This webpage title poses the question: Can Mind Arise from Plain Matter?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Q_Goest
  • Start date Start date
  • Tags Tags
    Cause Events
Click For Summary
The discussion centers on the challenges of mental causation, particularly the exclusion argument for epiphenomenalism, which posits that mental events do not influence physical outcomes due to preexisting physical conditions. Yablo's dualism is highlighted, asserting that mental and physical phenomena are distinct yet both exist. The debate includes examples like computers processing information, questioning whether they experience consciousness or simply follow programmed responses. Participants argue about the implications of quantum phenomena and the potential for unknown causal powers, suggesting that materialism and determinism may not fully account for mental experiences. The conversation ultimately seeks to reconcile mental and physical events, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of consciousness and causality.
  • #61
SW VandeCarr said:
Of the four fundamental interactions, what else would describe the dynamic activity of the brain which is electro-chemical in nature. All ordinary chemistry is mediated by the EMF. What else would it be: gravity, the strong and weak forces? You must be aware of this.


I've seen this amazing line of reasoning coming out from some of the most prominent physicists. And it never stopped to amaze me how it is considered a rational belief that it will one day be explained how our ordered macro world will somehow appear out of the 4 fundamental forces. Why not call quits to the idea that getting down to the bits will get you the big picture and instead seek a more plausible solution?
 
Physics news on Phys.org
  • #62
apeiron said:
Crank alert! Or can you cite the relevant experimental evidence in the reputable literature?

I think you should re-consider that statement. Action potentials, ion channel activity, synaptic neurotransmitters are all electrochemical processes. All electrochemical processes are manifestations of the EMF. What else would you consider to be the mediating force to be: gravity? The strong nuclear force? the weak nuclear force? Or perhaps some mysterious "mind" force?

You've mostly promoted your own personal theories on this and other threads including the GR-QM divide. Here's a reference on basic neurophysiology. I'm just saying that what we call mind is basic physics iterated over a large and complex system. I'll dig up some more references. There's nothing I've said that isn't accepted science except perhaps the free electron transmission across synaptic clefts. I'll find that reference,

The concept of "mind" is a essentially a philosophical construct. There is nothing aphysical about how brain function produces mind. Brain function requires energy just like any other physical process.

http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih2/addiction/guide/lesson2-1.htm

EDIT: Here's a reference regarding quantum tunneling at synaptic clefts. Hammeroff and others have proposed this. The idea is also supported by Roger Penrose. However it is controversial. As far as this thread is concerned, it doesn't matter. The well known transmission of neurotransmitters across synaptic clefts is still an electrochemical process.

http://arxiv.org/vc/quant-ph/papers/0207/0207093v2.pdf
 
Last edited:
  • #63
WaveJumper said:
I've seen this amazing line of reasoning coming out from some of the most prominent physicists. And it never stopped to amaze me how it is considered a rational belief that it will one day be explained how our ordered macro world will somehow appear out of the 4 fundamental forces. Why not call quits to the idea that getting down to the bits will get you the big picture and instead seek a more plausible solution?

What is your more plausible solution to the "Mind-Body Problem"?.
 
  • #64
SW VandeCarr said:
What is your more plausible solution to the "Mind-Body Problem"?.

I don't see it that black and white. The 'problem' area isn't strictly mind-body but in a wider sense "experience-objective reality". The relationship between personal experience and objective reality isn't as clear as some would like to believe. Until better evidence comes along, I will adopt a more humble attitude and agree with Einstein that reality is stranger than we can imagine. Whether systems science has anything worthwhile to say on the topic is debateable, but i'd say such an approach has much more potential. Or even more likely, we will never have complete knowledge of anything at all, just better models of phenomena.

BTW, suppose it were possible that we one day managed to explain everything. Would you not doubt the existence of an outside reality?
 
Last edited:
  • #65
SW VandeCarr said:
Also every electric field is associated with a magnetic field according to Maxwell's Laws. These fields are very weak in the brain but they do the job. The magnetic field doesn't interact because of the non metallic structure of the brain.

Apeiron:

Do you really need a reference for Maxwell's Laws of electromagnetism?
 
Last edited:
  • #66
WaveJumper said:
I don't see it that black and white. The 'problem' area isn't strictly mind-body but in a wider sense "experience-objective reality". The relationship between personal experience and objective reality isn't as clear as some would like to believe. Until better evidence comes along, I will adopt a more humble attitude and agree with Einstein that reality is stranger than we can imagine. Whether systems science has anything worthwhile to say on the topic is debateable, but i'd say such an approach has much more potential. Or even more likely, we will never have complete knowledge of anything at all, just better models of phenomena.

BTW, suppose it were possible that we one day managed to explain everything. Would you not doubt the existence of an outside reality?

As far as the Mind-Body Problem is concerned, I said that brain function is basic physics iterated over a large complex system. It's not an either/or situation. Chemicals like dopamine, norepinephrine, acetylcholine,and serotonin act as individual molecules at microscopic receptor sities, but collectively produce powerful macroscopic effects in mood, mental acuity and memory. There's no issue here. There's no divide between the macroscopic and microscopic except in the way are constrained to describe and understand reality.

Before we understand 'everything' we have understand ourselves and that may take a higher level of cognition than we presently possess.
 
Last edited:
  • #67
Hi People
Of course there is mental causation, if you include telepathy. How often have you been thinking about sex, for instance, while not looking at the person you're thinking of, only to surprise a look on their face that tells you they were sharing your thoughts? This is a difficult question to experiment about for reason of probable embarrassment of the parties involved, who may well not even know one another.
And again, I knew a group of guys who would play rhythms into a particular poker machine, and who assured me that the justice of their rhythms caused the machine to spit out coins, which it certainly did. Is this mental causation?
It seems to me that the motivating force behind phenomena such as these lies rather deeper within me than do my momentary thoughts, and that experiments are difficult to construct for that reason. Perhaps processes deeper than 'mental' processes are involved.
But surely, everybody knows that things sometime do happen because we have thought them into happening... but it's very easy to be shy of reporting such experiences because of the often scornful attitude of others, who fear to admit that they, too, have at least been very suspicious.
 
  • #68
apeiron said:
Crank alert! Or can you cite the relevant experimental evidence in the reputable literature?

Given that the majority of experimental evidence in neuroscience is based in chemistry and a lot of the theory is based on electrical engineering, both of which rely solely on the electromagnetic force (as does just about everything you experience) SW is taking a standard reductionist view.

I often consider whether gravity may have a significant effect or not, but there would be no experimental basis for that yet that I know of. Intuitively, it seems that for the most part, no, but I'm not so sure when it comes to questioning how turbulence or precipitation would effect chemical reactions.

apeiron, exactly what did you study in your 15 years that you keep referring to and from what academic perspective? The article you posted that you authored was extremely philosophical, yet you want to hold high scientific standards (on a rather trivial subject).
 
Last edited:
  • #69
SW VandeCarr said:
I think you should re-consider that statement. Action potentials, ion channel activity, synaptic neurotransmitters are all electrochemical processes. All electrochemical processes are manifestations of the EMF.

Look at what you actually said.

Because I believe that the EMF, in the complex configurations it assumes within the brain's dynamic and structural constraints is what we call mind.

If so, then holding a cell phone to your head ought to screw your mental state. It actually takes a big jolt of EMF to impact the brain. Use some common sense. Do you think electric current flows through the brain?

Also, every electric field is associated with a magnetic field according to Maxwell's Laws. These fields are very weak in the brain but they do the job.

What job? Cite the literature.

free electrons seem to play a role at synapses.

C'mon, if you fall for Hameroff you really are being suckered. And I could tell you stories about how little neuroscience Penrose knows.

Electrical synapses still just transact ions. Show me the literature that says otherwise.

SW VandeCarr said:
http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih2/addiction/guide/lesson2-1.htm [/url].

Don't insult me. I've written books on the brain. I wrote a column for Lancet Neurology. I've written on neuroscience for the New Scientist.
 
  • #70
apeiron said:
Read some phase transition literature. Ising models, Benard cells, etc. Check out vortexes and turbulence.
Could you be a bit more specific about how these involve downward causation? Let's take phase transition or turbulence as an example. I am not saying DC doesn't exist, I am just looking for examples and to understand how it works and what it means for mind.

If you prefer to identify mind with form and brain with substance, then that does work as an approximate ontology. But I have to keep reminding you that this is a dichotomistic rather than a dualistic ontic framework that I am using here.

All systems require both substance and form to be physically real. They can never be reduced completely to either one or other axis of being. Though for modelling reasons, we may chose to emphasise one or other aspect.
My interest lies in the origin of mind: when and where did it first exist. Suppose mind is "form" (which is the configuration/organisation of the substance right?), when did the earliest "form" first exist?

The newscientist article (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17523555.500-the-topdown-universe.html?full=true) talks about downward causation that is "as fundamental as the laws that govern particles". If all downward causation is "as fundamental as...", then a causal mind is still a fundamental mind.

And the big mistake you and so many others here are making is to think of "mind" as a simple state - just experiencing, as some put it. Qualia. Raw awareness. Whatever. Mental experience in fact does not have that raw simplicity.
Our experiences may not be simple, but they exist, agree? Or are you saying that you have left the whole phenomenal part of mind out of your story?
 
Last edited:
  • #71
apeiron said:
If so, then holding a cell phone to your head ought to screw your mental state. It actually takes a big jolt of EMF to impact the brain.

I was under the impression they did. Just not in a significant or harmful way:

from the journal you keep name dropping:

Physics and biology of mobile telephony
The Lancet, Volume 356, Issue 9244, Pages 1833-1836
G.Hyland

from the International Journal of Neuroscience:
http://informahealthcare.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00207450390220330

Do you think electric current flows through the brain?

Are you serious? Of course current flows through the brain! I am seriously beginning to doubt your credibility now:
http://www.cord.edu/faculty/ulnessd/neuroscience/neuronotes.pdf

What job? Cite the literature.

London or Van Der Waals force. I really don't see the point in citing the literature. Do some research on London forces in the context of chemistry, it's fairly common knowledge.

Of course, I wouldn't support Penrose after his "quantum consciousness" theory and I have no idea who Hameroff is.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #72
Pythagorean said:
I was under the impression they did. Just not in a significant or harmful way:

That's so lame its sad.

If you are conjecturing consciousness is an organised EM field, then you have to deal with the fact that waving magnets around isn't a big problem for consciousness. Brain cancer is a different subject.

Pythagorean said:
London or Van Der Waals force. I really don't see the point in citing the literature. Do some research on London forces in the context of chemistry, it's fairly common knowledge.

Chemistry? I thought we were talking neuroscience. Now show me who else apart from cranks like Hameroff think London forces hold the key to brain function?

Are you seriously planning to study neuroscience next year?
 
  • #73
There is a discussion about a conscious EM field in the brain here:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=100320

McFadden himself answers the phone question on his site:

Why don't external fields (from power lines, mobile phones etc.) affect our thoughts?

The head acts as a pretty effective Faraday cage that screens out most static electric external fields. Static magnetic fields (from eg. MRI scanners) will penetrate the head but don't induce currents so are unlikely to change neuron firing patterns and thereby produce a reportable effect. High frequency fields (eg. from mobile phones) may penetrate the head but are unlikely to interact with low frequency brain waves. Low frequency magnetic fields may penetrate the head and interact with the cemi field - and there is plenty of evidence for this in Transcranial Magnetic stimulation (TMS) that induces lots of behavioural effects - see my first JCS paper for more details.
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/cemi.htm
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/pdfs/cemi_theory_paper.pdf
 
  • #74
apeiron said:
That's so lame its sad.

If you are conjecturing consciousness is an organised EM field, then you have to deal with the fact that waving magnets around isn't a big problem for consciousness. Brain cancer is a different subject.

Waving a magnetic around would be an extremely low frequency electromagnetic wave, it would be like hearing atmospheric pressure changes. You don't hear them! They're too low of a frequency. Humans can't below 20 Hz, it doesn't interfere with you're hearing at all when a 10 Hz signal comes through, or even a complicated 1-10Hz bandwidth signal. This would be analogous to waving a magnet around.

Nobody said anything about brain cancer. Cell phones have been suggested in stimulating alpha waves, which can keep make it more difficult to go to sleep. But remember that cell phones are extremely low power at the source, but the time they make it to your neurons they are extremely attenuated, given 1/R^2 and dielectric materials they must pass through.

Chemistry? I thought we were talking neuroscience. Now show me who else apart from cranks like Hameroff think London forces hold the key to brain function?

Are you seriously planning to study neuroscience next year?

Have you ever heard of neurophysics? Chemistry and electrical engineering are required as background for neurophysics. It's also called molecular neuroscience:
http://www.cord.edu/faculty/ulnessd/neuroscience/neuronotes.pdf

You really don't have a clue, do you? You're coming at this from a completely philosophical angle. That's fine in itself, but you're also refuting the physical evidence!

Maybe you should do a little research into it before refuting the reductionist view. I didn't say anything about London forces "holding the key" to brain function, but they are definitely part of the process of electrochemical interactions! I have no idea what holds the key, that's the path of discovery I am on! You are the one claiming to have superior knowledge.

Let's address this, for instance:
Do you think electric current flows through the brain?

Do you think that current doesn't flow through the brain?

Are you seriously going to insist that you have any kind of credible background in neuroscience?
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #75
Pythagorean said:
Are you serious? Of course current flows through the brain! I am seriously beginning to doubt your credibility now:
http://www.cord.edu/faculty/ulnessd/neuroscience/neuronotes.pdf

Do you read your sources? Tell me again, what flows around the nervous system? Is it ions (bobbing sideways across membranes to produce action potentials)? Or is it electrons?

What cross synaptic junctions? Is it neurotransmitters (and ions again in the rare electrical junction)? Or is it electrons?

Your textbook clearly states...

There are two sources of current that we must consider in a
neuroscience problem
1. Natural
• flow of ions, (K+, Na+, Ca2+, Cl−)
2. Experimental
• injection by a electronic current source.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #76
apeiron said:
Do you read your sources? Tell me again, what flows around the nervous system? Is it ions (bobbing sideways across membranes to produce action potentials)? Or is it electrons?

What cross synaptic junctions? Is it neurotransmitters (and ions again in the rare electrical junction)? Or is it electrons?

Your textbook clearly states...

That's still electric current! It's still called an electric force even if a positive ion is causing it! We don't call it the positronic field, we still call it the electric field!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_current

Electric current can mean, depending on the context, a flow of electric charge (a phenomenon) or the rate of flow of electric charge (a quantity). This flowing electric charge is typically carried by moving electrons, in a conductor such as wire; in an electrolyte, it is instead carried by ions, and, in a plasma, by both.

You obviously have a serious lack of understanding in the physical sciences!
 
  • #77
The word electric pertains to the phenomena of the electric field. It's annoying that one of the flavors of charge involved is also called an electron, but this shouldn't be confusing to anyone who has taken just one semester of electrodynamics or electrical engineering (ok, maybe the EE's would be confused, but not the ones working in neuroscience!)
 
  • #78
Pythagorean said:
The word electric pertains to the phenomena of the electric field. It's annoying that one of the flavors of charge involved is also called an electron, but this shouldn't be confusing to anyone who has taken just one semester of electrodynamics or electrical engineering (ok, maybe the EE's would be confused, but not the ones working in neuroscience!)

I can see you're rather worked up. But it would help if you focused on the question rather than making random slurs.

This thread has strayed into plain crankology once people start citing EM fields as being the putative cause of consciousness. And you are making a fool of yourself for supporting this nonsense.

As I said, saying the mind is composed of its electrical fields is as vacuous as saying it is composed of its atoms. There is zilch evidence that the brain is a loom designed to weave electrical patterns that are then somehow, magically, conscious.
 
  • #79
pftest said:
There is a discussion about a conscious EM field in the brain here:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=100320

McFadden himself answers the phone question on his site:

Sadly this is more well-known nonsense. (I think I did speak to McFadden about his theories at the time, I definitely had some to and fro with Pockett).

Microwaves can do this...via thermal effects on the cochlea...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microwave_auditory_effect

Fortunately pigeon skulls don't seem to act as faraday cages...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetoreception

And essential wearing for those who still believe in EM consciousness...:smile:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tin_foil_hat
 
  • #80
pftest said:
Could you be a bit more specific about how these involve downward causation? Let's take phase transition or turbulence as an example. I am not saying DC doesn't exist, I am just looking for examples and to understand how it works and what it means for mind.
I'd disagree that Benard cells, vortexes or turbulence has anything to do with downward causation, pftest. These phenomena are studied by engineers and scientists using standard FEA and CFD multiphysics packages using the Navier Stokes equations. There's nothing in any computational modeling package that includes downward causes - these phenomena have always been assumed to follow local, causal laws.
 
  • Like
Likes mattt
  • #81
apeiron said:
Sadly [E/M field theories are] more well-known nonsense. (I think I did speak to McFadden about his theories at the time, I definitely had some to and fro with Pockett).
McFadden came on PF to discuss this with us here per the link provided by pftest. EM field theories are essentially no different than any other computational theory of mind, so saying they are nonsense is a personal choice.
 
Last edited:
  • #82
apeiron said:
Read some phase transition literature. Ising models, Benard cells, etc. Check out vortexes and turbulence.

The point of the systems approach is that it ends up not being "all just material". Yes, it should all be "physical" in the widest sense, but that involves the dichotomy of substance and form.

If you prefer to identify mind with form and brain with substance, then that does work as an approximate ontology. But I have to keep reminding you that this is a dichotomistic rather than a dualistic ontic framework that I am using here.

All systems require both substance and form to be physically real. They can never be reduced completely to either one or other axis of being. Though for modelling reasons, we may chose to emphasise one or other aspect.

And the big mistake you and so many others here are making is to think of "mind" as a simple state - just experiencing, as some put it. Qualia. Raw awareness. Whatever. Mental experience in fact does not have that raw simplicity.

Anyway, I was chucking out a lot of old references and came across a couple that a little randomly illustrate the variety of systems thinking out there.

Ok, so what is the order parameter an experimentalist should measure to determine whether a given system is in a conscious phase or not? Incidentally, I've always found the critical point fascinating - liquid and gas are truly different only if one passes through the phase boundary but not round the critical point.

Or is the definition of consciousness still embryonic, like the definition of long range entanglement, where we have a vague idea of some things to measure like the entanglement entropy and efference copy, but no definitive test.
 
  • #83
apeiron said:
I can see you're rather worked up. But it would help if you focused on the question rather than making random slurs.

This thread has strayed into plain crankology once people start citing EM fields as being the putative cause of consciousness. And you are making a fool of yourself for supporting this nonsense.

As I said, saying the mind is composed of its electrical fields is as vacuous as saying it is composed of its atoms. There is zilch evidence that the brain is a loom designed to weave electrical patterns that are then somehow, magically, conscious.

Do you see the way you're arguing? You're relying extremely on pathos. You've been shown wrong over the last several posts and now you want to change the subject to get the focus back. The focus isn't even about a theory of consciousness, it's about mental causation.

All of the arguments you lost were in trying to attack the EM theory on the basis of their premises being true (to which your counter was that it was silly or ridiculous, which adds no value to your argument) and you were wrong.

It's not my theory (I don't have one) but it's a viable reductionist theory. This is a philosophy forum, we can only see whether an argument is valid, not sound (https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=39367).

I only have access to understanding reductionist-type theories given my background in physics, but I'm also a pluralist (I see no reason to think that a systems approach should conflict with a reductionist approach, just because of how we label them, for instance).

In fact, I think a helpful and useful systems approach should be proven in the limit of the reduced theory. (I.e. QM reduces to classical physics in the limit, and to chemistry as well, chemistry and physics make up biology, astronomy (classical physics) and chemistry make up the geology, biology and geology make the ecosystem and of course:

biology + chemistry + physics --> neuroscience

(in the future)
neuroscience --> psychology

(this is not some strict hierarchy, it's meant mostly as an example)

My argument on mental causation is that the sense of "me" that we feel is an illusion brought on by a combination of systems that have found a sustainable energy balance (following the laws of physics)

The first time this happened was with single-celled organisms. Cells are amazing things little machines. The cell, one day takes in another kind of cell, but instead of completely digesting it, it forms a symbiotic relationship with it:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endosymbiotic_theory
(this is a valid theory that has suggestive evidence, but some objections. Note that the objections don't invalidate it.)

Now the cell has adopted the other cell as its organelle and is now a more complex system (really a set of two subsystems).

I posted the article about the slime mold in which, a colony of single-celled organisms form a multi-cellular organism for a task, then break apart back into single-celled organisms.

In this way you can see how the more cells involved, the more complex the system becomes. Now we can talk about organs (made up of cells) such as the brain. (Of course, consciousness could very well exist everywhere in the body too, for all I know).

Either way, the conclusion that you arrive at from the reductionist view is that the phenomena of consciousness is the effect that arises from the human body, of who's components are the cause.

The qualia of consciousness are not true representations of reality, but stereotypes laid by a sophisticated categorization system (a network of neurons in your brain, for instance) that uses these stereotypes to predict (within a tolerable accuracy) how the world around him is behaving, or will be behaving sometime in the future. It's not always accurate, but it does a lot for the survivability of its species.

We're only made individuals by the concept of the boundary layer between our organs and the environment (another helpful category). Even that boundary is somewhat loose; we mix with our environment in many ways. We depend on many cultures of bacteria that we would die without (namely, the ones in our digestive system). We're pretty much a bunch of interacting molecules that have stabilized a pattern of mass and energy given the environment and the rules of the universe.

aside:

There's also the matter of the nucleus of each cell to consider. They contain your base DNA. In some respect, they have a lot of say in how you respond to the environment, especially holding the DNA code that has allowed your strain to survive all these years.

As an aside, it would be an interesting argument that consciousness somehow arose from your cells, as a long-term process, that utilizes your brain in the short term and that consciousness is somehow linked with your DNA.
 
  • #84
Pythagorean said:
biology + chemistry + physics --> neuroscience

(in the future)
neuroscience --> psychology

If psychology has an operationally definition of something, we should be able to find the neuronal counterpart. Does psychology have an operational definition of "consciousness perception" as opposed to "unconscious perception"?
 
  • #85
If "mental events" is a meaningful term, ie. operationally defined, then yes, mental events can cause.

What is an "epiphenomenon"? Are there any known epiphenomena?
 
  • #86
Yes, of course someone's mood can affect physical processes. Mood is in part determined by serotonin levels which affects neuron's membrane conductances which affects membrane time constants.
 
  • #87
Hi all. Let's stay on topic. This thread is about mental causation. Thanks. :smile:
 
  • #88
Hi atyy,
atyy said:
Yes, of course someone's mood can affect physical processes. Mood is in part determined by serotonin levels which affects neuron's membrane conductances which affects membrane time constants.
This conflates physical phenomena and mental phenomena. If one wants to suggest these two phenomena are identical, and some such as Dennett will try to do so, then there's no reason to go on. There's no difference between the behavior and the phenomenal experience and there's no explanation needed. Qualia don't exist as distinct phenomena. Per this line of reasoning, qualia are essentially the same as pressure is to the statistical mechanical description of it's constituent parts (ie: the motions of molecules or atoms).

However, this is extremely difficult to make stick for many reasons. First and foremost, we don't need to postulate mental phenomena to explain physical phenomena. There's an explanatory gap in our understanding of consciousness because we will never need to use such things as mood or qualia to explain the physical comings and goings of material particles or portions of physical systems.

This is an important distinction if one wishes to address the issues around mental causation since folks such as Dennett would suggest there is no causal efficacy for mental events and as I've pointed out, this leads to a very serious paradox.
 
  • #89
Q_Goest said:
Hi atyy,

This conflates physical phenomena and mental phenomena. If one wants to suggest these two phenomena are identical, and some such as Dennett will try to do so, then there's no reason to go on. There's no difference between the behavior and the phenomenal experience and there's no explanation needed. Qualia don't exist as distinct phenomena. Per this line of reasoning, qualia are essentially the same as pressure is to the statistical mechanical description of it's constituent parts (ie: the motions of molecules or atoms).

However, this is extremely difficult to make stick for many reasons. First and foremost, we don't need to postulate mental phenomena to explain physical phenomena. There's an explanatory gap in our understanding of consciousness because we will never need to use such things as mood or qualia to explain the physical comings and goings of material particles or portions of physical systems.

This is an important distinction if one wishes to address the issues around mental causation since folks such as Dennett would suggest there is no causal efficacy for mental events and as I've pointed out, this leads to a very serious paradox.

Yes, I think you've have my point of view largely right, even though I'm not a Dennett fan, ie. my heuristic is that mood is to neurons as pressure is to molecules, and the main problem for me is that some terms like "consciousness" are not operationally well-defined. However, this doesn't mean that mental phenomena are not useful to explain physical phenomena. After all, pressure is a useful concept, even though strictly speaking it is not necessary if we can measure all the positions and velocities of the molecules in a gas. In practice we only have access to macroscopic variables like pressure, similarly sometimes we only have access to macroscopic variables like mood. In the same way, mood is predictive of physical behaviour, eg. being depressed increases the tendency for suicidal behaviour, which is an observable behaviour of a system of particles.

Let me elaborate a bit on why I am not a Dennett fan. Dennett seems to think there is nothing to explain about why we have qualia, and other things such as thermostats presumably don't, at least not to the same degree. I do think it is interesting - just as it is interesting trying to derive for which systems it is meaningful to describe using "pressure", "temperature", "solid", "liquid" or "gas". I think the situation in theoretical neuroscience is that we have a vague definition of many concepts like "conscious perception", but not a sharp enough definition to tell an experimentalist what quantities to measure to determine if an entity has " conscious percepts". It's similar to condensed matter theory, where they have a vague notion of long-range entanglement, but not a sharp or complete enough definition to tell an experimentalist what to measure to determine whether and what sort of "long-range entanglement" is present (http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.1016). In other words, I believe that it is interesting to derive phase diagrams for mental states.
 
Last edited:
  • Like
Likes mattt
  • #90
atyy said:
Yes, of course someone's mood can affect physical processes. Mood is in part determined by serotonin levels which affects neuron's membrane conductances which affects membrane time constants.

but if that mood can be explained as the result of the physical state/inputs that caused it, then it's ultimately a matter of physical phenomena causing physical phenomena.

Q_Goest said:
If one wants to suggest these two phenomena are identical, and some such as Dennett will try to do so, then there's no reason to go on. There's no difference between the behavior and the phenomenal experience and there's no explanation needed.

This is where I would disagree with Dennet if this is what he actually claims. The two phenomena are not identical. One (consciousness) is a byproduct of the other (the physical phenomena).

However, this is extremely difficult to make stick for many reasons. First and foremost, we don't need to postulate mental phenomena to explain physical phenomena. There's an explanatory gap in our understanding of consciousness because we will never need to use such things as mood or qualia to explain the physical comings and goings of material particles or portions of physical systems.

But 1) we don't directly arrive at the conclusions for the laws of physical phenomena, and on the other side of that same coin, 2) we do postulate mental phenomena to model physical phenomena.

My argument for 1) is that we arrive at physical laws through a very long process of statistical significance. We do not have a complete grasp of the laws. We also don't know whether a ball will go down the 99999 time we drop it (but we would probably make money in a bet that it did).

My argument for 2) is that the formulation of the scientific method itself and the development of science required us to postulate mental phenomena in terms of what we are capable of discovering in a fashion that satisfies us.

We do need a certain degree of qualia to describe the mathematics that the physics is talking about. We can't model anything that we observe without qualifying the quantities.
 
Last edited:

Similar threads

  • · Replies 18 ·
Replies
18
Views
5K
  • Poll Poll
  • · Replies 246 ·
9
Replies
246
Views
33K
  • · Replies 5 ·
Replies
5
Views
5K
  • · Replies 33 ·
2
Replies
33
Views
6K
Replies
6
Views
6K
  • · Replies 40 ·
2
Replies
40
Views
8K
  • · Replies 11 ·
Replies
11
Views
3K
  • · Replies 13 ·
Replies
13
Views
6K
  • · Replies 18 ·
Replies
18
Views
5K
  • · Replies 21 ·
Replies
21
Views
5K