Problems with the Dreamliner battery

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Discussion Overview

The discussion centers around the issues related to the battery system of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, particularly focusing on safety concerns following incidents of battery fires. Participants explore the implications of these problems for Boeing and the aviation industry, touching on engineering challenges, regulatory responses, and the innovative design of the aircraft's electrical systems.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Technical explanation
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Exploratory

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants express surprise at the lack of discussion regarding the Dreamliner battery issues, highlighting the severity of the incidents and their implications for Boeing's reputation.
  • One participant notes that thermite-style reactions in lithium-ion batteries are known, suggesting that Boeing has implemented multiple systems to monitor and control battery charging to mitigate risks.
  • Concerns are raised about the potential for internal cell shorts leading to overheating and self-sustaining fires, with a participant citing Boeing's design philosophy to contain such failures until they burn out.
  • Another participant argues that the Dreamliner represents a significant shift in commercial aircraft design, suggesting that the problems encountered were somewhat expected given the scale of innovation involved.
  • Some participants criticize the public relations efforts surrounding the aircraft's safety, questioning the FAA's role in certifying the new electrical systems and expressing skepticism about the resolution of ongoing issues.
  • Questions are posed regarding the uniqueness of the 787's electric power distribution system, with participants seeking further information and links to relevant articles.
  • There are mentions of other issues with the 787, such as brake failures and fuel leaks, with some participants downplaying these concerns while emphasizing the significance of the electrical system challenges.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express a mix of concerns and optimism regarding the Dreamliner. While some acknowledge the innovative aspects of the aircraft and the engineering challenges faced, others are critical of Boeing's handling of safety issues and the FAA's regulatory decisions. No consensus is reached on the overall safety or future of the aircraft.

Contextual Notes

Participants note the complexity of the 787's electrical system and its implications for aircraft design, but there are unresolved questions about the interactions between the battery and this system. Limitations in public knowledge about past electrical issues during the flight test program are also mentioned.

  • #181
donpacino said:
A few things to consider about aircraft control computers.
There are independently reset-able paths usually using dissimilar hardware. Resetting a CPU or event an entire board will barely effect system operation.

Most electrical systems on a modern airplane reset once or twice a flight due to single event upsets (SEUs).

Very interesting. In this context when you talk about an electric system resetting itself what is the smallest resettable unit? e.g. when a SEU happens how large is the system that gets reset?

Or when you talk about resetting a Dreamliner CPU, how many CPUs are on board in the first place?
 
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  • #182
rollingstein said:
Very interesting. In this context when you talk about an electric system resetting itself what is the smallest resettable unit? e.g. when a SEU happens how large is the system that gets reset?

Or when you talk about resetting a Dreamliner CPU, how many CPUs are on board in the first place?

So a single flight computer system is typically made up of multiple boards. You can typically reset on a box (multiple boards), board(multiple functions), or function level. examples of functions are com channels, watchdog channels, and flight mode channels. You can sometimes even reset individual memory blocks (which will most likely disable that entire function for that frame). I would say the smallest electronic system you can reset is a function.

I don't know the dreamliner's architecture, but think of it this way. If there are 3 redundant paths in each computer, and you have say 8 actuators computers, 2 mission/flight computer, at a minimum you'll have 30 flight critical cpus. I would say that's a LOW estimate.
 
  • #183
donpacino said:
You can typically reset on a box (multiple boards), board(multiple functions), or function level.

box & board resets I can understand but what does a function level reset mean? Or even a memory reset. i.e. If you reset memory how do you get a coherent state for the OS wherever it was last before the reset? Ditto for a function reset. A function is a software entity right? So this would be a soft reset?
 
  • #184
rollingstein said:
box & board resets I can understand but what does a function level reset mean? Or even a memory reset. i.e. If you reset memory how do you get a coherent state for the OS wherever it was last before the reset? Ditto for a function reset. A function is a software entity right? So this would be a soft reset?
I shouldn't have used the word function. By function I meant a 'block' or a circuit that preforms a particular task. An example of this is on a typical PC if you had the ability to reset the hardware (not the software) of an individual usb port.

with the memory reset issue you may need to restart the OS or some higher level function depending on what part of memory was affected. In flight critical applications all or most memory is partitioned for specific use. Even then, the reset times for most systems are not that long (hard resets are anywhere from 10 ms to 200 ms). software can be much longer (seconds). But compared to windows operating systems, its blazing fast
 
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  • #185
Are the single event upsets so much more often due to the altitude of flights & related increase in energetic particle bombardment?
 
  • #186
rollingstein said:
Are the single event upsets so much more often due to the altitude of flights & related increase in energetic particle bombardment?
I don't know that much about SEUs. I know what they are. I know how they effect electronics. I know that the thinner the atmosphere, the more prevalent they are.
 
  • #187
donpacino said:
I don't know that much about SEUs. I know what they are. I know how they effect electronics. I know that the thinner the atmosphere, the more prevalent they are.

How come they don't cause laptops or similar electronic devices that have no special protection against SEUs to keep crashing when used on aircraft?
 
  • #188
rollingstein said:
How come they don't cause laptops or similar electronic devices that have no special protection against SEUs to keep crashing when used on aircraft?

The sensors, wiring and interfaces are exposed to high energy transients from power control activators and hull discharges from static. A person sitting at a seat is usually well shielded by the cabin and are far away from most EMI/ESD sources.
 

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