Are mental phenomena such as experience, thought and qualia just an epiphenomena? The "exclusion argument" per Yablo: Ref: Yablo (1992) "Mental Causation" To put it even more simply, the cause of a switch in a computer changing position is due to the local affects of voltage on that particular switch. The switch is not affected by the configuration of the entire computer, only on the local causal actions. It seems the exclusion argument is perfectly valid when applied to computationalism. At the other extreme, it isn't valid for religious beliefs since religious beliefs accept a dualistic basis. There are however, numerous attempts to avoid this conclusion. It seems engineers, philosophers and scientists are not ready to accept that all mental phenomena are an epiphenomena. But if we try to avoid the exclusion argument* then don't we also have to give up computationalism? Or must we toss the baby (the mind) out with the bath water regardless? *For example: Alwyn Scott claimes that "nonlinear phenomena are those for which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" and attempts to claim the mind, as well as every other nonlinear phenomena, is irreducible and that medium and weak downward causation is applicable. See Scott, "Reductionism Revisited" also Emmeche et al, "Levels, Emergence and Three Versions of Downward Causation". PM for papers.