I Is there any interpretation of QM that doesn't clash with intuition?

[syed]

TL;DR Summary

Intuition clashes with QM

I'm having trouble making sense of any of the interpretations of QM (I'm still new to this) and wanted clarity as to whether or not the things that I do think are implausible within each interpretation are actually implausible, in order to make sure that I'm not misunderstanding anything.

So, as far as I understand, the Copenhagen interpretation which can consist of a denial of "realism" states that there are no causal influences between measurement outcomes within an entangled pair. So if John observes a positive spin for his particle, he can predict that Alice will observe a negative spin, but this does not imply any sort of causal process occurs from one measurement result to another. The problem I am having with this idea is that before measurement, the Bell experiments ruled out local predeterminism. In other words, before either Alice or Bob makes their measurement, it is not locally predetermined for either of them to have a specific spin. In a very real sense, both locally have a 50/50 chance of a positive or negative spin. And yet, the results are always correlated. The wave function collapses as soon as either measurement occurs. Yet on the other hand, the Copenhagen interpretation doesn't necessarily say that this collapse process is actually real, and is merely an update of your knowledge. But this seems contradictory. If it is merely an update in knowledge, and nothing in Alice's measurement is affecting Bob's measurement outcome, then why are they always correlated? There doesn't seem to be a plausible explanation here that doesn't merely involve restating the problem.

In the Bohmian mechanics interpretation, the above problem is solved by positing a sort of action at a distance between measurement outcomes. In this case, a preferred frame of reference is proposed where there is an objective causal order to the measurement outcomes. One measurement outcome occurs before the other, and one of the measurement outcomes causes the other. Of course, this explicitly violates relativity. But what seems to be even more implausible is the idea of instantaneous action at a distance. How can a measurement outcome influence another without anything propagating between them? How can an object affect another where it is not? This seems extremely implausible if not contradictory.

There is a realistic model proposed by Eberhard here, which seems to rarely be talked about, which talks about a superluminal causal model similar to Bohmian mechanics. This of course would also violate relativity but proposes a finite speed influence that actually travels through space and time. This avoids the pitfalls of instantaneous action at a distance but also seems prima facie implausible since this speed would have to be at least 10,000 x the speed of light as tests like these show. (Reading the paper though, it seems that this speed limit only works if earth's speed relative to the preferred reference frame is < 10^-3, so would love clarification on this, since I'm not sure why one should pick a frame like that)

The many worlds theory gets rid of the issues with the former two, but then proposes an infinite number of undetectable worlds. How does this branching occur? When does this branching occur? Do all these worlds already exist, and if so, how? And most importantly, how can one make sense of the probabilities via the Born rule that we use to verify quantum mechanics, if every possible world occurs? As far as I know, no satisfactory answer to these questions, especially the last one, has been proposed, which again makes this very implausible.

Superdeterminism seems to postulate a global conspiracy of sorts where even though everything is local and deterministic, it is left unexplained as to why the particles are predetermined to be correlated in such a way where it looks as if they are influencing each other. In principle, it seems as if you can use superdeterminism to explain away any causal relationship, making this again seem implausible.

I'm still relatively new to learning about this stuff, and would love to know if I misunderstood any of these interpretations. If not, do I just have to live with knowing that there might be something true that seems implausible?

EDIT: I realize this probably should have been posted in the interpretations section of the forum, so if someone could move it there, that would be great

 

[PeroK]

So, as far as I understand, the Copenhagen interpretation which can consist of a denial of "realism" states that there are no causal influences between measurement outcomes within an entangled pair. So if John observes a positive spin for his particle, he can predict that Alice will observe a negative spin, but this does not imply any sort of causal process occurs from one measurement result to another.

That's correct. The problem with postulating a causal process is that a measurement of spin is usually done indirectly. The measurement itself may be a simple detection event. The spin or polarization is inferred from the location of the detection. There's no point at which one particle could communicate to the other something like "hey, I've just had my spin measured about a specified axis and I chose spin up". There's no point in the experiment where a particle knows its spin about a given axis has been measured.

The problem I am having with this idea is that before measurement, the Bell experiments ruled out local predeterminism. In other words, before either Alice or Bob makes their measurement, it is not locally predetermined for either of them to have a specific spin. In a very real sense, both locally have a 50/50 chance of a positive or negative spin. And yet, the results are always correlated. The wave function collapses as soon as either measurement occurs. Yet on the other hand, the Copenhagen interpretation doesn't necessarily say that this collapse process is actually real, and is merely an update of your knowledge. But this seems contradictory. If it is merely an update in knowledge, and nothing in Alice's measurement is affecting Bob's measurement outcome, then why are they always correlated? There doesn't seem to be a plausible explanation here that doesn't merely involve restating the problem.

The collapse of the wave-function isn't a physical process. The results are corelated because nature is non-local. You don't have two independent particles. Both particles are described by the same non-local, entangled state. You either accept that nature could be like this or not.

Note that when you upgrade basic QM to the fully relativistic theory, QFT, then particle number is no longer necessarily fixed. Eventually you have to abandon the idea that particles are realistic in that sense.

In the Bohmian mechanics interpretation, the above problem is solved by positing a sort of action at a distance between measurement outcomes. In this case, a preferred frame of reference is proposed where there is an objective causal order to the measurement outcomes. One measurement outcome occurs before the other, and one of the measurement outcomes causes the other. Of course, this explicitly violates relativity. But what seems to be even more implausible is the idea of instantaneous action at a distance. How can a measurement outcome influence another without anything propagating between them? How can an object affect another where it is not? This seems extremely implausible if not contradictory.

@Demystifier might have something to say about this! I'll leave it to the expert to answer this.

There is a realistic model proposed by Eberhard here, which seems to rarely be talked about, which talks about a superluminal causal model similar to Bohmian mechanics. This of course would also violate relativity but proposes a finite speed influence that actually travels through space and time. This avoids the pitfalls of instantaneous action at a distance but also seems prima facie implausible since this speed would have to be at least 10,000 x the speed of light as tests like these show. (Reading the paper though, it seems that this speed limit only works if earth's speed relative to the preferred reference frame is < 10^-3, so would love clarification on this, since I'm not sure why one should pick a frame like that)

I'll leave that to someone who knows something about it.

The many worlds theory gets rid of the issues with the former two, but then proposes an infinite number of undetectable worlds. How does this branching occur? When does this branching occur? Do all these worlds already exist, and if so, how? And most importantly, how can one make sense of the probabilities via the Born rule that we use to verify quantum mechanics, if every possible world occurs? As far as I know, no satisfactory answer to these questions, especially the last one, has been proposed, which again makes this very implausible.

MWI is in many ways the simplest interpretation. It basically says that the evolution of a wave-function is all there is. The branching is nothing more than the usual mathematics of QM - it's what happens in basic QM before a measurement. Other interprations cut off all but once branch and generally a probabilistic rule determines which branch the universe follows. MWI simply says that the wave-function is never pruned in this way.

The main problem is how to explain the probabilities in cases where all branches are not equally likely. This is called the Born rule and, IMO, MWI cannot explain it.

Superdeterminism seems to postulate a global conspiracy of sorts where even though everything is local and deterministic, it is left unexplained as to why the particles are predetermined to be correlated in such a way where it looks as if they are influencing each other. In principle, it seems as if you can use superdeterminism to explain away any causal relationship, making this again seem implausible.

It's nonsense, IMO. I'll defer to Scott Aaronson on this one:

https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=6215

To say I’m not a fan of superdeterminism would be a super-understatement. And yet, nothing I’ve written previously on this blog—about superdeterminism’s gobsmacking lack of explanatory power, or about how trivial it would be to cook up a superdeterministic “mechanism” for, e.g., faster-than-light signaling—none of it seems to have made a dent. It’s all come across as obvious to the majority of physicists and computer scientists who think as I do, and it’s all fallen on deaf ears to superdeterminism’s fans.

So in desperation, let me now try another tack: going meta. It strikes me that no one who saw quantum mechanics as a profound clue about the nature of reality could ever, in a trillion years, think that superdeterminism looked like a promising route forward given our current knowledge. The only way you could think that, it seems to me, is if you saw quantum mechanics as an anti-clue: a red herring, actively misleading us about how the world really is. To be a superdeterminist is to say:

OK, fine, there’s the Bell experiment, which looks like Nature screaming the reality of ‘genuine indeterminism, as predicted by QM,’ louder than you might’ve thought it even logically possible for that to be screamed. But don’t listen to Nature, listen to us! If you just drop what you thought were foundational assumptions of science, we can explain this away! Not explain it, of course, but explain it away. What more could you ask from us?

I'm still relatively new to learning about this stuff, and would love to know if I misunderstood any of these interpretations. If not, do I just have to live with knowing that there might be something true that seems implausible?

The fact is that all interpretations of QM are unintuitive - in the sense that nature at the fundamental level cannot be the simple, Newtonian clockwork model that you might want. Moreover, the simple Newtonian model could never produce chemistry or complex organisms or life. If the universe were like that, we wouldn't be here to study it, in all its simplicity.

Instead, QM allows phenomena that generate complex chemistry (thru enganglement, non-locality, tunneling, probabilities etc.) and that gives us the much richer universe we inhabit.

 

[Demystifier]

How can a measurement outcome influence another without anything propagating between them? How can an object affect another where it is not? This seems extremely implausible if not contradictory.

Well, that's so in Newtonian gravity, which, presumably, you became familiar with before learning about special and general relativity. Back then, did Newtonian gravity seemed "extremely implausible if not contradictory" to you? Many scientists (e.g. rocket scientists) use Newtonian gravity in practice, some of them might not even know that there is a better theory (GR), do you think that Newtonian gravity seems "extremely implausible if not contradictory" to them? My point is, there is nothing strange, let alone contradictory, with instantaneous action at a distance once you get used to it.

 

[PeroK]

Well, that's so in Newtonian gravity, which, presumably, you became familiar with before learning about special and general relativity. Back then, did Newtonian gravity seemed "extremely implausible if not contradictory" to you? Many scientists (e.g. rocket scientists) use Newtonian gravity in practice, some of them might not even know that there is a better theory (GR), do you think that Newtonian gravity seems "extremely implausible if not contradictory" to them? My point is, there is nothing strange, let alone contradictory, with instantaneous action at a distance once you get used to it.

That's slightly disengenuous, given that Newton himself despaired over his own theory of gravity for those reasons. And, given that a finite speed of causality is a cornerstone of modern physics, BM demands a significant and potentially unnecessary rethink of the structure of spacetime. After all, probabilities are not so strange once you get used to them!

 

[Demystifier]

After all, probabilities are not so strange once you get used to them!

Bohmians do not have problems with probabilities, or with the view that nature is fundamentally non-deterministic. They have problems with non-realism, the view that things don't have well defined properties until we observe them.

 

[syed]

Bohmians do not have problems with probabilities, or with the view that nature is fundamentally non-deterministic. They have problems with non-realism, the view that things don't have well defined properties until we observe them.

fair enough, is there a reason why bohmians do not perhaps prefer a finite but faster speed causal model propagating through space time or would that generate too many problems?

I'm also still wondering about how they tested the bound on this supposed action at a distance (which is about 10^4*c), since it seems like it's based on the assumption of the earth's speed being smaller than a certain value relative to the preferred frame (specifically 10^-3*c). But I couldn't find many independent arguments for why that kind of frame should be preferred. If anyone knows the answer to this, that would be great

 

[PeroK]

fair enough, is there a reason why bohmians do not perhaps prefer a finite but faster speed causal model propagating through space time or would that generate too many problems?

I'm also still wondering about how they tested the bound on this supposed action at a distance (which is about 10^4*c), since it seems like it's based on the assumption of the earth's speed being smaller than a certain value relative to the preferred frame (specifically 10^-3*c). But I couldn't find many independent arguments for why that kind of frame should be preferred. If anyone knows the answer to this, that would be great

The bigger problem is that for spacelike separated events, relatively says that the order is frame dependent. Neither happens first. So, there is no possibility of a message.

I guess if you postulate a FTL causality, then each experiment will have an upper bound on that speed for spacelike separation.

 

[PeroK]

PS note that an infinite speed is meaningless in terms of a signal. So that's just another way to say "nonlocal".

 

[syed]

The bigger problem is that for spacelike separated events, relatively says that the order is frame dependent. Neither happens first. So, there is no possibility of a message.

I guess if you postulate a FTL causality, then each experiment will have an upper bound on that speed for spacelike separation.

Well that would suppose that no non local theories such as Bohmian mechanics can be true which do violate relativity, which as far as I know, QM itself cannot rule out.

But I'm still confused as to how they're calculating that speed even if we assume a privileged reference frame, since the bound for that speed would depend on earth's "objective" speed relative to a certain rest frame I believe. But what would be that rest frame?

 

[PeroK]

Well that would suppose that no non local theories such as Bohmian mechanics can be true which do violate relativity, which as far as I know, QM itself cannot rule out.

But I'm still confused as to how they're calculating that speed even if we assume a privileged reference frame, since the bound for that speed would depend on earth's "objective" speed relative to a certain rest frame I believe. But what would be that rest frame?

Because one event would have to happen first. And you know the experimental error on simultaneity.

The experiment should break the entanglement because the signal arrives theoretically after the second measurement.

And you'd get two spin ups or otherwise break the conservation laws.

It's all done for form's sake, to close the door on such theories - for those who are hard to persuade.

 

[PeroK]

PS I like your posts, but a downside of learning QM this way is that you end up reading a lot of rubbish, like superdeterminism. Like trying to learn evolution, while treating creationism on an equal footing.

 

[syed]

Because one event would have to happen first. And you know the experimental error on simultaneity.

The experiment should break the entanglement because the signal arrives theoretically after the second measurement.

And you'd get two spin ups or otherwise break the conservation laws.

It's all done for form's sake, to close the door on such theories - for those who are hard to persuade.

but that is according to the earth's frame, no? Why would that be the privileged frame in this hypothetical?

PS I like your posts, but a downside of learning QM this way is that you end up reading a lot of rubbish, like superdeterminism. Like trying to learn evolution, while treating creationism on an equal footing.

I was reading the different interpretations to keep an open mind, since as far I know, you cannot experimentally pick one. The sxperdeterminism interpretation seems wildly implausible though

 

[PeroK]

but that is according to the earth's frame, no? Why would that be the privileged frame in this hypothetical?

You can do the experiment in different directions. When you do experimental physics, you're allowed to be clever!

I was reading the different interpretations to keep an open mind, since as far I know, you cannot experimentally pick one. The sxperdeterminism interpretation seems wildly implausible though

Unless and until an interpretation makes a different prediction, then why worry? That said, I'm not sure superdeterminism is an interpretation. It's more a different philosophy of physics.

Moreover, QM itself isn't the end of the story. Bohmian Mechanics (BM) has to reproduce the results of relativistic QFT. And, both QM/QFT and BM must eventually support a theory of quantum gravity.

Physicists only argue about different interpretaions of QM when they have nothing better to do!

 

[Demystifier]

fair enough, is there a reason why bohmians do not perhaps prefer a finite but faster speed causal model propagating through space time or would that generate too many problems?

Because such a theory would be more complicated and not fully compatible with measurable predictions of standard QM.

 

[Demystifier]

Bohmian Mechanics (BM) has to reproduce the results of relativistic QFT.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.05986

 

[gentzen]

In the Bohmian mechanics interpretation, the above problem is solved by positing a sort of action at a distance between measurement outcomes. In this case, a preferred frame of reference is proposed where there is an objective causal order to the measurement outcomes. One measurement outcome occurs before the other, and one of the measurement outcomes causes the other. Of course, this explicitly violates relativity. But what seems to be even more implausible is the idea of instantaneous action at a distance. How can a measurement outcome influence another without anything propagating between them? How can an object affect another where it is not? This seems extremely implausible if not contradictory.

So you think Wolfgang Pauli made a mistake, when he admitted that Bohmian mechanics is not contradictory?

I do not see any longer the possibility of any logical contradiction as long as your results agree completely with those of the usual wave mechanics and as long as no means is given to measure the values of your hidden parameters both in the measuring apparatus and in the observed system. [...] as far as the whole matter stands now, your 'extra wave-mechanical predictions' are still a check, which cannot be cashed.

I still want to dig-out Wolfgang Pauli's "full" interactions with David Bohm, but let me instead link to Heisenberg's reasons to dislike Bohmian mechanics, for the moment.

I was reading the different interpretations to keep an open mind, since as far I know, you cannot experimentally pick one.

I am not so sure whether this "claim" was not primarily motivated by Bohmian mechanics. Many other attempts at interpretation failed in much more direct ways, or were refuted by experiments. And in recent times, also Bohmian mechanics starts to get attacked as not really fully equivalent to orthodox interpretations.

The sxperdeterminism interpretation seems wildly implausible though

Perhaps because it was a strawman invented by Bell (1977), to patch a hole in his proof discovered by

Clauser, J.F. and Horne, M.A., 1974, “Experimental consequences of objective local theories,” Physical Review D, 10: 526–535.
Shimony, A., Horne, M.A., and Clauser, J., 1976, “Comment on ‘The theory of local beables’,” Epistemological Letters, 13: 1–8. Reprinted in Shimony, Horne, and Clauser (1985), and in Shimony (1993), 163–167.

But in the end, you would first have to come to terms with non-locality anyway. And probably also with the other "remaining issues" of Bohmian mechanics. My impression is that every issue which you can nail down in Bohmian mechanics also shows up in orthodox interpretations, once you realized it is there.

 

[syed]

The bigger problem is that for spacelike separated events, relatively says that the order is frame dependent. Neither happens first. So, there is no possibility of a message.

I guess if you postulate a FTL causality, then each experiment will have an upper bound on that speed for spacelike separation.

After thinking about this a little further, I wonder if the time order of relativity is what is making "normal QM" paradoxical (i.e. the Copenhagen interpretation).

So, before either particle is measured, neither is locally predetermined. Only once either of the particles are measured is when either of the entangled particles possesses a definite value at measurement.

But in one frame, particle A is measured first, and then the measurement outcome of particle B is now determined. On another frame, particle B is measured first, and then particle A's measurement outcome is now determined. But this implies an ambiguous causal sequence which is impossible under relativity. How do Copenhagen theorists solve this?

Because such a theory would be more complicated and not fully compatible with measurable predictions of standard QM.

I see, do you know what predictions this kind of theory would violate? Prima facie, it seems like an extremely improbable coincidence for there to be no signs of telepathic like processes happening in the universe (i.e. we don't seem to live in a Harry Potter world where me moving my hand causes something else far away to move instantly) and then on the micro scale, have particles instantly influence each other without anything traveling in between. So unless we're forced to believe in action at a distance by experiment, I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around it (and I don't think I am alone, Newton famously did not believe it, and neither did Einstein)

 

[PeterDonis]

The answer to the question posted in the title of this thread is "no".

 

[Demystifier]

I see, do you know what predictions this kind of theory would violate?

It has been shown that a finite speed of propagation of information would imply possibility of superluminal signaling. https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795

 

[syed]

It has been shown that a finite speed of propagation of information would imply possibility of superluminal signaling. https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795

Interesting, but this does not imply that this model is ruled out by experiment though, since only the experimental scenarios listed in that paper would imply that this model is ruled out if signaling was deemed to be impossible in those 4-partite experimental scenarios.

As far as I know, the experimental scenarios in that paper have not been done or are too impractical to be done.

 

[Nugatory]

How do Copenhagen theorists solve this?

They don’t. Copenhagen is inherently non-relativistic because of its collapse model so we only use it when relativistic considerations can be safely ignored.

 

[gentzen]

How do Copenhagen theorists solve this?

They don’t. Copenhagen is inherently non-relativistic because of its collapse model so we only use it when relativistic considerations can be safely ignored.

Well, that depends on the version of Copenhagen. Bohr's version is inherently non-relativistic. The version by Heisenberg and his "pupils" (Weizsäcker, Peierls, ...) is inherently subjective, hence the causal sequence is when the subject learns the information, and updates his expectations.

See for example In defense of "measurement" by Rudolf Peierls 1991 Phys. World 4 (1) 19

 

[physika]

TL;DR Summary: Intuition clashes with QM

I'm having trouble making sense of any of the interpretations of QM (I'm still new to this) and wanted clarity as to whether or not the things that I do think are implausible within each interpretation are actually implausible, in order to make sure that I'm not misunderstanding anything.

You can also read about the models/theories of objective collapse (not interpretation)

.....

 

[martinbn]

I think this is the wrong way around. In my opinion you sould study QM and build new intuition.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Is there any interpretation of QM that doesn't clash with intuition?

The appropriate question would be: Is there any interpretation of QM that doesn't clash with 'classical' intuition?

 

[A. Neumaier]

The appropriate question would be: Is there any interpretation of QM that doesn't clash with 'classical' intuition?

A good candidate for such an interpretation is the interpretation in terms of quantum tomography.

 

[syed]

The appropriate question would be: Is there any interpretation of QM that doesn't clash with 'classical' intuition?

It is hard to distinguish between wrong interpretations and correct but unintuitive interpretations.

I think that a lot of people just say "it's not supposed to be classical, it's quantum" without really saying anything of substance or understanding what's actually going on. Okay, it's quantum, not classical. Go ahead and explain to me what exactly is going on then at measurement. If this is still left vague, then the argument that certain interpretations are correct but "classically unintuitive" is without merit.

 

[martinbn]

It is hard to distinguish between wrong interpretations and correct but unintuitive interpretations.

I think that a lot of people just say "it's not supposed to be classical, it's quantum" without really saying anything of substance or understanding what's actually going on. Okay, it's quantum, not classical. Go ahead and explain to me what exactly is going on then at measurement. If this is still left vague, then the argument that certain interpretations are correct but "classically unintuitive" is without merit.

Go on and explain my example. What is going on for the falling object to go on a parabolic path? Why not a log curve?

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Go ahead and explain to me what exactly is going on then at measurement.

An event localized in space and time is appropiately amplified to bring it to the attention of the experimenter.

 

[A. Neumaier]

An event localized in space and time is appropiately amplified to bring it to the attention of the experimenter.

And what is going on at coincidence measurements of entangled photons?

 

[gentzen]

An event localized in space and time is appropiately amplified to bring it to the attention of the experimenter.

Looks like Lord Jestocost "likes" Heisenberg's variant of Copenhagen:

The version by Heisenberg and his "pupils" (Weizsäcker, Peierls, ...) is inherently subjective, hence the causal sequence is when the subject learns the information, and updates his expectations.

In the "other" thread, Morbert and Fra showed "appreciation" for Bohr's variant of Copenhagen:

Quick reflection on the book looking at chapter 12.

Peres writings is very good, I like them, but the "sharpness" still rests on a few concepts that conceptually take the "role" of the heisenberg cut, some of the keys are

"Consistency thus requires the measuring process to be irreversible. There are no superobservers in our physical world."
Peres, p366

What you can learn about "my own opinion" from this is that I like to keep Bohr's and Heisenberg's variant of Copenhagen separate. I once also tried to find out who created that mess:

The idea that the "Copenhagen interpretation" should be the common core of the beliefs by Bohr and Heisenberg probably goes back to Henry P. Stapp in 1972.

Later I read articles which disagree with that guess. Not really sure. I mean, Heisenberg could have stopped him. Or Wheeler. Maybe they didn't realize how different Bohr's views actually were, because "Bohr himself was famously unable to express himself clearly". Even today, QBists cite Bohr as if he would agree with their views. OK, Chris Fuchs stopped doing this at some point, and distanced himself from Bohr. But Mermin never distanced himself from Bohr, as far as I know.

 

[Fra]

What you can learn about "my own opinion" from this is that I like to keep Bohr's and Heisenberg's variant of Copenhagen separate.

I know they had different perspectives, but what I consider CI today, is what seems to be the conceptual conjuction of their views; once residual disagreement is shaved off. But I admit that I think this conjuction may be afterwards construct. I have not studied the historical text to know.

From from the perspective of today and my preferred interpretation, these differences are not very important to me. Copenhagen, instrumental, statistical, are all good default interpretations for me, from where i stand, they have more in common than what separates them. But they all share also the same "conceptual problem". But I don't expect that as QM was born, these conceptual problems was priority. I see a disturbing hairball that if we splitting individual hairs make no big difference. The problem is much bigger than the small difference between sub-interpretations.

But I just perceive Bohr's way of putting as honest with the "inference situation", which is helpful when you want to go back for conceptual debugging.

/Fredrik

 

[gentzen]

I know they had different perspectives, but what I consider CI today, is what seems to be the conceptual conjuction of their views; once residual disagreement is shaved off.

I changed my mind. I guess I was too much influenced by Henry Stapp, despite disagreeing with him:

... the wikipedia article "implicitly proposes" a solution to the whole conundrum surrounding the Copenhagen interpretation:

In a 1960 review of Heisenberg's book, Bohr's close collaborator Léon Rosenfeld called the term an "ambiguous expression" and suggested it be discarded.[22] However, this did not come to pass, and the term entered widespread use.[16][19] Bohr's ideas in particular are distinct despite the use of his Copenhagen home in the name of the interpretation. [23]

Instead of trying to fit Bohr's ideas into the Copenhagen interpretation, or distinguishing between Heisenberg's and Bohr's variant of the Copenhagen interpretation, simply take the ideas of Heisenberg and his pupils as the Copenhagen interpretation, and let Bohr's ideas find a better home.

Bohr's ideas and views should be liberated from association with the Copenhagen interpretation. And the Copenhagen interpretation should take full responsibility for being subjective, without hidding behind Bohr's ideas.

Copenhagen, instrumental, statistical, are all good default interpretations for me, from where i stand, they have more in common than what separates them.

Do you think that Bohr's ideas are a mixture between instrumental and statistical? At least his ideas make sense from the perspective of a statistical interpretation. On the other hand, most of Bohr's attitudes don't mesh well with instrumentalism, even if Bohr occasionally hid behind instrumentalistic positions.

 

[Fra]

Do you think that Bohr's ideas are a mixture between instrumental and statistical? At least his ideas make sense from the perspective of a statistical interpretation. On the other hand, most of Bohr's attitudes don't mesh well with instrumentalism, even if Bohr occasionally hid behind instrumentalistic positions.

I can elaborate later but as i see everything from and inference perspective, i view bohrs reference to classical background as a general statment of that the inference machinery (which IS statistics from instruments - what else?) Is rooted and encoded in a solid context (classical world). This i interpret conceptually, as inference system needs som "hardware". So the quantum system is the "black box". And any inquiry (preparation and perturbation) are built solidly in the "background" - which we can give many names.. observer, classical realm, or maybe prior information.

Instrumentalism without thinkning about where and how the physical instruments are built is naive. Also if the instruments are our obly probea into the black box, then the nature and rooting of them does have fundamental implications on what we can say about nature.

I see more harmony than conflicts here. Also any statiatical information processing needs physical basis. Results need to be reliably stored and processed. Again bohrs classical realm is where it happens.

/Fredrik

 

[sbrothy]

With the The Montevideo Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: a short review all I have to go on is more or leas intuition (as I’m not as strong in math as you guys), but as I’ve said a million times before: intuition is a bad measure for correctness.

This interpretation really speaks to common sense and yeah well… intuition.

 

[sbrothy]

With the The Montevideo Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: a short review all I have to go on is more or leas intuition (as I’m not as strong in math as you guys), but as I’ve said a million times before: intuition is a bad measure for correctness.

This interpretation really speaks to common sense and yeah well… intuition.

Also, Scott Aaronson seems to believe that it makes testable predictions:

Jorge Pullin sent me an email responding to my question and to Ron Maimon's criticisms. In case people are interested, I'm posting it here with Jorge's kind permission. I particularly appreciated his clarification that the Montevideo interpretation is not really an "interpretation" at all, but new physics that makes new and different testable predictions. In particular, in Jorge and Rodolfo's view, the argument they give involving clocks is "motivational" in character; they're not claiming it as a derivation from accepted principles of quantum gravity. --Scott

---- Can the Montevideo interpretation of quantum mechanics do what it claims? (Physics Stack Exchange)

I'm a little sceptical about this, as this is not normally what you associate with QM interpretations, but I'm not so arrogant that I want to get into a discussion with Scott Aaronson! Someone else may perhaps have an opinion on this.

EDIT: Ah, I see there's yet again a pretty vehement disagreement in the discussion...