Is MWI Self-Contradictory and Does Time Travel Need a New Approach?

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The discussion centers on objections to the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, particularly regarding the Born Rule. Participants debate whether MWI is self-contradictory or simply fails to adequately explain the Born Rule, with some arguing that MWI cannot account for observed probabilities without introducing additional assumptions. Key points include the distinction between outcomes seen by individual observers and the overall distribution of outcomes across multiple worlds. Critics emphasize that MWI's reliance on consciousness to explain probabilities complicates its theoretical elegance. The conversation highlights ongoing challenges in reconciling MWI with established quantum mechanics principles.
  • #61
Hurkyl said:
Now imagine one person getting a ball, but what color it is is given by a probability distribution, rather than a definite outcome.

No, this doesn't work.
Remember it's the SAME person getting both balls.
 
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  • #62
Fyzix said:
I've given you tons of information as to why it doesn't work, citing a lot of physicists and philosophers, yet you don't see the point they are getting across, so I stopped trying:P

So far I've seen only 2 ways how you tried to attack MWI:

1. Born rule - ridiculous 'lottery' argument, discussed above.
2. Not related to the Born rule - different variations of the same:

Preassumption that there exist some kind of ('hard', 'clean', 'definite', 'final', 'complete', 'real' - words you used) separation between the 'branches'. Based on that (false) assumption you try different attempts of reductio ad absurdum: for example, assuming that there is a 'hard' border which separates different 'branches' you can show that the position of that border is not covariant.
 
  • #63
Dmitry67 said:
So far I've seen only 2 ways how you tried to attack MWI:

1. Born rule - ridiculous 'lottery' argument, discussed above.

Ridiculous lottery argument which you have not been able to refute?
Ok...
Then again you think consciousness is something special, so I can see how you may somehow magically get around this problem.

Preassumption that there exist some kind of ('hard', 'clean', 'definite', 'final', 'complete', 'real' - words you used) separation between the 'branches'. Based on that (false) assumption you try different attempts of reductio ad absurdum: for example, assuming that there is a 'hard' border which separates different 'branches' you can show that the position of that border is not covariant.

This just proves you haven't understood the arguments and points put forth.
 
  • #64
Dmitry67 said:
As we are discussing MWI here, does anyone see additional beauty of MWI because it explains Bell/EPR in a locally realistic (*) way?
According to MWI, reality does not exist in the 4-dimensional spacetime, but in the infinite dimensional Hilbert space, or as a special case, in the many-dimensional configuration space of particle positions. It is this "weird" highly dimensional space on which MWI is local. But on this space, Bohmian mechanics is also local. Therefore, Bohmian mechanics is not less local than MWI.
 
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  • #65
Demystifier, I just remember a question I wanted to ask you the other day:

Why do you prefer normal Bohmian over the "Many Bohmian Worlds" that Jeffrey Barrett once suggested as a potential solution to the problems "pure MWI" faces?
I know Jacques Mallah also consider this to be a potential solution to pure MWI's problems.
 
  • #66
Fyzix said:
Demystifier, I just remember a question I wanted to ask you the other day:

Why do you prefer normal Bohmian over the "Many Bohmian Worlds" that Jeffrey Barrett once suggested as a potential solution to the problems "pure MWI" faces?
I know Jacques Mallah also consider this to be a potential solution to pure MWI's problems.
Yes, I have also been thinking about many Bohmian worlds (MBW) as a compromise between BM and MWI. The main problem I see is the following: If many Bohmian worlds exist, then why do we see only one? (Decoherence provides an answer for standard MWI, but not for MBW.)
 
  • #67
Fyzix said:
Ridiculous lottery argument which you have not been able to refute?

There was already a reply in this thread:

Hurkyl said:
Putnam's argument is wrong because of the lottery thing. The "number of worlds" -- if that phrase even makes sense -- has absolutely no reason to coincide with any probability that is supposed to have bearing on reality.
 
  • #68
Dmitry, we have alraedy discussed this.
If you are goin to assume that consciousness is just something that arises in the physical brain (functionalism) this argument by Hurkyl does NOT work.
 
  • #69
Fyzix,

1. Regarding the Born rule, I see 2 options
1a. In fact, Born rule is an illusion, created by consiousness;
1b. MWI will be able somehow to 'prove' Born rule is MWI-compatible form (like Hurkyl had formulated)
have I ever told you that MWI had already solved the problem with the MWI Rule? No.

2. All other aspects of reality, specifically:
A. Why do we observer only one branch?
B. Why we don't feel ourselves being split?
C. Why do we see definite outcomes?
etc etc
All these things are successfully explained by the Decoherence.

You are making wide and fuzzy statements like 'decoherence is not enough!' without providing any details, this is why we are returning back again and again to the point where I try to understand, are we talkign about the Born rule or your favourite 'branching' stuff.
 
  • #70
Let's make it simple then, when this thread stops talking about Born Rule, we can move over to the ontological aspect, ok?
I have given you sources, Tim Maudlin, Jeffrey Barrett, MJ Donald etc. so don't claim I haven't given you any details, I've written long posts to you and given you sources for all claims...

However back to Born Rule:

You are doing science wrong, you have started out with a model and then you try to find facts that fit it.
Right now science is telling us MWI can't make sense of Born Rule, thus must be wrong!
You say "Nono, I like MWI so reality must be wrong"

Your assumption that consciousness can explain this is WAY more of a violation of Occam Razor than any other interpretation.

You also didn't answer Demystifiers statement that MWI isn't more local than Bohm in the sense you tried to argue...

To me it's blatantly obvious that you just like MWI and therfefor you are willing to ignore problems that show it isn't right / is incomplete.
 
  • #71
1. I need to think about Demystifier's argument before I reply.
2. Yes, it is obvious that I like MWI, like it is obvious that you hate it. But how does it change the facts and observations?

I talk about observations (post #69, item B), I ask you about wha is not in agreement with the observations? You reply in emotional manner about 'love' and 'hatred'. If your statement is refuted on page N, you simply repeat it on page N+1!

Right now science is telling us MWI can't make sense of Born Rule, thus must be wrong!

It was show in this thread that this logic is WRONG! There are many things science can't explain, but it does not make it "wrong". Demystifier had provided an example in post #20. Did it help?
 
  • #72
No it was shown that his argument only works if you assume that consciousness is something special...
Your impossible to argue with...
 
  • #73
Shown by whom? Where?
Anyway, I am happy that at least you had abandoned the stuff with the 'picture of spacetime unzipping', 'clean and complete separation', 'problems with SR', so now your critics is focused solely on the Born rule.
 
  • #74
Demystifier said:
According to MWI, reality does not exist in the 4-dimensional spacetime, but in the infinite dimensional Hilbert space, or as a special case, in the many-dimensional configuration space of particle positions. It is this "weird" highly dimensional space on which MWI is local. But on this space, Bohmian mechanics is also local. Therefore, Bohmian mechanics is not less local than MWI.

Well, let's say it differently. In MWI, "reality" exist in Hilbert space, but it can be also 'mapped' into our physical 4D space (in a given basis). Such mapping can create multiple (almost) non-interacting 'branches', occupying the same physical space. If we can create a transformation from one to another, based on MUCH you can't say what is 'more' real. I hope you agree.

So while what you said is true in Hilbert space, in physical space all 'influences' are limited to the light cones. So MWI provides 'stronger' locality then BM, where 'particles' affect each other FTL in physical space.

Am I right?
 
  • #75
Fyzix said:
No, this doesn't work.
Remember it's the SAME person getting both balls.
No, it's the same person getting one ball. And the physical state is a probability distribution over two colors, rather than a definite choice of color.

(For reference, a probability distribution, in this case, means nothing beyond assigning a non-negative number to each color so that the numbers add to 1)

This is what the negation of definite outcomes means. (Well, technically, asserting the existence of a probability distribution over the outcomes is stronger than merely asserting there isn't a definite outcome)
 
  • #76
Demystifier said:
According to MWI, reality does not exist in the 4-dimensional spacetime, but in the infinite dimensional Hilbert space, or as a special case, in the many-dimensional configuration space of particle positions. It is this "weird" highly dimensional space on which MWI is local. But on this space, Bohmian mechanics is also local. Therefore, Bohmian mechanics is not less local than MWI.
No, he really meant local in the usual sense of Minkowski space. One can identify space-time by operators that relate to position in space-time, and the time-evolution really is locally realistic*, at least assuming something resembling these axioms.

*: Defining "realistic" to mean that any physically meaningful calculation is completely determined by the quantum state. (Indefiniteness is a key here -- assuming definite outcomes would require a hidden variable to decide how to collapse)
 
  • #77
Dmitry67 said:
Well, let's say it differently. In MWI, "reality" exist in Hilbert space, but it can be also 'mapped' into our physical 4D space (in a given basis). Such mapping can create multiple (almost) non-interacting 'branches', occupying the same physical space. If we can create a transformation from one to another, based on MUCH you can't say what is 'more' real. I hope you agree.

So while what you said is true in Hilbert space, in physical space all 'influences' are limited to the light cones. So MWI provides 'stronger' locality then BM, where 'particles' affect each other FTL in physical space.

Am I right?
I think you are only partially right. The crucial question is whether reality in the Hilbert space can be mapped into the 4D spacetime. It can, but only on the macroscopic level when decoherence takes place. In a more general context, there is nothing "physical" about the 4D spacetime that our intuition is used to. Thus, at the fundamental level, the 4D world does not exist in any meaningful sense, so the world cannot be local on that space.

By the way, when decoherence takes place, at the macroscopic level Bohmian mechanics can also be well approximated by classical local laws of motion. Thus, I can conclude again that BM is not less local than MWI.
 
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  • #78
Hurkyl said:
No, he really meant local in the usual sense of Minkowski space. One can identify space-time by operators that relate to position in space-time, and the time-evolution really is locally realistic*, at least assuming something resembling these axioms.

*: Defining "realistic" to mean that any physically meaningful calculation is completely determined by the quantum state. (Indefiniteness is a key here -- assuming definite outcomes would require a hidden variable to decide how to collapse)
I would say that this (more or less standard) view of quantum theory is NOT the many-world view of quantum theory. In particular, your definition of reality above, which may be fine by itself, is NOT the many-world definition of reality. In MWI spacetime is NOT identified with operators that relate to position in space-time. In MWI, operators do not exist in an ontological sense. Only wave functions do.
 
  • #79
Something I don't quite get. When do branches get separated. Is it after what is equivalent to Collapse.. where instead of Collapse the branches split off and all real?

But before Collapse, the particles are in superposition, so what happens during superposition? Like are the branches active before collapse? If only after, then superposition prior to collapse is as mysterious as Copenhagen?
 
  • #80
Varon, in MWI there is no collapse. The split is described by the Schrodinger equation itself, or more precisely by the theory of decoherence emerging from the Schrodinger equation.
 
  • #81
Demystifier said:
Varon, in MWI there is no collapse. The split is described by the Schrodinger equation itself, or more precisely by the theory of decoherence emerging from the Schrodinger equation.

I know. But before split or decoherence, the system is in superposition.. What happens inside this superposition?
 
  • #82
Varon said:
Something I don't quite get. When do branches get separated. Is it after what is equivalent to Collapse.. where instead of Collapse the branches split off and all real?

But before Collapse, the particles are in superposition, so what happens during superposition? Like are the branches active before collapse? If only after, then superposition prior to collapse is as mysterious as Copenhagen?
Maybe it would help to see a mathematical example of how relative state works?

The simplest example, I think, is the quantum state of a qubit and the relative state of its "spin around the z axis".


The state space of a qubit can be described geometrically as the unit ball. The surface, called the Bloch sphere, is the space of pure states -- the ones you're most familiar with as being described by kets in a Hilbert space. For any unit vector v, the point on the sphere it describes represents the qubit state "spin-up along the v-axis".

In this geometric picture, (convex) linear combinations are interpreted in the sense of classical statistics. If P,Q are two points in the unit ball, then aP + bQ is the state that represents a statistical distribution of being in state P with probability a, and state Q with probability b.



The relative state "spin around the z axis" can also be represented geometrically as the interval [-1, 1]. The two endpoints 1 and -1 (the "surface" of the interval) represent "spin up" and "spin down" respectively.

The relationship between the two is the straightforward one: if (x,y,z) is the state of a qubit, then the state of its subsystem "spin around the z axis" is simply z.



Now, "spin around the z axis" is actually really, really simplistic -- it's actually a classical system, and even with a unique choice of 'basis' states! It's a particle that's in a statistical distribution over the possibilities "up" and "down". If we're studying this subsystem, it makes sense to call these two possibilities worlds.




Now, suppose the qubit starts at the North pole -- the state (0,0,1). Let's assume the qubit is a closed system. Time evolution, according to Schrödinger's equation, will move this state around the surface of the sphere -- the state is always a pure state! There are no worlds or anything, there is simply "which axis am I oriented around now?"

But, we might be interested in looking how the "spin around the z axis" subsystem behaves while all of this is happening. It starts off in the "up" state. But as time progresses, it slides back and forth in the interval. The state of this subsystem is (completely) described as being a weighted mixture of the two worlds "up" and "down", the specific weights depending on just where in the interval it is.


Other relevant things are that any operator (acting on the Hilbert space) in the {|z+>, |z->} basis can also be interpreted as acting on the "spin around the z axis" subsystem. e.g. any measurement operation can be described in terms of having some value on the "up" state, and some value on the "down" state, and that's all there is to it. If time evolution was diagonal in that basis, then the state of the "spin around the z axis" subsystem would evolve in a purely classical fashion. In this case it's a rather boring fashion, since "up" can only evolve to "up" and "down" can only evolve to "down", but in general it would be more interesting.
 
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  • #83
Varon said:
But before split or decoherence, the system is in superposition.. What happens inside this superposition?
Nothing which could be understood in classical terms. The cat is neither dead nor alive, etc. Fortunately, for macroscopic stuff decoherence is very very fast, so in practice such weird superpositions can never be seen. That's why it is hard to imagine the cat which is neither dead nor alive.
 
  • #84
Demystifier said:
Nothing which could be understood in classical terms. The cat is neither dead nor alive, etc. Fortunately, for macroscopic stuff decoherence is very very fast, so in practice such weird superpositions can never be seen. That's why it is hard to imagine the cat which is neither dead nor alive.

So in Many worlds, superposition in one world still exist (before split or decoherence). So Many World Interpretation doesn't make it simplier. It only explains what happens after split or decoherence when branches become separate worlds, but not before. So you still have the mysterious superposition state in one world just like Copenhagen.
 
  • #85
Varon said:
So in Many worlds, superposition in one world still exist (before split or decoherence). So Many World Interpretation doesn't make it simplier. It only explains what happens after split or decoherence when branches become separate worlds, but not before.
No, it describes very well what happens before in mathematical terms, but not in classical terms such as cats.

Varon said:
So you still have the mysterious superposition state in one world just like Copenhagen.
I don't think that superposition is mysterious for Copenhagen. What is mysterious for Copenhagen is how the superposition suddenly ceases to be a superposition. It says - by a measurement - but it does not specify what the measurement is.
 
  • #86
Demystifier said:
No, it describes very well what happens before in mathematical terms, but not in classical terms such as cats.


I don't think that superposition is mysterious for Copenhagen. What is mysterious for Copenhagen is how the superposition suddenly ceases to be a superposition. It says - by a measurement - but it does not specify what the measurement is.

Superposition in Copenhagen is not mysterious? It is. Explain how one electron at a time double slit experiment can still interfere with itself. Somehow it becomes a wave in between emission and detection. Let's just focus on Copenhagen whose superposition I assume is similar to the superposition in Many worlds before split or decoherence. Let's avoid Bohmian, your specialization for now.
 
  • #87
Hurkyl said:
Maybe it would help to see a mathematical example of how relative state works?

The simplest example, I think, is the quantum state of a qubit and the relative state of its "spin around the z axis".


The state space of a qubit can be described geometrically as the unit ball. The surface, called the Bloch sphere, is the space of pure states -- the ones you're most familiar with as being described by kets in a Hilbert space. For any unit vector v, the point on the sphere it describes represents the qubit state "spin-up along the v-axis".

In this geometric picture, (convex) linear combinations are interpreted in the sense of classical statistics. If P,Q are two points in the unit ball, then aP + bQ is the state that represents a statistical distribution of being in state P with probability a, and state Q with probability b.



The relative state "spin around the z axis" can also be represented geometrically as the interval [-1, 1]. The two endpoints 1 and -1 (the "surface" of the interval) represent "spin up" and "spin down" respectively.

The relationship between the two is the straightforward one: if (x,y,z) is the state of a qubit, then the state of its subsystem "spin around the z axis" is simply z.



Now, "spin around the z axis" is actually really, really simplistic -- it's actually a classical system, and even with a unique choice of 'basis' states! It's a particle that's in a statistical distribution over the possibilities "up" and "down". If we're studying this subsystem, it makes sense to call these two possibilities worlds.




Now, suppose the qubit starts at the North pole -- the state (0,0,1). Let's assume the qubit is a closed system. Time evolution, according to Schrödinger's equation, will move this state around the surface of the sphere -- the state is always a pure state! There are no worlds or anything, there is simply "which axis am I oriented around now?"

But, we might be interested in looking how the "spin around the z axis" subsystem behaves while all of this is happening. It starts off in the "up" state. But as time progresses, it slides back and forth in the interval. The state of this subsystem is (completely) described as being a weighted mixture of the two worlds "up" and "down", the specific weights depending on just where in the interval it is.


Other relevant things are that any operator (acting on the Hilbert space) in the {|z+>, |z->} basis can also be interpreted as acting on the "spin around the z axis" subsystem. e.g. any measurement operation can be described in terms of having some value on the "up" state, and some value on the "down" state, and that's all there is to it. If time evolution was diagonal in that basis, then the state of the "spin around the z axis" subsystem would evolve in a purely classical fashion. In this case it's a rather boring fashion, since "up" can only evolve to "up" and "down" can only evolve to "down", but in general it would be more interesting.

Thanks. I'll analyse it sometime after I learned all the maths (so don't make it quite complicated). For now. I just wanted to know if the superposition before split or decoherence in Many Worlds has the same ontology as the superposition of Copenhagen before collapse. I'll explain. Bohr stated that in the absence of measurement to determine position, there is no position. In Many worlds before split or decoherence, does a particle also has no position or does the wave function contain multiple copies of the particles (prior to split or decoherence)?
 
  • #88
Varon said:
Superposition in Copenhagen is not mysterious? It is. Explain how one electron at a time double slit experiment can still interfere with itself. Somehow it becomes a wave in between emission and detection. Let's just focus on Copenhagen whose superposition I assume is similar to the superposition in Many worlds before split or decoherence. Let's avoid Bohmian, your specialization for now.
That's easy. Electron is a wave, so nothing is easier than to interfere with itself. Nothing mysterious.
 
  • #89
Varon said:
In Many worlds before split or decoherence, does a particle also has no position or does the wave function contain multiple copies of the particles (prior to split or decoherence)?
In MWI there are no particles at all. Only waves.
 
  • #90
Demystifier said:
In MWI there are no particles at all. Only waves.

If that's true. How come the detector can detect particles if only waves exist?

Anyway. I just read that in a doublet slit experiment in Many Worlds. When an electron is emitted, the electron splits immediately where one goes to the upper slit in one world, the second goes to the lower slit in the other world. And interferences is due to superposition of universes (whatever this means). So when you said only waves are present, this is what propel the electron to their respective places in each universe that can interfere in the screen, isn't it.

I wonder if what I just mentioned is a Dewitt version or original Everett version (not likely). How do you create an Everett version out of the double slit experiment?
 

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