This webpage title poses the question: Can Mind Arise from Plain Matter?

[atyy]

that mind brought itself into existence by summarising/abstracting/conceptualising itself

That feels good to me - why do you think it's problematic?

 

[pftest]

That feels good to me - why do you think it's problematic?

For materialism this a problem, it holds that brains brought mind into existence.

 

[Pythagorean]

Ive argued against this in my topic and will briefly do so again since its relevant here (see the argument at the bottom of my post). As is mentioned here, the supervenient phenomenon is a "summation", or an "abstract" (and atyy calls it "a useful concept"). The reason why this cannot be the case for mind, is simple: we did not invent mind. Each of the terms summation/abstract/concept are already mental activities. So to claim that mind is a summation/abstract/concept is to claim that mind = mind, or worse, that mind brought itself into existence by summarising/abstracting/conceptualising itself. Mind cannot have originated as a concept because concepts require a mind in the first place. It cannot have been invented because inventions require a mind in the first place.

So it follows that experiences or qualia cannot be to the brain like what pressure is to moving atoms. Supervenience can't be relevant to the causal powers of mind.

But we did "invent" the concept of mind in the same way we "invented" the concept of pressure! We weren't somehow born knowing what a mind was and had to struggle with inventing pressure. In both cases, a lot of research and observation went into studying and labeling emergent properties of the systems.

My argument is that we really never leave the mind and safely make 100% objective observations/measurements. We're on a sliding scale where some things are more objective while others are more subjective. In this way, we can't separate the physical states from the mental states like the OP suggests. We never really leave the mental state, we only use repeatability to eliminate what's not the physical state from within our mental state.

Even the idea of qualia is fuzzy. We have to qualitatively define the values we're measuring in physics. We can't just cast rattle off numbers, they have to have qualifications attached to them. This is where subjectivity enters. The atom is a great example. The atom went through many models. None of them are completely objective, but they become more objective the more we can understand and isolate the phenomena we're interested in.

 

[pftest]

But we did "invent" the concept of mind in the same way we "invented" the concept of pressure! We weren't somehow born knowing what a mind was and had to struggle with inventing pressure. In both cases, a lot of research and observation went into studying and labeling emergent properties of the systems.

You can't invent anything without a mind in the first place. The first egg can't have been laid by an egg (unless eggs are fundamental). Sure we may have ideas about what mind is and does, and such beliefs may be an invention and may be true or false, but the invention itself is still based on our previous experiences. We were born conscious and to be conscious is to have a mind.

My argument is that we really never leave the mind and safely make 100% objective observations/measurements. We're on a sliding scale where some things are more objective while others are more subjective. In this way, we can't separate the physical states from the mental states like the OP suggests. We never really leave the mental state, we only use repeatability to eliminate what's not the physical state from within our mental state.

Even the idea of qualia is fuzzy. We have to qualitatively define the values we're measuring in physics. We can't just cast rattle off numbers, they have to have qualifications attached to them. This is where subjectivity enters. The atom is a great example. The atom went through many models. None of them are completely objective, but they become more objective the more we can understand and isolate the phenomena we're interested in.

I agree. However this is a methodological issue isn't it?

 

[Pythagorean]

You can't invent anything without a mind in the first place. An egg can't have laid itself either. Sure we may have ideas about what mind is and does, and such beliefs may be an invention and may be true or false, but the invention itself is still based on our previous experiences.

But you're basing your argument off of your conclusion. You're assuming that the mind you and I think of are exactly the mind that we possess. If it's something else happening (that we greatly simplified and come to call the mind) then we have very little idea of about.

Also, I'm not saying we completely invented pressure. There's some phenomena their that we interpret as pressure. My argument is that in the same way, there's some phenomena going on that we interpret as mind. We don't even know that the mind really exists as objectively as something like pressure does. This is why we must reserve discussions of mind for philosophy, while pressure is a scientific quantity.

We were born conscious and to be conscious is to have a mind.

Depending on your definition of consciousness, are you sure about this? Could we not argue that a newborn baby is completely a system of wired reflexes (for instance, if you stick your tongue out a newborn baby, she'll stuck her tong out back. They're hardwired to mimic, it's not something they learn. This a well known experiment, and I've done it myself with my newborn. Paul Bloom talks about it a little bit
http://oyc.yale.edu/psychology/introduction-to-psychology/content/class-sessions
(see session 5)

Then, through long-term stimulation, certain mimicked behaviors are "rewarded" and "punished" (by neurotransmitters) and from this system emerges something we eventually call consciousness because the stimuli history has been completely unique to that organism.

 

[Pythagorean]

I agree. However this is a methodological issue isn't it?

You can argue that, but there's no method that escapes it yet. We can never prove a negative (like that there's not an invisible God) but we don't have any evidence that it's methodological.

I don't believe in God or that any method will come about that can allow us to make 100% objective measurements of the physical world despite the fact that I can never disprove either of these statements.

addendum:

by the way, pftest, thank you for making an argument with premises and conclusions. I will review it and respond soon.

 

[Pythagorean]

I think we should all agree on a definition of mind, or at least make clear our definitions of mind. This is a definition provided for conscious awareness:

Conscious awareness: "The conscious aspect of the mind involving our awareness of the world and self in relation to it"

http://wps.pearsoned.co.uk/wps/media/objects/2784/2851009/glossary/glossary.html#C

From the same reference, mind is defined:

mind: A term unlikely to generate consensus of definition. As used here, it refers to the software aspect of human information process-ing systems of the brain, some of which are open to conscious introspection but most of which are unconscious (Chapter 22).

The first sentence I would agree with, which is why I think it's important that everyone submit a definition of mind, or at least agree with this one.

In my responses, I've considered mental causation to be events associated with the sensation of individuality, intent, and choice that we consciously feel. I realize now why it was brought up that willpower is irrelevant.

My argument from this definition:
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p1. All events exist as signals (even the idea of "signal" itself) in biological neural networks as a representation (or response) of something from the physical world (this holds for the concept of "velocity" as much as it does for the concept of "red"; even "software" and "mind" themselves are representations of something we experience in the physical world. The actual events, of course, don't happen in our brain signals, but our brain's signal model is the only access we have to those events, and of course, "events" is itself is an abstract of what's "really going on".
p2. These signals necessarily enter the cause/effect chain, as they are (to the best of our knowledge) physical electric signals.

conclusion: mind causes
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Though, I don't see exactly how upward or downward causation come into it. Building a hierarchy seems like it has some significant subjectivity to it.

From Wiki:

Physicalist solutions

The other major option is to deny that mental events are non-physical. Views that fall under this general heading are called physicalism or materialism. But, such views require a particular theory of how mental events are physical in nature. One such theory is behaviorism. Behaviorists, in general, argue that mental events are merely dispositions to behave in certain ways. Another theory is the identity theory, according to which mental events are (either type- or token-) identical to physical events. A more recent view, known as functionalism, claims that mental events are individuated (or constituted by) the causal role they play. As such, mental events would fit directly into the causal realm, as they are simply certain causal (or functional) roles. Finally, there is eliminative materialism, which simply denies that there are any such mental events; thus, there is really no problem of mental causation at all.

(emphasis added)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_mental_causation

Here is an example of the bolded. I am referring to his talk about synesthesia (his third subject) but I think all of it is relevant. The behavioral view would appreciate how a particular behavior like creativity is linked to the way neurons are connected.
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind.html

On his second subject, note that the man intellectually knew that he wasn't looking at his phantom limb, yet he was still able to fool his brain. This supports the behaviorlism view, as the man (as an "individual") had no control over his brain function as much as outside stimuli with respect to a particular brain behavior did.

Personally, I believe a lot of people's personal definitions and perceptions of mind in a dualist sense arise from the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angular_gyrus" of the brain, which has been shown to be associated with out-of-body experiences. VR Ramachandran discusses the angular gyrus a bit in his presentation above.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/health/psychology/03shad.html?_r=1

 

[pftest]

First, here are my definitions:

* My definition of consciousness is "having experiences". Examples of experiences are for example pain, what it feels like to see a car, etc. This is my theoretically neutral definition of C. It doesn't state C is material or non-material, it just refers to our experiences, and we all understand what we mean when talking about them.

* I am less clear on the definition of mind, but i do hold that anything that is conscious, has a mind.

But you're basing your argument off of your conclusion. You're assuming that the mind you and I think of are exactly the mind that we possess. If it's something else happening (that we greatly simplified and come to call the mind) then we have very little idea of about.

Also, I'm not saying we completely invented pressure. There's some phenomena their that we interpret as pressure. My argument is that in the same way, there's some phenomena going on that we interpret as mind. We don't even know that the mind really exists as objectively as something like pressure does. This is why we must reserve discussions of mind for philosophy, while pressure is a scientific quantity.

When you say "there is some phenomena that we interpret as mind", you are putting the act of interpretation as the origin of mind. You are essentially saying that mind is different than it appears. It may seem like you could get rid of mind that way, but where does that "appearing" or "interpreting" come from? What I am saying is that all such acts (interpreting, appearing, summarising, abstracting, conceptualising, etc) already are mental activities (since they involve consciousness - see my definitions). Note that I am not saying mind is immaterial. It makes no difference to the argument either way.

Depending on your definition of consciousness, are you sure about this? Could we not argue that a newborn baby is completely a system of wired reflexes (for instance, if you stick your tongue out a newborn baby, she'll stuck her tong out back. They're hardwired to mimic, it's not something they learn. This a well known experiment, and I've done it myself with my newborn. Paul Bloom talks about it a little bit
http://oyc.yale.edu/psychology/introduction-to-psychology/content/class-sessions
(see session 5)

Then, through long-term stimulation, certain mimicked behaviors are "rewarded" and "punished" (by neurotransmitters) and from this system emerges something we eventually call consciousness because the stimuli history has been completely unique to that organism.

Im not sure if newborns are conscious. I do think a baby needs to be conscious (have vision) in order to see someone else stick out his tongue and mimic it. Blind ones probably don't do it. But this is not important to my point, which was that the statement "mind is caused by interpretation/conceptualisation", is principally the same as the statement "mind is caused by a dream", and it boils down to "mind is caused by mind". So by this logic there must be mind before any babies or even before any life existed.

---------------------------------------------------
Btw i see we are drifting away from mental causation, so this line of discussion might be better suited for this topics of mine:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=358210
or maybe https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=346426

If you reply in any of those then i will do the same there.

 

[Pythagorean]

When you say "there is some phenomena that we interpret as mind", you are putting the act of interpretation as the origin of mind. You are essentially saying that mind is different than it appears. It may seem like you could get rid of mind that way, but where does that "appearing" or "interpreting" come from? What I am saying is that all such acts (interpreting, appearing, summarising, abstracting, conceptualising, etc) already are mental activities (since they involve consciousness - see my definitions). Note that I am not saying mind is immaterial. It makes no difference to the argument either way.

The behaviorist view (which is a stance on the 'problem of mental causation') takes the viewpoint that all those actions (interpreting, abstracting, etc.) come from the neural networks. From what I can tell, it's a combination of 1) the way neurons make connections with each other and 2) the way signals arrive from sensory input.

But advanced concepts like these are built over the long-term in the neural network, they don't appear overnight.

Im not sure if newborns are conscious. I do think a baby needs to be conscious (have vision) in order to see someone else stick out his tongue and mimic it. Blind ones probably don't do it. But this is not important to my point, which was that the statement "mind is caused by interpretation/conceptualisation", is principally the same as the statement "mind is caused by a dream", and it boils down to "mind is caused by mind". So by this logic there must be mind before any babies or even before any life existed.

I don't mean to say mind is caused by mind. The real mind is caused by neurons, quite simply. Our concept of mind is represented abstractly by signals in those neurons (i.e. our concept of mind is caused by the real mind.) In fact, from a behaviorist view, one could even argue that there is no mind, there is only behaviors that we sum up to "mind" for our own simplicity.

In the newborn example, we could argue that the babies brain simply receives inputs and sends outputs in the way the neurons were shaped to do so. The baby doesn't need to "know" it's mimicing; it's just a mechanism (output response to an input) that the neurons (which are connected to muscles) are experiencing.

http://www.fpnotebook.com/Nicu/Exam/NwbrnRflxs.htm" a list of newborn reflexes. My argument would be that these built-in reflexes allow the baby to survive and interact enough to develop an abstraction layer (a "map" of how they can interact with the world) through trial and error. As the abstraction layer becomes more complex and abstract, it becomes more like something we would call consciousness (though I wouldn't deny that the baby itself had consciousness... just a very limited form of it).

My point is ultimately that the baby does not know what it is doing. It's neurons are just responding to stimuli and adjusting for it. By the time we're adults, we may not know what we're doing either, our neurons have just become adapt at getting the dopamine and serotonin through the right combination of responses to particular inputs.

Btw i see we are drifting away from mental causation, so this line of discussion might be better suited for this topics of mine:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=358210
or maybe https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=346426

If you reply in any of those then i will do the same there.

I will take a look at those threads later, but when we use statements to support our conclusion, I think the statements are still relevant to the conclusion. (I.e. we are actually still on the topic of mental causation; we're analyzing one of your supporting arguments pertaining to your argument about mental causation).

Also note that post 107 was my response to your formal argument. It's not a rebuttal, just an inspired response.

 

[pftest]

My argument is that a causal mind is a mind that is not limited to brains. I am not sure if we disagree on this (because of what you mentioned about Koch), but my reply below is with that argument as the main point.

I don't mean to say mind is caused by mind. The real mind is caused by neurons, quite simply. Our concept of mind is represented abstractly by signals in those neurons (i.e. our concept of mind is caused by the real mind.) In fact, from a behaviorist view, one could even argue that there is no mind, there is only behaviors that we sum up to "mind" for our own simplicity.

I understand that you didnt mean to say mind is caused by mind, but that's just what the comparison "mind is to brain, like what pressure is to atoms" boils down to. In my view materialists (which I am not sure you are) should never mention the pressure example to support their ideas because it supports exactly the opposite.

Now the behaviorist view: everything has behaviour, so by equating mind with behaviour, we end up with a causal mind that is omnipresent. Suppose we state that "we have no mind at all, just behaviour", we are then left with the consequence that other things that have no mind at all (for example rocks), can have experiences as vivid as humans do. That we do not call it "mind" is only a semantic issue, not a qualitative difference between the human state we call mind and rocks. After all there is no qualitative difference in behaviour between the two either, only a quantitative difference in complexity.

In the newborn example, we could argue that the babies brain simply receives inputs and sends outputs in the way the neurons were shaped to do so. The baby doesn't need to "know" it's mimicing; it's just a mechanism (output response to an input) that the neurons (which are connected to muscles) are experiencing.

http://www.fpnotebook.com/Nicu/Exam/NwbrnRflxs.htm" a list of newborn reflexes. My argument would be that these built-in reflexes allow the baby to survive and interact enough to develop an abstraction layer (a "map" of how they can interact with the world) through trial and error. As the abstraction layer becomes more complex and abstract, it becomes more like something we would call consciousness (though I wouldn't deny that the baby itself had consciousness... just a very limited form of it).

My point is ultimately that the baby does not know what it is doing. It's neurons are just responding to stimuli and adjusting for it. By the time we're adults, we may not know what we're doing either, our neurons have just become adapt at getting the dopamine and serotonin through the right combination of responses to particular inputs.

Yes i think this also illustrates what i just said: by taking this route, one says that the adult brain is qualitatively no different from the baby brain: both have no mind (though there is a quantitative difference of complexity). What if we take this a step further: the adult brain is qualitatively no different from a thermostat. You end up with thermostats that, while semantically having no mind, can have as vivid experiences as adult brains do. And it doesn't stop with thermostats.

 

[Pythagorean]

My argument is that a causal mind is a mind that is not limited to brains. I am not sure if we disagree on this (because of what you mentioned about Koch), but my reply below is with that argument as the main point.

This is a very alluring idea. I've considered it a lot. On the one hand, why should something like consciousness be limited to living organisms if consciousness can be explained as a physical process?

On the other hand, what we define as the causal mind is a very complex physical process that we're still trying to understand. It may be that the brain is the only place the causal minds arrive in nature.

"mind is to brain, like what pressure is to atoms" boils down to. In my view materialists (which I am not sure you are) should never mention the pressure example to support their ideas because it supports exactly the opposite.

It supports the opposite only if you assume that pressure and mind are real, natural things, and not man-made concepts.

Now the behaviorist view: everything has behaviour, so by equating mind with behaviour, we end up with a causal mind that is omnipresent. Suppose we state that "we have no mind at all, just behaviour", we are then left with the consequence that other things that have no mind at all (for example rocks), can have experiences as vivid as humans do. That we do not call it "mind" is only a semantic issue, not a qualitative difference between the human state we call mind and rocks. After all there is no qualitative difference in behaviour between the two either, only a quantitative difference in complexity.

I disagree that a rock's experiences would be that complex if a rock experienced anything at all. I don't think the idea of vividness or even a "vividness" detector would exist in a rock. There could be many processes going on in a rock (phonons, thermodynamics) but the circuity that we use to study neurons and cognitive processes doesn't appear to exist in the rock.

The rock may not even have the concept of individuality. It may not separate itself from the world like we do. We see a boundary between rock and world, between us and world. But the boundary is not solid. Nor could we even survive as this individual life-form we believe we are. We depend on bacteria every day that have formed a symbiotic relationship with us. Bacteria that we would die with out.

Yes i think this also illustrates what i just said: by taking this route, one says that the adult brain is qualitatively no different from the baby brain: both have no mind (though there is a quantitative difference of complexity). What if we take this a step further: the adult brain is qualitatively no different from a thermostat. You end up with thermostats that, while semantically having no mind, can have as vivid experiences as adult brains do. And it doesn't stop with thermostats.

But notice, you've said "qualitatively" no different, but then went on to say that they're quantitatively different by saying "as vivid"

But we have no reason to believe that experience takes place in a thermostat or rock; at least, not whatsoever in the way we experience it. We're getting a feel for how we experience it through complex neural circuitry.

 

[pftest]

On the other hand, what we define as the causal mind is a very complex physical process that we're still trying to understand. It may be that the brain is the only place the causal minds arrive in nature.

Yes its complex, that's why i said the difference between a rock and a brain are a difference in complexity (which i call a quantitative difference). So if a behaviorist said that complex behaviour equals complex mind, then the consequence is that simple behaviour equals simple mind. Since the difference between the two is only in their complexity (of the way the physical ingredients behave and are arranged), there is no justification for any other type of difference, such as a qualitative difference like the arisal of mind out of complete non-mind.

Example: suppose we have a universe that fundamentally consists of balls in motion in space. The balls can interact with each other (bump into each other and cause a change in their movements), but the space has no causal powers (its not curved, has no gravity and such). These are the fundamental ingredients of this imaginary universe.

The motion and the number of balls in a specific area may vary. So there may be an area with just 2 balls bouncing against each other, and there may be an area with 10.000 balls doing figure 8 movements and moving in all kinds of unpredictable ways. The difference between these two situations is a difference in quantity/complexity. But you can see that no matter how complex the balls start moving, its still just moving balls in space and there is no justification for supposing that little square objects start appearing and that space suddenly gets curved and causes the motion of balls to change. That would be a qualitative difference.

You are right that the rock may not have a sense of individuality and even if it did it will not have the same experiences as a human brain does because of the difference in complexity (i talked about vividness because even simple experiences may be very vivid). The difference in their physical complexities allows a difference in their mental complexities, since the behaviorist thinks one = the other.

It supports the opposite only if you assume that pressure and mind are real, natural things, and not man-made concepts.

Concepts are mental activities so the statement "mind is a man-made concept" boils down to "mind is a mind". So that is still not materialist and the pressure example just doesn't support it. I don't think there is any other example of "supervenience" that supports it either.

 

[Pythagorean]

<snip>
That would be a qualitative difference.
<snip>

But we can show quite easily how quantitative differences do bring about qualitative differences. We can know how one particle behaves alone, but if we throw another particle in there, we can't just change all the 1's to 2's. We have completely different behavior.

We can know the properties of atoms and are still not able to predict how the same atoms would behave as a molecule.

This is the whole concept of emergent systems. You can understand your fundamental bits great, but it doesn't mean you're going to understand how a system of fundamental bits is going to work. Look at the computer experience that comes out of a system of 1's and 0's. We're able to communicate whole ideas and convey sound and audio over machine code without ever knowing machine code.

Also, the line between qualitative and quantitative is not a fine one. It is fine for scientific work, but in philosophy we have to accept that quantity is meaningless without quality. You may call geometry a qualitative description, but we can easily describe geometry quantitatively, as long as we label our quantities with qualities (length, angle, dimension, etc)

So a purely quantitative description would be meaningless, and a purely qualitative one is filled with so much meaning that ambiguities arise.

Concepts are mental activities so the statement "mind is a man-made concept" boils down to "mind is a mind". So that is still not materialist and the pressure example just doesn't support it. I don't think there is any other example of "supervenience" that supports it either.

I'll restate my point. You're forgetting that there's two different minds here. One is our subjective concept of mind that we tend to associate with our experience more (the mysterious mind), the other is the actual physical processes that manifest in the physical material (the brain). The software mind.

The software mind "boils down" to a bunch of random processes in a system of neurons that happened to find a stable state that allowed survivability are a mind. Not all of the processes are for survivability (but in fact, none of them were ever for stability as nature doesn't have intention and it doesn't willfully design).

Out of this comes a sense of individuality and separateness from the rest of the world (we could indicate the angular gyrus here, which was recently associated with out-of-body experiences.) Out of this comes lots of mental processes (which are a specific class of physical process).

One of those processes categorizes and labels the types of interactions the system is exposed to and another process manages the memorization of it (perhaps the hippocampus is involved here).

You would agree that all of these processes can be explained by physical events in the brain?

The mysterious and subjective mind is a definition that arises from these processes of categorizing. It is not the same as the real mind (the software running on the brain) it is a representation of it, just we have a representation of our environment, and the representation of a border between us and our environment. The representation may be misleading to the actual nature of the things they are representing, but that's ok. The only thing that's important to the mind's existence is survivability.

So, the actual statement is "mind is brain"

 

[pftest]

But we can show quite easily how quantitative differences do bring about qualitative differences. We can know how one particle behaves alone, but if we throw another particle in there, we can't just change all the 1's to 2's. We have completely different behavior.

We can know the properties of atoms and are still not able to predict how the same atoms would behave as a molecule.

I mentioned this "unpredictability" in my previous post (see the bit about the "universe that fundamentally consists of balls in motion in space"). We may not be able to predict how all the balls are going to move. The motion may be very complex and billions of balls may bounce against each other. But we can predict that no matter how many balls there are and no matter how complex they move, you will not get anything beyond balls in motion in space. There will be no sudden appearance of square objects or curved space.

Also, the line between qualitative and quantitative is not a fine one. It is fine for scientific work, but in philosophy we have to accept that quantity is meaningless without quality. You may call geometry a qualitative description, but we can easily describe geometry quantitatively, as long as we label our quantities with qualities (length, angle, dimension, etc)

So a purely quantitative description would be meaningless, and a purely qualitative one is filled with so much meaning that ambiguities arise.

Yes we are forced to describe the world in terms of our mental faculties. We have no choice. But it is different when you say that the universe in general can summarise/conceptualise/make abstractions/etc. and treat those terms as if they are material, non-mental actions. If i said that rocks can dream, then it follows that they have mind no? Similarly if one says that the universe in general (or particles) can summarise/conceptualise/make abstractions/etc., then it follows that it has mind.

The mysterious and subjective mind is a definition that arises from these processes of categorizing. It is not the same as the real mind (the software running on the brain) it is a representation of it, just we have a representation of our environment, and the representation of a border between us and our environment. The representation may be misleading to the actual nature of the things they are representing, but that's ok. The only thing that's important to the mind's existence is survivability.

So, the actual statement is "mind is brain"

Defining, categorising, representing and misleading are all mental activities (they do not happen without consciousness), so the mysterious mind cannot have arisen from those or it would have brought itself into existence. If plain matter (such as rocks and particles) can mislead itself (or have delusions, representations, etc), then i agree that such plain matter contains the ingredients that mind can consist of. However that is no longer materialism. But if on the other hand plain matter is completely devoid of consciousness (and therefore cannot mislead itself either) then your description of how "mysterious mind is a misleading representation" becomes insufficient. Which of the two is it?