoV, or is it the 1st-person PoV itself?

It is experience itself, which really comprises both of the items on your list. I don't know of any better way to explain this than the "what it is like" and the zombie examples. (For the zombie example, forget about logical possibility and philosophical implications and all that-- just imagine yourself walking around and talking and doing everything you do, but without the attendant conscious experiences, as if you were in a deep sleep. What you are missing in this case is P-consciousness, much like as if you were sleep walking, acting in the world without P-conscious subjective experience of acting in the world.) I think these two examples make the point rather straightforwardly. When you have had difficulty with these examples in the past, has it been because you honestly could not understand what they were getting at, or because you have purely logical objections already in place?

Now, if it is indeed something more than just the 1st-person experience itself, then it must be something experienced, in which case it itself is an objective phenomenon, processed right along with the rest of the objective phenomena in the world, by sentient beings.

It's not so much the what but the how. You never literally see 600nm photons; you see this[/color]. You never literally see a mountain; you see your consciously perceived subjective model of it. We make extrapolations from our subjective experiences to construct the idea of the objective world, but everything we directly experience is only subjective experience, somehow correlated (we quite plausibly believe) with that objective world. Nothing that is experienced, in the sense of direct conscious experience, is objective. If we know anything about the objective world, it is only in virtue of systematic correlations or isomorphisms between the structure of that world and our own subjective experiences. Thus the objective can only be said to be 'experienced' in an indirect, metaphorical sense.

So the blueness of the sky is part of P-consciousness, and not A-? Is not distinguishing that the sky is one shade of blue and not some other color a categorizational activity of the brain? It is as much an action that you percieve "blueness" as that you remarked on it, is it not?

Perceptual discrimination falls under A, not P. But there is more to our experience of color than just discrimination. If it were just discrimination, we would not viscerally experience this[/color] or this[/color]; we would just behave as if they were different. But from the 1st person view, it is clear that we do more than just behave as if they were different; we subjectively experience them differently. If all you did was just perceptually discriminate them, you would be able to tell me that this[/color] is different from this[/color], but they would not look like they do to you. They would not look like anything-- there would be no visual experience.

I shall probably look at it today, but for now my question becomes (as it has in the past), if "P-consciousness" were something aside from the physical, how could it interact with the physical?

Using the analogy I provided in my last post, this would be like asking how the fabric of a tapestry interacts with the abstract patterns woven on it. In other words, a classification error of sorts, if we are expecting the 'interaction' of the fabric with the patterns it instantiates to be of the same nature as the 'interaction' of those patterns among themselves.

Physical phenomena are characterized entirely in terms of their extrinsic, relational properties-- their patterns of interaction and tendencies to change other patterns. Thus, physics is ultimately a description of abstractions, abstract relationships and patterns. We are left with the question, what is it that supports these abstract patterns? The analogue of physics in the case of the tapestry describes in a purely abstract sense the patterns on the the tapestry, their relationships, and so on. What is it that is being patterned and related here? It is the fabric of the tapestry. Likewise, the panpsychist proposal put forth by Rosenberg is that subjective experience, in some manner, is the underlying carrier for all these abstractions described by physics. It seems to be an ideal candidate for such a role, not the least part in virtue of its seemingly intrinsic nature. Many concerns immediately arise from such a hypothesis, of course, but rather than get into those details here you would be better served reading Rosenberg's anticipation of and replies to these concerns.

Indeed, it is a point at which I had hinted earlier (however unintentionally), by mentioning the fact that neurologists never seem to run into this "P-consciousness" phenomenon; it never seems to effect anything in the brain. And yet you always define it as intrinsically related to A-consciousness, which is exactly that which these scientists are studying.

True, but they are not getting the whole story, for the same reason that studying only the patterns on a tapestry will not give us the whole story of the tapestry's nature.

 

[Mentat]

It is experience itself, which really comprises both of the items on your list. I don't know of any better way to explain this than the "what it is like" and the zombie examples. (For the zombie example, forget about logical possibility and philosophical implications and all that-- just imagine yourself walking around and talking and doing everything you do, but without the attendant conscious experiences, as if you were in a deep sleep. What you are missing in this case is P-consciousness, much like as if you were sleep walking, acting in the world without P-conscious subjective experience of acting in the world.)

Do you think it's actually possible, even in principle, for a being to behave exactly as though it were conscious, and yet not be? Why would the zombie behave as it does if it has no experience of the world around it? IOW, if it doesn't experience the world, how does it know what to do?

It's not so much the what but the how. You never literally see 600nm photons; you see this[/color]. You never literally see a mountain; you see your consciously perceived subjective model of it. We make extrapolations from our subjective experiences to construct the idea of the objective world, but everything we directly experience is only subjective experience, somehow correlated (we quite plausibly believe) with that objective world. Nothing that is experienced, in the sense of direct conscious experience, is objective. If we know anything about the objective world, it is only in virtue of systematic correlations or isomorphisms between the structure of that world and our own subjective experiences. Thus the objective can only be said to be 'experienced' in an indirect, metaphorical sense.

Where does "objective" end and "subjective" begin? Is there some cut-off point in the brain? Is the cut-off point just before one enters the brain? The computing model of the brain, from which most scientists appear to be working, makes "subjective" appear to simply mean "the effect that the stimulus has on the over-all structure and function of certain parts of the computer". But this does not appear to be what you mean, since there would be no subjectively-existant image of a mountain in the previous model of thinking. There would simply be the effect that the visual stimulus had on the appropriate parts of the brain.

Basically, I don't understand the use of the term "subjective" here.

Perceptual discrimination falls under A, not P. But there is more to our experience of color than just discrimination. If it were just discrimination, we would not viscerally experience this[/color] or this[/color]; we would just behave as if they were different.

So, if our visual cortexes could visually distinguish between one color and the next, this does not qualify as an experience of one color or the other, but simply as a behavior that coincides therewith? That doesn't seem right. After all, the question again becomes: why would we "behave" differently about one color than about another if we didn't experience them in the first place?

If all you did was just perceptually discriminate them, you would be able to tell me that this[/color] is different from this[/color], but they would not look like they do to you. They would not look like anything-- there would be no visual experience.

Then how would I be able to tell you that they were different? What tips me off to their difference from one another, if it is not a computation of both with reference to each other (as well as with reference to previous encounter with such colors, and the discrimination and categorization that occurred at that time)?

Using the analogy I provided in my last post, this would be like asking how the fabric of a tapestry interacts with the abstract patterns woven on it. In other words, a classification error of sorts, if we are expecting the 'interaction' of the fabric with the patterns it instantiates to be of the same nature as the 'interaction' of those patterns among themselves.

Dennett talked a bit about what you appear to be getting at. I mentioned it in a thread about the Physical, Design, and Intentional stances (probably long gone, by now). Anyway, the idea that the experience/processing of objective stimuli, by a conscious computer is of a different nature than the stimuli themselves is not directly opposed to the Physicalist position. Indeed, it (the computation/experience) is of a different nature than those individual parts which compose it (in this case, neurons, or collections thereof). However, this difference is (according to Dennett, on the topic of the three stances) purely with relation to the synergy of the many parts into a process that is then taken as an individual entity, greater than the sum of its parts. It's like the process of natural selection, in nature. Natural selection and evolution stand out as irreducible "entities" (if the term may be used loosely) since a reduction of them, into the many sub-processes involved, will not give the full flavor of the greater "entity". But that doesn't mean that it isn't a physical process, or that there's something other than the physical involved. It just means that the complex behaviors of many physical parts, taken together as a dynamic synergy, produce a gestalt of sorts, which may be conceived of on its own.

Another example is a symphony. There is nothing about a symphony that can't be reduced to the physical vibrations produced by the individual instruments involved, but the symphony still exists as a distinct "entity". Indeed, this fact is borne out all the more so, when one realizes that a symphony can exists on more than one medium (e.g. it could be in written form, on a sheet of paper).

Physical phenomena are characterized entirely in terms of their extrinsic, relational properties-- their patterns of interaction and tendencies to change other patterns.

Physical phenomena, sure. Physical elements themselves, not really. The patterns of behavior to which you refer are reduced to more fundamental processes, and so on until you reach the most elementary particles and spacetime itself.

 

[Mentat]

Here's that thread, btw: https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=24993

 

[hypnagogue]

Do you think it's actually possible, even in principle, for a being to behave exactly as though it were conscious, and yet not be?

I wasn't talking about logical possibility. I was trying to pinpoint what I mean by P-consciousness. We can't discuss more advanced issues if you can't acknowledge an understanding of the basic terms.

Basically, I don't understand the use of the term "subjective" here.

Unsurprisingly. I mean subjective in the same way I mean P-conscious.

So, if our visual cortexes could visually distinguish between one color and the next, this does not qualify as an experience of one color or the other, but simply as a behavior that coincides therewith? That doesn't seem right. After all, the question again becomes: why would we "behave" differently about one color than about another if we didn't experience them in the first place?

Do you think a computer is conscious? If not, do you think it behaves differently according to what inputs are fed into it?

If the case of the computer is contentious, use an atom instead. An atom is a system that behaves differently according to its 'inputs.' Is an atom conscious? If not, why does it behave differently according to different inputs?

Then how would I be able to tell you that they were different? What tips me off to their difference from one another, if it is not a computation of both with reference to each other (as well as with reference to previous encounter with such colors, and the discrimination and categorization that occurred at that time)?

I didn't preclude neural computations from the mix. Some sort of computation would be exactly what would tip you off. The point is that subjective experience cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of computation. You seem to be begging the question by consistently equating the two, when that is the issue that is up for grabs to begin with.

Dennett talked a bit about what you appear to be getting at. [snip]

We've been down that road plenty of times. I don't see the point in endlessly reiterating our stances. Physical phenomena logically entail symphonies and the like (excluding, of course, the subjective experience of hearing a symphony or the like); they don't logically entail P-consciousness.

Physical phenomena, sure. Physical elements themselves, not really. The patterns of behavior to which you refer are reduced to more fundamental processes, and so on until you reach the most elementary particles and spacetime itself.

Physics makes no claims about fundamental particles or spacetime beyond these entities' power to affect each other, be it realized (as in a description of an atom smasher) or only potential (as in, say, a single fundamental particle isolated in a vacuum). To physics, an elementary particle has no properties beyond those which can influence other physical properties; spacetime has no properties beyond those that explicitly relate to particles and the like; etc. To make a claim about an intrinsic property would be to make a claim about a property that is not defined by its propensity for interaction, in other words something undetectable even in principle by physical instruments. Physics remains silent about intrinsic properties.

 

[Mentat]

I wasn't talking about logical possibility. I was trying to pinpoint what I mean by P-consciousness. We can't discuss more advanced issues if you can't acknowledge an understanding of the basic terms.

But the term is only useful if it is an actual distinction. Not to draw parallel between the mystery of life and the mystery of consciousness (as I have done in the past), but can it not be said that "life" would be a completely irrelevant distinction if there is no possible way for a being to perform all the functions of living and yet not be alive?

What I mean is that I can't see the point of acknowledging a distinction that can never actually exist, even in principle.

Unsurprisingly. I mean subjective in the same way I mean P-conscious.

Do you think a computer is conscious? If not, do you think it behaves differently according to what inputs are fed into it?

I think you are a computer, and I think you are conscious. I also think my PC is conscious to some extent, but not to the same extent that I am. Consciousness refers to it's ability to interact, which is quite limited.

If the case of the computer is contentious, use an atom instead. An atom is a system that behaves differently according to its 'inputs.' Is an atom conscious? If not, why does it behave differently according to different inputs?

It reacts. We interact. And we do so with purpose. My real question is not "how can a zombie interact, if it does not experience the world?" it is "how can/why would a zombie interact in that particular manner if it does not experience the world?".

I didn't preclude neural computations from the mix. Some sort of computation would be exactly what would tip you off. The point is that subjective experience cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of computation. You seem to be begging the question by consistently equating the two, when that is the issue that is up for grabs to begin with.

I equate the two because I don't see anything lacking from pure computation...if I did see some lack, then I would see the need to fill it with a new concept (like P-consciousness).

We've been down that road plenty of times. I don't see the point in endlessly reiterating our stances. Physical phenomena logically entail symphonies and the like (excluding, of course, the subjective experience of hearing a symphony or the like); they don't logically entail P-consciousness.

I agree. The most solid definitions of P-consciousness I've seen have actually included the necessity that they be beyond the physical functions and structures, thus precluding that the opposite be the case (by virtue of the very meaning of the term being used).

I just don't know that P-consciousness (here defined as: that part of experience that is beyond the function and structure of computation) exists in the first place.

Physics makes no claims about fundamental particles or spacetime beyond these entities' power to affect each other, be it realized (as in a description of an atom smasher) or only potential (as in, say, a single fundamental particle isolated in a vacuum). To physics, an elementary particle has no properties beyond those which can influence other physical properties; spacetime has no properties beyond those that explicitly relate to particles and the like; etc. To make a claim about an intrinsic property would be to make a claim about a property that is not defined by its propensity for interaction, in other words something undetectable even in principle by physical instruments. Physics remains silent about intrinsic properties.

Do not theories such as LQG and SMT attempt to define the properties of the particles themselves? Indeed, from my very limited knowledge of LQG, it appears to also focus on the very properties of spacetime itself. Sure, up to now, physics has not touched on the nature of the fundamental entities, but one must also notice that, up to now, physics has not been able to unite -- or fully understand the relationship between -- the two best theories it has for understanding how those entities behave. They are still taken as the fundamental constituents of the Universe, and (according to the aforementioned "best theories") are the "fabric" on which the patterns of behavior and interaction occur.

 

[hypnagogue]

But the term is only useful if it is an actual distinction. Not to draw parallel between the mystery of life and the mystery of consciousness (as I have done in the past), but can it not be said that "life" would be a completely irrelevant distinction if there is no possible way for a being to perform all the functions of living and yet not be alive?

It is an actual distinction. The functions of life exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'life' means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of life simply follows from them. The functions of the brain do not exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'consciousness' (or rather, P-consciousness) means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of P-consciousness still does not follow. At best, given a complete functional understanding of the brain, we would have to posulate additional psychophysical laws to map the functions onto facets of P-conscious experience (eg, 40 hz oscillation in area X of the visual cortex maps onto visual experience of redness). The need for such ad hoc psychophysical laws is a direct consequence of the fact that the physical, functional description of the brain does not suffice to entail P-consciousness; there is something 'extra' that such an account omits.

It reacts. We interact. And we do so with purpose. My real question is not "how can a zombie interact, if it does not experience the world?" it is "how can/why would a zombie interact in that particular manner if it does not experience the world?".

Interaction is really just an elaborate kind of reaction, at least going by the physicalist picture.

The physicalist picture also offers an account of how a human agent could go about interacting in such and such a manner without experience, because there is nothing in the physicalist picture that takes experience into account in the first place. Given a physical description of a functional brain, it follows rather straightforwardly (conceptually, at least) how photons impinging on the retina could lead to a chain reaction of neural activity culminating in the utterance of the phrase "I see red." Here we have an elaborate story detailing human interaction in the world without any reference to, or entailing of, phenomenal experience. We have reference to photons and neurons, which logically entail an utterance. Nowhere do we have this[/color], the phenomenal percept presumably subjectively experienced by our human agent.

I equate the two because I don't see anything lacking from pure computation...if I did see some lack, then I would see the need to fill it with a new concept (like P-consciousness).

There is nothing lacking from pure computation, if we seek to describe the objective phenomena. There is only something lacking if we consider the subjective phenomena. And besides, P-consciousness is not a hypothesized entity that we drum up in the service of explanation; it is an experienced entity, a given in nature, for which we seek an explanation. If it were the former, we would be free to throw it away whenever we wished, as you continually propose; as it is actually the latter, we cannot ignore it unless we are satisfied with an incomplete account of reality.

Do not theories such as LQG and SMT attempt to define the properties of the particles themselves?

The level of nature described is irrelevant; what matters is how the properties themselves are defined. Extrinsic properties are defined in relational terms, and it should be clear that all the properties described by physics are relational properties. If physics were to describe a property in something other than relational terms, it would follow that that property could not be measured, clearly a violation of physics' objective epistemology.

 

[Mentat]

It is an actual distinction. The functions of life exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'life' means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of life simply follows from them. The functions of the brain do not exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'consciousness' (or rather, P-consciousness) means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of P-consciousness still does not follow. At best, given a complete functional understanding of the brain, we would have to posulate additional psychophysical laws to map the functions onto facets of P-conscious experience (eg, 40 hz oscillation in area X of the visual cortex maps onto visual experience of redness). The need for such ad hoc psychophysical laws is a direct consequence of the fact that the physical, functional description of the brain does not suffice to entail P-consciousness; there is something 'extra' that such an account omits.

I agree that no level of comprehension of the physical functions will ever explain P-consciousness...I'm just not convinced that it needs explaining, because I'm not convinced that it exists.

Besides, the concept of "life" is actually not as completely understood as you make it seem. In fact, most of the good definitions of "life" (the ones that include all things which we naturally deem "living") must also include such things as viruses and fire. What I'm saying is that there can be an entity which performs all of the functions necessary for being called "alive", and yet not really be alive...but, is it that there's something missing from this entity (something illusive, and non-physical), or is it that "life" is a meaningless distinction, which should simply be discarded, because it clouds the issues?

Interaction is really just an elaborate kind of reaction, at least going by the physicalist picture.

The physicalist picture also offers an account of how a human agent could go about interacting in such and such a manner without experience, because there is nothing in the physicalist picture that takes experience into account in the first place. Given a physical description of a functional brain, it follows rather straightforwardly (conceptually, at least) how photons impinging on the retina could lead to a chain reaction of neural activity culminating in the utterance of the phrase "I see red."

I don't see why verbal utterance is always the end-result in a physicalist approach. Why not go to the point just before this utterance, when the visual cortex processed the "red" stimulus? Of course, there was no end result to this computation (quite obviously so, considering the fact that the red was probably a part of a bigger picture (not all of which was red), around which the eyes' saccades were visiting and re-visiting different parts to get greater amounts of information about the bigger picture), it is an on-going process -- still occurring when the person makes the utterance. That is one of the reasons I don't like reference to "experience" as though it were an event. Experiencing the color red was not one event, but a set of events, which culminated naught, but which brought forth a general conclusion with regard to the utterance made.

Here we have an elaborate story detailing human interaction in the world without any reference to, or entailing of, phenomenal experience. We have reference to photons and neurons, which logically entail an utterance. Nowhere do we have this[/color], the phenomenal percept presumably subjectively experienced by our human agent.

Well, it should be assumed that the human agent had been (and probably still was) experiencing/processing the "red" stimulus. That isn't left out of a physicalist account, it's just usually glossed-over, since the exact neural processes involved in the categorization, memorization, &c are not yet perfectly understood.

There is nothing lacking from pure computation, if we seek to describe the objective phenomena. There is only something lacking if we consider the subjective phenomena. And besides, P-consciousness is not a hypothesized entity that we drum up in the service of explanation; it is an experienced entity, a given in nature, for which we seek an explanation. If it were the former, we would be free to throw it away whenever we wished, as you continually propose; as it is actually the latter, we cannot ignore it unless we are satisfied with an incomplete account of reality.

Interesting. Experience is an experienced entity? Does one always experience the fact that they are experiencing, or does one usually just experience the phenomenon and move on without giving a second thought to the concept of having experienced it? The point I'm making is that there seems to be no difficulty accepting that "subjective experience" is the equivalent of "1st-person computation" until you consider the ability to experience the fact that one is experiencing (i.e. until one introspects). Yet, if it could be accepted that all of the experiences we have while not introspecting are just 1st-person computation, then the experience of experience would be a meta-computation; a computation about previous computations. This is still something for which physicalist theory could account.

The level of nature described is irrelevant; what matters is how the properties themselves are defined. Extrinsic properties are defined in relational terms, and it should be clear that all the properties described by physics are relational properties. If physics were to describe a property in something other than relational terms, it would follow that that property could not be measured, clearly a violation of physics' objective epistemology.

First off, there are a lot of properties that cannot be exactly measured, as per the HUP.

Secondly, if physics attempts to describe some particular aspect of the physical nature (e.g. the shape) of some fundamental entity, then it is not describing any relation, just an intrinsic property. The superstring theory (as one example) has done just that.

Finally, the issue at hand (which brought forth this discussion of physics epistemology) is whether physics can identify the fundamental entities at work in the Universe, instead of just describing their relationships with each other. It becomes clear that it can, when one looks at current Theoretical Physics.

 

[hypnagogue]

Besides, the concept of "life" is actually not as completely understood as you make it seem. In fact, most of the good definitions of "life" (the ones that include all things which we naturally deem "living") must also include such things as viruses and fire. What I'm saying is that there can be an entity which performs all of the functions necessary for being called "alive", and yet not really be alive...but, is it that there's something missing from this entity (something illusive, and non-physical), or is it that "life" is a meaningless distinction, which should simply be discarded, because it clouds the issues?

I agree with you that the varying definitions of life that one finds are, to some degree, arbitrary. When one tries to define life rigorously, one often finds phenomena slipping into the category that one wouldn't have called 'alive' to begin with. But this is irrelevant to my point, which is simply that life, under any construal, is just an assembly of functional properties (metabolism, reproduction, etc.), and so is amenable to an entirely functional explanation. With consciousness, we have direct first-person evidence of pure, intrinsic properties. Not all the targeted explanandums in consciousness are functional in nature, unlike the situation with life.

This[/color], for example, is not entirely defined by 'what it does'; there is the added component of 'what it looks like.' And no, 'what it looks like' cannot be exhaustively described by 'what the brain does.' I know you are going to contend this, but we've discussed this ad nauseam already, so perhaps I'm just not communicating well enough. Please see chapter 2 of Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness, http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr2.htm , for a sophisticated and in depth review of my position.

Well, it should be assumed that the human agent had been (and probably still was) experiencing/processing the "red" stimulus. That isn't left out of a physicalist account, it's just usually glossed-over, since the exact neural processes involved in the categorization, memorization, &c are not yet perfectly understood.

You continue to equivocate and beg the question. Physicalism refers to the visual processing of the photons; it does not refer to the experiential property of redness. These are not the same thing, and the former does not entail the latter. Please see the text.

First off, there are a lot of properties that cannot be exactly measured, as per the HUP.

You do not need to be able to measure exactly in order to conduct the activity of measurement.

Secondly, if physics attempts to describe some particular aspect of the physical nature (e.g. the shape) of some fundamental entity, then it is not describing any relation, just an intrinsic property. The superstring theory (as one example) has done just that.

The concept of shape is meaningless without reference to some pattern of structural relationships among the extensions along the object's dimensions. Even if we assume that there is a most fundamental kind of string that cannot be divided into further strings, if we claim that this string has a shape in any meaningful sense, we are making a purely structural, relational claim. This is born out by the fact that, for any given shape of any given string, we could completely characterize the nature of its shape simply by plotting a series of points in the proper way on a suitably constructed set of axes. We can do this because shape is an abstract property describing relationships and nothing else. If shape were an intrinsic property, we would expect that there is something about the nature of the string's shape that is omitted once we have duplicated its relational aspects, but this is not the case. Remember, an intrinsic property is one that cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of a system of relationships.

Finally, the issue at hand (which brought forth this discussion of physics epistemology) is whether physics can identify the fundamental entities at work in the Universe, instead of just describing their relationships with each other. It becomes clear that it can, when one looks at current Theoretical Physics.

No, that is not the issue at all. The issue is whether physics describes intrinsic properties at work in the universe. The fundamental entities that physics describes are still characterized in purely relational terms, what Rosenberg calls bare differences. Again, please see chapter 2 as linked above for a better account of what I'm getting at.

 

[Mentat]

Well, Hypna, I read a good deal of that chapter, and I have some responses:

1) With regard to "bare differences" and the relational way in which physics looks at entities, I guess your pretty much right. What I'm wondering (and what may have caused my initial rejection of the concept) is whether the description of intrinsic properties is logically possible at all. Logic works on truth values, and truth values only have properties as they relate to each other. There is nothing instrinsically describable about "truth" or "falsehood". "False" just isn't "true" and vice versa. So why should science (a logical construct) seek to explain anything intrinsic, when such explanation would be outside the realm of both logic and empiricism (which is, itself, a logical construct)?

2) With regard to "Mary". It was quite enlightening, with regard to your position, since it now appears that your objection to physicalism is that it usually focuses on the processes by which one becomes conscious, and not on the consciousness itself. This is where the separation of A- and P-consciousness would come in, if such a distinction were valid. However, as Edelmann has pointed out in both of his major books (Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, and A Universe of Consciousness) a scientific explanation never explains anything but the process, the circumstances that are conducive to that process, and how to reproduce those circumstances. He gives the example of a hurricane, but I will use the example of gravity (I know I have before, but I think I've got a different slant on it this time):

Gravity has been explained in terms of a "push", a "pull", a pre-programmed change in inertia, and (the currently excepted explanation) a curvature of space-time itself by the presence of mass. However, the scientists (and crackpots) who have devised their versions of the aforementioned explanations have -- it appears -- been completely concerned with what causes gravity, instead of the gravity itself. Regardless of whether it is caused by a curvature of spacetime or a bombardment of neutrinos (yes, that actually was a circulating hypothesis on the web), we are still not addressing the intrinsic properties of gravity, only the circumstances conducive to it, and the things that may be required to produce it. Because of this distinction, I can imagine a case where the curvature is there, but the particle does not move in the prescribed direction, because nothing has yet explained to me the explicit necessity of a curvature to entail gravity.

I'm purposefully using some of the words that are used both in the referenced book and in the few bits of Chalmers that I've read (usually just references to it by other philosophers), but replacing "consciousness" with "gravity" and "computation" with "curvature".

Do you see what I'm getting at? Science does not explain intrinsic properties because it has no need to. Indeed, it is the scientific stance (science being a physicalist approach) that the explanation of a phenomenon can be complete without such inspection into intrinsic properties.

 

[hypnagogue]

Well, Hypna, I read a good deal of that chapter, and I have some responses:

Thanks.

1) With regard to "bare differences" and the relational way in which physics looks at entities, I guess your pretty much right. What I'm wondering (and what may have caused my initial rejection of the concept) is whether the description of intrinsic properties is logically possible at all. Logic works on truth values, and truth values only have properties as they relate to each other. There is nothing instrinsically describable about "truth" or "falsehood". "False" just isn't "true" and vice versa. So why should science (a logical construct) seek to explain anything intrinsic, when such explanation would be outside the realm of both logic and empiricism (which is, itself, a logical construct)?

Intrinsic properties are not entirely defineable in terms of conceptual systems consisting only of sets of bare differences and their relationships. (I'll call such systems 'schematic systems.') But this does not imply that the natures of intrinsic properties are entirely elusive to schematic analysis. Those aspects of intrinsic properties that schematic systems can capture are precisely their relational aspects.

You may be wondering just how we can know about the nature of intrinsic properties as thus construed, and how it can be possible for intrinsic properties to enter into systems of relations in the first place. The paradigmatic case here is phenomenal consciousness. With P-consciousness, we have evidence of the existence of intrinsic properties via a direct, immediate acquaintance with them. We do not need to discover them schematically, since their nature is directly apparent to us. (In Rosenberg's framework, this is possible because there is a sense in which phenomenal properties compose or realize the schematic systems of relationships described by physics (such as a human brain), rather than 'being produced by' or 'interacting with' them.) Indeed, we cannot discover phenomenal properties only via a schematic system, which accounts for why I can know all the facts about the brain of, say, a bat, without having complete knowledge of the bat's phenomenal experiences. At the very best, I can extract the schematic set of relationships into which its phenomenal percepts engage, but I cannot know if sounds sound qualitatively the same way to it as they do to me.

We can make sense of the concept of a system of relationships existing among intrinsic properties by a similar appeal to P-consciousness. For example, some colors appear to us qualitatively brighter than others (a scalar relationship), and the occurence of some phenomenal properties appear to either necessitate or exclude others (a conditional inclusion/exclusion relationship), such as how brightness seems to necessitate hue, or how the appearance of a necker cube as facing up excludes the experience of seeing it as facing down.

What is the upshot for science? Science studies schematic systems of relationships, so it appears that science can at least reveal to us, in principle, the systems of relationships existing among intrinsic properties. The question of how to ascertain the existence of such intrinsic properties in the first place finds the beginning of an answer by noticing correlations between directly experienced phenomenal experiences and physical activity occurring in the brain, and attempting to inductively generate general conditions for the existence of phenomenal consciousness from the observed specific cases (no news there). Rosenberg argues to great effect for a revised conception of causation, resulting in a framework that appears to make that inductive procedure more tractable (in addition to addressing simultaneously a host of problems involving in causation, consciousness, and their theoretical overlap).

I know, again, that you probably have a number of objections to some of the things I've said here, and that I've invariably left holes in the argument by giving such a brief overview. Again, I'd like to refer you specifically to the text, this time chapter 12: http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr12.htm . You should be able to extract the force of the arguments given here (up until section 12.4) without suffering too much from having skipped the previous chapters. Be aware, however, that this chapter does not contain the entire content (or even most of the content) of Rosenberg's revised framework for causation, and also that he uses the terms 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' a little differently than I have been using them here. (Basically, he generalizes the concepts to apply to a range of cases and refers to the kind of bottom-line intrinsic property I have been talking about here as 'intrinsic tout court.')

That's all I have time for right now, but I'll get back to the remaining parts of your post later.

 

[Philocrat]

Subjective Eperience dispute is out of date. The argument is no longer about whether subjective experience exists or is defineable or is explainable, but wholly about how much of it is already passively transmitted and extended outward to the objective realm. The logical implication of those who claim that subjective experience may not exist afterall merely implies that subjective experience is already causally and functionally objective. The algorithm should quite rightly deduce that subjective consciousness is objective consciousness, and that if there were any difference at all it would be that the former is wholly dependent upon the latter for self-realisation.

 

[hypnagogue]

Sorry for the long layoff; I've just returned from a long trip.

2) With regard to "Mary". It was quite enlightening, with regard to your position, since it now appears that your objection to physicalism is that it usually focuses on the processes by which one becomes conscious, and not on the consciousness itself.

A better characterization of the objection would be to say that there is no theoretical connection between the processes by which one supposedly becomes conscious and the consciousness itself. There is no compelling reason to believe, a priori, that the brain doing such and such should be associated with the qualitative perception of a color, for example. Contrast this with the scientific account of any physical phenomenon P, where one should be able to derive P given the appropriate set of physical facts and laws-- the derivation, of course, constituting an a priori connection between the set of facts and laws and P.

However, as Edelmann has pointed out in both of his major books (Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, and A Universe of Consciousness) a scientific explanation never explains anything but the process, the circumstances that are conducive to that process, and how to reproduce those circumstances.

Agreed. Put in other terms, a scientific explanation never explains anything but a schematic set of relationships-- extrinsic properties. Therefore, with regard to intrinsic properties, we should not expect a purely scientific account to have anything meaningful to say, except insofar as it is able to catalogue the set of relationships that might exist among such properties. Since subjective experience is composed of intrinsic properties, we should not expect science to say anything about it beyond describing the sets of relationships that exist among its qualitative elements as a function of brain activity. In other words, we should not expect a scientific account of phenomenal consciousness to be a complete account of phenomenal consciousness.

Gravity has been explained in terms of a "push", a "pull", a pre-programmed change in inertia, and (the currently excepted explanation) a curvature of space-time itself by the presence of mass. However, the scientists (and crackpots) who have devised their versions of the aforementioned explanations have -- it appears -- been completely concerned with what causes gravity, instead of the gravity itself. Regardless of whether it is caused by a curvature of spacetime or a bombardment of neutrinos (yes, that actually was a circulating hypothesis on the web), we are still not addressing the intrinsic properties of gravity, only the circumstances conducive to it, and the things that may be required to produce it. Because of this distinction, I can imagine a case where the curvature is there, but the particle does not move in the prescribed direction, because nothing has yet explained to me the explicit necessity of a curvature to entail gravity.

There isn't an explanatory gap here. You can only imagine that a particle should not move in the prescribed direction if you neglect to take into account some of the physical facts or laws. For example, in your hypothetical account it appears as if, in the course of your imagining, you have neglected to include the fact that particles follow geodesics. From a complete description of the physical facts and laws-- matter curves space in such and such a fashion, particles follow geodesics, and so on-- a logically sound analysis can only lead you to conclude that the particle does indeed follow the prescribed direction.

You might object that there is nothing yet explained that should entail why particles should follow geodesics, or some more basic phenomenon underpinning this fact. We will eventually hit some rock bottom where we must just take it as a brute fact that the world is such and such a way. Many philosophers conclude that the existence of P-consciousness and its relationships with brain activity must fall into just such a class of brute facts, which could be catalogued under the heading of psycho-physical laws.

Even if we allow psycho-physical laws the same unexplained, rock-bottom status as their counterparts in physics, there is still a disanalogy. Psycho-physical laws would at least refer to, if not explain, intrinsic properties such as this[/color], whereas physics as we know it refers only to extrinsic properties. There would still be something fundamentally new here, some domain which the extrinsic approach of physics could not broach.

Do you see what I'm getting at? Science does not explain intrinsic properties because it has no need to. Indeed, it is the scientific stance (science being a physicalist approach) that the explanation of a phenomenon can be complete without such inspection into intrinsic properties.

Clearly it cannot. How can a theory of this[/color] be complete if its most quintessential character, its defining characteristic, remains opaque to the theory?

We don't even need to mention P-consciousness to realize the incompleteness of physical theory. Physics describes extrinsic properties, a system of relationships consisting only in bare differences. Even for uncontroversially objective phenomena, there still remains the question, what is it that realizes these bare differences? In what do these bare differences subsist? What is it that carries these differences and allows them to exist in the first place? To answer such questions, we need to make reference to intrinsic properties; extrinsic properties will not do the job.

Again, for a better explanation of what I'm getting at here, you might want to refer to chapter 12 of Rosenberg's book, http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr12.htm .

 

[selfAdjoint]

A better characterization of the objection would be to say that there is no theoretical connection between the processes by which one supposedly becomes conscious and the consciousness itself. There is no compelling reason to believe, a priori, that the brain doing such and such should be associated with the qualitative perception of a color, for example. Contrast this with the scientific account of any physical phenomenon P, where one should be able to derive P given the appropriate set of physical facts and laws-- the derivation, of course, constituting an a priori connection between the set of facts and laws and P.

Well, the different opsin molecules in the retina, sampling the ambient EM at several narrow bands, followed by the post processing in the visual cortex, essentially forming the differences of the intensities in the bands, would give us the ability to derive certain topological and ordering properties that we ascribe to color. I think we could derive the fact that the lowere visual frequencies correspong to "bright" or by cultural assimilation based on experience with fire, "warm" colors and the higher ones to "dark" or "cool" ones. This is a long way from a fine color-sense, but the processing is only a little way into the brain, too.

I know you will never accept physicalism, but I see nothing in the present state of understanding of the brain to justify the big leap to dualism. And whatever you say, it IS dualism, because you deny the competence of the physical universe to generate some facet of reality.

 

[hypnagogue]

Well, the different opsin molecules in the retina, sampling the ambient EM at several narrow bands, followed by the post processing in the visual cortex, essentially forming the differences of the intensities in the bands, would give us the ability to derive certain topological and ordering properties that we ascribe to color. I think we could derive the fact that the lowere visual frequencies correspong to "bright" or by cultural assimilation based on experience with fire, "warm" colors and the higher ones to "dark" or "cool" ones. This is a long way from a fine color-sense, but the processing is only a little way into the brain, too.

This is in line with what I've been saying. We shouldn't expect the relationships between qualitative perceptions to be entirely opaque to physics, since physics describes relationships. So, from science, we can deduce a three-channel perceptual system with varying intensities along each channel and the like-- what we can't deduce is a sense of the qualitative feel of those colors themselves. For that we rely on direct perception, and science really has nothing to say here. An alien with a different visual system will never know what this[/color] looks like, even if he has a pretty good idea of how it participates in human vision.

I know you will never accept physicalism, but I see nothing in the present state of understanding of the brain to justify the big leap to dualism.
And whatever you say, it IS dualism, because you deny the competence of the physical universe to generate some facet of reality.

I deny the competence of our conceptual understanding of physics to account for some facet of reality. Big difference there. In Rosenberg's conception, the web of relationships described by physical theory is underpinned by intrinsic properties, which themselves are of the same general (experiential) nature as the kind of intrinsic properties we encounter in qualitative consciousness. Physical theory makes no mention of such intrinsic properties, be they in some sense experiential or not.

In other words, in Rosenberg's picture, there is one kind of stuff in the universe that underpins all phenomena. There is no metaphysical dualism here; the stuff that allows for the existence of physical phenomena is the same stuff that makes itself apparent in P-consciousness. The only 'dualism' here is an epistemological dichotomy inherent in our understanding of natural phenomena: we describe relationships without any mention of anything that is to be doing the relating. Thus, what is questioned is not the competence of the physical universe to generate anything, but rather the completeness of physical theory as an account of reality as a whole.

 

[yanniru]

I ran across a rather deep paper from the Ukraine on machine consciousness which includes quantum effects, emergent effects and levels of complexity. It is so inclusive that I suspect it may be an adequate model for natural (human) as well as artificial consciousness. I have not read this paper in depth yet. But I think some posters on this forum may find it quite interesting. Here is the link and the abstract:


http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0409140
Emerging Consciousness as a Result of Complex-Dynamical Interaction Process
Authors: Andrei P. Kirilyuk
Comments: 32 pages, 42 eqs, 54 refs; Report presented at the EXYSTENCE workshop Machine Consciousness: Complexity Aspects (Turin, 29 September - 1 October 2003), this http URL
Subj-class: General Physics
A quite general interaction process within a multi-component system is analysed by the extended effective potential method, liberated from usual limitations of perturbation theory or integrable model. The obtained causally complete solution of the many-body problem reveals the phenomenon of dynamic multivaluedness, or redundance, of emerging, incompatible system realisations and dynamic entanglement of system components within each realisation. The ensuing concept of dynamic complexity (and related intrinsic chaoticity) is absolutely universal and can be applied to the problem of consciousness that emerges now as a high enough, properly specified level of unreduced complexity of a suitable interaction process. This complexity level can be identified with the appearance of bound, permanently localised states in the multivalued brain dynamics from strongly chaotic states of unconscious intelligence, by analogy with classical behaviour emergence from quantum states at much lower levels of world dynamics. We show that the main properties of this dynamically emerging consciousness (and intelligence, at the preceding complexity level) correspond to empirically derived properties of natural versions and obtain causally substantiated conclusions about their artificial realisation, including the fundamentally justified paradigm of genuine machine consciousness. This rigorously defined machine consciousness is different from both natural consciousness and any mechanistic, dynamically single-valued imitation of the latter. We use then the same, truly universal concept of complexity to derive equally rigorous conclusions about mental and social implications of the machine consciousness paradigm, demonstrating its indispensable role in the next stage of civilisation development.

 

[Preator Fenix]

I too am back Mentat.

And I still disagree with you.

 

[yanniru]

What is a Mentat?