Is Consciousness Beyond Physical Explanation?

[Q_Goest]

That is not my question. I'm not asking about arguments that have dualism as a hypothesis -- I'm asking about arguments that have dualism as a conclusion.

Why, for example, doesn't one insist that reducing a gas to a physical arrangement of molecules leaves something out, or rhetorically ask "Why should an arrangement of molecules be accompanied by fluid behavior?"

The cynical answer is that the kinetic theory of gas has been "finished', but the "reductive explanation" of consciousness is still in progress.

You asserted that consciousness "resists reductive explanation" -- without assuming that as an axiom, how does one defend that position against progress in research into the brain?

The fundamental idea behind what a physical theory is, is nicely explained by Chalmers in my last post. Any such theory regarding the structure and dynamics of physical processes is objectively measurable.

Clearly, phenomenal experience, qualia for example, are not objectively measurable. If anyone disputes this, they have to explain how in principal, one might be able to objectively measure qualia. Note that this is not a description of the "structural dynamics" on which the phenomena supervene, it is a description of the qualia or phenomenal experience. In other words, we need a way to compare one instance of qualia with another such as an ability to compare one person's experience of the color red with another person's experience of it. We need a measure of some sort, but the best we can do is provide a measurement of the structure and dynamics of the objectively measurable physical processes.

If a phenomenon is not objectively measurable, it is not quantifiable. If it is not quantifiable, we can't create a physical theory of it. Note also that physical theories are all describable using mathematics, but without an ability to quantify the phenomenon we can't use mathematics to describe the phenomenon. Without a mathematical description, we have only a qualitative description. If all we have is a qualitative description, and making the assumption of the causal closure of the physical, we don’t even have a way of verifying this qualitative description per the Knowledge paradox.

It would seem that calling phenomenal experience a physical phenomenon is based solely on there being a physical substrate. Even dualism doesn't reject this basic premise. But to catagorize phenomenal experience as a physical phenomenon is to place it in the same category as the kinetic theory of gasses, or to call it a phenomenon analogous to wing flutter. Without a physical theory to quantifiably describe conscious phenomena, calling it physical might be considered a catagorical error, thus dualism.

 

[Q_Goest]

I think the idea of a zombie is flawed. The closest thing to a zombie is somebody that is dead (they have all the brain matter, but no thought process). But they're still not a zombie, because there's definitely a physical difference (in terms of events and interactions) between a live and dead person.

Why should the concept of a p-zombie be flawed? In my view it is perfectly logical. A zombie is simply the physical process less the phenomenal experience.

If things are measurable in a consistent way, they have a physical basis. If they're not... then we're pretty much screwed on understanding it.

I agree it’s tough to understand how we might incorporate consciousness into a physical description of the world. If mental phenomena have a causal influence over the physical, we might not be screwed but it might be a bit difficult to reconcile.

 

[Upisoft]

Clearly, phenomenal experience, qualia for example, are not objectively measurable. If anyone disputes this, they have to explain how in principal, one might be able to objectively measure qualia. Note that this is not a description of the "structural dynamics" on which the phenomena supervene, it is a description of the qualia or phenomenal experience. In other words, we need a way to compare one instance of qualia with another such as an ability to compare one person's experience of the color red with another person's experience of it. We need a measure of some sort, but the best we can do is provide a measurement of the structure and dynamics of the objectively measurable physical processes.

Fascinating.

How one makes objective measurement? Let's say you have a battery and you want to measure objectively its voltage. You get a multimeter, connect it to the battery and there it is, it shows 1.48V. Then you realize that the multimeter can be malfunctioning, so you decide to repeat your measurement with another multimeter. It shows 1.47V. You decide that you have made objective measurement.

But did you look inside your multimeters? They are quite different. One of them is digital and the other is analog. They have "experienced" the measurement quite differently. Their "qualia" is different. Did you care? No.

Then why try to do that with us? What you care is the objective measurement, which is "red". How the measurement is done is of no consequence to the objectivity of that fact.

 

[Math Is Hard]

Fascinating.

How one makes objective measurement? Let's say you have a battery and you want to measure objectively its voltage. You get a multimeter, connect it to the battery and there it is, it shows 1.48V. Then you realize that the multimeter can be malfunctioning, so you decide to repeat your measurement with another multimeter. It shows 1.47V. You decide that you have made objective measurement.

But did you look inside your multimeters? They are quite different. One of them is digital and the other is analog. They have "experienced" the measurement quite differently. Their "qualia" is different. Did you care? No.

I think that's quite in line with what the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism" were getting at in their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. What could be observed and measured was important, but unobservable mental events and respresentations were trivial, and for all scientific purposes, meaningless.

Then why try to do that with us? What you care is the objective measurement, which is "red". How the measurement is done is of no consequence to the objectivity of that fact.

There can be an objective measurement of the properties of red, specifically as a wavelength range of visible light. But the "experience of red" still falls into the subjective.

 

[Upisoft]

I think that's quite in line with what the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism" were getting at in their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. What could be observed and measured was important, but unobservable mental events and respresentations were trivial, and for all scientific purposes, meaningless.There can be an objective measurement of the properties of red, specifically as a wavelength range of visible light. But the "experience of red" still falls into the subjective.

I didn't say there are unobservable mental events. Nor the events in analog and digital multimeters are unobservable. If you want to study and understand the digital multimeter you don't get the Analog Electronics textbook. The same is valid for us. If you want to understand what is going in someone's head you don't compare it with something else. Even if that something else is quite similar. The best you can get is to find the parts that perform similar functions. But still, how they perform these functions could be quite different in the details.

 

[Hurkyl]

If anyone disputes this, they have to explain how in principal, one might be able to objectively measure qualia.

An experiment to determine how well a specific television and RGB combination reproduces a specific color would be to grab 100 people, show them both the original color and the color on the television, and ask them if they are the same.

Voila -- you have an objective measurement that X of your 100 test subjects reported having the same color viewing experience.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

An experiment to determine how well a specific television and RGB combination reproduces a specific color would be to grab 100 people, show them both the original color and the color on the television, and ask them if they are the same.

Voila -- you have an objective measurement that X of your 100 test subjects reported having the same color viewing experience.

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do. A person will learn to associate a sensation caused by light from the lower end of the visible light spectrum with a name and behave in a consistent way regarding that particular sensation. They will stop at red lights and follow the red line marked on floors when asked. That tells us nothing about what they "see". The private sensation they experience cannot be observed by others. They probably do "see" the same thing other humans with normal anatomy and neural function see, but this is an assumption. In any case, IMO such sensations can only be described as the perceived signature of a physical effect.

My point is that dualism vs a monist physicalism is simply a version of the physical/metaphysical issue;questions that can be answered (in principle) and those that cannot be. In my previous post on this thread I asked how we could imagine the sensations of an intelligent alien who was able to sense wave lengths in the radio spectrum. IMO this really isn't about dualism but about observer-observed interaction and whether the observer can make statements about what is inherently unobservable (other observers' qualia).

 

[Upisoft]

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do. A person will learn to associate a sensation caused by light from the lower end of the visible light spectrum with a name and behave in a consistent way regarding that particular sensation. They will stop at red lights and follow the red line marked marked on floors when asked. That tells us nothing about what they "see". The private sensation they experience cannot be observed by others. They probably do "see" the same thing other humans with normal anatomy and neural function see, but this is an assumption. In any case, IMO such sensations can only be described as the perceived signature of a physical effect.

My point is that dualism vs a monist physicalism is simply a version of the physical/metaphysical issue;questions that can be answered (in principle) and those that cannot be. In my previous post on this thread I asked how we could imagine the sensations of an intelligent alien who was able to sense wave lengths in the radio spectrum. IMO this really isn't about dualism but about observer-observed interaction and whether the observer can make statements about what is inherently unobservable (other observers' qualia).

The question "how do others experience something" is based on an assumption. You assume there is something different than your brain (name it soul) which is experiencing the sensations. You imagine it can somehow enter someones's head replacing their soul with yours, and then asking the question how your soul will experience what they see. So you assume something unknown as true (do we have a soul?) and conclude there are things that cannot be known. Bravo! What did you expect?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

So you assume something unknown as true (do we have a soul?) and conclude there are things that cannot be known. Bravo! What did you expect?

I assume no such thing. Where did I say anything about souls? I said that our sensations are the perceived signatures of physical effects. Moreover I believe that there are observable correlates of all aspects of what we call mind. I do believe there are limits to what we can know from observer-observed interactions and that I cannot prove to a metaphysical certainty that the world is not an illusion that exists only in my mind. But then again, what are the metaphysical standards? How do you prove a negative? IMO debating metaphysical questions is usually a waste of time. There are no answers, only opinions and beliefs. Choose what you like.

 

[Upisoft]

The private sensation they experience cannot be observed by others.

You made your assumption here. When I say I cannot sing (quite true), I assume there is someone else that can sing. When you assume that private sensations cannot be observed by others (humans), you assume that they can be observed by something else (God?). You cannot have the negative without the positive.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

You made your assumption here. When I say I cannot sing (quite true), I assume there is someone else that can sing. When you assume that private sensations cannot be observed by others (humans), you assume that they can be observed by something else (God?). You cannot have the negative without the positive.

You can choose to believe what you wish about metaphysical propositions, but that's not the issue here. I once did a thought experiment about literally getting into someone else's head. Imagine wiring two brains together so that one brain could literally experience the other person's thoughts and sensations. Now ask yourself the question: Who is the observer and who is the observed? From my point of view, I'm the observer. I see red like I always see it. Assuming both brains are normal, could I expect anything different?

 

[DaveC426913]

Imagine wiring two brains together so that one brain could literally experience the other person's thoughts and sensations.

...

I see red like I always see it. Assuming both brains are normal, could I expect anything different?

That depends on the actual mechanism of the wiring. Are you tapping in before the processing, or after? If you are simply wired to the sensory inputs (i.e. before processing) then of course you would see 'red'. But if you are wired in after the processing ... the question is raised: what does it mean to be wired in "after processing"?

 

[Upisoft]

You can choose to believe what you wish about metaphysical propositions, but that's not the issue here. I once did a thought experiment about literally getting into someone else's head. Imagine wiring two brains together so that one brain could literally experience the other person's thoughts and sensations. Now ask yourself the question: Who is the observer and who is the observed? From my point of view, I'm the observer. I see red like I always see it. Assuming both brains are normal, could I expect anything different?

Your thought experiment is invalid. It is same as to assume that you can wire an analog multimeter parts with a digital multimeter parts, so that they can both experience what the other device is experiencing. There is no meaningful way to interconnect them. Thus, your question "who is the observer" is also invalid, because it is based on invalid assumption.

 

[sganesh88]

"Die!" said the VIRUS. It was the VIRUS, not its RNA.

Precisely the point!

 

[SW VandeCarr]

That depends on the actual mechanism of the wiring. Are you tapping in before the processing, or after? If you are simply wired to the sensory inputs (i.e. before processing) then of course you would see 'red'. But if you are wired in after the processing ... the question is raised: what does it mean to be wired in "after processing"?

Yes. Are you anchored in your own identity seeing through the other's eyes, but processing visual data in your own observing brain? If so, you would see red as you always have. On the other hand, if you are processing with the other's brain, I argue that you become the other and therefore see red as the other does. However since your identity is now anchored in the other with the other's memory, you will see red as you (as the other) always did.

 

[Hurkyl]

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do.

The experiment is an objective measurement of something. And "qualia are what people measure" is, IMO, a rather reasonable working definition.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

The experiment is an objective measurement of something. And "qualia are what people measure" is, IMO, a rather reasonable working definition.

The experiment is a measure of people's color memory, but as far as I can tell, does not address the issue of color perception. I have no way of knowing what you see when you say you see red. Since I can read and understand what you write, your brain and my brain content and processing seem to be are similar enough that I can infer that your red is the same as, or very similar to, mine. But I can't know this to a metaphysical certainty.

I want to address some possible questions I anticipate from the thought experiment in my previous post where the observer anchors his/her identity in the observed.

1) What happens to the identity of the observed "other".

2) What happens to the identity of the observer..

In my view the other's stream of consciousness does not miss a beat. The observed is not aware of anything unusual since the 'occupation' of her/his brain carries no external content. However the identity of the observer is effectively (if temporarily) erased.

When the experiment ends observer's identity is re-established in her/his own temporarily comatose brain with no memory of the experience.

My conclusion from this thought experiment is that it is not possible to experience the world as another experiences it without effectively being the other. I would, as an axiom, exclude the possibility one can anchor their identity in more than one individual at the same time (effectively be two people at the same time).

 

[Hurkyl]

The experiment is measure of people's color memory, but as far as I can tell, does not address the issue of color perception. I have no way of knowing what you see when you say you see red. Since I can read and understand what you write, your brain and my brain content and processing seem to be are similar enough that I can infer that your red is the same as, or very similar to, mine. But I can't know this to a metaphysical certainty.

But how is this different than any other topic of physical science? We make observations and notice some consistency, so we study it in more detail, formulate and test hypotheses, build scientific theories, and so forth.

What is "really" going on -- if that notion is even meaningful -- doesn't enter into it.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

But how is this different than any other topic of physical science? We make observations and notice some consistency, so we study it in more detail, formulate and test hypotheses, build scientific theories, and so forth.

What is "really" going on -- if that notion is even meaningful -- doesn't enter into it.

Well, I too am arguing that while I believe qualia exist, since I'm aware my own sensations and I cannot observe or experience other people's sensations; the term "dualism" suggests to me there are two streams of reality. I believe sensations are personal signatures of observable effects/events, but the sensations themselves only can be known by the individual. My view is that there is only one stream of reality which is in principle can be observed and measured by sentient observers, but that sentience itself is a private property of the observer that can only be indirectly observed or communicated to other observers. That does not constitute a separate stream of reality or "ghost in the machine", but simply is a limit on what we can observe or experience.

EDIT: It's true that we cannot know other's thoughts, but many thoughts can be described clearly and understood. When I tell you I'm thinking of the color red, I can only hope you understand what I mean because I can't describe it.

 

[Q_Goest]

An experiment to determine how well a specific television and RGB combination reproduces a specific color would be to grab 100 people, show them both the original color and the color on the television, and ask them if they are the same.

Voila -- you have an objective measurement that X of your 100 test subjects reported having the same color viewing experience.

Depending on your view of mental causation, SW VandeCarr has provided one reasonable perspective.

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do. A person will learn to associate a sensation caused by light from the lower end of the visible light spectrum with a name and behave in a consistent way regarding that particular sensation..

That depends on the actual mechanism of the wiring. Are you tapping in before the processing, or after? If you are simply wired to the sensory inputs (i.e. before processing) then of course you would see 'red'. But if you are wired in after the processing ... the question is raised: what does it mean to be wired in "after processing"?

The experiment is an objective measurement of something. And "qualia are what people measure" is, IMO, a rather reasonable working definition.

What Hurkyl and DaveC are trying to suggest has of course, been considered before. I’m going to point out what I believe both of you believe and left unsaid. These things you believe and leave unsaid are what are in conflict with your statements. I believe both arguments fall into the knowledge paradox I mentioned earlier.

What was believed and left unsaid:
- The causal closure of the physical domain: I’m assuming you both accept the causal closure of the physical and reject any kind of nonphysical cause.
- Computationalism: I’m assuming you both accept computationalism.

If that’s correct, the knowledge paradox applies and any claims (or behaviors) that people are somehow “measuring” their own qualia, are incorrect. This problem is further exacerbated by computationalism, which makes it impossible in my mind for anyone to claim they are somehow measuring their own qualia or reporting it in any way.

The short explanation of the knowledge paradox is that there is always a physical cause for any physical behavior. This is essentially the “behaviorism” MIH (correct me if I’m wrong) is referring to:

I think that's quite in line with what the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism" were getting at in their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. What could be observed and measured was important, but unobservable mental events and representations were trivial, and for all scientific purposes, meaningless.

A behavior is physically observable and we can treat it scientifically. We don’t need to even talk about mental states when referring to behavior. Physical states are assumed to influence other physical states, so mental states are basically ‘along for the ride’ and are epiphenomenal on the physical states. So if someone is to suggest that a mental state is a cause for a behavior, all one has to do to deny this is point to the causal closure of the physical domain. Jaegwon Kim among others has made his living making this point.

What makes this argument much more powerful is the aspect of computationalism which assumes classical mechanical interactions between neurons are those causal actions that give rise to the emergent phenomena of consciousness including qualia. And here is where any argument that a person is ‘measuring’ their own qualia in some way, becomes untenable. I’ll try and explain …

We often talk of the brain as being a computer of sorts, so I’m going to assume strong AI (ie: a suitable, classical computer can experience the same things as a person) is true for the moment only to help explain the problem. The example can then be extended to neurons.

The physical state of a computer can be fully described through a description of its 1) architecture, 2) a description of its physical state, and 3) a description of its input and output over a time period [dt]. Knowing how the computer’s billions of microscopic transistors are wired will fully describe its architecture. With this in hand, we can know the basic layout of the machine, but we won’t know what physical state it is in at some given time. If we know the position of each transistor at a given time, we can know the physical state of the machine at that time. The third thing we need is physical input and output to describe the machine, or boundary conditions over time. With these three things, we can describe in physical terms (by describing physical properties), everything there is to know about the machine’s function. We can know how it will “behave” at any time by knowing these three things.

We might extend this physical description to a molecular description of the switches, but this isn’t necessary to describe what the machine is doing. All we need to describe the machine’s function are the architecture, physical state and boundary conditions and we have enough information to determine the time evolution of the machine over any given time interval.

Next, we introduce qualia to the description of the machine. How should we do this? We can know everything about what a computer does over some time interval. However, we might also think that whatever the machine indicates in the way of behavior or verbal explanation, is also a description of the qualia that machine experiences. In other words, if a computer flinches as if in pain, and screams as if in pain, that behavior is equal to, and an indication of, the experience of pain. The behavior and the experience are one in the same. The experience of pain may be epiphenomenal, but we might assume that the experience of pain is THE SAME AS the physical behavior. This is the most common conclusion and why consciousness and mental states are often thought to be epiphenomenal. This conclusion holds there is a 1 to 1 correlation between the behavior, or time evolution of the physical states, and the experience of the qualia. The problem with this logic however, is the knowledge paradox.

The knowledge paradox points out that it doesn’t matter what experience the machine is thought to be having when it expresses a behavior or verbal description of some phenomenal experience, that behavior and that verbal description are utterly and completely controlled by the architecture, physical states and boundary conditions of the machine over that time interval. The phenomenal experience can not influence the architecture, physical state, nor can it influence the boundary conditions of the computer. Qualia can influence none of that. These phenomena we know as qualia can have no influence over any physical aspect of the computer. So we not only don’t know what the machine is experiencing, also; we can’t know if the machine is experiencing anything at all! All we can do is know that it is behaving in a way that we might describe as being in pain, but we can’t know if there is any experience going on at all inside, nor what it might be. The machine’s behavior is fully understood by understanding the architecture, physical state and I/O. We could not for example, know if the machine was experiencing the color red, or the smell of coffee, or experiencing an orgasm when it behaved as if it were in pain.

So there is a logical split between what physics tells us about the time evolution of a computer and what we can know about the experience a computer is having. Qualia are clearly not describable by describing the architecture, physical states and boundary conditions of a computer. And for the case of a computer, and by extension any computational system, the properties of qualia are not capable of influencing in any way, the physical evolution of those systems. Qualia can not be measured by the computer in any way because not a single measurement is taking place, nor are there any aspects of the computer that are responding to a specific type of phenomena except the change in the electrical state on the transistors.

When we come to a logical dead end and find there is no way out, then the problem is most likely with one of our unwritten assumptions.

Note that I haven't gotten into emergence or downward causation and don't think that's necessary here. Weak emergence as defined by Bedau for example, is all we need to understand what kind of emergence is applicable to a computational system, and I've maintained that version of emergence in the explanation above.

 

[Hurkyl]

When we come to a logical dead end and find there is no way out, then the problem is most likely with one of our unwritten assumptions.

What's unwritten? You have explicitly assumed qualia is non-physical and cannot affect physical systems, and naturally, you arrive at the conclusion that one cannot measure qualia physically. This isn't particularly deep, mystifying, or paradoxical -- unless one tries to simultaneously cling to ideas like the experiences one has that shape how one interacts with the world are supposed to be qualia.


I have no problem with simply making postulates and seeing where they lead as a mental exercise.

My problem is with asserting these postulates are really true, in the face of apparent contradiction, without anything resembling a decent supporting argument.

 

[Pythagorean]

Q_Goest,

The (fact?) that qualia are subjective isn't contradictory to physicalism at all. For arguments sake, let's say each person does have an individual sensation to the same experience. This is perfectly acceptable, since everyone's physically wired a little different. When they first experience something (say a color), that color is stored in memory somehow. It doesn't matter whatsoever that the way it's stored is a little different to each person. What's important is that it consistently gives the same sensation and that it's a sensation that is separable from other sensations (and furthermore, it's class is separate from other classes of sensation). We don't expect the semantic memory of the color blue to wire itself the exact same way in every person. That's irrelevant.

What is important, again, is that they have a reliable flag to repeatedly identify the object. What's even more important though, is that the person can somehow assess the danger or benefit of the object with an emotional memory (as mitigated by the amygdala and the basal ganglia) and furthermore that the emotional memory as compared to the sensation gives an accurate prediction of how one should behave in the presence of that sensation. (For instance, knowing that pain is bad and pleasure is good as a simplified example).

The science of how and why sensations are subjectively different will deal with the minute differences in cell structure and dynamics between any two people. But it's not significant in terms of survival. Our brains are meant to be dynamic and adaptive. They don't have a rigid storage system (because that would almost certainly fail in a real world situation).

Why should the concept of a p-zombie be flawed? In my view it is perfectly logical. A zombie is simply the physical process less the phenomenal experience.

Well, I guess this is the fundamental difference in both our assumption and conclusions. I think the evidence has continually favored the physicalist stance though.

 

[Q_Goest]

The (fact?) that qualia are subjective isn't contradictory to physicalism at all.

The fact qualia are not objectively measurable is a (potential) problem for physicalism. Along with other assumptions, Shoemaker and Rosenberg have pointed out it leads to a knowledge paradox. We can accept this paradox or try to resolve it. To me, it is just one more of the many problems associated with computationalism.

For arguments sake, let's say each person does have an individual sensation to the same experience. This is perfectly acceptable, since everyone's physically wired a little different. When they first experience something (say a color), that color is stored in memory somehow. It doesn't matter whatsoever that the way it's stored is a little different to each person. What's important is that it consistently gives the same sensation and that it's a sensation that is separable from other sensations (and furthermore, it's class is separate from other classes of sensation). We don't expect the semantic memory of the color blue to wire itself the exact same way in every person. That's irrelevant.

What is important, again, is that they have a reliable flag to repeatedly identify the object. What's even more important though, is that the person can somehow assess the danger or benefit of the object with an emotional memory (as mitigated by the amygdala and the basal ganglia) and furthermore that the emotional memory as compared to the sensation gives an accurate prediction of how one should behave in the presence of that sensation. (For instance, knowing that pain is bad and pleasure is good as a simplified example).

The science of how and why sensations are subjectively different will deal with the minute differences in cell structure and dynamics between any two people. But it's not significant in terms of survival. Our brains are meant to be dynamic and adaptive. They don't have a rigid storage system (because that would almost certainly fail in a real world situation).

That’s all perfectly in line with computationalism. It shows you have a good understanding of computationalism. What I see from this however, is that you’ve not tried to address the “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap" ” which asks the question, “Why should there be any qualia at all?” Daniel Dennett for example, is a computationalist that has suggested, “So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all.” (See “Quinning Qualia”) He comes to this conclusion for many of the reasons you cite above (ie: we can’t know how qualia compare, even within the same person from one time to another). However, if this phenomena exists at all, it begs the question, “Why?” I think to get rid of the various paradoxes and issues with consciousness, we really have to ignore them and go back to behaviorism because these kinds of phenomena are not explainable otherwise. Problem is, despite Dennett’s plea to ignore them, we can’t.

 

[Q_Goest]

You have explicitly assumed qualia is non-physical and cannot affect physical systems, and naturally, you arrive at the conclusion that one cannot measure qualia physically. This isn't particularly deep, mystifying, or paradoxical -- unless one tries to simultaneously cling to ideas like the experiences one has that shape how one interacts with the world are supposed to be qualia.

Not at all. How does the above deviate from computationalism and the assumption of weak emergence? Especially this:

… whatever the machine indicates in the way of behavior or verbal explanation, is also a description of the qualia that machine experiences. In other words, if a computer flinches as if in pain, and screams as if in pain, that behavior is equal to, and an indication of, the experience of pain. The behavior and the experience are one in the same. The experience of pain may be epiphenomenal, but we might assume that the experience of pain is THE SAME AS the physical behavior. This is the most common conclusion and why consciousness and mental states are often thought to be epiphenomenal. This conclusion holds there is a 1 to 1 correlation between the behavior, or time evolution of the physical states, and the experience of the qualia.

That’s the simple, straightforward description of the conclusion that comes from computationalism. There are philosophers that work hard at defending the conclusion of epiphenomenalism (ex: http://comp.uark.edu/~jclyons/papers/Epiphenomenalism.pdf" ), though few have tried to address the knowledge paradox.

 

[Pythagorean]

Q-Goest,

I'm not sure how you define computationalism, but I was thinking of connectionism. My rsearch is in computational neuroscience, but that just means I use a computer (because the equations are nonlinear and beyond standard analysis). Nonlinear dynamics that govern neurons are not particularly similar to computer operations. They pertain to a complex set of electrochemical interactions on a global scale.

Anyway, I have tried to address the explanatory gap. The answer isn't satisfactory or particularly interesting. The answer is that qualia are a byproduct of the most efficient way to store information (not like a computer, this is a much more fluid idea of storage and information) that pertains to survival.

 

[Pythagorean]

Also, I'm starting to thing this computationalism accusation is a bit of a straw man, looking at your last reply to Hurkyl. Computers are a lot different in terms of their dynamics and structure. Some analogies can be drawn, but that example takes the analogy too far.

 

[Q_Goest]

Also, I'm starting to thing this computationalism accusation is a bit of a straw man, looking at your last reply to Hurkyl. Computers are a lot different in terms of their dynamics and structure. Some analogies can be drawn, but that example takes the analogy too far.

I don't see any problem in claiming there is a difference between a computer and a brain, and that difference may make a difference in phenomena produced. Alwyn Scott for example, might point out how nonlinear a brain is (and a neuron is) and would claim there are emergent phenomena based on this observation, so there are plenty of other arguments out there that would identify differences between a computer and a brain. But we need to start somewhere which is the intent of the analogy. People tend to take these arguments personally though, and don't like to look at the wider array of logical arguments presented regarding qualia and consciousness.

I would personally agree that there's a difference between a brain and a computer. However, I have very little interest in discussing my own conclusions. The arguments I'm presenting are essentially those of others. So the argument regarding the knowledge paradox (as given by Rosenberg and others), and applying it to strong AI as I've done, disputes that people are measuring qualia and reporting them in some way as suggested earlier. I think there are philosophers that will argue that the analogy still holds for a brain however, and I enjoy seeing what conclusions are being drawn given the various assumptions people make.

 

[Pythagorean]

I don't see any problem in claiming there is a difference between a computer and a brain, and that difference may make a difference in phenomena produced. Alwyn Scott for example, might point out how nonlinear a brain is (and a neuron is) and would claim there are emergent phenomena based on this observation, so there are plenty of other arguments out there that would identify differences between a computer and a brain. But we need to start somewhere which is the intent of the analogy. People tend to take these arguments personally though, and don't like to look at the wider array of logical arguments presented regarding qualia and consciousness.

I would personally agree that there's a difference between a brain and a computer. However, I have very little interest in discussing my own conclusions. The arguments I'm presenting are essentially those of others. So the argument regarding the knowledge paradox (as given by Rosenberg and others), and applying it to strong AI as I've done, disputes that people are measuring qualia and reporting them in some way as suggested earlier. I think there are philosophers that will argue that the analogy still holds for a brain however, and I enjoy seeing what conclusions are being drawn given the various assumptions people make.

Computers are stupid. They do what we tell them to do. Even a single-celled organism is more advanced than a computer in terms of learning and memory... and they don't even have neurons. Even the genetic code is type of generational learning and memory (epigenetics being the learning, the code itself being the memory).

It comes to no surprise that eventually, through selection, this aspect of knowing relevant information became such a pressure on large creatures, that they had to develop better systems of information handling (better in terms of accuracy and speed... and generally only relevant to survival and comfort... comfort being an indicator of good survivability).

This development was the central nervous system: A central location to integrate sensory information and control behavior in response to the information (as opposed to distributed neurons and molecular networks in single-celled organisms). beliefs, opinions, etc:

That a sense of individuality and subjectivity, sensation, and feelings emerges from this is a mystery still, no doubt. It's my opinion that there is a dynamical state that must be maintained by an equilibrium, and that our subjective existence is directly tied to that equilibrium. But this means that if such similar dynamics exist in other systems, the too must experience a subjective state. Computers definitely don't seem to exhibit the likely dynamics. In fact, for us to be able to control them, we want them as static as possible.

I believe that even single-celled organisms have a subjective experience, personally. Does this extend to non-living systems? I doubt it.

 

[Maui]

Is everything matter and can everything be reduced to matter? Does it make sense to hold such an opinion?

 

[Upisoft]

Is everything matter and can everything be reduced to matter? Does it make sense to hold such an opinion?

What is matter?

 

[Maui]

What is matter?

Neurons' humming?

What is mind?



True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing.

And in knowing that you know nothing, that makes you smartest of all.

Socrates

 

[Upisoft]

Then the answer to your question is: "yes".

 

[Maui]

Then the answer to your question is: "yes".

All is matter?

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

You still have yet to prove that it's a fact...

 

[Maui]

You still have yet to prove that it's a fact...

There is no property of matter that requires that it produces something as unphysical and intangible as mind.

If one denies the existence of emergent properties altogether, one is faced with deep and unsurmountable paradoxes. Think of the difference between mind and matter as in the example - Mind thinks, matter does not.

 

[Pythagorean]

There is no property of matter that requires that it produces something as unphysical and intangible as mind.

If one denies the existence of emergent properties altogether, one is faced with deep and unsurmountable paradoxes. Think of the difference between mind and matter as in the example - Mind thinks, matter does not.

We're not talking about dead matter, we're talking about matter and its interactions (as you stated in your previous post). Matter alone is likened to a rock or dirt. But lightning, weather, light, fusion, and life itself are all just a few of the examples of what matter and it's interactions are capable of. (Actually, so can be the rock if you consider phonons, magnons, etc.)

We ARE talking about emergent properties (of physical systems). I don't understand what constraints you're placing on matter or why you think it's necessary to place them there... I mean do you have a journal reference entailing what matter can't do? I can give you plenty of journal references about what matter can do, certainly you're not just subtracting that from the universal set and calling it good? Because we keep expanding the list of things matter can do...

 

[sganesh88]

Romanticists like me hope that the mysteries of quantum mechanics are very much linked to the mystery of consciousness and hence, Life.
If its all in "connectivity inside the brain" as someone said in that video, I will chase God and make him eat the damned apple. Mandamned God!

 

[Maui]

We're not talking about dead matter, we're talking about matter and its interactions (as you stated in your previous post). Matter alone is likened to a rock or dirt. But lightning, weather, light, fusion, and life itself are all just a few of the examples of what matter and it's interactions are capable of. (Actually, so can be the rock if you consider phonons, magnons, etc.)

We ARE talking about emergent properties (of physical systems). I don't understand what constraints you're placing on matter or why you think it's necessary to place them there... I mean do you have a journal reference entailing what matter can't do? I can give you plenty of journal references about what matter can do, certainly you're not just subtracting that from the universal set and calling it good? Because we keep expanding the list of things matter can do...

It's evident what matter can do and i have no idea why you need to state the obvious. The question I raised was and still is:

Is mind matter or not?

If mind is different from matter, then your implied statement that all is matter does not hold water, i.e. non-dualism(mind/body) doesn't make sense.

I mean do you have a journal reference entailing what matter can't do?

What does this have to do with the claim that matter is not all that exists?

Could you address specifically what i have been saying for 3 posts now - that matter is not all that exists? Here is the post you initially replied to:

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

The above is saying that my conscious choices and thoughts are not reducible to the properties of matter that comprises my brain.


Thanks.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

The above is saying that my conscious choices and thoughts are not reducible to the properties of matter that comprises my brain.Thanks.

I assume when you talk about the properties of matter, you are using the term broadly to mean matter-energy and in physical terms, the four fundamental forces that currently define all physical reality according to the Standard Model of physics.

If you define matter this way, what do you think this "non physical" existent is? It's not clear to me whether you accept that mind is an emergent property of natural processes or not. If you do, it seems we are all on the same page. Otherwise, just what do you think consciousness/mind is? Is it some unknown fifth force? Can this 5th force be discovered and described? Is is "psi" or spirit? Are are arguing for a deity? If it's a deity, that's out of bounds in PF. Defaulting to a deity ends all discussion outside of theology.

 

[Upisoft]

Is mind matter or not?

You don't know what is matter, I already asked you. I suspect that you will give me the same answer if I ask about the mind. So, they are both what you don't know. It seem they are the same to you.

 

[Maui]

You don't know what is matter, I already asked you. I suspect that you will give me the same answer if I ask about the mind. So, they are both what you don't know. It seem they are the same to you.

What does it matter for the purpose of this discussion that I and everyone else on the planet doesn't sufficiently well know what 'matter' is to state it as proven FACT?

We can still lead a philosophical discussion about it.

 

[Maui]

I assume when you talk about the properties of matter, you are using the term broadly to mean matter-energy and in physical terms, the four fundamental forces that currently define all physical reality according to the Standard Model of physics.

Yes.

If you define matter this way, what do you think this "non physical" existent is?

Consciousness.

It's not clear to me whether you accept that mind is an emergent property of natural processes or not.

Yes i do and that places me with the dualists.

If you do, it seems we are all on the same page. Otherwise, just what do you think consciousness/mind is?

This is going beyond science and philosophy. As far as i am aware there is very little progress within the current scientific paradigm.

 

[Upisoft]

What does it matter for the purpose of this discussion that I and everyone else on the planet doesn't sufficiently well know what 'matter' is to state it as proven FACT?

We can still lead a philosophical discussion about it.

Why do you assume that there is such thing as FACT? Matter can be unknowable.

 

[Maui]

Why do you assume that there is such thing as FACT? Matter can be unknowable.

I don't. That doesn't stop us from weighing in the possibities. That's what a good philosophical discourse is about.

 

[Upisoft]

Well, then matter is unknowable. I choose to call everything matter.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Consciousness.
Yes i do and that places me with the dualists.

Well, if you believe that mind is an emergent property of natural processes, why is that dualism? This is my position as well. I checked "not a dualist" in the poll. I think the word "physical" is sometimes misunderstood. If we are talking about natural processes, then I equate that with physical processes. There's the nature we in some way "know" though tested models and there's the nature we don't "know" because we have no tested models. Can we eventually know (model) all of nature, including the nature of our own self-awareness and identity? Good question. There may be aspects of nature we cannot know because our brains are not sufficiently developed or there may be some natural censoring. For example our present theories tell us we cannot know of events outside of our light cone.

EDIT: Just to be clear, the "light cone" example is given as an example of natural censoring, nothing more. Afaik, it has nothing to do with self-awareness or consciousness.

 

[Maui]

Well, if you believe that mind is an emergent property of natural processes, why is that dualism?

My impression was that anyone who recognized the mind-body problem was a dualist.

This is my position as well. I checked "not a dualist" in the poll. I think the word "physical" is sometimes misunderstood.

It might be that it's always misunderstood to a certain degree. Calculations show there's suppsed to be 5 times as much dark matter than ordinary matter in my room that doesn't interact directly with ordinary matter. Is dark matter ''physical'' or just inferently present/existing? The word "physical" isn't quite what it used to be.

If we are talking about natural processes, then I equate that with physical processes. There's the nature we in some way "know" though tested models and there's the nature we don't "know" because we have no tested models. Can we eventually know (model) all of nature, including the nature of our own self-awareness and identity? Good question. There may be aspects of nature we cannot know because our brains are not sufficiently developed or there may be some natural censoring. For example our present theories tell us we cannot know of events outside of our light cone.

EDIT: Just to be clear, the "light cone" example is given as an example of natural censoring, nothing more. Afaik, it has nothing to do with self-awareness or consciousness.

There is no deep understanding of anything, and it may even be unattainable. One could argue that what Socrates said 2400 years ago about Truth was all that could be said about certainty - True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

There is no deep understanding of anything, and it may even be unattainable. One could argue that what Socrates said 2400 years ago about Truth was all that could be said about certainty - True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing.

We build mental models of the world and to the extent they survive continuous testing, that suffices for empirical knowledge. Logic and reason however is a different kind of "knowledge" which in a Kantian sense seems to arise from an inherent ability for abstract thought. But that's another subject.

As for dualism, I don't accept there is a "mind-body' problem" in the same way as physicists don't accept that there is a fundamental problem with physics just because they cannot observe events outside our light cone or inside black holes. If they could, their theories would be wrong. The mind-body "problem" is not even as well defined. There may be problem, but we don't know if there are hard limits as to what we can know. In any case, any censoring that might exist will be natural, not supernatural IMO, and therefore could be accommodated by a (physical) theory of nature.

 

[Ferris_bg]

The reason I am not a dualist is that all forms of dualism contradict with itself in one way or another. Let's define mental states as M and physical as P. We have the following versions of dualism:
1) Interactionism (P <-> M) // mental events and physical events influence each other
2) Epiphenomenalism (P -> M) // mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical
3) Parallelism (P | M) // no causal interaction, but run in harmony

In case 2) and 3) either the mental or both have no influence over the other, but we still want to value them somehow. So why not accept into the picture N (Neutral Monism)? The cases will look like this:
4) P interacts with M through N and M is reported to N, but not to P.
5) P and M are reported to N.

So this leaves option 1) as the single option for dualism. But again it faces the problem of causal over-determination.
6) Neural state (S) causes pain (P) which causes wince (W) => S causes W => W is causally over-determined.

And over-determination of behaviour doesn't seem logic.

 

[G037H3]

What is matter?

energy in a slow vibration